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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is  a historical  study of  influential  currents  in  the 
philosophy  of  language  and  linguistics  of  the  first  half  of  the 
twentieth  century,  explored  from  the  perspective  of  the  English 
scholar C. K. Ogden (1889–1957). Although no ‘Great Man’ in his 
own right, Ogden had a personal connection, reflected in his work, to 
several of the most significant figures of the age. The background to 
the ideas espoused in Ogden’s book  The Meaning of Meaning,  co-
authored  with  I.A.  Richards  (1893–1979),  are  examined  in  detail, 
along with the application of these ideas in his international language 
project Basic English. A richly interlaced network of connections is 
revealed between early analytic philosophy, semiotics and linguistics, 
all  inevitably  shaped  by  the  contemporary  cultural  and  political 
environment. In particular, significant interaction is shown between 
Ogden’s ideas, the varying versions of ‘logical atomism’ of Bertrand 
Russell (1872–1970) and Ludwig Wittgensten (1889–1951), Victoria 
Lady  Welby’s  (1837–1912)  ‘significs’,  and  the  philosophy  and 
political activism of Otto Neurath (1882–1945) and Rudolf Carnap 
(1891–1970) of the Vienna Circle. Amid these interactions emerges a 
previously  little  known  mutual  exchange  between  the  academic 
philosophy and linguistics of the period and the practically oriented 
efforts  of  the international  language movement.  In exploring these 
connections, novel light is shed on the intellectual history of a period 
crucial in the development of both linguistics and philosophy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1. Setting the scene
In novels, Utopias, essays, films, pamphlets, the antithesis 
crops up, always more or less the same. On the one side 
science, order, progress, internationalism, aeroplanes, steel, 
concrete, hygiene: on the other side war, nationalism, religion, 
monarchy, peasants, Greek professors, poets, horses. History as 
he sees it is a series of victories won by the scientific man over 
the romantic man.
 (Orwell 1968[1941]:142) 
Written during the most hopeless days of the Second World War, this 
is George Orwell’s (1903–1950) summary of the main themes in the 
writings  of  H.G.  Wells  (1866–1946).  The  faith  in  science  and 
technology to effect progress for humanity that Orwell identified in 
Wells is the same sentiment that drives the efforts recounted in these 
pages, efforts to tame ‘meaning’, pin it down, bring it under control 
of science and engineer it anew for the benefit of humanity. These 
efforts we explore from the perspective of the English scholar C. K. 
Ogden (1889–1957) – the C and K stand for  ‘Charles’ and ‘Kay’ 
respectively, but he preferred to be known just as ‘C. K.’ – whose 
various projects span from the first decade of the twentieth century to 
the end of the Second World War, years typically identified with the 
age of modernism.
It is fitting that we open with Wells and Orwell. Not only did both 
serve, as we will see, as literary interpreters of Ogden’s later work, 
but they also delineate our age. Each of them stands at one end of the 
era and of the cultural arc that begins with optimism and ends with 
disillusionment:  Wells  at  the hopeful  beginning and Orwell  at  the 
troubled and sober  end.  This  is  the arc  of  the age  of  modernism. 
‘Modernism’,  as  every  text  that  invokes  it  must  observe,  is  a 
nebulous term, conjuring up various fashions and associations. The 
general character of modernism’s broad contours as a socio-historical 
category  is  well  known  and  hardly  needs  to  be  rehearsed  here. 
Nevertheless,  the  very  breadth  of  the  category  necessitates  some 
explicit attempt to delineate its contours which, as we will see, are 
discernible also in the specific ideas and events we recount in this 
dissertation. A prominent feature of the age of modernism, and a key 
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aspect  for  us,  is  technology.  In  this  period,  technology was  often 
praised as the driver  of  progress,  but  the unprecedented change it 
brought  was  associated  with  tumult,  revolution,  and  the  resulting 
human catastrophes that marred the age. Within a single lifetime, the 
transport  and  communication  networks  of  the  world  –  driven  by 
inventions perfected in the nineteenth century: railways, steamships 
and  the  electric  telegraph  and  telephone  –  were  expanded  and 
consolidated to the point that every part of the globe could be reached 
with  unprecedented  ease.  With  the  turn  of  the  twentieth  century 
practical  advances  in  radio  technology  (Guglielmo Marconi’s  first 
practical  demonstrations  were  made  in  England  in  1897)  and 
powered flight (the Wright brothers first flight was in Kitty Hawk, 
North  Carolina,  1903)  extended  this  reach  into  the  ether  and  air. 
Enumeration of these advances and the inspiration they offer is, as we 
will  see,  a  mainstay  of  the  rhetoric  employed  by the  figures  that 
appear  in  these  pages  (cf.  Hobsbawm  1987:26-33;  chapter  1  of 
Krajewski 2006). 
Concomitant with these technological advances was rapid social 
change around the world. Mass political movements were formed – 
depending  on  the  region  –  by  landless  lower  middle  classes, 
industrial  workers,  and  women,  and  through  such  political 
movements these oppressed groups asserted their rights. This brought 
about the expansion of  voting franchises and,  in some cases,  full-
blown revolution, such as the decisive 1917 October Revolution in 
Russia, and the uprisings in Germany and the Habsburg Empire after 
the  First  World  War.  Outside  Europe  –  but  by  no  means 
independently of events in Europe – political and social upheavals 
occurred  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  Persia,  China  and  Mexico  (see 
chapters 4 and 12 of Hobsbawm 1987; chapter 2 of Hobsbawm 1994 
for classic accounts). Within Europe, and to varying degrees beyond, 
the containment of the tensions that brought about these revolutions 
was finally broken through the catastrophe of the First World War, the 
first  war  in  human  history  to  draw  most  of  the  globe  into 
simultaneous hostilities, and a war that saw death and destruction on 
a scale never before known, facilitated by technological marvels of 
the same kind that had so visibly accelerated humanity’s progress. 
The events that followed in Europe and the wider western world, the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, the polarisation of politics in Central 
Europe  and  Russia,  the  rise  of  totalitarian  dictatorships,  and  the 
eventual total war that began in 1939 and continued for six years, 
levelling  cities  and killing  millions  with  bombers,  rockets  and,  of 
2
course, the atomic bomb, complete our cycle (see chapters 1 and 3 of 
Hobsbawm 1994). These latter catastrophes, and the extremist high-
flown rhetoric and actions that  caused them, are the source of the 
disillusionment with which we are left at the end of our period.
Crisis  and  revolution  were  not  confined  to  technology  and  the 
social world. Natural science – which frequently, but not invariably, 
both learnt from and informed technological advance – was wracked 
by revolutions as it annexed ever more of the world to its descriptive 
and explanatory sovereignty. The classic example here is of course 
physics.  Einstein’s theories of special  and then general relativity – 
published  1905  and  1915,  with  full  absorption  into  mainstream 
physics  over  the  following  years  –  not  only  eventually  served  to 
provide an alternative explanation that rendered the postulation of the 
recently  conquered  ether  obsolete,  but  also  broke  down  the  old 
objective certainties of Newtownian physics and made them relative 
to  the  observer.  Research  into  atoms,  which  proved  through  the 
possibility  of  their  decomposition  that  they had  been  prematurely 
baptised,  led  to  the  development  of  quantum theory in  the 1920s, 
made up of numerous attempts to capture the unpredictability of the 
subatomic realm (see chapter 11 of Bowler and Morus 2005). The 
revolutionary  advances  made  in  the  natural  sciences,  often 
intertwined  with  technological  breakthroughs  and  social 
consequences, inspired thinkers in traditionally book-bound, human-
focused fields. The frequent invocation of ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ 
methods that  we will  encounter  in  the treatments  of  meaning and 
language  examined  in  this  dissertation  attest  to  the  importance 
attributed to the natural sciences as the source of rigorous and valid 
knowledge.
Similarly  in  modernist  art  and  literature  old  paradigms  were 
overturned. Here we can recite the names of the numerous schools 
that rejected traditional measures of technique and representation: the 
Impressionists,  the Cubists, the Dadaists. This last group of course 
made  an  art  out  of  deliberately  shocking  the  public  out  of  their 
complacency, a task they felt compelled to undertake after witnessing 
the  horrors  of  the  First  World  War  (see  MacLeod  2011  for  a 
traditional  account  of  this  period  in  the  history  of  art).  Similar 
experiments with form and themes, all driven by the wish to ‘make it 
new’, as Ezra Pound famously put it,  typify European literature in 
this  period  (see  Lewis  2007:1-35  for  a  standard  account).  These 
classical  manifestations  of  cultural  modernism appear  only  on the 
periphery of the research presented in this dissertation but, as we will 
3
see, they were sparked and fanned by the same events and fashions, 
and exhibit the same features as the modernist approaches to meaning 
that we treat.
‘Meaning’, the rubric under which any layperson would order the 
subject  of  the studies we explore here,  eludes simple definition at 
least  as  much,  if  not  even  more,  than  ‘modernism’.  To  all  those 
engaged in fashioning ‘scientific’ theories of meaning in our period 
the problematic status of this term became quickly apparent. Opening 
his contribution to a debate on ‘the meaning of “meaning”’ in 1920, 
the  Anglo-German  philosopher  Ferdinand  Canning  Scott  Schiller 
(1864–1937),  whom  we  meet  properly  in  the  coming  chapters, 
observed  how  the  notion  is  even  quite  peculiarly  English  and 
therefore perhaps culturally restricted:
Greek […] is so defective that it can hardly be said to have a 
vocabulary  for  the  notion  [of  meaning]  at  all:  it  has  to  rely 
entirely on periphrases, and gets no nearer to saying ‘it means 
nothing’ than declaring that ‘it  says  nothing’. Latin is a little 
better ; it has coined the notions of ‘significance’ and ‘sense’ as 
aids to the expression of the missing word, and passes them on 
to the languages descended from, or influenced by, itself. But 
‘significatio’ is  clearly a  late and learned word for a special 
intensity  of meaning,  while ‘sensus’ is  a  manifest  misnomer. 
Meaning belongs to a much higher level of mental development 
than sense-perception. Latin notices also the volitional factor in 
meaning by employing periphrases with  volo  and  valeo,  and 
these,  too,  have  had  a  prosperous  career.  It  is  only  in  the 
Teutonic  languages  that  a  specific,  antique,  and  genuinely 
native vocabulary is  found for the notion of  ‘meaning’.  The 
root ‘mean’ appears to be common to all of them. In German, 
however,  it  has suffered serious degeneration.  ‘Meinung’ has 
become  ‘opinion,’ though  ‘meinen’ may  still,  in  a  context, 
translate ‘mean’. The result is that German is nearly as badly 
off as the Latin tongues in expressing ‘meaning’. ‘Bedeutung’ 
is  ‘significance’  or  ‘interpretation’  rather  than  meaning  ; 
‘unmeaning’ is ‘sinnlos,’ ‘what does that mean?’ is ‘was soll 
das heissen?’ or ‘besagen,’ i.e. properly ‘what is it to be called? 
or  to  ‘declare’.  It  would  seem  then  that  ‘meaning’ usually 
baffles  language  :  English  alone  has  a  full  and  specific 
vocabulary for it... 
(Schiller, Russell and Joachim 1920:25-26; emphasis original)
The first step taken then in making meaning subject to science was 
typically  either  to  define  the  word  strictly,  generally  much  more 
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narrowly  than  in  colloquial  usage,  or  to  abolish  it  altogether, 
replacing it  with a  variety of  alternative technical  terms.  The first 
course was that taken by Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912), a major 
influence on the young Ogden, who identified ‘meaning’ as just one 
aspect of the use of signs, the intention the creator of a sign has in 
producing it, which exists alongside its ‘sense’ and ‘significance’, a 
theory that we explore in more detail in the next chapter. At a much 
later point in our story, after the main lines of contention in the debate 
had been established and schools of thought had become more clearly 
delineated,  the English philosopher Alfred Jules Ayer (1910–1989) 
expressed the opinion that had become characteristic of logicians and 
logically  inclined  philosophers  when  he  asserted  that ‘one  should 
avoid  saying  that  philosophy  is  concerned  with  the  meaning  of 
symbols, because the ambiguity of “meaning” leads the undiscerning 
critic  to  judge the  result  of  a  philosophical  enquiry by a  criterion 
which is not  applicable to it’ (Ayer 1946[1936]:69). Ogden, in his 
most  comprehensive  statement  on  the  issue,  the  1923  book  The 
Meaning of Meaning, co-authored with his friend and colleague Ivor 
Armstrong  Richards  (1893–1979),  embraced  this  point  in  even 
greater  detail.  The term ‘meaning’ found no technical  use in  their 
‘science  of  Symbolism’;  they went  on to  treat  the  term using the 
methods they developed within their theory to reveal that no less, and 
possibly more, than sixteen definitions could be given for the various 
senses the term takes on.
2. Outline
The body of this dissertation contains case studies of three stations in 
the life of Ogden. Through these we see the interwoven networks that 
bound him to his contemporaries, and how their ideas and practical 
efforts were all inevitably shaped by the wider intellectual, social and 
political concerns of the times. We begin in chapter 2 with a detailed 
exposition of Ogden and Richards’ early philosophy of language, as 
presented  in  The  Meaning  of  Meaning,  accompanied  by  an 
examination  of  the  Cambridge  environment  in  which  it  was 
incubated.  In  chapter  3  we then  turn  Ogden’s  next  major  project, 
Basic English, which not only represented an application of Ogden’s 
theoretical views to a practical end, but was also a contribution to the 
vibrant  contemporary  international  language  movement,  which 
sought  to  establish  a  single  language  for  international 
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communication.  Finally,  in chapter  4,  we look at  the later  contact 
between Ogden, and the philosophers Otto Neurath (1882–1945) and 
Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) of the Vienna Circle. We see how Ogden 
and  Neurath’s  views  came  into  alignment  through  their  resulting 
collaboration, and witness the closing of our period in the shared fate 
of Ogden and his Viennese counterparts.
According  to  Richards’ later  mythologising  account  (related  in 
chapter 2, section 1), it was the defining disaster of the first decades 
of  the  twentieth  century  that  brought  him  and  Ogden  together  to 
consider the problem of meaning. On Armistice Day 1918 the offices 
of Ogden’s  Cambridge Magazine  were ransacked by a rioting mob 
angry at the perceived pacifist stance of the magazine. Ogden first 
approached Richards, a witness to the riot, for his help in identifying 
the culprits. Their resulting conversation soon turned, Richards tells 
us, into a broad-ranging discussion of meaning in which the outlines 
of  The Meaning of  Meaning  emerged,  a book that  was eventually 
published  in  1923.  The  motivating  concern  that  runs  through  the 
entire book is the establishment of an adequate theory to fight the 
dangers  of  ‘word-magic’,  the  confusions  engendered  through 
ignorance, whether wilful or not, of the workings of language. Such 
confusions, argued Ogden and Richards, abound in philosophy and 
other forms of  abstract  discourse,  but they appear too in the most 
pragmatically anchored discussions and, if acted on, may lead to the 
most catastrophic consequences.
Ogden and Richards’ answer to ‘word-magic’ was their ‘science of 
Symbolism’,  which  had  both  a  descriptive  and  a  normative 
component.  On  the  descriptive  side,  their  theory  offers  a  model 
accounting for the workings of language (which we outline in chapter 
2, section 2). Central to this model is the notion that language has a 
number of different functions and that all of these, in different ways, 
shape linguistic expressions. But Ogden and Richards devoted most 
of  their  attention  to  the  ‘symbolic’,  or  referential,  function  of 
language, which they saw as the most important in modern, scientific 
discourse. The normative component of their theory consists of rules 
for the most  honest and efficient use of language in its referential 
capacity, coupled with a method of definition designed to guarantee 
the reliability of reference (section 3).
Despite  Richards’ legend-making  narrative  about  the  origins  of 
The Meaning of Meaning, and the book’s proud proclamation of its 
own originality in addressing the problem of ‘word-magic’, the ideas 
it contains have roots extending far back and which tap deeply into 
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existing  intellectual  seams.  The  closest  of  these  to  Ogden  and 
Richards’  views  are  the  various  forms  of  ‘logical  atomism’  of 
Bertrand  Russell  (1872–1970)  and  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  (1889–
1951), both of whom were in close personal contact with Ogden and 
also, to a lesser extent,  with Richards. We draw out the numerous 
parallels between logical atomism and the science of symbolism (in 
chapter  2,  section  4).  Most  prominent  here  are  the  focus  on  the 
referential aspect of language and definition or paraphrase as a means 
of securing reference, as well as the common appeal they made to the 
latest  ‘scientific’  psychological  theories  in  grounding  their 
approaches. Other features of Ogden and Richards’ model, however, 
such as the multiple functions they postulate and the accent they lay 
on rules governing the use of language and interpretation, are very 
unlike logical atomism. But we find clear precedents for these in the 
‘significs’ of Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912), who became, during 
his undergraduate days, something of a mentor to Ogden (section 6). 
The synthesis  of  logical  atomism and significs  that  the science of 
symbolism represents  could  not  be  taken for  granted.  We see  the 
personal  antagonism that  existed  between  Russell  and Welby,  and 
how  this  is  further  reflected  in  the  reception  The  Meaning  of  
Meaning  had, both on its appearance and in later years (section 7). 
During  the  course  of  our  discussion,  we  encounter  many  other 
potential sources of inspiration on which Ogden and Richards may 
have drawn in elaborating the numerous nuances in their theory (in 
particular, in sections 5 and 8). 
Ogden’s next major project, Basic English, grew directly out of his 
joint  efforts  with  Richards  in  The  Meaning  of  Meaning.  It  was 
intended as a contribution to the international language movement, 
which was at its height by the time Basic appeared at the end of the 
1920s. In order to contextualise Basic, we begin with an exposition of 
the key features of the now very poorly known international language 
movement.  We look  at  the  self-image  projected  by  many  leading 
members of the movement at the turn of the century, and how they 
conceived of  their  projects  as  a  continuation of  Enlightenment-era 
efforts to construct ‘philosophical languages’ (chapter 3, section 2). 
We see  the major  –  and frequently conflicting – currents  that  ran 
through  the  movement:  the  humanitarian  groups  that  envisaged 
international  language as a tool  of  international  understanding and 
peace,  and  the  technocratic  groups  who  were  interested  in 
engineering  an  international  language  that  would  be  better  than 
existing languages, with the aim of securing efficiency and progress 
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in science, technology and business (section 3). We then examine the 
‘common solution’ that emerged as a general pattern for the design of 
an international language became established (section 4). 
Basic was in some ways highly typical of international language 
projects at the time, and in others highly unusual. As essentially an 
implementation  of  the  philosophy  of  language  contained  in  The 
Meaning of  Meaning  (a  point  we  demonstrate  in  sections  6-7),  it 
strove  for  many  of  the  ideals  espoused  by  technocratic  language 
constructors.  But  Ogden’s  avowed  pacifism  brought  him  into 
alignment  also  with  many  humanitarian  language  constructors. 
However,  while  most  international  language  constructors  agonised 
over ensuring that their projects did not privilege the speakers of any 
existing  languages,  Ogden  saw  all  that  was  required  for  the 
international language in English. English, he felt, already exhibits 
most of the ‘logical’ properties desired for the international language, 
in a proven form, and its natural superiority in this respect trumped 
all other concerns. The charges of chauvinism that Ogden faced he 
simply rebuffed. This is no peculiarity of Ogden’s: we see the same 
sentiments in appraisals of Basic from such a diverse range of figures 
as  Richards,  who promoted Basic  in China,  and the British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill, who at one point hoped to reconstruct 
the world after the Second World War along the lines suggested by 
Basic (section 5).
In the early 1930s, shortly after the appearance of Basic, Ogden 
came into contact with Neurath and Carnap of the Vienna Circle, two 
leading philosophers of the time who had much in common with him, 
a fact that was apparent to them all. After briefly placing Neurath and 
Carnap in context (chapter 4, section 2), we turn to the commonalities 
between  their  philosophy  and  Ogden’s  (section  3).  Carnap  and 
Neurath  were  also  enthusiastic  about  the  concept  of  universal 
languages, both of the philosophical and the international varieties. 
They were engaged in a campaign in which they pitched their new 
‘scientific  world  conception’ against  the  confusions  of  traditional 
‘metaphysics’, a term that they used to describe any philosophy that 
did  not  meet  their  standards  of  scientific  rigour.  Language  was  a 
decisive part of their system: anything that could be expressed in the 
universal  scientific  language  was  valid,  and  everything  else  was 
meaningless metaphysics. The key difference between Neurath and 
Carnap  arose  in  their  attitude  to  this  universal  language.  While 
Carnap  thought  it  would  essentially  be  a  perfected  version  of  the 
present language of physics, and indeed that it could be perfected, 
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Neurath was more sceptical. He believed that the universal language 
would  be  based  on  the  everyday  language  and  would  never  be 
perfect: it could only be approached through the gradual elimination 
of metaphysical terms.
Ogden had the most in common with Neurath, and this is visible in 
their resulting collaboration (which we explore in section 4). Since 
the  First  World  War,  Neurath  had  been  developing  his  system of 
picture  statistics,  initially  in  order  to  explain  the  workings  of  the 
German war economy to the general  population,  and then later  to 
explain  the  revolutionary  economic  policies  of  the  socialist 
government of Vienna after the war. Neurath saw pictures as perhaps 
the best basis for a universal language since, as he believed, they are 
free  of  the  confounding  influence  of  abstract  language,  being 
inherently concrete, and able to represent only tangible objects in the 
real world. This view was further elaborated in his collaboration with 
Ogden,  in  the  course  of  which  his  picture  statistics  evolved  into 
‘Isotype’,  a  contribution  to  the  international  language  movement 
aligned  with  Basic.  We  gain  further  insights  into  the  thought  of 
Ogden, Neurath and Carnap and their interaction in our examination 
of their unpublished correspondence (section 5). Ogden sought to win 
both Neurath and Carnap over to the Basic cause, and in the ensuing 
discussion  we  see  their  views  on  the  problem  of  international 
language and its place in their philosophical and social thought.
The  clearest  parallel  between  Ogden  and  his  Viennese 
correspondents comes through the backlash they faced at the end of 
the  age.  Modernist  approaches  to  meaning,  and  the  related 
technocratic element in the international language movement, were 
predicated on a belief in enlightened benevolent control. It was the 
task of scientists and engineers to decide on and propagate the perfect 
form of language. Ogden’s adherence to this belief comes out most 
clearly in his appeal  to the English Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham as the main inspiration for Basic, in particular Bentham’s 
‘Panopticon’,  an  ideal  prison  designed  to  control  its  inmates  by 
winning ‘power of mind over mind’ (chapter 3, section 8).  Ogden 
toyed with the connotations and implications of  the Panopticon in 
creating  Basic,  and  this  sense  of  benevolent  control  was  eagerly 
adopted by Basic’s chief literary interpreter,  H.G. Wells,  who, like 
many  others,  saw  a  solution  to  the  crises  of  the  times  in  such 
technocratic  direction  of  human  affairs.  In  the  minds  of  many, 
however, any idealistic efforts to guide people’s thoughts and actions 
had as their inevitable consequence the intolerant totalitarianism that 
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brought about the wave of  barbarity  in  Europe that  peaked in the 
Second World War.  This is  the sentiment that  lay behind Orwell’s 
critique  of  Basic  and  other  proposed  international  languages  in 
Newspeak (section 9). Neurath and Carnap, with their demarcation of 
‘science’ and ‘metaphysics’, faced similar criticisms from within the 
logical  positivist  movement  amid  the  growing  malaise  and 
disillusionment at the end of our period (chapter 4, section 6).
3. Rationale
I understand this dissertation as a contribution to the history of ideas, 
a form of scholarship at its  best  when it  reaches over disciplinary 
boundaries.  Disciplinary  subdivision  entails  a  narrowing  of  focus 
onto a circumscribed subject matter, to be dealt with using a limited 
range of recognised conceptual tools. While this may be a desirable 
prerequisite for efficient co-operation between scholars working on a 
defined task – as Kuhn (1962) famously postulated in his account of 
‘normal science’ – there is also enormous value in being conscious of 
the bigger picture that lies beyond the limits of any one discipline. In 
looking at the treatment of ‘meaning’ in the early twentieth century, 
this dissertation examines ideas and figures that are claimed by such 
present-day disciplines as analytic philosophy, semiotics, linguistics, 
and also the much less well established field of ‘interlinguistics’, the 
study of international auxiliary languages (see chapter 1 of Blanke 
2006; Schubert 1989 for an outline of interlinguistics).
A common charge levelled at present-day analytic philosophers is 
a disregard, or even dislike of history (see chapter 4 of Glock 2008 
for discussion), and the same charge could very well be levelled at 
many linguists  (cf.  chapter  5,  section  1).  Despite  this,  both  fields 
possess a vast historiography; this is also true of semiotics, and even 
the  much  smaller  field  of  interlinguistics.  For  the  most  part,  no 
attempt  is  made  in  this  dissertation  to  overthrow  existing 
interpretations  in  these  historiographic  traditions;  rather,  these 
traditions  inform  the  account  given  here.  Although  numerous 
previously unknown or very poorly known details come to light in 
the course of  our exposition and discussion,  the chief novelty and 
value  of  this  dissertation  lies  in  the  way  it  complements  existing 
accounts to paint a broader picture of the various ideas examined. 
The  amalgamation  of  different  historiographic  traditions  and  the 
placing of them in their social  and political context that we effect 
serves  to  decompartmentalise  existing  accounts,  and  to  produce  a 
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more  integrated  historical  narrative.  To  establish  common  ground 
with  all  readers,  no  matter  what  their  background,  it  is  in  places 
necessary  to  summarise  key  points  that  are  well  known  in  the 
historiography of some disciplines,  but  largely unknown in others. 
Analytic  philosophers,  for  example,  will  already  be  familiar  with 
much of  the  material  in  the  exposition  of  the  logical  atomism of 
Russell and Wittgenstein (chapter 2, section 4), and of the protocol 
sentence  debate  within  the  Vienna  Circle  (chapter  4,  section  4). 
Likewise, semioticians will know about Ogden and Richards’ views 
in  The Meaning of Meaning  (chapter 2, sections 2-3) and Welby’s 
work (chapter  2,  section  6).  Interlinguists  will  recognise  the  main 
points in the history of the international language movement (chapter 
3, sections 3-4), and linguists, too, will know of some of the figures 
that  appear  there.  The  links  that  appear  in  the  course  of  this 
exposition and discussion will, however, be new to most readers: up 
until now these topics have been isolated islands of knowledge in the 
historiography of each of these disciplines.
It might be wondered why we have taken Ogden as the protagonist 
in a narrative aimed at elucidating this intellectual era: despite his 
best  efforts  and  his  often  rather  inflated  rhetoric,  he  remained  a 
relatively  minor  player  in  many  of  the  events  we  recount. But 
although Ogden may have proved to be no ‘Great Man’, he stood at 
the intersection of many of the most notable figures in the period, 
many of whom are still remembered today for the foundational role 
they played in defining the limits and parameters of investigation into 
meaning.  Already in his  undergraduate  days at  Cambridge,  Ogden 
was  in  close  contact  with  Welby,  as  well  as  Russell,  and  their 
influence is visible in  The Meaning of Meaning.  His  project Basic 
inserted  him  into  the  international  language  movement,  and  his 
personal contact Carnap and, even more so, his collaboration with 
Neurath,  connects  him  with  the  logical  positivists  of  the  Vienna 
Circle. By exploring Ogden’s many connections to significant players 
of the time, and seeing how their ideas are reflected in his work, we 
can acquire a broader and more representative picture of the age than 
would be possible  through the investigation of  a single  prominent 
figure.
In looking at these connections,  and positing lines of influence, 
preference has been given to cases where there was personal contact 
between individuals. This is partly a matter of evidence: the surviving 
published and unpublished documents – speeches, papers, personal 
accounts and letters – provide a record of the events and personalities 
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of  the  time.  Without  these,  the  historian’s  work  would  simply  be 
speculation. Intuitive knowledge of people and the social groups in 
which they live would also suggest that the people who are in the 
closest  personal  contact  have  the  greatest  influence  on  one  other, 
whether that influence leads to a convergence of ideas or a repulsion 
to opposite poles on an issue. This is not only a theory of how ideas 
emerge; it is also a belief in the best way to recount this emergence: a 
narrative  of  the  interaction  of  human  characters,  possessing 
personalities,  their  own  histories,  ideals  and  goals,  offers  a  more 
natural and engaging, and perhaps even accurate and truthful, account 
than the story of disembodied discoveries in Plato’s world of forms. 
But  the  personal  interaction  of  thinkers  does  not  exhaust  the 
possibilities for the growth and transmission of ideas, especially in 
the  case  of  someone  as  widely  read as  Ogden,  whose  intellectual 
reach was not  confined to  contemporary  thought,  but  extended to 
ideas written down long ago, in Britain and Europe, but also in lands 
far away. Throughout this dissertation reference is made to insights 
Ogden would seem to have drawn from beyond his personal milieu. 
In many cases, too, there is a sense in which some ideas are simply 
‘in  the  air’.  In  these  cases,  the  most  prominent  contemporary 
exponents of the ideas must be taken as their representatives. These 
occasional  excursions into more  remote regions  of  early twentieth 
century thought lend this dissertation a slightly centrifugal character 
but, just as following a single established disciplinary history would 
be excessively constrictive, limiting ourselves to Ogden’s biography 
alone would result in a blinkered view of the period.
As a  contribution to  Ogden’s  biography and an exegesis  of  his 
ideas,  this dissertation adds considerably to the existing secondary 
literature.  A firm  foundation  for  studies  into  Ogden’s  work  has 
already been laid by Gordon (e.g., 1990a; 1990b; 1991; 1994;  2006), 
but these publications – mostly reprints of Ogden’s key writings and 
bibliographies, with some exposition and analysis – represent only a 
beginning. Preliminary explorations of the influence of Russell and of 
Welby on Ogden can be found in Wolf (1988) and Gordon (1990a) 
respectively, but the account offered here goes to a much greater level 
of detail and reveals many further nuances.  We build on numerous 
other  secondary  sources  that  deal  with  the  most  important 
personalities in Ogden’s early life,  including Monk’s (1990; 1996; 
2000)  biographies  of  Russell  and  Wittgenstein,  Schmitz  (1985a; 
1990)  and  Petrilli’s  (2009)  studies  of  Welby’s  life  and  work,  and 
Russo’s (1989) biography of Richards.  We also draw on Nerlich’s 
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(1990; 1992) studies of early semantic and semiotic theories within 
philology and  linguistics  to  see  the  inspiration  Ogden could  have 
drawn  in  his  wider  reading.  Our  account  is  further  fortified  by 
extensive research into the primary literature, as well as numerous 
other minor secondary sources.
Even though it  has largely disappeared into historical  obscurity 
since the end of our period, a foundation of secondary sources exists 
also for our treatment of the international language movement. The 
small band of interlinguists have kept the memory of the international 
language movement alive amid the otherwise widespread scholarly 
amnesia that surrounds the topic. In sketching out the international 
language  movement  and  placing  Basic  into  it,  we  draw  on  such 
secondary works as Forster (1982), Lins (1988), Haupenthal (2005b) 
and Blanke (1985; 2006), as well as numerous primary sources. Very 
many  points  that  we  make  in  our  analysis  of  the  movement  are, 
however, novel. Although the recurring appeals to logic and science 
from many in the  movement  have not  gone unnoticed in  existing 
historical scholarship, the ‘technocratic’ stream that we identify, and 
into  which  we  place  Basic,  has  not  previously  been  described  in 
precisely  these  terms  (chapter  3,  sections  4-5).  Similarly,  the 
philosophical and aesthetic concerns that we show uniting language 
constructors,  logicians,  epistemologists  and  linguistics  have 
previously been noticed but never been connected as manifestations 
of  similar  sentiments  within  a  single  milieu  (section  4).  We  also 
postulate a possible projection of the ideals held by modern language 
constructors into the past through their search for antecedents in the 
philosophical  language  projects  of  the  Enlightenment  (section  2). 
This may be of some significance, given the recent re-assessment of 
the  standard  perception  of  these  projects  by  Maat  and  Cram (see 
Maat and Cram 2001; Maat 2004): the possibly skewed view we have 
of Enlightenment projects may be a product of these early twentieth 
century language constructors.
Logical  positivism and the Vienna Circle  have,  in recent  years, 
been the subject of numerous studies – such as Haller (1993), Stadler 
(1997) and Uebel (2007) – which have revealed the complexity of the 
Circle’s  inner  dynamics.1 We build also  on these,  and supplement 
them with published papers and books by Neurath and Carnap, as 
well as Ogden, Neurath and Carnap’s unpublished correspondence. 
1 There is an English translation of Stadler (1997), which was not consulted in writing this 
dissertation: Stadler, Friedrich. 2001. The Vienna Circle. Studies in the Origins, Development  
and Influence of Logical Empiricism. Vienna: Springer.
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Neurath’s  Isotype  has  also  recently been examined in light  of  his 
philosophy of  language (e.g.,  Müller  1991;  Burke  2011),  although 
these short studies have not looked at the project in the context of the 
international language movement, as is done here.
The impact of external social and political developments on the 
efforts  of  this  era,  and  their  literary  expression,  has  not  gone 
unnoticed,  but  they  have  never  been  drawn  together  in  the  form 
presented in this dissertation (chapter 3, section 9; chapter 4, section 
6). Koeneke (2004) has looked at the history of Richards’ promotion 
of Basic in China, and its political implications, but his treatment of 
Basic’s  place  in  the  international  language  movement  is  fairly 
superficial. The critique of Basic and other constructed languages in 
Orwell’s  Newspeak  has  received  some  attention  (e.g., Fink  1971; 
Courtine 1986; Rai 1988; Joseph 2001), as has Kallen’s critique of 
the Vienna Circle’s logical positivism either side of the Second World 
War (e.g., in chapter 9 of Reisch 2005), but the juxtaposition of these 
two  related  critiques  in  the  general  climate  of  disillusionment 
surrounding the Second World War helps to fill out this picture and 
solidify connections previously only glimpsed.
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2. THE MEANING OF MEANING
1. Introduction
By the turn of  the nineteenth century to the twentieth,  the natural 
sciences – which have come in the English language to enjoy almost 
exclusive  rights  over  the  designation  ‘science’  –  were  rapidly 
discovering and recording the details of the natural world. Wanted 
was  the  same  power  over  the  world  of  the  peculiarly  human, 
populated  by  thoughts  and  ideas.  But  these  are  perceptible  only 
through signs,  such  as  words  and sentences,  which  are  frequently 
unfaithful and deceiving representatives. It is this task of subjugating 
signs to science and bringing order to meaning that Ogden and his 
main  collaborator  in  his  early  career,  Ivor  Armstrong  Richards 
(1893–1973), took up in their book The Meaning of Meaning (Ogden 
and  Richards  1989[1923]),  an  assault  in  equal  measure  on 
contemporary  theorising  about  language and on the  way language 
itself  is  used.2 Their  approach  they  dubbed  the  ‘science  of 
Symbolism’,  a  label  designed  to  declare  the  doctrine’s  scientific 
credentials . It was intended to provide both a suitable theory for the 
analysis of language and practical methods for overcoming ‘word-
magic’, their term for the superstitious belief in the power of words.
A  disaster  exacerbated  by  word-magic  looms  large  in  The 
Meaning  of  Meaning:  while  gas  and  machine  guns  created  the 
physical horror of the First  World War of 1914–1918, propaganda, 
just one manifestation of word-magic, contributed to its intellectual 
horror.  First  World  War  propaganda  sharpened  Ogden’s  sense  for 
2 There are ten editions of The Meaning of Meaning published in Ogden and Richards’ lifetime, 
the first from 1923 and the last from 1949. Although Ogden and Richards later discussed the 
desirability of making revisions to the 1949 edition (see volume 3 of Gordon 1994:xxii-xxv),  
this never occurred. The first edition is significantly longer than all subsequent editions: under 
pressure from their publisher, who wanted to reduce production costs, chapter 2, ‘The power 
of  words’,  was  shortened  in  the  second  edition  of  1927 to  a  quarter  of  its  original  size 
(ibid.:xxi).  Ogden had intended to publish the cut  material  as a  separate work on ‘word-
magic’; this never appeared as an independent book, although portions were published as the 
articles Ogden (1934b) and (1938-1952). The revisions made from the second to the tenth 
edition are all minor (see Gordon 1990b:67-68). The discussion in this chapter is based on a 
1989 reprinting of the 1949 edition, which represents the book in the final state that Ogden 
and Richards left it. There is a more recent critical edition (volume 3 of Gordon 1994), but 
this is an idealised version of the book that combines later revisions with the material cut from 
the first edition.  There are various in-depth critiques of the theory of meaning presented in 
The Meaning of Meaning. Some of the most significant of these are collected in volume 5 of 
Gordon (1994). See also Hotopf (1965:10-32) and chapter 7 of  Russo (1989). Gordon (2006) 
presents  a  comprehensive,  up-to-date,  and  very  compact  assessment  of  The  Meaning  of  
Meaning and its subsequent influence in linguistics and semiotics.
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word-magic’s dangers and, although the roots of the book go much 
deeper, it was at the end of the war, on Armistice Day, 11 November 
1918,  that  The  Meaning  of  Meaning  first  started  to  take  concrete 
shape. The plan for the book, Richards tells  us, was worked out on, 
and as a serendipitous result of, that day.  As news of the armistice 
broke in Cambridge, a mob of angry rioters, incensed by the apparent 
pacifist stance of Ogden’s The Cambridge Magazine, ransacked one 
of his bookshops, where it was sold (see Gordon 1990b:12-20 for the 
history  of  The  Cambridge  Magazine).  That  evening  Ogden 
approached Richards, whom he had seen across the square where the 
riot took place, to ask him if he could identify any of the perpetrators. 
As  they  spoke,  the  conversation  turned  to  ‘meaning’ and  several 
hours later they had outlined their future book and embarked on their 
collaboration:
After collecting my useless impressions of the rioters, Ogden 
started off, steadily talking, for Top Hole, his fantastically 
cluttered attic above Mac-Fisheries in Petty Cury. Half-way 
down the tightly twisting stairs, under an aged, faintly 
whistling, Bat’s Wing gas jet, he stopped to make some remark 
upon a recent controversy in Mind. An hour or two later when 
we went downstairs, the main outline of The Meaning of 
Meaning was clear enough, and plans for a joint work to 
embody it were in being. I remember that turn of the stairway 
and the flickering of the Bat’s Wing flame.
(Richards 1977:99)3
The final product, Richards (1977:100) would later say, was a  truly 
collaborative effort, though Ogden ‘held the pen’ while they jointly 
composed the text.  The  Meaning  of  Meaning is  triumphant  in 
declaring the validity and originality of the solutions it offers and – 
although  it  brims  with  footnotes  reaching  out  into  the  web  of 
scholarship from ancient times to the present – the treatment of all 
other views, whether contrary to or anticipatory of those it contains, 
is  superficial  and dismissive.  The book was published in  Ogden’s 
thirty-fifth  year  and  Richards’  thirty-first:  they  were  both,  by 
academic  standards,  ‘young  men’.  A historian  of  more  advanced 
years might put the book’s brashness down to youthful exuberance, 
an exuberance  that  frequently masks its  place in  its  contemporary 
3 Richards tells another version of the story, with only inconsequential differences in details, in 
Brower (1973:19, 22). Russo (1989:704, note 5) catalogues Richards’ different versions of the 
story. See also Joseph (1999:51-53).
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intellectual setting.4 But The Meaning of Meaning is most certainly a 
product of its times, in the themes it addresses and the solutions it 
proposes.  The  Anglo-Polish  anthropologist  Bronisław  Malinowski 
(1884–1942), writing in his ‘supplement’ to the book (Malinowski 
1989[1923]), commented:
It is remarkable that a number of independent inquirers, Messrs 
Ogden and Richards, [the neurologist] Dr [Henry] Head, [the 
philologist] Dr [Alan Henderson] Gardiner and myself, starting 
from definite and concrete, yet quite different problems, should 
arrive,  if  not  exactly  at  the  same results  stated  in  the  same 
terminology,  at  least  at  the  construction  of  similar  Semantic 
theories based on psychological considerations.
(Malinowski 1989[1923]:299)
The similar ideas these figures stumbled upon were no doubt ‘in the 
air’  –  discussed  in  private  and  public  forums,  written  down  in 
journals and books – and served to focus attention on a common set 
of issues with the suggestion of similar solutions. Examining a single 
monument of the age, such as  The Meaning of Meaning,  however, 
allows  us  to  identify  its  particular  pedigree  and  the  immediate 
environment in which it was created. This is the approach we will 
take in this chapter, treating The Meaning of Meaning and its closest 
relatives.
The material that finds its final form in The Meaning of Meaning 
was written in the Cambridge of the first two decades of the twentieth 
century.  Although Ogden had already declared his  devotion to the 
problem of meaning upon his arrival in Cambridge in 1908 – he came 
on a classics scholarship to study the topic of the influence of Greek 
language on Greek thought (see Gordon 1990b:5) – the intellectual 
4 Hotopf (1965:10) remarks: ‘Perhaps the best way of describing it [The Meaning of Meaning] 
is as a book written by two young men who pretend to be angry. It is an immensely high-
spirited  book.  They  attack  almost  everybody,  and  claim  to  solve  a  host  of  fundamental  
problems in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and aesthetics, or, if not to solve them, at 
least  to indicate the general lines upon which others might now proceed to their solution. 
Some of the brash positivism associated with youth reveals itself in their attitudes. It shows 
itself  in  great  hopefulness,  in  impatience  with  uncertainties,  in  a  belief  in  the  practical  
importance of their mission.’ Carington (1994[1949]:168) says of The Meaning of Meaning: 
‘I, personally, find it most gratuitously written, and in places quite gratuitously obscure; it  
gives  me  the  impression,  perhaps  quite  unjustly,  that  the  authors  are  more  interested  in 
making the reader feel small and ignorant than in explaining pellucidly to him just what they 
want to say – but this may be my fault. […] But despite these animadversions I regard it as a  
work of the utmost importance; in fact, I do not think it too much to say that it is one of the  
key books of the century, and one that should not only be read but closely studied by anyone 
who is anxious to think clearly on any but the most concrete subject-matter.’
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environment of Cambridge could only serve to further incubate this 
interest.  This  environment  was  dominated by Bertrand Russell 
(1872–1970), who –  following the lead of George Edward Moore 
(1873–1958) and joined soon by his student Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(1889–1951) – was revolutionising philosophy through a new radical 
realist program centred on a critique of language, a key step  in the 
evolution of the tradition now known as ‘analytic philosophy’.5 
Beyond the university, but still within the same milieu, Victoria Lady 
Welby (1837–1912) was approaching the end of her amateur – in the 
sense  of  non-professional –  but influential career in the study of 
meaning, with her theory of ‘significs’ which, unlike early analytic 
philosophy, analysed expressions not for the meaning they contained, 
but looked to how they were interpreted. Richards, too, was exposed, 
albeit in a slightly different measure, to these influences:  coming as 
an undergraduate to Cambridge in 1911, he began by reading history 
but – concluding after one semester of wading through the suffering 
and cruelty  of  the  past  that  ‘history  ought  not  to  have  happened’ 
(Richards, quoted in Russo 1989:35) – switched to philosophy, after 
being decisively swayed by Ogden (see Russo 1989:35-36).
What we see in The Meaning of Meaning is essentially a synthesis 
of  the  two  parallel  streams,  personified  by  Russell  and  Welby, 
flowing  through  Cambridge.  This  becomes  clear  in  the  following 
discussion,  where  we  first,  in  section  2,  examine  Ogden  and 
Richards’ multifunctional model of language, and then, in section 3, 
their  notion  of  ‘word-magic’  and  their  practical  remedies  for 
overcoming it. We then look at how the incipient analytic philosophy 
visibly  shapes  The Meaning of  Meaning,  in  section  4,  as  well  as 
Ogden  and  Richards’  connection  to  it  through  their  personal 
relationships with Russell and Wittgenstein. In section 5 we then take 
a  closer  look  at  the  genealogy  of  specific  features  in  Ogden  and 
Richards’ model  of  reference.  In  section  6  we turn  to  Welby,  her 
relationship to Ogden, and how her significs and its congeners are 
reflected in  The Meaning of Meaning. The compatibility of the two 
major traditions and their minor variants brought together in Ogden 
and Richards’ book could not be taken for granted: in section 7 we 
explore  the  arguments  and  counter-arguments  made  across  these 
traditions. In section 8 we then look at the reception The Meaning of  
Meaning  had  in  Ogden  and  Richards’ immediate  milieu  and  the 
5 As a major sub-discipline in English-speaking philosophy, analytic philosophy has a vast 
literature. A recent but very traditional introduction to the history of this approach is Soames 
(2003).  Glock (2008) presents a more critical  discussion that  looks at  analytic philosophy 
from a number of different perspectives, including the historical.
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enduring role the book may have played in bridging the two major 
antagonistic traditions from which it comes. Finally, in section 9 we 
make a broader survey of the contemporary intellectual scene, to see 
the  ideas  put  forward  by  philologists,  psychologists  and 
anthropologists  that  would  seem  to  find  some  reflection  in  The 
Meaning of Meaning.
2. The many functions of language
The basis of Ogden and Richards’ philosophy of language is a belief 
in language’s multifunctional  nature,  a view of language as a tool 
with  many  purposes.  From  the  very  outset  of  their  book,  they 
postulate  a  multifunctional  model  of  language,  with  a  primary 
division  between  the  ‘symbolic’,  or  referential,  function,  and  the 
‘emotive’ functions, a collection of what would now be considered 
various  pragmatic  and  attitudinal  aspects.  But  the  referential  use 
always has priority: it is not only the first to be explicated – and the 
only function to receive a truly comprehensive exposition – but it is 
also  considered  crucial  for  the  ‘reflective,  intellectual  use  of 
language’ (Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:10), the key to modern 
discourse.  Reference  may  not  exhaust  meaning,  and  in  non-
intellectual contexts or in more ‘primitive’ societies it may be only a 
subordinate  function,  but  for  the  modern  thinkers  of  the  civilised 
world,  for  whose  benefit  Ogden  and  Richards’  ‘science  of 
Symbolism’ was chiefly conceived, it is of utmost importance:
The reference of a symbol […]  is only one of a number of 
terms which are relevant to the form of a symbol. It is not even 
the dominant factor in most cases […] None the less, since, for 
all our finer dealings with things not immediately present – i.e., 
not in very close and simple contexts with our present 
experience –  since for all our more complicated or refined 
reference we need supports and distinguishing marks, this 
strictly symbolic function of words easily becomes more 
important than any other.
 (Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:233)
The model they develop for the symbolic function is introduced in 
the first pages of their book with the ‘Triangle of Reference’, shown 
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in Figure 1, a diagram that has gone on to achieve iconic status in 
twentieth century semiotics.
Figure 1. The Triangle of Reference (Ogden and Richards 
1989[1923]:11)
Each of the points in the triangle represents an entity assumed to be 
involved in an act of reference; the sides in turn illustrate the relations 
between these entities. A ‘symbol’, a word or any other type of sign, 
evokes a ‘thought or reference’, an idea or ‘image’ in the mind of the 
hearer or perceiver of the sign, which is then directed to a ‘referent’, 
some entity or object in the world. Ogden and Richards do not restrict 
their account to the purely linguistic. They base their model on the 
notion  of  ‘engram’,  proposed  by  the  Lamarckian  evolutionary 
biologist  Richard  Semon  (1859–1918;  Ogden  and  Richards 
1989[1923]:52  acknowledge  the  source  of  this  term  in  Semon 
1921[1904]), which is a mental impression  of the relation between 
two entities in the world formed after repeatedly observing their co-
occurrence.   This notion includes any stimulus-response pairing in 
any organism: a person’s expectation of seeing a flame after striking 
a  match,  a chicken’s avoidance of  yellow striped caterpillars  after 
eating one and discovering it tastes bad, and a dog’s prompt arrival at 
the dining table on hearing the dinner bell are all examples of the 
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workings  of  engrams (Ogden and Richards  1989[1923]:52,  55-56, 
81-84).  In  the  same  way,  repeated  occurrences  of  a  word  in  the 
presence of its referent lead to the development of the engram, or 
‘thought  or  reference’,  that  connect  them.  In  fact,  Ogden  and 
Richards  (1989[1923]:63)  argue  that  all  cognition  is  a  matter  of 
recursive inferences and interpretations that start  with the engrams 
formed from direct sensations. 
The moral they intend to be taken away from their model is that 
there is no direct connection between the symbol and its referent. The 
relation between them is rather ‘imputed’, as the dotted base of the 
triangle and its caption tell us. For any act of reference to succeed, it 
must first pass through the intermediate step of ‘thought or reference’ 
(Ogden  and  Richards  1989[1923]:9-12).  Failure  to  recognise  this 
intermediate  step  results  in  ‘word-magic’,  here  the  superstitious 
belief that for every word there is a corresponding entity in the world. 
This superstition, they claim, plagues modern philosophers, logicians 
and grammarians just as much as ‘primitive’ people, as the cascade of 
examples  that  makes  up  most  of  chapter  2  demonstrates.  They 
rhapsodise:
[W]ords may come between us and our  objects  in  countless 
subtle ways, if we do not realize the nature of their power. In 
logic,  as  we  have  seen,  they  lead  to  the  creation  of  bogus 
entities,  the  universals,  properties  and  so  forth  […]  By 
concentrating  attention  on  themselves,  words  encourage  the 
futile  study  of  forms  which  has  done  so  much  to  discredit 
Grammar; by the excitement which they provoke through their 
emotive force, discussion is for the most part rendered sterile; 
by  the  various  types  of  Verbomania  and  Graphomania,  the 
satisfaction of  naming is  realized,  and the  sense of  personal 
power factitiously enhanced.
(Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:45)
The  Triangle  of  Reference  is  intended  to  explode  word-magic  by 
highlighting the mediating role of thoughts, severing the direct link 
between words  and objects.  Ogden and Richards go on to  further 
fortify  language  against  word-magic  through  guidelines  for  clean 
references and methods for achieving clarity (which we take up in 
section 3). But referring to the world does not exhaust the uses of 
language:  symbols are also used to convey the speaker’s ‘attitude, 
mood, interest, purpose, desire, and so forth’ (Ogden and Richards 
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1989[1923]:223). In addition to the ‘symbol situation’ of the Triangle 
of Reference, where a sign stands as the mark of a reference, there is 
the ‘verbal sign-situation’, where the sign reflects the internal state of 
the speaker (ibid.:223-224). These two ‘situations’ cause the primary 
functional division in language,  between  the symbolic use and the 
emotive  use  of  language  (the  latter  they  also  call  ‘evocative’, 
ibid.:239  et passim). Providing a more finely grained  breakdown of 
these  two  uses,  Ogden  and  Richards  enumerate  a  total  of  five 
‘functions’ that language can perform:
(i) Symbolization of reference;
(ii) The expression of attitude to listener;
(iii) The expression of attitude to referent;
(iv) The promotion of effects intended;
(v) Support of reference.
 (Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:226-227)
Function  (i),  ‘symbolization  of  reference’,  stands  alone  as  the 
symbolic function, in which language has a solely referential use; the 
four remaining functions together constitute the emotive functions, 
where language reflects the speaker’s emotional and attitudinal states 
and, in the case of ‘promotion of effect intended’, can manipulate the 
hearer’s  emotions  for  a  particular  reaction  (Ogden  and  Richards 
1989[1923]:157-159,  223-224).  All  functions  may  play  a  role  in 
shaping linguistic form, but the significance of their role varies with 
the type of discourse: in scientific discourse the symbolic function is 
primary  and  all  other  functions  should  be  eliminated  as  much  as 
possible to avoid bringing extraneous concerns into what should be 
an  exchange  of  direct,  referential  statements.  On  the  other  side, 
exclamations, oaths and greetings, have no symbolic content at all; 
they are purely emotive. Commands and threats similarly put more 
emphasis on the emotive than on the symbolic. Commands must at 
least refer to some action that can be performed properly, but threats 
do not have to make such references (ibid.:234-235).
Despite Ogden and Richards’ repeated assertion that all functions 
are  important  in  language,  only  the  symbolic  function  receives 
detailed  examination  in  The  Meaning  of  Meaning,  through  the 
Triangle  of  Reference  model;  the  other,  ‘emotive’  functions  are 
largely  neglected.  This  differential  treatment  continued  to 
characterise  Ogden’s  work: his  next  major  linguistic  project,  the 
international  language Basic  English (see chapter  3),  pursued very 
much  the  goal  of  purifying  language  to  its  scientific,  ‘symbolic’ 
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essentials. But Richards followed a slightly different course. In the 
years following the publication of The Meaning of Meaning, he went 
on to develop fuller accounts of the emotive functions in a number of 
books on literary criticism (e.g., Richards 1926[1924]; 1926; 1930), 
and later explicitly stated that he did not want his early work  to be 
interpreted as a defence of ‘scientism’ (see Richards 1948:151, note 
31),  the  idolisation  of  natural  science  as  the  sole  source  of 
knowledge.  While he acknowledged both the importance of science 
and its intellectual autonomy, he was careful to maintain that there 
are provinces of knowledge and experience beyond it:
To  declare  Science  autonomous  is  very  different  from 
subordinating all our activities to it. It is merely to assert that so 
far  as  any  body  of  references  is  undistorted  it  belongs  to 
Science. It is not in the least to assert that no references may be 
distorted if advantage can thereby be gained. And just as there 
are  innumerable  human  activities  which  require  undistorted 
references if they are to be satisfied, so there are innumerable 
other human activities not less important which equally require 
distorted references or, more plainly, fictions.
(Richards 1926[1924]:266)6
But  the  emotive  functions  continued  to  evade  precise  analysis  in 
Richards’  subsequent  works.  Although  Ogden  and  Richards 
(1989[1923]:227-228)  had  cautiously  claimed  exhaustiveness  for 
their list of functions – or at the very least that the list contains the 
absolute minimum of functions – Richards kept tinkering with it. In 
Richards  (1930)  he  eliminated  the  fifth  function,  which  was  then 
reinstated in modified form in Richards (1936:50); in later years he 
expanded the list  of functions to six,  seven,  and finally eight  (see 
Russo 1989:137). When asked in a lecture ‘around 1970’ why the 
number of functions had increased,  he is said to have replied that 
there is nothing magical about the number of functions, and that there 
may be ‘as many functions as one likes provided each is given its 
specific work within the context’ (as reported in Russo 1989:137). 
This  enduring  imprecision  was  not  a  failing  in  Richards’  eyes: 
emotive language, he came to believe, is not amenable to the strict 
6 In saying ‘fictions’ Richards most probably intended to invoke the theory of fictions of the 
eighteenth-century  English  utilitarian  philosopher  Jeremy  Bentham,  whom  Ogden  was 
rediscovering and reinterpreting around the time Richards wrote these words (see chapter 3, 
section 7).  A ‘fiction’ under  this  conception  is  essentially  an  abstract  entity  with no real 
existence in the world that we create and use in our thinking.
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parameterised  account  that  he  and  Ogden  had  developed  for  the 
symbolic function. The best way to study the emotive function is to 
amass examples of interpretations, the goal Richards pursued in his 
books on literary criticism (see Richards 1948).
In The Meaning of Meaning, by contrast, the only elaboration the 
emotive functions receive is their enumeration and brief explanation. 
The most clearly ‘emotive’ of these are (ii) and (iii), the ‘expression 
of  attitude to  listener’ and ‘to  referent’ respectively,  pertaining,  as 
they do, to  emotional or attitudinal aspects of an utterance: in this 
case, to  the  stance  that  the  speaker  has  towards  their  audience  or 
interlocutor, or to the object of their reference. Typical attitudes that a 
speaker may take to their listener include amity, hostility, courtesy 
and  respect  (Ogden and  Richards  1989[1923]:224-225),  a  set  that 
confirms  a  common-sense  interpretation  of  this  function.  We  are 
given no examples of possible attitudes to a referent, the implication 
perhaps being that they are parallel to those that can be held towards 
the listener. With function (iv), the ‘promotion of effects intended’, 
the emotive function strays away from direct expressions of attitude 
and  towards  utterances  calculated  to  achieve  specific  ends  in  the 
world. This function, they insist,  is distinct from function (ii), ‘the 
expression of attitude to a listener’, since a range of very different 
motives may drive a speaker to seek a certain end, so the speaker’s 
attitude may be very different from that which they appear to hold on 
a  superficial  interpretation.  In  their  somewhat  tasteless  example,  a 
speaker may encourage their interlocutor to commit suicide not, as 
might first be thought, out of ‘dislike of his personal characteristics’, 
but out of ‘benevolent interest in his career’ (ibid.:225). These two 
very different attitudes to the listener could stand behind utterances 
aimed at the same effect.
Function  (v),  the  ‘support  of  reference’,  is  perhaps  the  most 
obscure and difficult to assimilate to the whole system. About this 
function they say  that  ‘references  have  a  character  which may be 
called,  from  the  accompanying  feelings,  Ease  or  Difficulty’ 
(ibid.:225).  Their  illustration  of  this  function  comes  through  the 
following example:
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The  two  symbols,  “I  seem  to  remember  ascending  Mount 
Everest,” and “I went up Everest,” may, on occasion, stand for 
no  difference  in  reference  and  thus  owe  their  dissimilarity 
solely  to  degrees  of  difficulty  in  recalling  this  uncommon 
experience. On the other hand this may, of course,  be a real 
symbolic difference which does not merely indicate difference 
of difficulty but states it.
(Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:225-226; emphasis original)7 
It  would  seem  that  they  take  the  relative  complexity  of  the  two 
sentences as marking a difference in the difficulty of recalling the 
referent,  in  this  case,  the  memory  of  climbing  Mount  Everest. 
Function (v), they insist, is not concerned with ‘certainty or doubt’ or 
‘degree  of  belief  or  disbelief’  that  the  speaker  attaches  to  the 
reference (Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:226), aspects that could 
be assimilated to the modern conception of evidentiality, and which 
they would treat under function (iii), ‘attitude towards the referent’. 
Function (v) reflects specifically the difficulty in recalling memories, 
a seemingly strange inclusion in the paradigm of emotive functions, 
which  are  otherwise  concerned  with  expressions  of  attitude  or 
deliberate  pragmatic  effects.  Richards’  later  elimination  of  this 
function may be an indication that he was conscious of its oddness. 
When it  briefly  reappeared,  in  Richards  (1936:50),  it  became ‘the 
confidence  I  have in  the soundness  of  the  remark’,  which sounds 
much more like evidentiality (see also Hotopf 1994[1965]:289, note 
39).
Language, under Ogden and Richards’ conception, is a device with 
many functions, grouped into the two unequal categories ‘symbolic’ 
7 The  obscurity  of  function  (v)  is  only  enhanced  by  Ogden  and  Richards’  apparent 
terminological  confusion  in  their  exposition;  or  perhaps  their  terminological  confusion  is 
indicative of the function’s obscurity. Stand for has already been established in the Triangle of 
Reference model as the imputed relation between a symbol and referent (see Figure 1) – and 
Ogden and Richards’ italics would suggest that they intend this technical sense – but here they 
appear to be talking about a relation between ‘symbols’ and their ‘reference’, an interpretation 
urged by the wider textual context. This relation should, under their model, be symbolise. But 
perhaps by ‘reference’ they mean an act of referring to a  referent, in which case they have 
identified the correct relation according to their own model.  In any case, the passage is by no 
means  clear,  and  this  lack  of  clarity  would  seem  to  come  from  their  confusing  and 
inconsistent  use  of  terms,  a  charge  that  they  faced  from  other  quarters  (see  Gordon 
2006:2579-2581 for discussion). The other words that Ogden and Richards typographically 
raise to technical status in the quoted passage,  indicate and  state, they go on to explain as 
being either the realisation of a function directly in a linguistic sign (indicate) or through the 
symbolic function (state). That is, the emotive functions can either shape the linguistic form 
or they can describe in referential terms the end to be realised: ‘Each of these non-symbolic 
functions,’ Ogden  and  Richards  (1989[1923]:226)  say,  ‘may  employ  words  either  in  a 
symbolic capacity, to attain the required end through the references produced in the listener, 
or in a non-symbolic capacity when the end is gained through the direct effects of the words.’
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and  ‘emotive’,  whose  inequality  is  revealed  by  their  uneven 
treatment. Although Richards alone went on to make amends in later 
works, in  The Meaning of Meaning, as we have seen, it is only the 
symbolic  function  that  receives  proper  elaboration;  the  emotive 
functions  are  left  as  a  list  of  seemingly  miscellaneous  linguistic 
devices that express emotional attitudes, reach for certain pragmatic 
ends, or reflect the difficulty of mental processes. As Richards would 
later argue, this apparent miscellaneous character and fluidity could 
be an inherent property: the emotive functions do not lend themselves 
to the kind of rigorous analysis to which the symbolic function can be 
subjected.  In  The  Meaning  of  Meaning,  however,  Ogden  and 
Richards  not  only  suggest  that  the  emotive  functions  operate  in 
parallel fashion to the symbolic function, but also allow for them to 
be  realised  in  symbolic  terms,  suggesting  that  an  analysis  of  the 
emotive  functions  in  symbolic  terms  ought  to  be  possible.  The 
referential  use  of  language,  and  its  abuse  in  word-magic,  remain 
however the focus of The Meaning of Meaning. With their descriptive 
framework in place, they turned to combating word-magic through a 
combination  of  referential  hygiene  and  methods  for  clarifying 
reference.
3. Definition and the canons of symbolism
‘We  ought  to  regard  communication  as  a  difficult  matter,’ write 
Ogden and Richards (1989[1923]:123), ‘and close correspondence of 
reference for different thinkers as a comparatively rare event.’ To help 
safely navigate these perilous regions where word-magic dwells and 
secure reliable references in discourse they offered their method of 
definition, a technique for making references more precise and more 
likely to correspond for the speaker and their interlocutors. Definition 
rests in turn on their ‘Canons of Symbolism’, a set of ground rules 
whose observance guarantees honest and valid references.
The method of definition is a means for ‘expanding’ a symbol so 
that it reflects the ‘thought or reference’ it stands for more clearly 
and, preferably, more  analytically. But  a definition has no priority 
over the term it replaces: it is simply an alternative to the original 
expression,  a  better  alternative,  but  not  necessarily  a  scientifically 
valid decomposition that exposes the true parts and structure of the 
referent (cf.  the later debate, in which Ogden was involved,  about 
different forms of analysis, in chapter 4, section 3). Such definitions 
may be possible, they argue, but:
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[…] this process [of scientific classification] is only possible 
with complex objects which have been long studied by some 
science.  With  simple  objects,  or  those  which  for  lack  of 
investigation are not known to be analysable, as well as with 
everything to which classificatory methods have not yet been 
applied, such a method is clearly not available, and here other 
symbols  must  be  found  as  the  substitutes  which  symbol-
definition seeks to provide.
(Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:110)
Their definitions are merely provisional paraphrases of the original 
symbol negotiated between the participants in a discourse through a 
dialectical process. To ensure a successful definition it is necessary to 
have a shared starting point and a clear route to reach the reference: 
‘It is never safe to assume that it [correspondence of reference for 
different  thinkers]  has been secured unless both the starting-points 
and  the  routes  of  definition,  whereby  the  referent  of  at  least  a 
majority of the symbols employed have been reached, are known’ 
(Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:123). These starting points are best 
sought ‘outside the speech situation’; they should be ‘things, that is, 
which we can point to or experience’ (ibid.:115). Here we see a faith 
in ostension and the concrete objects of the external world as anchors 
for  meaning,  a  faith  that  was  common  to  their  philosophical 
contemporaries and which would develop into an emphasis on the 
‘pictured’ in Ogden’s Basic English (see section 4; chapter 3, sections 
6 and 7; chapter 4, section 4). 
After introducing their method of definition, Ogden and Richards 
(chapter 7-9 of 1989[1923]) demonstrate its application and efficacy 
in defining the contentious and primarily emotive term ‘beauty’, and 
the quarry of their book, ‘meaning’. Both terms, they find, have a 
range  of  senses  (see  the  tables  ibid.:142-143,  186-187),  used  by 
different people in different contexts. This laying out of the range of 
interpretative possibilities Richards pursued further in his later work, 
developing  it  into  ‘multiple  definition’,  a  technique  he  used  to 
explore the range of interpretation in cases where large differences in 
background between author and reader lead to potentially extreme 
misunderstandings. This is the technique used in Richards (1932) to 
explicate in English the works of the classical Chinese philosopher 
Mencius.  Ogden,  by  contrast,  moved  away  from  examining  the 
possibilities of interpretation, and instead became interested in more 
or less laying down fixed paraphrases to capture concepts in Basic 
English (see chapter 3, section 6). 
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The bedrock on which definition is built is made up of the ‘Canons 
of  Symbolism’,  which  ‘allow  us  to  perform  with  safety  those 
transformations  and  substitutions  of  symbols  by  which  scientific 
language  endeavours  to  reflect  and  record  its  distinctions  and 
conclusions – those operations which […] appeared to primitive man 
to  partake  of  the  nature  of  magic’  (Ogden  and  Richards 
1989[1923]:108). These canons are the rules, six in number, that must 
be followed in constructing references to ensure that they efficiently 
and unambiguously take all  participants in a discourse to the right 
referents:
(i) One Symbol stands for one and only one Referent.
(ii) Symbols that can be substituted one for another symbolise 
the same reference.
(iii) The referent of a contracted symbol is the referent of that 
symbol expanded.
(iv) A symbol refers to what it is actually used to refer to; not 
necessarily to what it ought in good usage, or is intended by an 
interpreter, or is intended by the user to refer to.
(v) No complex symbol may contain constituent symbols 
which claim the same ‘place.’
(vi) All possible referents together form an order, such that 
every referent has one place only in that order.
(Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:88-106)
Canon  (i)  establishes  the  basic  principle  of  unambiguous 
communication, that there should be a unique and exclusive relation 
between  the  symbol  and  its  referent  (Ogden  and  Richards 
1989[1923]:88-91), the central point of their scheme on which all the 
following canons essentially elaborate. Two of the three ‘subterfuges’ 
that they (ibid.:132-134) identify – common ‘tricks’ that people use 
to  obfuscate  references,  with  or  without  intent  to  deceive  –  are 
violations of this first canon. The ‘Phonetic subterfuge’, the abuse of 
homonyms,  involves  using  two  symbols  with  the  same  form  but 
different referents,  all  the while claiming that  the referents are the 
same. An alleged example of this abuse is English philosopher John 
Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) treatment of the ‘-able’ in ‘desirable’ as 
being the same as that in ‘knowable’ or ‘visible’. In the latter two 
words, it carries a sense of possibility, ‘able to be’, argue Ogden and 
Richards  (1989[1923]:133),  while  in  ‘desirable’ its  sense  is  more 
deontic, ‘ought to be’.8 The ‘Utraquistic subterfuge’, the misuse of 
8 This example was first raised by G.E. Moore in his critique of Mills’ utilitarian ethics (Moore 
1993[1903]:118-119). Ogden and Richards do not cite Moore, presumably on the assumption 
that their readers will recognise the example and its pedigree. 
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polysemous terms, occurs when a speaker moves freely among the 
many  referents  that  a  single  symbol  may  have,  such  as  when  a 
speaker  says  ‘knowledge’ and  means  variously,  but  without  due 
recognition, that which is known and the act of knowing it.
Canon (ii) provides the foundation for the process of definition: it 
establishes the principle that interchangeable symbols have identical 
references, an essential requirement for definition, which involves the 
swapping  out  of  referentially  equivalent  symbols  (Ogden  and 
Richards  1989[1923]:91-92).  Canon  (iii)  then  introduces  the  other 
requirement  for  definition,  the  notions  of  ‘contracted  symbol’ and 
‘expanded symbol’, by which they (ibid.:92-103) mean less and more 
specific terms. An ‘expanded symbol’ goes to a more detailed ‘level 
of  interpretation’  than  its  ‘contracted’  counterpart,  as  when  the 
contracted term ‘that animal’ is substituted with the more expanded 
‘that lynx’. This is how definition functions: a more specific term, in 
the current discourse context, is substituted for a more general term. 
This more specific term, as in the case of ‘animal’ and ‘lynx’, need 
not offer an analysis but, as they make clear in their discussion, an 
analytic paraphrase is preferable to one that is merely more specific 
but perhaps equally opaque. The root of their third subterfuge, the 
‘Hypostatic  subterfuge’,  lies  in  taking  a  contracted  symbol  as 
referring  to  individual  real  entities,  the  mistake  that  philosophers 
make in proposing the existence of  classes and universal  qualities 
(ibid.:95, 133-134):
In  this  way universal  “qualities”  arise,  phantoms due  to  the 
refractive power of the linguistic medium; these must not be 
treated as part of the furniture of the universe, but are useful as 
symbolic  accessories  enabling  us  to  economize  our  speech 
material.  Universal  “relations”  arise  in  a  precisely  similar 
fashion, and offer a similar temptation. They may be regarded 
in the same way as symbolic conveniences. [...]
(Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:96)
With Canon (iv) they give a direct warning against the creation of 
such entities  from symbols  (Ogden and Richards  1989[1923]:103-
105). A symbol, according to Canon (iv), can refer only to what it 
actually  refers  to,  regardless  of  whether  this  is  the  referent  the 
speaker  intended,  how the interpreter  understood it,  or  what  good 
usage  in  the  speech  community  would  dictate.  If  the  speaker 
mistakenly says ‘My pipe is alight’ when it is in fact out, there is no 
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referent. It cannot be claimed that the symbol actually refers to the 
sensation the speaker had that made them mistakenly think the pipe 
was alight.9 
Logical issues continue to occupy them (ibid.:105-107) in Canons 
(v)  and  (vi).  Here  they  extend  the  principle  of  a  unique  and 
unambiguous relation between symbol and referent to apply within 
‘complex’ symbols, that is, symbols with multiple parts. These parts, 
by Canon (v), may not cover the same referent as the whole complex 
symbol and, by Canon (vi), each of the parts must not overlap with 
any of the others. Canon (vi) they see as an equivalent within the 
science of symbolism to Aristotle’s laws of thought, the axioms that 
lie  at  the  foundation  of  traditional  scholastic  logic.  Each of  these 
laws,  they  argue,  can  be  re-interpreted  as  a  kind  of  connection 
between symbol and referent covered by Canon (vi):
For  symbolism they  [Aristotle’s  laws  of  thought]  become  a 
triad  of  minor  Canons  which  help  to  keep  the  Cathedral  of 
Symbolism in  due  order.  First  comes  the  Law of  identity  – 
quaintly formulated as ‘A is A’; a symbol is what it is ;  i.e.,  
Every  symbol  has  a  referent.  The  second  is  the  Law  of 
Contradiction – ‘A is not not-A’; no  symbol refers to what it 
does not refer to ; i.e., No referent has more than one place in  
the whole order of referents. The third is the Law of Excluded 
Middle – ‘A is either B or not B’; a symbol must have a given 
referent or some other; i.e., Every referent has a fixed place in  
the whole order of referents.
(Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:105-106)
In  the  exposition  of  these  six  Canons  we  encounter  Ogden  and 
Richards’ continual  overt  mention of  the problems and failings  of 
logicians and philosophers, and it is at these parties that their account, 
with its overarching interest in  reference, was aimed: these are the 
people they saw pushing, and at times exceeding, the boundaries of 
our ‘reflective, intellectual use of language’. But Ogden and Richards 
were not alone in their critique of contemporary philosophy: a new 
language-critical current was forming in Cambridge, led by Russell 
and Wittgenstein, and with these two Ogden and Richards shared a 
point of departure and elements of their solution to the problems they 
identified.  But  in  their  treatment  of  definition  in  living discourse, 
9 The principle embodied here Ogden and Richards (1989[1923]:291-295) apply to the problem 
of ‘negative facts’, which exercised logicians, Russell among them, in this period. There are  
no negative facts,  they conclude, just symbols that  have no referents, like any other non-
referring expression.
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Ogden  and  Richards  brought  in  also  influences  from  a  parallel 
tradition, the incipient stages of modern semiotics, as represented in 
the work of Welby. We now turn to these two traditions and Ogden 
and Richards’ contact with them.
4. Logical atomism and its allies
Cambridge,  in  the first  two decades  of  the twentieth century,  was 
home  to  some  of  the  most  exciting  developments  in  logic  and 
philosophical analysis, and it was here in these years that Ogden and 
Richards began, as  impressionable  undergraduates,  the studies that 
would  induct  them  into  contemporary  debates  in  philosophy  and 
logic.  One of the brightest stars in the Cambridge firmament was 
Bertrand Russell, known not only for his work that was 
revolutionising the  philosophy of mathematics, but also for his 
outspoken support of progressive political causes, in particular 
women’s suffrage and opposition to the First World War (see Russell 
1959; 1967-1969; Monk 1996; 2000). In 1911 Russell was joined by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in  the  following  years  took Russell’s 
philosophical  program to its  uncompromising conclusion, and 
reigned, often unwillingly and not without dissent from his subjects, 
as the sovereign in a personal union between the intellectual 
kingdoms of Cambridge and Vienna, the two centres of the new 
scientific, language-critical philosophy in the 1920s and 30s  (see 
chapter  4,  section  2;  McGuinness  1979;  Monk  1990;  Stadler 
1997:918-919). Ogden came into association with both Russell and 
Wittgenstein, and under their influence. Richards,  too,  knew  and 
received instruction from these thinkers, although his relationship to 
them never reached the degree of intimacy and mutual significance of 
Ogden’s. Russell and Wittgenstein, as the leading proponents of the 
new  logical  methods  and  personal  acquaintances  of  Ogden  and 
Richards, played a key role in defining their position with respect to 
the  logical  tradition’s  treatment  of  meaning.  The  Meaning  of  
Meaning can be seen to a large extent as a reflection of, and at times 
a  reaction  against,  Russell  and  Wittgenstein’s  two  different  but 
closely related theories of ‘logical atomism’.
That Russell  and Wittgenstein should loom so large in Ogden’s 
consciousness should be no source of surprise, given the strength of 
their relationships. Ogden’s relationship to Russell was the closest, 
bound by  many threads, both intellectual and political: as founding 
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member  and  president of the ‘Heretics’  discussion society (see 
section  6;  Gordon  1990b:5-8)  and editor of The Cambridge 
Magazine, Ogden constantly pursued Russell to have him talk and 
write in these forums. Ogden and Russell were also both active in the 
women’s suffrage and pacifist movements. It  was  at  a  meeting 
between Russell and Ogden where such matters were being discussed 
that Wittgenstein first burst onto the stage. The scene is passed down 
to us as an evocative vignette, written by Russell that night in a letter 
to Lady Ottoline Morell (1873–1938), his ‘lady friend’ at the time:
I got home at 4.30. I had just read your letter and made my tea 
when Ogden (Secretary of the Heretics) came to say Chesterton 
is speaking the night of my P.S.F. [People’s Suffrage 
Federation] Meeting –  this raised a lot of complicated 
problems, which we were in the middle of when an unknown 
German appeared, speaking very little English but refusing to 
speak German. He turned out to be a man who had learnt 
engineering at Charlottenburg, but during his course had 
acquired, by himself, a passion for the philosophy of 
mathematics, and has now come to Cambridge on purpose to 
hear me. This took till 5.15; in the next few minutes I settled 
my business with Ogden, and then went off to my lecture, 
where I found my German duly established. I lectured very 
well, owing to excitement and insufficient preparation. I am 
much interested by my German, and shall hope to see a lot of 
him. Ogden has undertaken to do P.S.F. work for me, which is a 
very great relief.
(Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, 18 October 1911; letter reproduced in full 
in Griffin 1992:397-399, no.179)10
Wittgenstein, an Austrian, not a German, as Russell would discover 
in time, had come on the advice of the German mathematician and 
logician Gottlob Frege (1848–1925; see Monk 1990:36), inventor of 
a new logical formalism, the  Begriffsschrift  (‘conceptual notation’; 
Frege  1972[1879]),  which  provided  much  inspiration  to  Russell. 
Although his pupilage had a rocky start, by the beginning of 1912, 
when Wittgenstein handed Russell a manuscript he had prepared over 
Christmas, Russell became convinced of his genius and adopted him 
as his protégé (Monk 1990:41), a role that he soon outgrew. Russell 
(1926[1914]:9) was commenting shortly after on the benefits he had 
received from the ‘vitally important discoveries’ in ‘pure logic’ made 
by ‘my friend Mr Ludwig Wittgenstein’. Russell later described his 
10 The People’s Suffrage Federation was an organisation that campaigned for universal adult  
suffrage, which Russell helped to found and in which he was active.  The episode Russell  
describes in his letter is also recounted in Monk (1990:38-39), with an excerpt from the letter.
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1918  lectures  –  which,  as  we  will  see,  were  influential  on  The 
Meaning  of  Meaning –  as  being  ‘very  largely  concerned  with 
explaining  certain  ideas  which  I  have  learnt  from  my  friend  and 
former pupil Ludwig Wittgenstein’  (Russell 1918-1919:160).
When Wittgenstein’s views finally took the form of a manuscript, 
which eventually received  the title Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, 
Ogden was instrumental in bringing it to the world. As an editor at 
Kegan Paul publishers, Ogden oversaw the publication of 
Wittgenstein’s book in 1922 in a German and English edition.11 In the 
same role and in the same period, his relationship to Russell became 
symbiotic: Ogden needed new books to sell, and Russell, whose 
name had become a by-word for erudition and genius, and who was a 
gifted and prolific writer, was in need of money (Monk 2000:24). The 
result was a series of popular philosophy and science books written 
by Russell, edited by Ogden and published by Kegan Paul (see Dora 
Russell  1977:93-94). The  relationship  was  further  solidified  by 
Russell’s romantic involvement and subsequent marriage to one of 
Ogden’s closest  friends,  Dora Russell  (née Black;  1894–1986).  At 
one  point  Ogden  was  even  executor  of  their  wills  (Dora  Russell 
1977:82-95).
Russell  began  as  a  mathematician  but  turned,  after  his  final 
undergraduate  examinations,  to  philosophy  (Russell  1959:38;  cf. 
Grattan-Guinness 2000:269-270). The turn of the nineteenth to the 
twentieth  century  was  an  exciting  time  for  a  mathematician  with 
philosophical  inclinations  like  Russell:  the  debate  over  the 
foundations of mathematics, the search for the basic principles of the 
discipline  and  their  justification,  was  gaining  momentum  (see 
Grattan-Guinness  2000;  Ewald  1996). Russell,  after  hearing 
Giuseppe  Peano  (1858–1932),  the  Italian  mathematician  (and 
international  language  constructor;  see  chapter  3,  sections  3-4), 
speak at the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris 1900, was 
11 The German text of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus had already been published in Germany the year 
before in Wilhelm Ostwald’s Annalen der Naturphilosophie (the chemist Ostwald had broad-
ranging interests in philosophy and internationalisation; he reappears in chapter 3, sections 3-
4, in the context of the international language movement). Wittgenstein disowned this first 
edition, however; he was not satisfied with the final copy and complained that his revisions 
had been ignored. The Entstehungsgeschichte of Ogden’s edition of the Tractatus is told most 
comprehensively  in  von  Wright (1973).  The book contains letters from Wittgenstein to 
Ogden in which Wittgenstein comments on draft English translations and the original German 
text, as well as an introduction by von Wright where a narrative of the translation, informed 
by primary research not contained in the letters, is given. The most significant aspect of the 
narrative told here is that it appears Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903–1930), who is introduced 
into the main discussion below, was responsible for the first draft of the English translation 
(Wright 1973:8-9).
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converted  to  the  ‘logicist’ camp,  which sought  the  foundations  of 
mathematics in logic: all mathematics could be reduced to arithmetic, 
and this in turn to logic.12 This led Russell to a direct engagement 
with logic, and the problems of meaning attached to these new logical 
formalisms. 
By  the  1920s  Russell’s  philosophy,  which  he  dubbed  ‘logical 
atomism’,  had  grown  from  purely  logical  concerns  to  address 
questions in metaphysics, epistemology and psychology (see Russell 
1926[1914]; 1918-1919; 1921; 1924; chapter 2 of 1959). Although he 
claimed  only  to  have  become  interested  in  language  after  1918 
(Russell  1959:145;  cf.  Monk  1997:39),  the  formal  innovations 
leading to logical atomism all exhibit a linguistic character, and these 
occurred around the turn of the century and the years immediately 
following (see  Russell  1959:13-14,  63-64 for  a  chronology).  Like 
Ogden and Richards, Russell saw many of the central problems in 
philosophy as stemming from a slavish acceptance of the terms in 
natural language we use to describe the world, a view quite obviously 
akin to ‘word-magic’. One of the key innovations of the new logical 
notations of Frege and Peano that Russell further developed was an 
escape from the  structure of  syllogism to a  logic  of  relations  that 
allowed predicates with numerous arguments. This new logic Russell 
used against the ‘monistic’ varieties of idealism dominant during the 
time of his philosophical  education in Cambridge,  which maintain 
that the entire world is made up of a single unified entity, a view 
epitomised  by  Francis  H.  Bradley’s  (1846–1924)  notion  of  ‘the 
Absolute’ (see Bradley  1897[1983]).  This  monism hangs from the 
doctrine of internal relations, which postulates that what appear to be 
relations between separate entities in the world are really just internal 
properties of the single whole (cf. Griffin 1991:326-27, and section 
8.2, which complicates Russell’s  account). Russell’s rejection of the 
doctrine  of  internal  relations  sprang  into  possibility  with  the 
realisation that it was not a logical necessity, but a linguistic illusion 
(see Russell 1959:54-62 for the story; Russell 1903:222-226; 1906-
1907:28-49  for  the  arguments). The  form  of  the  syllogism,  the 
defining  structure  of  traditional  western  logic,  realised  Russell,  is 
merely an abstraction from the grammar of Greek and other European 
12 Peano placed a crucial piece in the puzzle with his axioms of arithmetic, although much of the 
theoretical framework and formalism that lay behind them (the foundations of what is now 
referred to as first-order logic) had in fact already been developed by Frege. Russell only 
discovered this later, but Peano may have known about Frege’s prior work (see Grattan-
Guinness 2000:247-49 for discussion of Peano and Frege’s most important intellectual 
interaction in this period; and Russell 1959:66 for his retrospective account of Peano and 
Frege).
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languages.  The  subject-predicate  mould  of  sentences  in  these 
languages leads the logician to conceive of their logic in the same 
way: a maximum of one entity with one property predicated of it per 
proposition. Enslavement to language pushes the thinker into a rut; 
only a superior formalism that recognises a plurality of entities and 
the  possibility  of  multiple  relations  between  them  can  rescue  the 
logician and bring them to a better representation of the world:
The influence of language on philosophy has, I believe, been 
profound and almost unrecognized. If we are not to be misled 
by this influence, it is necessary to become conscious of it, and 
to ask ourselves deliberately how far it is legitimate. The 
subject-predicate logic, with the substance-attribute 
metaphysic, are a case in point. It is doubtful whether either 
would have been invented by a people speaking a non-Aryan 
language; certainly they do not seem to have arisen in China, 
except in connection with Buddhism, which brought an Indian 
philosophy with it.
(Russell 1918-1919:38; see also Russell 1921:212)
The ‘monistic metaphysic’ is a product of Indo-European syntax; it 
can be cured by developing a logic of relations. The vocabulary of a 
language can be just as misleading: we seem to suppose that words 
name objects in the world and, when we find no object to correspond 
to a word, we have to invent it. This, claimed Russell (1918-1919:38-
39), is the origin of those entities that populate the Platonic world of 
forms. It is not only Russell’s critique of language that is echoed in 
The  Meaning  of  Meaning,  but  also  the  solution  he  proposed:  to 
escape the influence of the ordinary language and the misconceptions 
it creates, we must do away with our everyday expressions and find 
others that say precisely what they mean. The classic example of this 
approach is Russell’s ‘theory of descriptions’, which made its first 
public  appearance  in  Russell  (1905),  with  further  refinements  and 
formal  elaboration  in  Russell  (1910),  and  Whitehead  and  Russell 
(chapter 3 of 1910-1913).
The crux of the theory of descriptions is embodied in Russell’s 
signature propositions ‘The present King of France is bald’ and ‘Scott 
was  the  author  of  Waverley’,  each  of  which  in  its  ordinary  form 
presents a logical puzzle. In the first proposition we face the problem 
that there is no present King of France to which we can apply the 
predicate. We could argue that the proposition is simply meaningless, 
but  Russell  preferred to call  it  false:  a fastidious logician,  Russell 
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wanted only to recognise propositions that are either true or false and 
nothing  else.  He  proposed  a  paraphrase  that  lays  bare  the  logical 
structure  of  the  proposition  and  thereby  shows  why  it  is  false. 
Russell’s  (1905:497)  paraphrases  are  anchored  in  a  distinction 
between  ‘knowledge  by  acquaintance’  and  ‘knowledge  by 
description’:  we  are  acquainted  only  with  what  we  can  perceive 
directly and everything else we know only by description. In his later 
elaboration of logical atomism, it is only the evidence of the senses, 
so-called ‘sense-data’ that we know by acquaintance, and all other 
entities are ‘logical constructions’ that we make from these according 
to the laws of logic, which we know only by our descriptions (see 
chapter 3 of Russell 1926[1914]). ‘The present King of France’, in 
the  terms  of  Russell’s  later  elaborated  theory,  is  a  logical 
construction,  and  the  uttering  of  this  expression  assumes  his 
existence. If we replace the expression with a logical analysis,  the 
fact that it asserts the existence of the construction will be apparent; 
we recognise that this assertion is false and that, as a consequence, 
the  entire  proposition  is  false  (Russell  1905:488;  for  a  modern 
exposition, see chapter 5 of Soames 2003). In the case of Russell’s 
second proposition, ‘Scott was the author of Waverley’, the puzzle is 
how  this  sentence  is  informative:  if  ‘Scott’  and  ‘the  author  of 
Waverley’ are simply labels that point to entities in the world and they 
point  to  the  same  entity,  we  might  ask  how  our  knowledge  is 
furthered  to  be  told  that  they  are  equivalent.  Here  again  analysis 
provides the answer: ‘Scott’ is indeed simply a label, but ‘the author 
of Waverley’ is a complex description that both asserts the existence 
of an entity and points it out. The proposition therefore tells us that 
the label ‘Scott’ can be applied to the existent entity that is the author 
of Waverley.13
Ogden  and  Richards’  definitions  are  clearly  akin  to  Russell’s 
descriptions.  Both are  aimed at  the rectification of  names through 
paraphrase. Laying bare the underlying structure of ideas, which may 
be concealed by the language they are habitually expressed in, was 
likewise a motivation for Frege in creating his Begriffsschrift:14
13 In later years, with the further development of Russell’s epistemological doctrines, the proper  
names of natural language also became descriptions; only truly logical proper names, which 
refer to the sense-data with which we are directly acquainted, remained unanalysable labels 
(see Russell 1910-1911:114; 1921:193; 1959:167).
14 Frege (1984[1892]) of course proposed his own solution to these logical  puzzles with his 
well-known notions of Sinn (usually translated as ‘sense’) and Bedeutung (‘reference’), which 
Russell cited (1905:482-483). In short, the ‘sense’ of an expression is what guides us to make 
a particular  ‘reference’ to  a  thing in  the world.  Russell  saw his  theory of  descriptions as 
superior to Frege’s solution, since, as Russell contended, it does not account for the falsity of 
‘The present King of France is bald’. Surely ‘is bald’ is a predicate of the object referred to by 
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If it is a task of philosophy to break the power of the word over 
the human mind, uncovering illusions which through the use of 
language almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations of 
concepts, freeing thought from that which only the nature of the 
linguistic  means  of  expression  attaches  to  it,  then  my 
“conceptual  notation”,  further  developed  for  these  purposes, 
can become a useful tool for philosophers.
(Frege 1972[1879]:106)
But while Russell may have newly popularised the need to establish 
correct  connections  between  name  and  object  in  Cambridge  and 
beyond, this issue has also a long tradition in the empirically rooted 
philosophy  of  the  English-speaking  world,  with  the  English 
Enlightenment philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) standing out as 
an early and influential figure (see Book III of Locke 1975[1690]). 
The formulation of correct names concerned also many of Locke’s 
contemporaries  who,  although they may not  have  agreed with  his 
assumptions  and  methods,  pursued  a  similar  course.  Chief  among 
these  are  John  Wilkins  and  Gottfried  Wilhelm  Leibniz,  whose 
constructed  language  projects  aimed  in  part  at  creating 
philosophically  sound  linguistic  expressions,  and  which  may have 
provided  inspiration  to  Ogden  in  designing  Basic  English  (see 
chapter 3; chapters 7 and 8 of Knowlson 1975 for a wider context). 
Russell,  too,  was familiar  with Leibniz’ work in this area:  Russell 
(1937[1900])  is  a  monograph-length exposition  of  Leibniz’  œuvre. 
Although  highly  critical  of  Leibniz’ idealistic  metaphysics,  which 
entailed a strictly syllogistic logic and a belief that all knowledge is 
ultimately  deducible  without  empirical  input  (see  Russell 
1937[1900]:169-171; 1959:61), Russell was clearly impressed by the 
autonomy  Leibniz  accorded  to  logical  notation.  Echoing  Leibniz’ 
faith in a notation that could reveal incontrovertible truths – when a 
dispute arises, Leibniz (Gerhardt 1890:125, English translation from 
‘the present King of France’, and if the sense fails to produce a reference to an object then 
there  is  no  subject  for  the  predicate.  Although Russell  did  not  explicitly  say  so,  Frege’s 
account would have presumably been unappealing to him on other grounds: Frege’s ‘sense’ is 
a thoroughly Platonic conception, timeless and abstract, that would be difficult to reconcile 
with  Russell’s  realism  (see,  in  particular,  Frege  1984[1918-1919]).  Another  solution  to 
problems of this sort that Russell cited is that of the Austrian idealist philosopher Alexius 
Meinong (1853–1920; Russell 1905:482-483 cites Meinong 1904; Russell 1910-1911 cites 
Meinong  1910[1902]).  Meinong  proposed  that  every  grammatically  correct  expression 
denotes an entity that exists, but that there are different ways in which entities can exist (the 
chief distinction here being between ‘existence’ and ‘subsistence’).   ‘The present King of 
France’ is therefore a kind of existent entity, but an abstract one whose existence is not part of 
the time-bound physical world. Quite apart from doctrinal objections, Russell (1905:482-483; 
1910-1911:122-123) claimed that this is a contradiction: we would have to accept that ‘the 
present King of France’ both exists and does not exist.
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Maat  2004:303) says,  ‘...it will no longer be necessary to deal with 
the matter by screaming, but one can say to the other: let’s calculate’ 
(cf.  chapter  3,  section  2)  –  Russell  sought  a  ‘logically  perfect 
language’,  which would sweep away the confounding form of our 
ordinary language and replace it  with its  true  logical  form (Frege 
1972[1882]:90-91, in his  Begriffsschrift, also looked to the example 
set by Leibniz). It would ‘show at a glance the logical structure of the 
facts asserted or denied’, and would offer the user unparalleled clarity 
of thought, ‘for  a good notation has a subtlety and suggestiveness 
which at times make it seem almost like a live teacher. Notational 
irregularities  are  often the first  sign of  philosophical  errors,  and a 
perfect notation would be a substitute for thought’ (Russell 1922:xvii-
xviii).  The  theory  of  descriptions  and  its  later  elaborations  in 
Principia  Mathematica Russell  saw  as  the  first  step  towards  this 
language. But whereas Russell’s descriptions aimed to be a logically 
valid paraphrase of an expression, Ogden and Richards claimed no 
ontological  priority  for  their  definitions.  Ogden  and  Richards 
(1989[1923]:253-255) were in fact highly critical of the suggestion 
that  there  could  be  ultimate  descriptions  that  somehow  directly 
correspond  to  facts  in  the  world,  a  position  explicitly  taken  by 
Wittgenstein in his own version of logical atomism (see  props. 2.1-
2.225 of Wittgenstein 1922). Their definitions were intended to be 
better than existing expressions, it is true, but only because they are 
more effective in the particular communicative context in which they 
appear. This is a guiding principle of the semiotic tradition, which we 
come  to  in  section  6  (we  also  return  to  this  issue  and  its  later 
developments in chapter 4, section 3).
The  psychological  theory  on  which  Russell  built  his  logical 
atomism  also  shares  a  kinship  with  the  psychological  foundation 
Ogden and Richards sought for their science of symbolism (cf. Wolf 
1988). Russell’s ‘sense-data’, as the external, observable elements of 
experience,  emulate a line popularised at  the time by behaviourist 
psychologists.  The  behaviourists  claimed  unassailable ‘scientific’ 
status for their doctrines with their appeals to observable, empirically 
verifiable  data  only  and  banishment  of  all  supposition  of  mental 
goings-on.  The  scientific  psychologist,  so  the  behaviourist,  refers 
only to the ‘stimuli’ that  animals  and humans – which are simply 
‘higher’ animals – receive and their ‘responses’. Thoughts, memories, 
consciousness  are  considered  phenomenological  phantoms, 
unacceptable  in  a  scientifically  rigorous  psychology.  Russell  (e.g., 
1921:26)  cited  favourably  John  B.  Watson  (1914),  the  intellectual 
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leader of the behaviourists, but he still accorded a place for mental 
‘images’,  mental  occurrences not  caused by immediate  sense-data, 
and remained  critical  of  Watson  for  not  permitting  these  in  his 
analyses (see chapter 8 of Russell 1921; 1919:10-11, 22; cf. Russell 
1914). Ogden and Richards in turn saw the nature of their ‘thought or 
reference’ as  contrasted to Russell’s  ‘images’ as  the main point  at 
which their theories differed: ‘It is mainly on this point [the use of 
images]  that  the  view  here  developed  differs  from  Mr  Russell’s 
account  of  meaning’ (Ogden  and  Richards  1989[1923]:62).  They 
were  targeting  specifically  the  notion  that  images  are  ‘revivals  or 
copies  of  sensory  experience’  (ibid.:60).  Their  ‘thoughts  or 
references’,  by  contrast,  need  not  replicate  sense-data,  but  merely 
direct,  in  some  non-specific  way,  the  interpreter’s  attention  to  a 
referent (see further chapter 3 of ibid.). But this is a minor difference: 
‘thoughts  or  references’  and  ‘images’  are  still  fundamentally 
comparable in both being some sort of acquired mental reflex of an 
organism generated as a response to external stimuli.
In  later  moving closer  to  orthodox behaviourism,  Russell  (e.g., 
1926) retreated from images as necessary methodological posits in 
explaining meaning, although he remained agnostic about whether or 
not they do in fact exist in some form. But his images were never 
wholly incompatible with behaviourism, in that they did not inhabit a 
separate mental realm. Under his metaphysical doctrine of ‘neutral 
monism’, ‘mind and matter alike are […] constructed out of a neutral 
stuff’ (Russell  1921:244):  there  is  therefore  no  separate  plane  of 
mental existence, independent of the material world (see chapter 15 
of  Russell  1921;  cf.  Russell  1914;  cf.  also  the  logical  positivists’ 
‘physicalism’,  discussed  chapter  4,  section  3).15 Images,  argued 
Russell,  act  through a  process  of  ‘mnemic  causation’.  This  is  the 
connection  between  a  stimulus  and  a  response:  after  repeated 
occurrences  of  a  stimulus,  an  organism  becomes  conditioned  to 
respond in a particular way.  The term derives from the work of the 
Lamarckian  evolutionary  biologist  Richard  Semon  (1859–1918; 
Russell in Schiller, Russell and Joachim 1920:403; Russell 1921:145 
cites  Semon  1921[1904];  1909),  whose  later  works  Ogden  and 
Richards cited in their account of signs as ‘engrams’ (see section 2). 
15 Note that Russell’s neutral monism is different from the idealist forms of monism he earlier 
refuted: neutral monism is not a general theory of metaphysics, but is rather restricted to the 
problem of mind-matter dualism.
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Like Ogden and Richards later, Russell embraced the full scope of 
mnemic causation. He did not limit it to linguistic signs, but extended 
it to all learnt behaviour. A bear made to stand on a hot floor while 
music is played will learn to dance whenever it hears the music, even 
in the absence of the heat: for the bear, the music has become the sign 
of the hot floor, it ‘means’ the hot floor (Russell in Schiller, Russell 
and  Joachim  1920:398).  Ogden  and  Richards  in  fact  emulated 
precisely  Russell’s  respect  for  the  empirical,  scientific  spirit  of 
behaviourism while at the same time rejecting behaviourists’ zealous 
enforcement of this spirit  to the point of denying consciousness, a 
stance they took in their own assessments of  Watson’s work (e.g., 
chapter  10  of  Ogden  1926;  Richards  1926[1924];  Ogden  1927a; 
Richards  1973[1938]:283;  cf.  Gordon  2006:2584-2585).  This 
position finds expression again in Richards’ later good-natured poem 
‘against’ the  book  Verbal  Behavior  (1957),  a  book  written  by his 
friend,  the  leading  behaviourist  Burrhus  Frederic  Skinner  (1904–
1990; see Russo 1989:175). Since the polemical review of Chomsky 
(1959),  this  book  has  acquired  a  reputation  as  the  incarnation  of 
behaviourist excesses in linguistic theorising (see chapter 5, section 
2).
Ogden and Richards’ philosophy of language in  The Meaning of  
Meaning bears, in its circumscription of the problem and its proposed 
solutions,  the  unmistakable  marks  of  the  linguistic  and 
epistemological doctrines that grew out of Russell and Wittgenstein’s 
logical  atomism. The psychology Ogden and Richards drew on in 
grounding their model of reference is precisely that  used by Russell 
in his own model. Their method of definition answered to Russell’s 
theory of descriptions: both offer a way to sweep aside the confusions 
of  language  and  reach  for  a  reference.  But  Ogden  and  Richards’ 
approach was pragmatic in a way that Russell and Wittgenstein’s was 
not:  their  definitions  did  not  necessarily  uncover  underlying 
structures; they were merely conveniences of communication. This 
emphasis on interpretation, and clarifying interpretation, is perhaps a 
consequence of another tradition in which they stand, the semiotic 
tradition,  to  which  Ogden  was  personally  connected  through  the 
figure of Welby. But before we come to this tradition, we will take a 
closer  look  at  the  inspiration  Ogden  and  Richards  drew  from 
logicians in their Triangle of Reference.
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5. The trigonometry of reference
The positing of three terms to account for the relation of words to 
their  referents  was  a  commonplace  of  logicians’  treatments  of 
meaning  in  this  period:  between  word  and  referent  the  American 
logician  and  semiotician  Charles  Sanders  Peirce  (1839-1914;  e.g. 
Peirce 1984[1867]:53-54) had his ‘interpretant’, Frege (1984[1892]; 
see  also  note  13  above)  his  ‘sense’  and  Russell  his  ‘image’ (see 
section  4).  Ogden  and Richards’ ‘thought  or  reference’ fulfilled  a 
similar role in their theory. Like Russell’s ‘image’, their ‘thought or 
reference’ could claim impeccable scientific credentials, secured as it 
was in the same psychological framework Russell invoked. But this 
three-term model is  not  original  to any of  these thinkers;  it  has a 
lineage  extending  back  to  ancient  Greek  thought.  The  specific 
triangular representation that Ogden and Richards postulated also has 
clear antecedents in contemporary scholarship.
The invocation of thoughts or impressions to mediate the relation 
between verbal signs and their referents is found in Aristotle (384–
322 BC).  He proposed a  linear  model  with  four  terms –  external 
things, impressions on the soul, spoken signs, and written signs – in 
which each term depends on that preceding it. The Aristotelian model 
was  rediscovered  by  medieval  scholastic  logic  and,  from  there, 
carried into the modern age. Commenting specifically on Ogden and 
Richards’ Triangle of Reference, Ullmann (1962:56) observes: ‘There 
is  nothing  fundamentally  new  in  this  analysis  of  meaning;  the 
mediaeval schoolmen already knew that “vox significat mediantibus 
conceptibus” (the word signifies through the medium of concepts)’ 
(see  also  John  Lyons  1963:1-2,  Padley  1976:162;  Gordon 
2006:2581).  In  his  private  correspondence  with  Ogden  in  1930, 
Richards  himself  commented:  ‘Rather  startled  to  find  in  a 
Stoneyhurst [sic] book on theories of knowledge by Father Walker 
that our causal theory is very nearly the official scholastic one. Lucky 
we  didn’t  know  it  in  those  days,  or  we’d  have  changed  it  all’ 
(Richards to Ogden, 30 October 1930, quoted in volume 3 of Gordon 
1994:xxii, note 16).16 It would seem that Richards, at least, was not 
consciously  aware  of  the  scholastic  theory  when  they  wrote  The 
Meaning of Meaning, although it does not tell us whether the trained 
classicist Ogden knew of it or not. Of course, none of this rules out 
the  possibility  that  both  Ogden  and  Richards  could  have  simply 
16 The ‘Stoneyhurst [sic] book on theories of knowledge by Father Walker’ that Richards refers 
to is probably Walker (1910).
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absorbed the scholastic model during the course of their education as 
an unquestioned fundamental assumption.
A more recent antecedent for the precise trigonometry of Ogden 
and  Richards’ model  can  be  found,  however,  in  the  work  of  the 
Austrian philosopher Heinich Gomperz (1873–1943). At the centre of 
his Semasiologie – a term widely used in German at the time for sign 
theories, especially in their semantic aspect (see chapter 2 of Nerlich 
1992) – was a semiotic model Gomperz illustrated with the Schema 
in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Gomperz’ (1908:77) Schema
The resemblance of Gomperz’ Schema  to the Triangle of Reference 
goes  beyond  the  merely  superficial:  both  triangles  represent  very 
similar semiotic models.  The outer triangle of Gomperz’ diagram is 
in  fact  directly  comparable  to  Ogden  and  Richards’:  Gomperz’ 
Aussagelaute,  the  ‘sprachliche  Form’  (linguistic  form),  matches 
Ogden  and  Richards’  symbol; the  Aussageinhalt,  the  ‘Sinn  der 
Aussage’ (sense of the proposition), corresponds to the  thought or 
reference; and the Aussagegrundlage, ‘jene Tatsache, auf die sich die 
Aussage  bezieht’ (that  actual  fact  that  the  Aussage  relates  to),  is 
equivalent  to  the  referent.  The  relations  between  each  of  these 
elements recall  those between the entities in Ogden and Richards’ 
model:  the  Aussage  is  the  Ausdruck  (expression)  of  the 
Aussageinhalt, which is in turn the Auffassung (interpretation) of the 
Aussagegrundlage (see Gomperz 1908:61).17 In the same way, Ogden 
and Richards’ symbol causes the thought or reference to be brought to 
17 ‘Interpretation’ is  the  English  translation  Ogden  and  Richards  (1923[1989]:275)  use  for 
Gomperz’ term Auffassung. 
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mind,  which  in  turn  causes  the  referent  to  be  identified.  The 
‘secondary elements’, those at the base of Gomperz’ inner triangle, 
find no place in Ogden and Richards’ model, however: the Aussage 
(proposition), which is a ‘whole’ consisting of the Aussagelaute and 
the Aussageinhalt, and the Sachverhalt (state of affairs), a ‘complex’ 
made  up  of  the  Aussageinhalt  and  the  Aussagegrundlage.  This 
expansion  into  primary  and  secondary  elements  allows  for  a 
differentiation  of  two  semiotic  levels,  the  primary  Bezeichnung 
(signification),  the  relation  between  the  Aussagelaute  and  the 
Aussagegrundlage,  and  the  secondary  Bedeutung  (meaning),  the 
relation between the abstract Aussage and the Sachverhalt (Gomperz 
1908:61-62, 76-77; see also Seiler 1991). 
Gomperz’  introduction  of  the  Aussage,  a  complex  element 
combining linguistic form and its accompanying concept recalls the 
notion of ‘linguistic sign’ as it is generally accepted among present-
day  linguists  and  semioticians.  In  these  circles  the  concept  is 
attributed in its current formulation to the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de 
Saussure  (1857–1913;  see  Saussure  1983[1916]:65-67,  110-111) 
who,  at  the  same time  Gomperz  was  writing,  was  espousing  this 
notion to his students in his course in general linguists in Geneva. 
Not part of Gomperz’ account but central to Saussure’s, however, is 
the idea of value, the idea that the possible range signs cover, in both 
their formal and semantic aspects, is mutually defined by each sign’s 
relation to all  other  signs (see Saussure 1983[1916]:112-120).  The 
overarching  ideas  Gomperz  and  Saussure  do  share  in  common, 
however, they indubitably arrived at independently but via a common 
heritage:  Gomperz  (1908:79-91)  traced  a  long  and  complex 
genealogy for his ideas, going back to Aristotle and Plato, with many 
points of transmission and innovation in between; Joseph (chapter 3 
of 2012) finds a similar background for Saussure’s thoughts on the 
sign. This complex internal structure of the sign, of course, finds no 
place  in  Ogden  and  Richards’ account,  and  in  fact  they criticised 
Saussure  for  including  ‘the  process  of  interpretation  […]  by 
definition in the sign!’ (Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:5, note 2). In 
defining  the  sign  itself  as  a  two-sided  entity  consisting  of  the 
signifying  linguistic  form and  its  signified  meaning,  they  argued, 
Saussure  posits  fixed  relations  between  words  and  meanings,  an 
alleged failing that their model, with its separation of ‘symbol’ and 
‘thought’,  linked  through  experience,  aimed  to  avoid.  In  his  later 
work, Gomperz (e.g., 1939) himself dispensed with his inner triangle 
and dealt with meaning on a single level.
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Ogden  and  Richards  were  aware  of  Gomperz’  model  and  its 
geometry: they in fact summarised it in Appendix D of The Meaning 
of Meaning  (Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:274-277), where they 
offered  a  survey  of  modern  approaches  to  meaning.  Gomperz’ 
Schema, however, they did not reproduce, and they claimed as their 
source  not  Gomperz’  original  work,  but  a  summary  in  Dittrich 
(1913). In the presentation of their own Triangle of Reference, they 
made no acknowledgement of any debt they might owe to Gomperz 
or  inspiration  they  may  have  drawn  from  him,  although  later 
commentators  have  pointed it  out  in  passing (e.g.,  Stern 1931:37; 
Gordon 1982:59; Nerlich 1990:250; Seiler 1991:102-103; 1994:41). 
The Triangle of Reference appears much less novel than it might at 
first seem when it is put into its immediate context, and the broader 
context of the long European tradition of which it is a part.
6. Significs and sympathisers
While Russell and like-minded philosophers sought to tame meaning 
by extending the precise and rigorous formalisms of logic into wider 
domains,  other  thinkers  approached  this  end  by  examining  the 
functioning  of  signs  themselves.  Chief  among  these  was  Victoria 
Lady  Welby  who,  through  her  theory  of  ‘significs’,  explored  the 
process of interpretation.18 Despite never having any official standing 
in  academic  life,  Welby  maintained  many  informal  contacts  with 
some of  the  most  renowned scholars  of  her  time,  some of  whom 
promoted  her  work  more  widely.  With  a  letter  from  Ogden  in 
November  1910,  his  third  undergraduate  year,  began  a  short  but 
intense period of personal contact between Ogden and Welby, which 
continued until Welby’s death in March 1912. During this time, she 
inducted him into her  thought,  and he became a champion of  the 
significs cause. This early enthusiasm for significs leaves its mark in 
The  Meaning  of  Meaning:  though  not  as  visible  as  Russell  and 
Wittgenstein’s logical atomism, Welby’s theory permeates the book 
and lies behind its fundamentally interpretative treatment of signs.
As a woman whose life extends, at its beginning and end, just 
beyond the boundaries of the Victorian period, Welby was subject to 
the subordinate role imposed on her sex in public and her access to 
academic  life  was  restricted.  But through her privileged social 
18 Welby seems to have only started using the term ‘significs’ to refer to her approach around 
1900. In Welby (1896) she still used the earlier term ‘sensifics’. See Schmitz (1985a:l-lii) for  
an account of the coining of the name ‘significs’.
44
position and perhaps as a result of her unconventional upbringing, 
she developed an interest in the philosophy of language that she was 
able to exercise  through  her  network  of  scholarly  contacts,  an 
achievement she shared with only a small number of other women in 
that  era.19 Welby’s  privileged social position came by birth: like 
Russell,  she was a member of the English high aristocracy, god-
daughter of Queen Victoria, in whose honour she was named and in 
whose court she served as Maid of Honour. Her unconventional 
upbringing came through spending her formative years travelling the 
world with her mother between 1844, the year of her father’s death, 
and 1855, when her mother died on the road to Beirut. After fulfilling 
her womanly duties of marriage and raising children, Welby threw 
herself into her philosophical  studies and soon built up a circle of 
correspondents and discussion partners  (see  Petrilli  2009;  Schmitz 
1985a). Some were enthusiastic supporters of her work and others 
not. Notable members of the former camp include Peirce,  whose 
correspondence  with  Welby was in  his  later  years  one  of  his  few 
intellectual  outlets  (the  correspondence  is  published  in  Hardwick 
1977), and the English idealist  philosopher George Frederick Stout 
(1860–1944), who taught both Moore and Russell at Cambridge, and 
who  not  only  encouraged  Welby  to  publish  her  ideas  in  the 
philosophical journal  Mind, which he edited, but also co-authored a 
paper with her (Welby, Stout and Baldwin 1902). In the latter camp 
are such scholars as the French philologist Michel Bréal (1832–1915; 
see  Auroux and Delesalle  1990)  – coiner  of  the term  sémantique, 
which became in English ‘semantics’ – and Russell himself (Schmitz 
1995;  1985a:clvii-clxiii;  see  section  6).20 Her  detractors  would 
eventually  gain  the  upper  hand:  after  her  death,  Welby’s  work 
disappeared into relative historical obscurity. Only a small band of 
intellectuals  in  the  Netherlands,  the  ‘Dutch  Significs  Movement’, 
founded by Frederick van Eeden (1860–1932), explicitly understood 
themselves as carrying on the tradition she established (see Schmitz 
19 Some other ‘ladies of the time who worked in logic and philosophy’ mentioned by Grattan-
Guinness (1977:111) include Mary Everest Boole (a friend of Welby and wife of the logician 
George Boole), Sophie Bryant, Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones (who engaged in academic 
debate with Russell over meaning and reference: see Jones 1910; 1910-1911; Russell 1910-
1911), Eleanor Jourdain (sister of Philip Jourdain; see section 7), and Christine Ladd-Franklin 
(a student of Peirce).
20 Although no great enthusiast of her work, Bréal was superficially tolerant in his dealings with  
Welby (see Petrilli 2009:285-287, 302-307; Auroux and Delesalle 1990). His tolerance was 
most  probably  motivated  largely  by  self-interest:  his  chief  work  on  semantics,  Essai  de  
sémantique  (Bréal  1900[1897]),  was  translated  into  English  on Welby’s  initiative,  by her 
daughter, Nina Cust.
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1983; 1985a; 1985b; Petrilli 2009:748-766, 782-796, 829-885; they 
reappear briefly in chapter 3, section 8; chapter 4, section 3).
When Ogden approached Welby in 1910 she was at the height of 
her fame and, it would seem from their correspondence, Ogden was 
already a keen admirer. Welby, for her part, perhaps conscious that 
her  time  was  limited  (she  would  die  just  over  a  year  later),  was 
looking  for  a  young  and  energetic  successor  (see  Gordon  1990a; 
Petrilli  2009:731-747,  767-782;  Schmitz  1985a:clxxviii-clxxxiv). 
Two months after his first letter, in January 1911, Ogden accepted an 
invitation from Welby to spend  three days in her house, filled with 
conversation and perusal of her library, including her correspondence 
with noted scholars (Gordon 1990a:182). Shortly after this first visit, 
Welby described to Peirce with evident joy  her new apprentice and 
his interest in Peirce’s work and her own theory of significs:
Meanwhile the news that I was anxious to impart to you when I 
wrote my post-card is that I have found you, I think, a disciple 
at Cambridge. He has been studying with care all I could show 
him of your writing on Existential Graphs, and is anxious to see 
your contribution to the volume of Essays which Prof. Stout is 
still holding back, in hopes of receiving it. The name of the 
recruit is C. K. Ogden, and he is at Magdalene College. He 
enters also with enthusiasm into the possibilities of Significs.
(Welby to Peirce, 2 May 1911, in Hardwick 1977:138-139)
Ogden  soon  assumed  this  role  of  protégé. Around Cambridge he 
spoke frequently on significs, and began, probably in 1911, to write a 
manuscript on it, which he may have continued to revise up until 
1922, one year before the publication of The Meaning of Meaning 
(see  Gordon  1990a:185-186;  Petrilli  2009:732-736;  Ogden 
1994[1911] is a reproduction of a later version of this manuscript). 
The Meaning of Meaning in turn contained what was to remain for 
many years the most accessible account of Peirce’s theory of signs 
(Ogden  and  Richards  1989[1923]:279-290), based on the 
correspondence between Welby and Peirce, which Ogden had first 
seen on his visits to her house. But in the face of the poor reception 
his  talks  enjoyed  in  Cambridge  (see  Gordon  1990a:181-182), 
Ogden’s publicly avowed enthusiasm for significs soon waned. This 
may have contributed to the almost complete lack of explicit mention 
Welby received in Ogden’s later writings. Even during the period he 
publicly  supported  significs,  his  relationship  to  Welby  was  not 
without friction: Welby’s unwavering Christian belief did not sit well 
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with  him,  a  founding  member  and  president  of  the  Cambridge 
‘Heretics’, a student discussion group whose original purpose was to 
protest against compulsory student attendance at chapel, and which 
repeatedly  made  its  opposition  to  all  forms  of  institutionalised 
religion known (see Frank 2008). Welby specifically addressed this 
issue with Ogden, expressing her dislike of the name ‘Heretic’, ‘[f]or 
the  Heretic  in  the  last  resort  only  differs  and  objects’ (Welby  to 
Ogden,  5  May  1911,  Petrilli  2009:776,  and  quoted  p.742).  She 
continued to proclaim the importance of her religious convictions in 
her  correspondence with Ogden:  ‘As to  Religion! That  is  where I 
began. I found out that none of us knew where we were or what we 
were battling for at the very centre of life, that which ought to focus  
all our interests and powers’ (Welby to Ogden, 24 December 1910, 
in Petrilli 2009:771; emphasis original). Ogden did not back down, 
however. In a talk on significs, he commented: ‘Indeed, all who make 
any  study  of  the  problems  of  significs  must  find  themselves  in 
agreement with Ellen Key when she says that the most demoralizing 
factor  in  European  education  is  Christian  Religious  instruction’ 
(Ogden 1994[1911]:35).21 This is hardly a conclusion Welby would 
have endorsed (see further Petrilli 2009:742-743).
Welby’s significs, to the study of which the young Ogden applied 
himself, was essentially a theory of interpretation, but it was never 
just that. Growing originally out of Welby’s interests in theology and 
Biblical textual criticism, it came, like Rusell’s logical atomism, to 
encompass positions in metaphysics and epistemology (see Schmitz 
1985a:xxix). Welby saw meaning not just as a property of language, 
but as part of all human experience. She drew on a broad range of 
contemporary scholarship, from philosophy and psychology to 
biology and evolutionary theory, and wove this work into a rather 
idiosyncratic thesis.22
At the centre of significs stands the act of interpretation, which 
consists  in  an  interpreter  assimilating  what  is  said  to  their  own 
21 Ogden  was  presumably  referring  to  Ellen  Key  (1849–1926),  the  Swedish  feminist  and 
educational reformer.
22 Her uniqueness is undoubtedly a result of her lack of formal education, and renders her work 
difficult to those approaching it for the first time. For the uninitiated, her papers (such as 
Welby 1893; 1896; 1911) rather than her books offer the clearest exposition of her ideas. Her 
papers  are  more  restrained,  generally  treating  a  more  clearly  defined  topic  in  a  succinct  
fashion,  and  do  not  drift  off  into  the  wider  metaphysical,  epistemological  and  mystical 
concerns dealt with in her books (the two most important of which are Welby 1983[1903];  
1985[1911]). Exegeses of Welby’s works have multiplied in recent years, with her adoption 
by semioticians exploring the historical roots of their discipline (e.g., Petrilli 2009; Schmitz 
1985a).
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understanding of the world, built up through previous experience and 
informed by the present context. ‘We take his [the author’s] words, 
we take his phrases,’ writes Welby (1893:512-3), ‘we fill them out 
with that  same content  as  our own,  we make him mean precisely 
what we ourselves mean. And be it noted that it is always what we 
mean now. That this in any way varies from what we meant at some 
time when, e.g., our attention was differently focussed, rarely enters 
our  heads.’ There  can  therefore  be  no  ‘literal’ meaning  or  ‘Plain 
Meaning’. All language has a metaphorical quality; any expression 
that is not obviously metaphorical is simply so deeply engrained that 
its  metaphorical  character  is  no  longer  noticeable.23 ‘The  word 
“literal”  itself,’ points  out  Welby (1893:512) cleverly,  ‘is  indeed a 
case in point.  It  has rarely,  if  ever,  any reference to writing.’ Our 
inherited  language  necessarily  contains  an  accumulation  of  these 
dead metaphors. Even when we use the most direct, literal language 
we  can  muster,  we  cannot  avoid  evoking  the  assumptions  and 
associations fossilised, layer upon layer, in our language:
We all “compound for sins we are inclined to, By damning 
those we have no mind to.” Thus we are now freely banning as 
‘superstition’  the animistic and mythical beliefs of our 
forefathers. Yet all the while we retain these very associations 
in our inherited language, the surface-sense only being altered, 
and the old associations being unconsciously but coercively 
called up in the ‘subconscious’ region whence come the most 
powerful of our impulses and tendencies, since there act not 
merely the individual but the Race whose tradition he carries.
(Welby 1985[1911]:29-30; see also Welby 1893:515)
When unnoticed and unappreciated metaphor can lead to confusion, 
but  it is also  the very lifeblood of language and the only means we 
have to render comprehensible levels of experience and 
consciousness beyond the immediate. What is required is a mastery 
of metaphor; we must be conscious of its existence and operation and 
make it our servant (see Welby 1985[1911]:32). The practical method 
for achieving this mastery is ‘translation’, where we seek to restate 
what is said in terms of another view, thereby revealing which points 
of similarity targeted in a metaphor or analogy are real and which are 
merely  superficial  (Welby  1983[1903]:287-288,  130-138; 
‘translation’ is  first  used  in  manuscripts  from  1888,  see  Schmitz 
1985a:xxxvi):
23 The parallel to modern studies of conceptual metaphor based on Lakoff and Johnson (1980) is 
obvious.
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But there is a method both of discovering, testing, and using 
analogy (or in some cases homology), the value of which does 
not yet seem to be recognised ; and this may be called in an 
extended sense Translation. […] The mere attempt to state one 
subject in terms of another, to express one set of ideas in those 
words which seem to belong properly to another, changing only 
the leading terms, could not fail, if done systematically and 
critically, both to enlighten us on points of connection or 
correspondence which have not been suspected, and also, 
perhaps, to reveal ignorance in some cases where we have 
taken knowledge for granted. It would automatically sift the 
superficial and partial from the deep or complex likeness ; and 
it would lead to the recognition of a wide difference between 
the casual, the merely illustrative analogy, and that which 
indicated inter-relations not yet recognised and utilised.
(Welby 1983[1903]:126-8)
The proper application of translation depends on an understanding of 
the process of interpretation, which, in Welby’s final model, 
consisted of three stages, or levels of ‘expression-value’: ‘sense’, 
‘meaning’  and ‘significance’  (Welby  1983[1903]:2-9  et  passim). 
Triads occupied a special place in Welby’s thought. She wrote her 
first (unpublished) essay  about the triadic nature of the universe in 
1886 (reproduced in Petrilli 2009:177, 331-339), and a triadic model 
of meaning is found already in Part II of Welby (1896; e.g. p.187), 
but this is not identical to her mature model of 1903. In this  final 
model,  ‘sense’ is the immediate, unreflective response an interpreter 
has to a sign, ‘meaning’ the actual sense that the creator of the the 
sign wants to convey, and ‘significance’ the ultimate effect that the 
sign has (see Petrilli 2009:264-271; Schmitz 1985a):
(a) The first of these [levels of ‘expression-value’] at the outset 
would naturally be associated with Sense in its most primitive 
reference; that is, with the organic response to environment, 
and with the essentially expressive element in all experience. 
We ostracize the senseless in speech, and also ask “in what 
sense” a word is used or a statement may be justified.
(b) But “Sense”  is not in itself purpose; whereas that is the 
main character of the word “Meaning,”  which is properly 
reserved for the specific sense which it is intended to convey.
(c) As including sense and meaning but transcending them in 
range, and covering the far-reaching consequence, implication, 
ultimate  result  or  outcome of  some event  or  experience,  the 
term “Signficance” is usefully applied.
(Welby 1911:103)
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The feeling that Welby’s definitions are impressionistic would not be 
misguided: whether motivated by modesty or a genuine belief that 
her work was only preliminary, Welby insisted that her terms were 
not  intended to be precise,  but  simply a stimulus for future,  more 
systematic  studies,  a  point  Schmitz  (1985a:xciv)  highlights,  with 
reference  to  Welby’s  (18 November  1903,  in  Hardwick  1977:6-7) 
letter to Peirce: ‘You have observed that I have made no attempt at 
formal definition of the “triad of signification”. It seemed better to 
state it vaguely in as many ways as possible first […] in order that the 
very  inconsistencies,  apparent  or  real,  between  them,  may  be 
suggestive of the need of systematic study, and the rewards that this 
must bring.’ We see also in the framing of her terms that her theory 
aimed  to  be  much  more  than  simply  an  account  of  meaning  in 
language, or even necessarily an account of sign systems as they are 
typically understood. It was instead an account of how a  biological 
organism  responds  to  its  environment,  grounded  in  contemporary 
biological theory, especially Darwinism (see Petrilli 1999), and at this 
point where she broadened her scope her theory took on a  mystical 
aspect.24 To each level of expression-value she assigned a level of 
consciousness.  ‘Sense’,  the  direct  response  of  an  organism  to  its 
immediate,  earth-bound  environment,  corresponds  to  ‘planetary’ 
consciousness.  In this category belongs all knowledge we acquire 
from our senses of touch, smell, taste and hearing, as well as ideas we 
arrive at through inductive and deductive reasoning  (Welby 
1983[1903]:94). ‘Meaning’  corresponds  to  ‘solar’  consciousness. 
This is a consciousness that comes to us through ‘feeling’ – we can 
feel the heat of the sun – and through further reflection on what we 
24 A further mystical aspect to Welby’s thought, which lies at its base, hidden and unpublished, 
is her notion of the ‘mother-sense’ or ‘primal sense’, the force that drives interpretation, that  
causes us to pick out ‘sense’, ‘meaning’ and ‘significance’ from our environment. Although 
the  term  ‘mother-sense’ never  appeared  in  her  published  work,  Welby  elaborated  it  in 
manuscripts from 1904 and 1907, with suggestions of the concept going back to 1890 (see 
Schmitz 1985a:ccxxxvii-cclxvii, cccxxxvii; Petrilli 1999:53-61; chapter 6 of Petrilli 2009 for 
reproductions of the manuscripts with commentary).  The mother-sense is the complement of  
the intellect; it makes an interpretation of experience while the intellect constructs rational, 
logical schemes. This term remained a point of unresolved disagreement between Welby and 
her academic supporters – in particular the pragmatic philosopher Ferdinand Canning Scott 
Schiller and the founder of the Dutch significs movement Frederik van Eeden – which may 
explain why it never found its way into her published writings. They objected to the overt  
femininity of the term, which Welby strenuously defended, claiming: ‘[T]he dominant Man 
with his imperious intellect has for uncounted ages stamped down their [women’s] original 
gift: all the activities beyond the nursery (and, alas, there also, now) are masculinised […] the 
whole social order is laid down, prescribed for the woman on masculine lines only’ (Welby to 
Schiller, October 1907, in Schmitz 1985a:ccxlix-ccl and Petrilli 2009:634). Although she was 
by  no  means  a  conventional  feminist  –  like  her  namesake  Queen  Victoria,  she  had  no 
sympathy  for  the  suffragettes,  the  contemporary  vanguard  of  political  feminism  (see 
Chipchase 1990:39) – Welby clearly possessed her own feminist sensibilities.
50
have acquired at the ‘planetary’  level: it ‘answers to the scientific 
activities, made possible by the leisure and protection of civilisation, 
and stimulated by more and more complex demands upon brainwork’ 
(Welby 1983[1903]:96). It is the ability to divine ‘meaning’ through 
our ‘solar’  consciousness that sets humans apart from other living 
organisms: ‘The whole animal “kingdom” (if not also the plant order) 
shares the sense-world : the advent of the sense of meaning –  the 
highest kind of sense –  marks a new departure : it opens the 
distinctively human era’ (Welby  1983[1903]:28).  Completing  the 
triad is ‘cosmic’ consciousness,  corresponding to ‘significance’, and 
coming to us through sight, ‘the only sense by which we respond to 
the  sidereal  universe’  (Welby  1983[1903]:30;  see  also  Schmitz 
1985a:xciii-cviii).25
While the more mystical aspects of Welby’s doctrines may not find 
expression in  The Meaning of Meaning, her model of interpretation 
with its  three levels  of  expression-value almost  certainly informed 
Ogden and Richards’ functional  approach to  language.  Ogden and 
Richards’ emotive function, in supplying language with what from a 
present-day  perspective  would  be  called  a  pragmatic  dimension, 
evokes Welby’s concerns with effects created by utterances. Indeed, 
realisation of the multifaceted uses of language and the prototypes of 
Ogden  and  Richards’  later  functions  can  be  found  in  Ogden’s 
(1994[1911])  ‘Progress  of  Significs’  manuscript,  providing  the 
missing  link  between  significs  and  the  ‘science  of  Symbolism’. 
Ogden (1994[1911]:23) writes: ‘As soon as we can locate the place of 
words  in  the  Hierarchy  of  signs  –  Demonstrative,  Expressive, 
Suggestive, Substitute, Natural, Fixational, Aritificial, Social, and so 
on, it will be found that words and consequently Language fall into 
more than one of the groups. And hence we ought not to speak of 
Language vaguely as a whole […]’
Ogden and Richards’ method of definition, their remedy for the 
potential  confusions of  language,  further  reveals  Welby’s enduring 
25 Peirce,  who in later  years  shared a similar  mystical  bent  (see,  for  example,  chapter  9  of 
Hookway 1985), saw in Welby’s division of ‘sense’, ‘meaning’ and ‘significance’ his own 
scheme  of  ‘immediate  interpretant’,  ‘dynamical  interpretant’ and  ‘final  interpretant’.  He 
commented: ‘[…] I had not realized, before reading it [Welby (1911)], how fundamental your 
trichotomy of Sense, Meaning and Significance really is. It is not to be expected that concepts  
of such importance should get  perfectly defined for a long time. […] I now find that my 
division [of the three kinds of Interpretant] nearly coincides with yours,  as it  ought to do  
exactly, if both are correct’ (Peirce to Welby, 14 March 1909, in Hardwick 1977:109; cited by 
Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:287-288; see also Schmitz 1983:126). The only major point 
of difference Peirce could see is that he conceived of his ‘dynamical interpretant’ as the effect 
actually produced on the hearer, which is not necessarily the effect intended by the speaker, as 
in Welby’s ‘meaning’.
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influence. Unlike Russell and Wittgenstein, who sought to legislate a 
new, unambiguous form for language, Welby saw significs as part of 
a program of training to cultivate  –  through  such  methods  as 
‘translation’, which she also called ‘definition’ (see Petrilli 2009:560) 
–  awareness  of  the  process  of  interpretation,  all  with  the  goal  of 
improving our communication with one another:
Significs […] must therefore be considered first as a method of 
mental  training,  which,  though  implied  in  all  true  views  of 
education,  is  not  yet  practically  recognised or  systematically 
applied.  In  a  special  sense,  it  aims  at  the  concentration  of 
intellectual activities on that which we tacitly assume to be the 
main  value  of  all  study,  and  vaguely  call  ‘meaning.’  Its 
instructive and disciplinary value must be secondary to this, as 
they are both ultimately dependent upon it.
(Welby 1983[1903]:83)
Ogden  and  Richards’  method  of  definition  could  be  seen  as  a 
practical  implementation  of  this  call.  It  aimed  to  sharpen 
interlocutors’ understanding of each other’s terms by making them 
negotiate their meanings; there is no single ideal definition, as there is 
a single ‘description’ or ‘picture’ for Russell  and Wittgenstein (see 
section  4):  correspondence may  be  desirable  and  achievable  in 
‘scientific symbol systems’, but it is not found in ordinary language, 
which  ‘los[es]  in  accuracy  but gain[s]  in  plasticity,  facility  and 
convenience’,  as  Ogden  and  Richards  (1989[1923]:254-255)  say. 
This  approach  also  has  its  prototype  in  Ogden’s  (1994[1911]) 
‘Progress of Significs’ manuscript, all in terms uncannily similar to 
those in The Meaning of Meaning. In a critique of word-magic avant 
la  lettre,  Ogden  (1994[1911]:21-22)  discoursed  at  length  on  the 
power of words, using many examples that reappear in chapter 1 of 
The Meaning of Meaning – naming taboos, magical spells, and so on 
– and proposing the same remedies: the avoidance of ‘Unfortunates’, 
incurably confusing words (Ogden 1994[1911]:25ff), and some form 
of definition as a way of becoming clear about meanings; although 
the method to be employed is not specified in the kind of detail found 
in  The  Meaning  of  Meaning  (Gordon,  in  his  notes  to  Ogden 
1994[1911], indicates further parallels). Even if these ideas are not 
entirely part of the classical conception of significs Welby held, they 
were certainly present in Ogden’s mind during his period of informal 
tutelage under Welby, and he saw them as being inspired by her work. 
Gordon (1990a) describes Ogden’s efforts here and in The Meaning 
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of Meaning as an attempt to create an ‘applied significs’, perhaps not 
precisely as Welby would have conceived it, but in her spirit.
7. Antagonism and synthesis
The Meaning  of  Meaning,  as  we  have  seen,  attempted  to  forge  a 
synthesis between the main theses of Welby’s significs and Russell’s 
logical atomism. From Welby there is the focusing of attention on the 
act  of  interpretation,  the  insistence  that  every  meaning  must  be 
negotiated in a dialectical fashion. But Welby’s vague, and at times 
mystical, formulations are replaced in The Meaning of Meaning with 
explanations based on the latest psychological theories and outlines 
of  concrete  procedures  for  analysing  and  controlling  meaning, 
directly  inspired,  as  we  have  shown,  by  Russell’s  work.  This 
synthesis,  however,  could  not  be  taken  for  granted:  there  was  a 
certain amount of antagonism between Welby and Russell, and the 
doctrines they represented. 
In  the first  years  of  the  twentieth century,  Welby,  ever  keen to 
widen her circle of scholarly contacts, engaged Russell in dialogue 
over  his  early  logicist  work  and  theory  of  descriptions.  Russell, 
however,  was  largely  uninterested  and  dismissive  of  Welby’s 
overtures. His antagonism may have been an extension of his fight 
against the idealist English  philosophical establishment  (see section 
4; chapters 4-6 of Russell 1959), which drew him into a debate within 
the mainstream of academic philosophy in which he later had to face 
many queries and criticisms similar to those already raised by Welby. 
But  in  the  mainstream debate,  in  contrast  to  his  discussions  with 
Welby, Russell was compelled to reply. We therefore see in Russell 
and  Welby’s  correspondence  a  first  confrontation  of  two  very 
different approaches to related problems, and the opening words of a 
debate  that  would  continue,  with  other  participants,  well  into  the 
twentieth century. In this subsequent debate Russell remained firm in 
preserving the sanctity of his formalisms. A very different route was 
taken by Wittgenstein, who made a radical reappraisal of his earlier 
views.
The Meaning of Meaning, as a synthesis of Welby and Russell’s 
ideas,  could  have  been  received  as  a  mediator  between  these 
positions, but instead it was initially dismissed by leading analytic 
philosophers, Russell and Wittgenstein included. It would be another 
twenty years before it was accorded a place, and a minor one at that, 
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in  the  mainstream,  due  mostly  to  the  efforts  of  the  American 
philosopher  Charles  Leslie  Stevenson  (1908–1979) and,  by 
extension, the English philosopher  Alfred Jules Ayer (1910–1989). 
Stevenson saw in Ogden and Richards’ book a possible precedent for 
the emerging  philosophy  of  ‘emotivism’,  analytic  philosophy’s 
answer to  the problem of non-referential  language.  It  was another 
twenty years again, after a rift had opened up between the Cambridge 
analytic camp and the Oxford ‘ordinary language’ camp (see chapter 
3  of  Baldwin  2001  for  a  standard  account),  before  an  acceptable 
synthesis  similar  to  Ogden  and  Richards’  –  but  independently 
formulated  –  appeared,  which  granted  logicians  their  proposition 
while accounting for the problems of interpretation.
The issues that divided these two camps are visible in Welby and 
Russell’s correspondence, which commenced in 1903, with a letter 
from Welby written after she read Russell’s (1903) first logicist work, 
Principles  of  Mathematics,  and  continued  until  1910  (the 
correspondence is reproduced with commentary in Petrilli 2009:294-
301,  310-325;  see  also  Schmitz  1995;  1985a:clix-clx  for 
commentary). Most notable among the topics Welby raised in this 
period  is  a  critique  of  Russell’s  theory  of  descriptions  from  the 
perspective  of  significs.  The  division  between  knowledge  by 
acquaintance  and  knowledge  by  description  neglects  ‘awareness’, 
argued Welby. The theory of descriptions is too narrow: it deals only 
with the ‘sense’ (in Welby’s scheme; see section 6) of an  utterance. 
The crucial aspect of an utterance like ‘The present King of France is 
bald’ is the speaker’s intention to show that it is nonsense; this is its 
‘meaning’, says Welby:
 
I do not here raise the question of whether we should not gain 
by always using “meaning” in its immediate or central sense of 
intention: in which speaking of the “present King of France” as 
bald, we intend to convey what is sheer mistake or sheer 
nonsense. That is, it is not meaningless (or purposeless) but 
senseless. 
(Welby to Russell, 14 November 1905, in Petrilli 2009:321, 
also in Schmitz 1985a:clxii; emphasis original)
Russell’s response to Welby’s critique is polite but dismissive. He 
felt that she has missed the point: his concern was simply with logical 
language and what can be referred to in it, and all other features of 
natural language are  simply irrelevant. The theory of descriptions is 
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not about ‘...intention, but something logical; I do not know quite 
how to explain what it is that I intend, & I think perhaps I could 
excise the word meaning with advantage, as I do not intend what you 
intend when you use the word, & your use seems more correct than 
mine’ (Russell  to Welby, 25 November 1905, in Petrilli  2009:322, 
also  in  Schmitz  1985a:clxii;  emphasis  original).  Their 
correspondence on this topic continued in a similar fashion until  the 
end of the year: Welby raised further considerations and Russell 
politely dismissed them as irrelevant to his interests. Behind Russell’s 
rejection of Welby is more than simply a logical point; it is also a 
matter of temperament. Welby’s broad-ranging and discursive style 
and her frequent invocations of mysticism and intuition would have 
hardly  appealed  to  the  rational,  scientific  crusader  Russell.  Even 
Peirce, one of Welby’s staunchest public supporters, commented in 
his double review of Russell (1903) and Welby (1903) – in which 
Welby’s  book  received  a  much  more  favourable  recommendation 
than  Russell’s  –  that  Welby’s  ‘is  a  feminine  book,  and  a  too 
masculine  mind  might  think  parts  of  it  painfully  weak’  (Peirce 
1977[1903]:308).  Neither  would  have  Welby’s  evasive  style  of 
argumentation  endeared her  to  Russell:  harnessing the  convictions 
that motivate significs, she would often insist that an argument was 
the result  of  misunderstanding rather  than a  genuine  difference  of 
opinion (an observation that Chipchase 1985:50 makes on her style of 
argumentation).
Russell’s  reception  of  Welby  was,  however,  not  completely 
negative.  On the cover sheet to his collection of letters from Welby, 
he wrote:  ‘From Lady Welby who helped to  turn  my attention  to 
linguistic  problems’  (reported  in  Petrilli  1988:80).  But  these 
concessions and Russell’s unimpeachable politeness towards her may 
merely be due to the dictates of gallantry. In his other correspondence 
Russell was much more candid about his feelings towards her. To the 
English mathematician Philip Jourdain (1879–1919) he wrote: 
Many thanks for your amusing letter about Lady Welby. […] I 
have in the past been very nearly rude to her, in refusing to go 
there [her home], because I found it was quite impossible to be 
sincere  if  I  saw  her.  I  think  it  is  very  wrong  of  all  these 
philosophers to encourage her as they do, and I don’t want to 
be a party to it ; at the same time, when one is with her, one 
can’t be as rude as truth requires.
(Russell to Jourdain, between March and October 1908, quoted 
in Grattan-Guinness 1977:111)
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Russell’s reception of  The Meaning of Meaning  followed the same 
lines as his treatment of Welby’s overtures: he was quick to dismiss 
it, without engaging with it in any great depth.  In his review of the 
first  edition  Russell  described  it as  ‘undoubtedly  important  and 
valuable’ (Russell 1923), and in his review of the second edition as 
‘of  considerable  importance’  (Russell  1926:114),  but  he  still 
concluded:
Whether it achieves all it professes to achieve, I have found it 
impossible to decide. If it does so, it is of first-class 
philosophical importance. The authors, however, seem a trifle 
too prone to believe that every question would be easy if the 
wilful obscurities of metaphysicians were swept aside, and this 
makes their discussion sometimes seem a little perfunctory. It is 
to be hoped that future elaborations of the theory will enable us 
to judge whether this is a defect in their thought or only an 
impatience in their manner of exposition.
(Russell 1923:137)
Russell’s assessment of The Meaning of Meaning applied also to the 
person  of  Ogden,  it  would  seem.  Five  years  after  Ogden’s  death, 
Russell commented in 1962 that he was ‘the cleverest man that had 
been at Magdalene since Pepys,’ but added: ‘To be the cleverest man 
at Magdalene since Pepys is no very great praise, because it was not a 
college  that  went  in  for  intellect,  particularly  –  it  was  a  sporting 
college’ (see Anderson 1977:235).
Russell’s assessment of The Meaning of Meaning and Ogden came 
after  almost  two  decades  of  defending  his  doctrines  against 
objections similar to Welby’s and those of her supporters within the 
English  philosophical  establishment.  In  connection  with  the 
publication of his original 1905 paper on the theory of descriptions, 
Russell (1959:83) tells us: ‘This doctrine [the theory of descriptions] 
struck the then editor [of Mind] as so preposterous that he begged me 
to reconsider it and not to demand its publication as it stood.’ This 
editor was G.F. Stout, who in preceding years had encouraged Welby 
to publish in Mind and co-authored a paper with her (see section 6). 
Russell  does  not  tell  us  why  the  doctrine  struck  Stout  as 
‘preposterous’ but  it  is  possible  that  his  reasons  were  related  to 
Welby’s.  A decade  and  a  half  later  Russell  had  to  face  further 
objections,  which  he  met  with  detailed  and  reasoned  rebuttals.  In 
1920  Mind  organised a ‘symposium’ on the ‘meaning of  meaning’, 
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involving  Russell,  the  idealist  philosopher  and  Welby  supporter 
F.C.S.  Schiller,  and  Harold  Henry  Joachim  (1868–1938),  another 
idealist philosopher (Schiller, Russell and Joachim 1920; with further 
discussion in Schiller 1921, Strong 1921, Sidgwick 1921).  Schiller 
charged,  in  terms  reminiscent  of  Welby,  that  there  must  be  some 
interpretive force that  creates meaning,  for  which Russell  gave no 
account. Meaning, says Schiller (1920:389), is ‘essentially an activity 
or attitude taken up towards objects by a subject or energetically 
projected into them like an α particle, until they, too, grow active and 
begin to radiate with “meaning”’. Russell (ibid.:398) countered that 
he never claimed that meaning is ‘an intrinsic property inherent in 
objects’  but rather the ‘causal efficacy of that which has meaning’, 
by  which  he  meant  the  response  that  a  particular  stimulus  brings 
forth. Here Russell introduced his pseudo-behaviourist model, which 
still left a place for ‘images’ (see section 4).
Russell’s  ‘causal  efficacy’ is  not  intrinsically  incompatible  with 
significs and allied doctrines. As the direct response of an organism 
to  its  environment,  it  is  essentially  equivalent  to  Welby’s  ‘sense’. 
Ogden and Richards’ use of ‘engrams’ as the psychological element 
creating references (see section 2) can similarly be assimilated to this 
group of  ideas.  The irreconcilable  difference  between  Russell  and 
Welby’s approaches arises with Russell’s introduction of descriptions, 
which seek to be unique and unambiguous, to eschew interpretation 
and capture what Welby would call ‘Plain Meaning’. In attempting to 
eliminate interpretation by legislating linguistic form, Russell – and 
for  that  matter  the early Wittgenstein – made a return to Cratylan 
linguistic naturalism (see Jowett 1892). Russell not only believed that 
it  is  possible  to  create  unambiguous  forms,  he  also  believed  that 
words originally matched what they name and have become obscured 
over time. He put his faith in philology, which may yet be able to 
undo the changes and reconstruct the original forms: 
If we trace any Indo-European language back far enough, we 
arrive hypothetically (at any rate according to some authorities) 
at the stage when language consisted only of the roots out of 
which subsequent words have grown. How these roots acquired 
their  meanings  is  not  known,  but  a  conventional  origin  is 
clearly just as mythical as the social contract by which Hobbes 
and Rousseau supposed civil government to have been 
established. We can hardly suppose a parliament of hitherto 
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speechless elders meeting together and agreeing to call a cow a 
cow and a wolf a wolf. The association of words with their 
meaning must have grown up by some natural process, though 
at present the nature of the process is unknown.
 (Russell 1921:189-90)
Despite his naturalism, Russell respected the ambiguity of ordinary 
language;  it  is  an  essential  feature  that  makes  communication 
possible:
When one person uses a word, he does not mean by it the same 
thing as another person means by it. I have often heard it said 
that  this  is  a  misfortune.  That  is  a  mistake.  It  would  be 
absolutely fatal if people meant the same things by their words. 
It  would  make  all  intercourse  impossible,  and  language  the 
most  hopeless  and  useless  thing  imaginable  […] We should 
have to talk only about logic – a not wholly undesirable result.
(Russell 1918-1919:174; see also ibid.:176; 1923b)
The  difference  between  Russell  and  Welby,  and  one  one  of  the 
reasons  why  he  would  reject  the  kind  of  synthesis  Ogden  and 
Richards attempted, is that he saw his ‘logically perfect language’ as 
distinct from ordinary natural language. The words of the logically 
perfect  language  Russell  strove  for  could  only  describe  each 
individual’s  sense-data;  it  would  be  an  entirely  private  language 
through  which  we  could  communicate  nothing  to  other  people 
(Russell 1918-1919:176; cf. Russell 1923a). This is a complex stance 
on  language  and  meaning.  Although  he  believed  in  a  naturalistic 
origin of language, Russell saw the historical departure of language 
from this naturalism as an inevitable result of how it functions. In his 
logical  work  he  hoped  to  restore  this  naturalism  by  establishing 
isomorphy of form and meaning, but his logically perfect language 
was  intended  only  for  scientific  and  philosophical  purposes;  the 
ambiguity of ordinary language is an essential property. In the theory 
of  descriptions  Russell  was  concerned,  as  he  insisted  in  his 
correspondence  with  Welby,  specifically  with  ‘something  logical’, 
not  with  language  altogether.  ‘Logicians,’  pointed  out  Russell 
(1919:7), ‘so far as I know, have done very little towards explaining 
the nature of this relation called “meaning,” nor are they to blame in 
this, since the problem is essentially one for psychology’ (cf. Russell 
1959[1924]:44-45).  Whether  it  is  in  fact  possible  to  construct  a 
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notation  that  escapes  from  the  vagaries  of  natural  languages  and 
approaches ‘Plain Meaning’ is, however, still a valid question.
Even though Russell  strove for a logically perfect language and 
found it ‘impossible to decide’ whether The Meaning of Meaning in 
fact answered the questions it raised, he was at least impressed by 
those questions, whether or not he was consciously aware of it.  In 
later  years,  his  rhetoric  came  ever  more  to  resemble  Ogden  and 
Richards’ description of word-magic:
Words  have been objects of superstitious awe. The man who 
knew his enemy’s name could, by means of it, acquire magic 
powers over him. We still use such phrases as ‘in the name of 
the Law’. It is easy to assent to the statement ‘in the beginning 
was the Word’.
(Russell 1940:23)
 
In chapter 2 of The Meaning of Meaning, a twenty-page catalogue of 
instances  of  word-magic,  we  find  examples  comparable  to  those 
Russell raised (see in particular Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:26-
30). Russell’s words above recall the opening lines of this chapter: 
From the earliest time the Symbols which men have used to aid 
the process of thinking and to record their achievements have 
been a continuous source of wonder and illusion. The whole 
human race has been impressed by the properties of words as 
instruments for the control of objects, that in every age it has 
attributed to them occult powers […]
(Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:24)
Russell’s absorption of the approach Ogden and Richards cultivated 
extended to accepting a multifunctional model of natural language in 
his later work, but he never allowed ordinary language to encroach on 
his  logical  formalisms.  Russell  (1940:204;  cf.  ibid:53-55;  1926) 
endorsed a functional model of language with three purposes: ‘(1) to 
indicate facts, (2) to express the state of the speaker, (3) to alter the 
state of the hearer’, each of which may be more or less present in 
sentences of  different  types.  But the problem remained always for 
Russell  ‘something logical’: ‘The question of truth and falsehood,’ 
insisted  Russell  (1940:212),  ‘has  to  do  with  what  words  and 
sentences indicate, not with what they express.’ 
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But Russell had to answer once again criticisms of his theory of 
descriptions  from a  pragmatic  perspective,  this  time coming  from 
Peter  F.  Strawson  (1919–2006),  a  proponent  of  Oxford  ordinary 
language  philosophy.  With  arguments  reminiscent  of  those  Welby 
used  half  a  century  before  (a  similarity  noticed  also  by  Schmitz 
1995:301-303),  Strawson  (1950),  addressing  Russell’s  theory  of 
descriptions,  insisted  that  it  is  necessary  to  consider  how  an 
expression  is  used  to  make  a  reference  rather  than  the  formal 
properties  of  the  expression  itself. Russell’s  (1959[1957])  rebuttal 
recalls his reply to Welby in all but tone; it is more polemical than 
polite.  He  contended  that  Strawson  has  confused  the  problem  of 
descriptions  with  ‘egocentricity’,  that  is,  the  variation  in  basic 
ostension  through  language  because  of  differences  in  experience. 
Russell believed that the two problems are separate and that in fact 
descriptions provide us with a way to overcome the variation due to 
egocentricity  by  giving  us  access  to  data  beyond  our  immediate 
senses. He reiterated, a final time, his goal of the logically perfect 
language, a language divorced from the ambiguity and vagueness of 
ordinary language, two features indispensable in ‘daily life’ but not 
suitable to the purposes of science:
This brings me to a fundamental divergence between myself 
and many philosophers with whom Mr Strawson appears to be 
in general agreement. They are persuaded that common speech 
is good enough, not only for daily life, but also for philosophy. 
I, on the contrary, am persuaded that common speech is full of 
vagueness and inaccuracy, and that any attempt to be precise 
and accurate requires modification as regards vocabulary and 
as regards syntax. Everybody admits that physics and chemistry 
and  medicine  each  require  a  language  which  is  not  that  of 
everyday life. I fail to see why philosophy, alone, should be 
forbidden to make a  similar  approach towards  precision and 
accuracy.
(Russell 1959[1957]:241-242)
The  Oxford  ordinary  language  philosophy  that  Russell  found  so 
objectionable had its origins in the later teachings of Wittgenstein. 
Although, as we have seen, initially aligned with Russell  and also 
engaged, as Russell (1922) claimed, in the search for the ‘logically 
perfect  language’,26 he began to question the possibility  of  such a 
26 F.P. Ramsey – the principal translator of the Tractatus into English and friend to Wittgenstein 
– in fact even denied that finding the ‘logically perfect language’ was Wittgenstein’s aim in  
the Tractatus, claiming instead that he was concerned with the functioning of all languages 
(Ramsey  1923:465).  This  view is  possibly  buttressed  by  Wittgenstein’s  reactions  against 
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language and turned to investigations of language in use in the later 
1920s and 30s (see Wittgenstein 1958; Waismann 1979). When The 
Meaning  of  Meaning  appeared,  one  year  after  the  Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein  was  unimpressed.  To  Wittgenstein  Ogden  sent  a 
complimentary  copy  of  the  book,  which  prompted  the  following 
response: ‘[…] I have not been able to read your book thoroughly. I 
have however read in it and I think I ought to confess to you frankly 
that I believe you have not quite  caught the problems  which – for 
instance – I  was at  in my book (whether  or  not  I  have given the 
correct solution)’ (Wittgenstein to Ogden, March 1923, in von Wright 
1973:69; emphasis original). In a letter to Russell, Wittgenstein was 
even more candid: ‘Is it [The Meaning of Meaning] not a miserable 
book?! Philosophy is not as easy as that! From this one sees how easy 
it  is to write a thick book’ (Wittgenstein to Russell,  7 April  1923, 
quoted  in  Monk  1990:214).27 Frank  P.  Ramsey  tried  to  console 
Wittgenstein, who was greatly irritated by Russell’s apparent support 
for  The Meaning of Meaning:  Russell,  Ramsey claimed, ‘does not 
really think The Meaning of Meaning important, but he wants to help 
Ogden by encouraging the sale of it’ (Ramsey to Wittgenstein,  20 
February 1924, in von Wright 1973:84). Ramsey’s (1924) own short 
review of The Meaning of Meaning was not particularly flattering.
Wittgenstein’s  final  statement  on  language,  contained in  the 
posthumous  Wittgenstein  (1953),  no  longer  treats  language  as a 
mirror for reflecting the world, but as an activity, a ‘game’, in which 
people participate (ibid.:§7), and not a single game, but a series of 
games,  each related to the other  but not sharing a single common 
property that unites them all (ibid:§67). There is no longer a complete 
analysis of an expression that shows its meaning (ibid.:§46-49, 60, 
91), but ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ (ibid.:§43). 
The  possibility  of  a  logically  perfect  language  is  denied  and 
examination of  interpretation in ordinary language is  raised to  the 
utmost significance:28 
constructed international languages a few years later (see chapter 4, section 5).
27 Ogden and Richards would seem to have taken this rebuff to heart.  Over fifty years later 
Richards (1977:102; see also Brower 1973:26) claimed that the only value he and Ogden 
could  see  in  Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus  was as  a  ‘plainly  [...]  magnificent  specimen of  the 
unintelligible,  certain  to  be  the  occasion  of  rich  misunderstandings  of  the  sort  we  were  
studying’. This assessment ignores the common elements in The Meaning of Meaning and the 
Tractatus  that  we have observed,  as  well  as  other  common points  that  emerged  between 
Richards and Wittgenstein’s theorising. Richards (1926:45), for instance, went on to adopt 
Wittgenstein’s  (1922:prop.  6.54)  distinction  between  ‘saying’ and  ‘showing’ as  a  way  of 
characterising the distinction between symbolic and emotive language, although even here he 
tried to distance himself from Wittgenstein somewhat (cf. Richards 1926:53-54, note 2).
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[L]ogic does not deal with language – or thought – in the sense 
that science deals with a natural phenomenon, and the most one 
can say is that we construct ideal languages. But here the word 
“ideal”  would  be  misleading,  because  it  sounds  as  if  this 
language  would  be  better,  more  perfect,  than  our  everyday 
language; and as if it  were needed for the logician to finally 
show people what a correct proposition looks like.
(Wittgenstein 1953:§81)
Russell  was not  swayed by Wittgenstein’s later views in any way. 
Russell  (1959:216)  claimed  that  Wittgenstein’s  later  doctrines 
‘remain to me completely unintelligible’ (although he did find use for 
some aspects of them, e.g. Russell 1940:330). In mainstream analytic 
philosophy, reconciliation between what became the two poles of a 
semantic and a pragmatic approach to language emerged only in the 
1960s  through  the  work  of the  English  philosopher  Herbert  Paul 
Grice (1913–1988). His breakthrough was to distinguish between the 
logicians’ literal meaning and ‘implicatures’,  the meaning intended 
and  taken  away  by  participants  in  a  discourse,  determined  by  a 
mixture of cultural conventions and factors specific to the context. 
This granted the logicians their literal meaning but then modulated it 
through pragmatics,  all  the  while  appealing  to  logicians’ sense  of 
rigour by positing ‘maxims’ that constrained pragmatics (see Grice 
1961;  chapter  2  of  Grice  1989,  based  on material  from 1967;  cf. 
chapter 3 of Baldwin 2001). In Grice’s maxims – which are intended 
to  be  descriptive,  but  which  have  a  normative  character  in  being 
expressed as imperatives – we can perhaps hear  the faint  echo of 
Ogden and Richards’ canons of symbolism, which similarly sought to 
specify the conditions under which references are to be made.
The only explicit recognition  The Meaning of Meaning  found in 
contemporary analytic philosophy came for the distinction it makes 
between  symbolic  and  emotive  language.  Stevenson  (1944:33),  in 
identifying what he called the ‘descriptive’ and ‘emotive’ aspects of 
meaning in language, cited Ogden and Richards’ distinction between 
the  symbolic  and  emotive  functions,  a  distinction  that  became  a 
central  pillar  of  his  theory  of  ethics:  he  even  quotes  Ogden  and 
Richards (1923) in the opening leaf of his book. Disagreements over 
moral  and  ethical  questions,  according  to  Stevenson,  generally 
involve  both  difference  in  beliefs  and differences  in  attitudes:  the 
28 Some recent scholarship, such as Nolan (1990) and Pietarinen (2009), postulates the influence 
of Welby’s work and her followers on Wittgenstein’s later views. Unfortunately, due to a lack 
of explicit  documentary evidence in this area,  such suggestions remain rather speculative, 
although highly compelling. 
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former are matters of fact expressed in ‘descriptive’ terms, while the 
latter are matters of feeling expressed in ‘emotive’ terms. Although 
Stevenson  (1944:8-11)  criticised  Richards  (1926[1924])  for  later 
collapsing the distinction between belief and attitude, making both a 
matter of belief amenable to empirical psychological investigation, he 
praised Ogden and Richards (1923) for first establishing it. Stevenson 
(1944:265-268 et passim) counted Ogden and Richards (1923) among 
those  who  would  now  be  considered  early  analytic  philosophers, 
citing them alongside Ayer (1936), Russell (1925; 1935) and Rudolf 
Carnap (1935) as a source of inspiration. Ayer (1936) – specifically 
chapter 6, ‘critique of ethics and theology’ – has in turn acquired the 
reputation of a foundational text in the ‘emotive theory of value’, as 
Ayer (1955[1936]:20) retrospectively called it in the second edition. 
He acknowledged Stevenson’s (1944) achievement in giving ‘a more 
detailed  analysis  of  specimen  ethical  judgements’  (Ayer 
1955[1936]:20), but nowhere mentioned Ogden and Richards.
The Meaning of Meaning  represents an early effort at forming a 
synthesis of the logical and semiotic approaches to meaning, although 
the effort was little appreciated by the leaders of the logical school at 
the  time.  Russell,  who  was  already  engaged  in  defending  his 
doctrines against the encroachment of interpretative concerns raised 
by Welby and her supporters, saw little value in Ogden and Richards’ 
attempts.  Wittgenstein,  too,  was  unimpressed.  Although  he 
acknowledged many of the points raised by his opponents, and came 
to talk in terms uncannily reminiscent of  The Meaning of Meaning, 
Russell maintained his hard line in searching for the logically perfect 
language, commenting that ‘it is not impossible to whittle away the 
element of interpretation, or to invent an artificial language involving 
a  minimum  of  theory.  By  these  methods  we  can  approach 
asymptotically to the pure datum’ (Russell 1940:124). Wittgenstein, 
however,  departed  from  such  views  and  arrived  at  the  opposite 
extreme,  providing  inspiration  to  the  ‘ordinary  language’  camp, 
which Russell continued to rebuff with similar arguments. It was only 
in the 1960s that the two sides were brought together again within 
mainstream analytic philosophy, due to the efforts of Grice, whose 
maxims  of  conversation  may  remind  us  of  Ogden  and  Richards’ 
canons  of  symbolism.  The  only  explicit  recognition  that  The 
Meaning  of  Meaning  achieved  within  the  mainstream  came  from 
Stevenson, who  accorded  them  a  place  in  the  development  of 
emotivism.
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8. Philologists, psychologists and anthropologists
Welby and her theory of significs may form the personal link between 
Ogden and the beginnings of the modern semiotic tradition, but she 
was not alone in developing doctrines of this type. Among others – 
philologists, psychologists and anthropologists – similar ideas about 
the interpretation of signs, communication as action, and the role of 
emotions were finding expression, and Ogden and Richards were not 
deaf to these voices.
The Meaning of Meaning is today remembered not only for Ogden 
and Richards’ text, but also for the platform it provided to the Anglo-
Polish  anthropologist  Malinowski,  whose  contribution  to  the  book 
(Malinowski 1989[1923]), one of two ‘supplements’ appended to the 
end, presents his own functional model of language and ties it into 
Ogden and Richards’. Malinowski’s supplement took shape alongside 
Ogden and Richards’ final text: in the lead-up to the publication of 
The Meaning of Meaning, shortly after his return from a half-decade 
field trip to the Trobriand Islands of New Guinea, Malinowski was a 
regular visitor to Ogden’s apartment (see Richards 1977:104; see also 
Young 2004). The convergence that we see between his views and 
Ogden and Richards’ no doubt owed much to their discussions during 
these visits.
Malinowski (1989[1923]:206-209) endorsed Ogden and Richards’ 
concept  of  ‘sign-situation’ and  widened  it  in  his  own  ‘context  of 
situation’ to encompass not only the immediate discourse context, but 
also  the  entire  culture  of  the  speech  community,  a  necessary 
extension  for  an  anthropologist  trying  to  make  sense  of  an  alien 
people. Malinowski then embraced Ogden and Richards’ functional 
model, identifying three uses of language in which various functions 
predominate  to  greater  and  lesser  degrees.  In  the  first  of  these, 
‘speech in action’, language is used to the direct pragmatic end of co-
ordinating an activity, such as a hunting or fishing expedition, and 
here reference predominates.  In the next,  ‘narrative discourse’,  the 
referents  are  displaced and,  even though the narrative depends on 
there being a possibly existing situation that it recounts, the ‘emotive’ 
effect of the tale on the listeners is more important than any reference 
to  the  world.  Finally,  language  becomes  wholly  detached  from 
reference in the ‘phatic communion’, the meaningless trivialities and 
gossip  exchanged  to  break  the  silence  and  establish  amicable 
relations,  such  as  greetings,  enquiries  about  one  another’s  health, 
discussion of the weather, and so on (Malinowski 1989[1923]:309-
316;  see  also  Malinowski  1935;  Schmidt  1984).  These  are  the 
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fundamental  uses  of  language,  most  visible  in  ‘primitive’ 
communities,  but  serving still  as the basis of  speech in ‘civilised’ 
societies.  The  decontextualised,  purely  referential  use  of  language 
characterised  by  Ogden  and  Richards’  ‘symbolic  function’, 
Malinowski (1989[1923]:321-323 et passim) argued, is derivative of 
these three fundamental uses and occurs only at the more advanced 
levels of linguistic and intellectual development found in the Indo-
European languages, and even then only among the more educated 
members  of  a  society.  ‘The  illiterate  members  of  civilized 
communities  treat  and  regard  words  very  much  as  savages  do,’ 
observed  Malinowski  (1989[1923]:323).  Here  he  treats  ‘Indo-
European’  as  a  more  advanced  phylogenetic  stage,  somewhere 
beyond the ‘primitive’, rather than as a developmentally value-free 
linguistic grouping. This implication Malinowksi (e.g. 1935) softened 
in  his  later  work,  but  in  1923  it  is  unmistakable  (see  Schmidt 
1984:127, 170-175 for discussion).
The  developmental  character  of  language  Malinowski  saw  as 
being recapitulated in each generation through language acquisition. 
Taking  Ogden  and  Richards’  Triangle  of  Reference,  Malinowski 
(1989[1923]:316-326)  showed  how  it  is  built  up  through  the 
successive  development  of  each  of  the  uses  of  language  in  the 
individual (see Figure 3). A baby begins by babbling; these sounds 
are ‘expressive, significant and correlated with the situation, but not 
involving  any  act  of  thought’ (Malinowski  1989[1923]:323).  The 
baby’s babbling is merely a natural, reflex reaction to its environment 
and internal  desires.  In the second stage of  development  the child 
begins to form actual articulate sounds and simultaneously to pick out 
parts of the environment. It comes to correlate particular sounds with 
their referents, forming symbols, and these symbols become tools to 
manipulate their referents: when the child utters ‘mama’, the mother 
appears (ibid.:319-320). In the third stage of development, reference 
acquires its triadic character and Ogden and Richards’ triangle begins 
to  take  visible  shape.  ‘Speech  in  action’ continues  the  childlike 
understanding  of  meaning  –  words  remain  tools  to  act  on  their 
referents – but in ‘narrative speech’ the referents are not immediately 
present and a third term, the ‘act of imagery’, must stand in for them. 
Malinowski  (1989[1923]:322-323)  then  introduced  a  new  use  of 
language, ‘language of ritual magic’, which has the same displaced 
character as narrative speech, but where the speaker tries to achieve 
the pragmatic ends of speech in action. This is literally word-magic: 
spells and incantations become for speakers tools that they assume 
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act  directly  on  the  world.  Malinowski’s  reworking  of  Ogden  and 
Richards’ triangle  represents  both the acceptance of  its  underlying 
tenets and, as Gordon (1982:49; 1990c:825) argues, a quiet restriction 
of  its  applicability,  since  ‘language  in  its  primitive  function  and 
original  form  has  an  essentially  pragmatic  character  […  and]  to 
regard it as a means for the embodiment of thought is to take a one-
sided view of one of its most derivative and specialized functions’ 
(Malinowski 1989[1923]:316).
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Figure 3. Malinowski’s (1989[1923]:324) adaptation of the Triangle of 
Reference.
This emphasis that Malinowski placed on the ‘essentially pragmatic 
character’  of  language  was  becoming  a  commonplace  in 
contemporary  European  linguistic  theory.  The  English  philologist 
Alan Henderson  Gardiner  (1879–1963),  whose  1922 paper  Ogden 
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and  Richards  (1989[1923]:192-193,  230)  quoted,  recognised  a 
‘volitional  attitude’ of  the speaker  to  the hearer,  a  desire  to cause 
some  effect  on  the  hearer  through  their  words,  an  idea  already 
expressed  by  Gardiner  (1919),  which  was  ‘extracted  […]  from a 
letter  to  Dr.  B.  Malinowski’.  Ogden  and  Richards  assimilated 
Gardiner’s ‘volitional attitude’ to their function (iv), ‘the promotion 
of effects intended’ (see also Firth 1935; Nerlich 1992:258-266). On 
the Continent  in the following years  similar  ideas gained traction: 
Nerlich (1990:166-171) highlights the  French psychologist Frédéric 
Paulhan’s (1856–1931) notion of the ‘double function of language’ 
(Paulhan 1927), where on one hand language reports thoughts and 
facts  in  the  world,  and  on  the  other  creates  them.29 The  German 
psychologist  Karl  Bühler  (1879–1963),  a  colleague  of  Heinrich 
Gomperz  at  the  University  of  Vienna  (introduced  in  section  5), 
elaborated  his  Organon  model  of  language,  in  which  language 
‘represents’ objects or states of affairs in the world as well as making 
an ‘appeal’ to the hearer and providing a means of ‘expression’ for 
the  speaker  (Bühler  1990[1934];  see  also  Innis  1982;  Eschbach 
1988). Much later – after the logical positivist  Charles Morris had 
introduced the distinction between ‘semantics’ and ‘pragmatics’ in a 
sense  that  is  the  immediate  ancestor  of  how  these  terms  are 
understood today (see Morris 1938) – Gomperz (1941) adopted the 
notion of ‘appeal’ as the defining property of ‘linguistic signs’ in his 
taxonomy of sign types. By ‘appeal’ he meant the use of a sign ‘for 
the purpose of modifying P2’s [the listener’s] future behavior in some 
particular way’ (Gomperz 1941:164).30   
Gardiner and Bühler – who were aware of one another’s work and 
acknowledged the similarities, although not uncritically (see Gardiner 
1951[1932]:4, 7; Bühler 1990[1934]:28; see also Nerlich 1992:261) – 
both named the German philologist Philipp Wegener (1848–1916) as 
a major inspiration (see Gardiner 1951[1932]:12  et passim;  Bühler 
1990[1934]:27,  38  et  passim).  Wegener  (1991[1885]:68)  held  that 
speech is primarily a means for the speaker to excite the ‘Sympathie 
oder  Interesse’  (sympathy  or  interest)  of  the  listener  towards 
29 Ogden was certainly familiar with Paulhan’s work: he translated Paulhan’s (1930)  Laws of  
Feeling, a treatise on the psychology of emotions, first published as a book in French 1887 
(and which is not related to Ogden and Richards’ distinction between symbolic and emotive 
language).
30 There  is  a  temptation  to  hear  the  distant  echo  of  Ogden  and  Richards  (1989[1923])  in 
Gomperz’ (1941)  essay.  Its  title,  ‘The  meanings  of  “meaning”’,  and  its  observation  that 
meaning ‘is used in quite a number of senses’ (Gomperz (1941:157) would encourage this.  
But Gomperz’ answer, which is to identify the common element of all senses of ‘meaning’ 
and then provide a taxonomy of sign types by their mode of signification, does not necessarily 
follow Ogden and Richards’ example.
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themselves  or  the  object  of  discourse.  Wegener’s  view,  like 
Malinowski’s, grew out of observation of child language acquisition: 
speech begins  with a  child’s  cries  for  its  mother’s  attention.  Firth 
(1957[1950]:181-182),  surveying  the  study  of  meaning  in  British 
linguistics up to that time, made the connection between Wegener, 
Gardiner  and  Malinowski.  Modern  historians  of  linguistics 
sympathetic  to  pragmatic  approaches  –  such  as  Koerner  (1991), 
Knobloch (1991) and Nerlich (1992:81-87) – have similarly viewed 
Wegener as the founder of a tradition lost and then rediscovered in 
the course of the twentieth century.
In this wider circle of philologists beyond Ogden and Richards’ 
personal acquaintances we find precedents also for their distinction 
between purely referential  use  of  language and the  emotional  and 
attitudinal aspects that emerge in the emotive functions (ii) and (iii; 
see section 2). The German philologist Karl Otto Erdmann (1858–
1932) – whose 1900 Die Bedeutung des Wortes Ogden and Richards 
(1989[1923]:xvii)  list  among  the  studies  from  whom  they  have 
‘derived  instruction  and  occasionally  amusement’  –  drew  a 
distinction between the  begriffliche Inhalt  (conceptual content) of a 
word  and  two  other  kinds  of  value  it  contains,  the  Nebensinn 
(connotation), all the ideas beyond the immediate conceptual content 
associated  with  a  word,  and  Gefühlswert  or  Stimmungsgehalt  
(emotional  value  or  content),  all  the  feelings  the  word  evokes 
(Erdmann 1900:80-82). The philologists Charles Bally (1865–1947) 
and Hans Sperber (1885–1960), the former Swiss (and a prominent 
disciple of Saussure) and the latter German, produced simultaneously 
and independently studies of the role affect plays in semantic change, 
in the process identifying the ‘emotive’ in the sense of ‘attitudinal’ as 
a component of meaning in language, on a par with reference (see 
Bally 1913; Sperber 1914; Nerlich 1992:250 also comments on the 
similarity of these three approaches to Ogden and Richards’).
The  concerns  about  language  in  use  that  Ogden  and  Richards 
raised – the problem of interpretation in context, the pragmatic uses 
of  language  to  create  effects  in  hearers  and  the  world,  and  the 
expression of emotions and attitudes – did not stem all from Welby, 
although in her position as mentor to the young Ogden her influence 
was no doubt  great.  We see  among contemporary  anthropologists, 
psychologists  and  philologists  discussion  of  many  of  the  same 
themes, in similar terms. Ogden and Richards were acquainted with 
the  participants  in  the  contemporary  discussion,  in  some  cases 
personally and in others only through their works. The philosophy of 
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language that comes through The Meaning of Meaning can equally be 
placed in this tradition.
9. Summary and conclusion
Ogden and Richards’  The Meaning of  Meaning,  in setting out  the 
‘science  of  Symbolism’,  offers  an eclectic  mix of  ideas  from two 
major,  and  in  many  ways  antagonistic,  traditions  in  the  early 
twentieth  century,  traditions  to  which  Ogden  and  Richards  were 
personally linked through their Cambridge milieu. On the one side 
was  the  logical  tradition,  represented  by  the  logical  atomism  of 
Russell and Wittgenstein; on the other was the beginnings of modern 
semiotics, in the form of Welby’s significs. These semiotic concerns 
were expressed in similar forms, too, by thinkers in fields as diverse 
as philology, psychology and anthropology, with whom Ogden and 
Richards  also  had contact,  and who,  in  many cases,  were  able  to 
assimilate Ogden and Richards’ ideas to their own. 
Ogden and Richards’ concern with reference and finding the right 
forms to guarantee its accurate functioning derive, as we have seen, 
from the logicians,  but  their  acknowledgement  of  other,  ‘emotive’ 
uses of language and the concessions they made to communication as 
an activity owe much to the early modern semioticians. The attention 
Ogden  and Richards  craved from their  mentors  and colleagues  in 
logic  was  not  forthcoming,  although  they  did  belatedly  find 
recognition among the analytic philosophers in Stevenson’s account 
of ‘emotivism’. By this time, however, the debate had moved on, and 
the  logical  positivists  (whose  contact  with  Ogden  we  come to  in 
chapter 4), already driven into exile from their Vienna home, were the 
leaders in the discipline.
While  Richards principally  pursued the semiotic  course in  later 
years, Ogden drew himself closer to the logicians. Richards explored 
the emotive function and under his hands the method of definition 
became  ‘multiple  definition’,  used  to  explicate  the  range  of 
interpretations  available  for  a  linguistic  expression.  By  contrast, 
Ogden, in his next major project, Basic English, sought to neutralise 
the emotive as much as possible and make definition a means for 
prescribed precise, unambiguous linguistic forms. Definition became 
a means of reduction, elimination and minimisation of language and 
its effects, as Richards would later recall:
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The chapter on Definition in “The Beadig of Beadig”, as we 
came to call it in memory of a frustrating cold in the head, led 
us into long discussions of the number of radically different 
ways there may be of telling anyone what any word may mean. 
This inquiry was the germ of Basic English. Ogden had long 
been deep in the history and theory of universal languages, and 
it was no long step from our account of Definition to notions of 
a minimal English capable of serving all purposes.
 (Richards 1977:108; repeated in Brower 1973:34 and Richards 
1943:xliii, 22-23)
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3. BASIC ENGLISH
1. Introduction
‘What the world needs most,’  Ogden (1931:13) tells us, ‘is about 
1,000 more dead languages – and one more alive.’ By the 1930s the 
unprecedented technological advances delivered through modern 
engineering, the practical-minded sibling of science, had shrunk the 
world: railways, radio, telephones and aeroplanes made it possible to 
send messages instantly to the furthest parts of the globe; people and 
goods could reach them in a fraction of the time it took only a 
generation before. But despite European civilisation’s conquest of the 
natural world, the barbarism and base national jealousy buried at its 
foundations had not been overcome. In Ogden’s mind, and the minds 
of many others, the root of the problem was the curse of Babel, and 
the solution was the adoption of an international language. Only a 
common medium would secure scientific intercourse,  progress and 
efficiency,  and peace.  But  just  as  the modern technology that  had 
already brought us so far was not of nature – wheels and rails, fixed 
wings  and  propellers,  speakers,  microphones  and the  transmission 
apparatus in between are wholly artificial products – so, Ogden was 
not alone in thinking, no existing natural language could solve the 
problem of  international  communication.  What  was  needed  was  a 
new,  artificial  language,  better  than  those  that  already  existed;  it 
would  be  the  product  of  a  new  form  of  linguistic  engineering 
informed by the scientific study of  language and meaning already 
underway.
Ogden’s solution was his project Basic English. By the time his 
first publications about it appear in 1927, interest in the international 
language problem had reached its height, having been in the general 
public consciousness for almost fifty years, with myriad proposals for 
a common international tongue.31 The historian who wants to quote 
dates to delineate one age from another will place their stake at the 
year 1879, the year in which the first publications on the language 
project Volapük appeared, the first of the international languages to 
actually win a community of speakers. Following closely behind, in 
1887,  is  Esperanto,  the  most  successful  of  the  international 
languages, both in terms of the number of speakers it  was able to 
31 The discussion of Basic in this chapter is based largely on Ogden’s publications from the 
period in which he was actively developing and promoting the project. The final statement on 
Basic, which was published a decade after Ogden’s death, is Ogden (1968), a ‘revised and 
expanded version of The System of Basic English [Ogden 1934a]’.
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acquire and the longevity it was able to achieve. Today there is still a 
small  but  active  worldwide  community  of  Esperanto  speakers. 
Although  interest  in  international  languages  persists  in  pockets 
around  the  world,  the  time  has  passed  when  the  issue  was  of 
mainstream concern. The end of the period could be dated to 1951, 
the year in which IALA Interlingua, the last of the major international 
language projects, was published: the subdued welcome it received 
was a sign that the problem of international language was no longer a 
pressing issue.
The  international  language  movement  began  with  enthusiastic 
amateurs, but as it reached maturity around the turn of the century, it 
came to be increasingly dominated by scholars who sought to seize 
the issue and treat it  in what they considered a properly scientific 
manner. For these scholars it became a burning priority to save the 
movement from what they saw as cranks, fanatics and Bolsheviks, 
whose  undesirable  political  views  and  dilettantish  attempts  at 
linguistic  engineering  were  doing  so  much  to  discredit  it.  They 
looked  back  to  the  Enlightenment,  which  they  saw  as  the  most 
recently  preceding  period of  intellectual  upheaval.  They cast  their 
Enlightenment  forebears  as  conscious  fighters  against  medieval 
superstition,  exalting  in  its  place  science  and  universally  shared 
human rationality. A pillar of Enlightenment linguistic thinking was 
the search for the philosophical basis of language and the fashioning 
of improved languages for international communication on this basis. 
Many modern language constructors styled themselves as the heirs to 
this  tradition.  In  section  2  we  look  at  these  modern  technocratic 
language constructors and their  relationship to their Enlightenment 
forebears. We then proceed in section 3 to look at the broader social 
history  of  the  modern  international  language  movement  and  the 
Enlightenment-inspired technocratic constructors’ efforts to enter this 
scene.  This  is  the  social  and  intellectual  environment  into  which 
Basic English was born, and we see how in Basic Ogden adopted the 
design considerations and the rhetoric that characterised these efforts. 
Although there is a  considerable  amount of  research that  explores 
various aspects of this history, it is very poorly known today except 
by the specialist interlinguists who take it as their main interest, and 
for this reason we explore it in some detail.32
32 There  are  numerous  histories  of  the  international  language  movement  and  surveys  of 
international  language  projects  with  varying  degrees  of  discussion  of  their  historical 
background. It must be noted that most of these histories were written by active participants in 
the movement and so tend to be partisan: the line between propaganda and scholarly research 
is frequently unclear. The best examples include Couturat and Leau (1903; 1907), Guérard 
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Beginning with Volapük, but becoming increasingly marked with 
the advent of the self-consciously ‘scientific’  approach, there 
developed a ‘common solution’ to the international language problem 
that embodied the practical considerations as well as the aesthetics of 
the age. Most major projects proposed a constructed, artificial 
language, based on the existing European national languages, but 
‘improved’, generally in the same direction as the new systems of 
mathematical logic, of the kind that Russell and Wittgenstein were 
developing, and which we saw reflected in Ogden’s own philosophy 
of language in  The Meaning of Meaning  (see chapter 2, section 4). 
Irregularity and illogicality would be banished; these were minimalist 
languages, with a minimum of grammar (understood primarily as 
morphology), a minimum of ambiguity, and maximal efficiency in 
the bond of form and function. To avoid national jealousies and 
advantage, no single existing language should be privileged in the 
design. Basic English reflected many of these design and aesthetic 
concerns: Ogden (1931:27) described Basic as ‘a language that is as 
simple, as regular, and as economical as possible ; a language which 
starts with a minimum of demands on the learning capacity of the 
humblest individual and can yet do the maximum amount of work.’ 
But  at the same time, in its adherence to the national language 
English, Basic  offered some unusual, even perverse, conclusions to 
the questions raised by the challenge of international language 
construction. We look at the ‘common solution’ in  section  4  and 
Ogden’s unusual stance in section 5.
English recommends itself as the basis of a refined and perfected 
international language, Ogden (1931:28) claimed, since it is already 
‘the most adaptable language the world has yet seen’. According to 
Ogden, English is in the grip of an advanced ‘analytic tendency’, 
which  he  understood  in  at  least  two  ways:  a  preference  for 
periphrastic expressions in the place of single unanalysable words, 
and a grammar almost totally reliant on syntax, free of morphological 
unpleasantness.  Basic  merely  developed  this  ‘analytic  tendency’ 
further. But of the two manifestations of the analytic tendency, the 
(1922), the annotated bibliography Stojan (1929), and Pei (1968[1958]). Among more recent 
scholarly studies are the survey Blanke (1985); the historical studies Forster (1982) and Lins  
(1988), which look at various aspects of the Esperanto movement; and Haupenthal (2005b), 
which  offers  a  contrastive  examination  of  the  beginnings  of  the  Volapük  and  Esperanto 
movements. Two recent popular accounts of the history of constructed languages – including, 
to varying degrees, the modern international language movement – are Large (1985) and Eco 
(1995[1993]). Unfortunately, the scholarship presented in both these books is rather derivative 
and in many respects limited (see the reviews Tonkin 1988; Maat 1999). See chapter 4 of  
Blanke  (2006)  and  the  accompanying  bibliography  for  an  up-to-date  guide  to  the 
interlinguistic literature.
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most important in Ogden’s mind was the preference for periphrasis. 
The key to a successful international language, according to Ogden, 
was to have a minimal vocabulary consisting of words ‘scientifically 
selected’ for  their  reliability  in  reference,  a  claim Ogden repeated 
frequently (but probably first mentioned in Ogden 1929a:1, repeated 
word-for-word in Ogden 1933[1930]:1). This is a conviction deeply 
rooted in his thought. In The Meaning of Meaning, the malady he and 
Richards identified was ‘word-magic’, the superstitious subjugation 
of sense to the lexicon (see chapter 2). Their remedy there was the 
unpacking of references to find what each word actually means, if 
anything. Basic pursued this principle to its conclusion. It offered a 
restricted  core  vocabulary  of  what  were  claimed  to  be  the  most 
necessary  and  reliable  words,  850  in  number,  and  thereby  forced 
users  of  the  language  to  spell  out  what  they  mean.  This  had  the 
additional advantage of reducing the amount of material the learner 
had  to  assimilate.  The  solution  to  ‘the  problem  of  a  Universal 
language’,  asserted  Ogden  (1929a:1),  lies  in  shrinking  the  entire 
language down to ‘no more than can be made easily legible to the 
naked eye, in column form, on the back of a sheet of notepaper.’ His 
ideal was a ‘panoptic’ language, a language ‘seen at a glance’. The 
method he used to arrive at it was ‘panoptic conjugation’; it was the 
application of this method that ensured the words were ‘scientifically 
selected’.  This component of his thought we explore in section 6.
In Ogden’s view, an escape from word-magic and ease of learning 
were  not  the  only  benefits  of  vocabulary  reduction;  a  restricted 
vocabulary  would  also  solve  all  other  difficulties  that  concern 
language  constructors:  grammar,  pronunciation,  orthography, 
meaning and idiom. For Ogden, words make the language, and the 
correct  selection  of  words  would  determine  all  other  aspects  of  a 
language’s  design.  Ogden’s  belief  that  only  the  right  vocabulary 
would result in ‘grammatical reform’, in the realignment of language 
to ‘universal grammar’ – an Enlightenment coinage – is examined in 
section 7.
In a fashion characteristic of him, Ogden made very little reference 
to the wider international language movement. Other projects were 
mentioned only in order to demonstrate their inferiority to Basic. He 
also  expended  very  little  effort  on  expounding  and  justifying  the 
philosophical background to the language; his energies seem to have 
been  directed  towards  establishing  and  propagating  a  practical 
project.  ‘Basic,’ Ogden  (1930a:1)  says,  ‘must  be  presented  like  a 
radio set,  with all  the works concealed and only a few convenient 
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knobs  protruding  for  the  public  to  twiddle’. What  philosophical 
insights he did discuss for the system, Ogden attributed to the English 
utilitarian  philosopher  Jeremy  Bentham  (1748–1832),  whose 
scholarly champion he had become by this time. But as we see the 
roots of Basic go much deeper: quite apart from the context of the 
wider international language movement, the methods Ogden used in 
Basic have an obvious kinship with his earlier language philosophy in 
The Meaning of Meaning,  and there are hints among his surviving 
manuscripts that he had already formulated many of the central ideas 
of  Basic  while  working within the  paradigm of  Welby’s  significs. 
Many of Basic’s features are also strikingly reminiscent of those of 
his Enlightenment-era predecessors and fellow countrymen George 
Dalgarno  (1626–1687) and John Wilkins (1614–1672). In section 8 
we dig down to discover the roots of Basic in these antecedents, and 
see how they are reflected in Ogden’s pre-Basic writings.
One of the most curious aspects of Ogden’s thought is his notion 
of  ‘panoptism’,  which  is  no  innocent  neohellenism but  is  derived 
from Bentham’s ‘Panopticon’, an ideal prison where the watchman’s 
ceaseless surveillance guarantees the prisoners’ compliance. Rather 
than shying away from the connotations attached to this term, Ogden 
flirted  with  them.  A later  critique,  usually  taken  to  be  aimed  at 
twentieth century linguistic manipulation in general,  but  clearly in 
many points  aimed particularly  at  Basic,  stems from no less  than 
George Orwell (1903–1950). As we see in section 9, he cast Basic 
and other projects of its sort in a sinister light, as prisons for minds, 
engineered to restrict free thought. This would seem to be part of a 
wider  post-World  War  II  reaction  against  what  was  seen  as 
technocratic meddling in everyday life, a theme that emerges again in 
the next chapter.
2. The Enlightenment and modernity
The scientific and technological achievements of the nineteenth 
century had their final outing at the 1900 Exposition Universelle in 
Paris. As at previous Universal Exhibitions, or World’s Fairs, as they 
are variously known, and as at Exhibitions still to come, each nation 
showcased in its pavilion the products of its industry, the fruits of its 
colonial trade, and the technological innovations of its engineers. 
Organised to coincide with the Exhibition were numerous 
international scholarly conferences, including the International 
Congress of Mathematics and the inaugural International Congress of 
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Philosophy. Left to us are stories, often  told in mythical tones, of 
scientists and scholars from all corners of the ‘civilised’  world 
assembled at these conferences, standing on the cusp of the twentieth 
century, which promised to multiply exponentially the successes of 
the outgoing nineteenth, trying to exchange news of their discoveries 
but constantly hindered and frustrated by the Babylonian confusion 
of their speech. In Paris, through universal recognition of the problem 
in this year 1900, and  by the individual  suggestion of the French 
mathematician Léopold Leau (1868–1943), the Délégation pour 
l’adoption d’une langue auxiliaire internationale (Delegation for the 
adoption  of  an  international  auxiliary  language)  was called into 
being. The Délégation was to be a committee that would examine the 
international language problem and recommend a solution to the 
International Association of the Academies, the worldwide union of 
national learned societies, which would definitively decide on the 
issue. The issue of international communication officially became the 
concern of scholars and would be settled scientifically. This marks 
the  beginning  of  the  technocratic  current  within  international 
language movement, of which Ogden’s Basic was a part. Scholars of 
the time wanted to rescue the issue from dilettantes and make it once 
again a subject  of  serious enquiry,  as it  they believed it  had been 
during  the  Enlightenment:  they  were  conscious  of  their 
Enlightenment forebears and many saw their efforts as a continuation 
of that tradition. 
The forming of the Délégation was not the first time that a learned 
society officially investigated the international  language problem – 
that  honour  goes  to  the  American  Philosophical  Society’s 
examination and resulting rejection of Volapük – but it was the first 
time that such an investigation led to practical action. The American 
Philosophical  Society’s  call  for  a  conference  to  work  out  an 
alternative to Volapük ‘suited to the needs of modern thought’ (see 
Brinton  et  al. 1888:12)  was  answered  only  by  the  London 
Philological  Society,  which  came  out  in  support  of  Volapük  and 
rejected the need for a conference (see Ellis 1891). The establishment 
of the Délégation finally raised the international language problem to 
the level of academic respectability, after twenty years of its being the 
domain of ‘scientifically untrained persons’, the worst of whom were 
‘fanatics  and  Utopians’,  as  the  Austrian  chemist  Richard  Lorenz 
(1863–1929;  1910[1909]:24),  a  leading member  of  the  Délégation 
described  them.  The  central  figure  in  these  efforts  was  Louis 
Couturat  (1868–1914),  logicist  mathematician  and  engine  of  the 
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Délégation  after its establishment, who was also a leading Leibniz 
scholar of his day (see Couturat 1901; 1903) and initiator of research 
into  the  history  of  constructed  languages  (see  Couturat  and  Leau 
1903; 1907). Clearly seeing an analogy with his own time, Couturat 
portrayed the Enlightenment projects, in particular those of his own 
hero Leibniz, as products made possible by the ideals of the adjoining 
Renaissance,  which,  ‘in  the  renewal  of  all  the  sciences  and 
philosophy, had revealed the fundamental unity of the human spirit 
and  had  given  birth  to  the  idea  of  the  international  union  of  all 
scholars,  as  is  well  put  in  the  expression  “Republic  of  Letters”’ 
(Couturat 1901:55-56). The ‘emancipation of thought from ancient 
authority and the yoke of Aristotle’ in the Renaissance led to modern 
scientific  research  and  a  ‘desire  for  a  logic  more  modern,  most 
appropriate to the needs of the new science’. As a result, ‘[r]eason 
became  aware  of  its  strength  and  independence,  and  tended  to 
overcome all barriers of tradition and routine, and we began to  see 
that we could surpass antiquity in our knowledge of the universe, and 
to envisage an infinite progress’ (loc. cit.).33
Couturat’s  portrayal  may be more a  projection than an analogy 
(indeed Maat 2004:7-10 specifically takes issue with some details of 
Couturat’s  account),  but  the  period  of  the  late  Renaissance  and 
Enlightenment and the modernist era are undoubtedly kindred in their 
belief in new, previously inconceivable, possibilities, including that 
of  ‘infinite  progress’.  But  the  Enlightenment  would  seem  to  be 
characterised more by musing than the direct pragmatic action of the 
early  twentieth  century.  Enlightenment  projects  were  more 
experimental  than  their  modern  counterparts:  theoretical  questions 
were  given  more  time  than  the  practicalities  of  implementation 
(although  Maat  2004  shows  many  concessions  on  the  part  of 
Dalgarno and Wilkins to practicality).  René Descartes (1596–1650) 
summed  up  the  Enlightenment  language  constructors’ aspirations, 
33 Couturat’s (1901:55-56) original text from which these excerpts are taken runs: ‘Le dessein de 
fonder  une  Langue  universelle  qui  remplaçât  toutes  les  langues  nationales,  soit  dans  le 
commerce entre  les  divers  pays,  soit  surtout  dans les  relations entre  les  savants  de toute 
l’Europe,  procède  évidemment  du  mouvement  intellectuel  de  la  Renaissance,  qui,  en 
renouvellant toutes les sciences et la philosophie, avait révélé l’unité fondamentale de l’esprit  
humain  et  avait  fait  naître  l’idée  de  l’union  internationale  de  tous  les  savants,  si  bien 
experimée  par  la  locution  de  “République  des  Lettres”.  D’ailleurs,  la  Renaissance,  en 
émancipant la pensée de l’autorité des anciens et surtout du joug d’Aristote, dont la Logique 
avait régné pendant tout le moyen âge et cognait encore dans les écoles, avait donné l’essor 
aux recherches scientifiques,  et par suite fait  naître le désir d’une Logique plus moderne,  
mieux appropriée aux besoins des sciences nouvelles. La raison prenait conscience de sa force 
et de son indépendance, et tendait à s’affranchir de toutes les entraves de la tradition et de la  
routine;  on  commençait  à  s’apercevoir  qu’on  pouvait  dépasser  l’antiquité  dans  la 
connaissance de l’univers, et à entrevoir la possibilité d’un progrès indéfini.’ 
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problems and their eventual resolution right at the beginning of the 
period:34
If someone were to explain correctly what are the simple ideas 
in the human imagination out of which all human thoughts are 
compounded, and if his explanation were generally received, I 
would dare to hope for a universal language very easy to learn, 
to speak, and to write. […] I think it is possible to invent such a 
language and to discover the science on which it depends: it 
would make peasants better judges of the truth about the world 
than philosophers are now. But do not hope ever to see such a 
language in use. For that,  the order of nature would have to 
change so that the world turned into a terrestrial paradise; and 
that is too much to suggest outside of fairyland.
 (Descartes to Marin Mersenne, 20 November 1629, 
reproduced in translation in Kenny 1970:6) 
Notable  among  the  Enlightenment  projects,  especially  for  the 
potential inspiration they provided Ogden (as we see in section 8), are 
those of the British philosophers – in the broadest sense of the term, 
befitting  Enlightenment  figures  – George  Dalgarno (see  Maat  and 
Cram 2001) and John Wilkins (1968[1668]), which originally began 
as a collaboration but soon split into separate projects as a result of 
their irreconcilable differences. We see in these projects a faith in the 
improvement deliberate human work can deliver over the accidents 
of nature: existing languages, Wilkins (1968[1668]:19) tells us, ‘must 
needs  be  liable  to  manifold  defects  and  imperfections,  that  in  a 
Language at once invented and according to the rules of Art might be 
easily  avoided.’ The  centrepiece  of  both  projects  –  although  to  a 
greater  extent  in  Wilkins’ –  were  vocabularies  organised  around 
classificatory  tables  that  look  back  to  the  Aristotelian  categories, 
established  in  antiquity  and  refined  through  Scholastic  logic. 
Slaughter (1982) sees this approach as an attempt to create taxonomic 
nomenclatures, a final outing for the traditional Aristotelian epistemic 
34 It should be noted that  Enlightenment projects did not have the single-minded focus on a  
spoken language that is a feature of most mainstream modern projects, but rather recognised a 
distinction between a written ‘character’ and a spoken language, and sought to offer both (see 
Maat 2004:16-28).  The great  hope,  popularised by such figures  as  Francis  Bacon (1561–
1626),  was that a true character,  unlike parasitic alphabetic writing, would circumvent the 
confusions of spoken language, as ‘in China and the provinces of the furthest East’, where, 
thought Bacon (unfortunately, naively), ‘there are in use at this day certain real characters, not 
nominal; characters, I mean, which represent neither letters nor words, but things and notions’ 
(Bacon,  quoted  in  Maat  2004:17;  see  also  ibid.:16-23).  These  ideas  perhaps  live  on  in 
obscured  form  in  various  ‘picture  theories’ of  language  and  meaning,  such  as  those  of 
Wittgenstein, Ogden and Neurath (see section 5; chapter 4, section 4).
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scheme in the face of the explosion of knowledge resulting from the 
new science. Maat (2004:171-172, 257-258  et passim), by contrast, 
sees no simple relationship between tradition and the new science in 
either Dalgarno’s or Wilkins’ projects, but rather tangled networks of 
tradition  and  innovation,  further  complicated  by  concessions  in 
design  that  reveal  their  frequent  betrayal  of  principle  to  practical 
convenience (see, for example, the commentary in Maat 2004:54-59; 
see also Cram 1980; 1985; Maat and Cram 2001:32-62). 
Completing  what  is  often seen as  a  trinity  of  the  most  famous 
Enlightenment projects was Leibniz’ contribution (see chapter 5 of 
Maat 2004), which served in equal measure as an inspiration to the 
new mathematical logic and the modern constructed languages (see 
chapter 2, section 4).35 Leibniz’ various ideas, many of them recorded 
only in draft form in unpublished fragments, eschewed pre-conceived 
classificatory schemes and instead aimed to elucidate the composition 
of thoughts expressed in the language, right down to the constitutive 
primitive concepts. This would not only offer a universal language, 
which,  because  of  the  shared  basis  of  rationality,  would  be 
understandable to all  people,  but would also provide a calculus of 
thought that could automatically deliver proofs and expose fallacies. 
It  promised  escape  from the  confines  of  language  boundaries  and 
from linguistic confusion and the pointless disputes that arise from it. 
Couturat,  in  his  dual  roles  of  Leibniz  expositor  and  language 
constructor, can be credited with bringing much of Leibniz’ thought 
on this issue into the modern movement.
At  the  turn of  the  nineteenth  century to  the  twentieth,  scholars 
eyed the new international language movement, which by this time 
had been an issue of widespread public concern for around twenty 
years. Conscious of the precedent set in the Enlightenment, but living 
in a time when philosophe was no longer a pastime but a profession, 
the scholars set out to seize the international language problem and 
make  it  the  object  of  proper  ‘scientific’ study.  To  this  end,  the 
Délégation  was  founded,  to  resolve  the  problem  with  official 
academic sanction. This new technocratic current in the international 
35 While there were numerous other philosophical language projects in this period, we will focus 
on these three – those of Wilkins, Dalgarno and Leibniz – because they have been the subject 
of the most secondary research and, as we demonstrate, were the most significant to language 
constructors in the modern period. See chapter 3 of Knowlson (1975), part II of Slaughter 
(1982) and Maat and Cram (2000) for information on other projects. Key writings of Francis 
Lodwick (1619–1694), another prominent philosophical language constructor of this period, 
have recently been edited and reprinted, along with a secondary essay on his life and work, by 
Henderson and Poole (2011).
80
language movement is the one later joined by Ogden with his Basic, 
as we will see.
3. Peace and progress
The  modern  international  language  movement  into  which  the 
technocratic language constructors sought to manoeuvre was marked 
from its  early  days  by tensions  between those  who looked to  the 
international  language  as  a  humanitarian  project,  directed  at 
international  reconciliation and preserving peace,  and those  whose 
interest was mainly in efficiency in international communication, for 
securing the continued scientific progress of humanity. Volapük, the 
first  of  the major  modern international  languages,  was surrounded 
mostly by the rhetoric of progress. By contrast, Esperanto, its main 
rival,  was  associated  much  more  with  humanitarian  goals.  As 
European politics moved to extremes and boiled over into revolution 
and war in the early twentieth century, many technocratic language 
constructors  distanced  themselves  from  overtly  humanitarian 
rhetoric,  in  the  fear  that  their  careful  plans  would  fall  victim  to 
political  intrigues.  But  many  figures  resisted  retreat  to  extremes, 
Ogden among them: as a pacifist (see chapter 2, sections 1 and 4), he 
was committed to international language as an instrument of peace, 
but  he also embraced the technocratic  hopes  of  furthering science 
through an improved language. His appeal for a single international 
language, which we quoted at the opening of this chapter, continues:
The absence of a common medium of communication is the 
chief obstacle to international understanding, and therefore the 
chief underlying cause of War. It is also the most formidable 
obstacle  to  the  progress  of  international  Science,  and  to  the 
development of international Commerce.
(Ogden 1931:13)
In order to gain an understanding of the now little-known social and 
intellectual background to Basic and kindred efforts of the time, we 
will  now take  an  extended  excursion  into  the  social  and  political 
history of the modern international language movement.  We begin 
with Volapük and Esperanto, the two language projects that set the 
tone and established a pattern for much of what followed. Esperanto, 
in  particular,  played  an  incomparable  role  in  defining  the 
international  language  movement.  Most  major  projects  that  came 
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after  it  were  either  reforms  or  challenges  to  it:  the  philosophical 
proposals of Couturat and his collaborators were intended as reforms, 
and  other  projects  generally  expended  considerable  effort 
demonstrating  their  differences.  Ogden,  for  one,  worked  hard  to 
trumpet  the  superiority  of  Basic  to  Esperanto  (see,  in  particular, 
Ogden 1935; chapter 4, section 5). Our historical survey closes with 
IALA Interlingua, the last of the major projects.
Appearing first in 1879, Volapük  was the creation of a Swabian 
priest, Johann Martin Schleyer (1831–1912), a man who saw 
modernity as the great uniter of humanity (see Haupenthal 2005a for 
a  biography). He sought a catholic, in the sense of universal, 
language to add one further piece to the unification of the world. In 
his characteristically rhapsodic style, where even the typography is 
compelled to enthusiasm through bold text and Sperrung,36 he 
discoursed  on  how  modern technological brings us daily closer 
together, and how steps towards world union are already being taken 
at a political level. The natural next step, he insisted, is union through 
language:
Through railways, steamships, the telegraph and telephone the 
globe has shrunk both temporally and spatially. The countries 
of the earth have, so to speak, become significantly closer. For 
this  reason the times for petty, narrow-minded national pride 
are  forever  finished.  Mankind  becomes  daily  more 
cosmopolitan,  and  longs  for  Union.  With  the  World-post  a 
major step forward to this magnificent goal have already been 
made. The fraternity of man should also unite more and more in 
terms  of  money,  measures,  weights,  units  of  time,  laws  and 
language.  This  current  work  hopes  to  give  the  first  push 
towards this language-unification in great measure. […] After 
mankind has united in the World-post, it must also unite in a 
world-script,  language  and  grammar!  This  is  indubitably  a 
great, intellectual gain and advance.
(Schleyer 1982[1880]:1; emphasis very much in the original)37
36 Sperrung  is  the spacing out of text for emphasis,  with a use similar to italics in English, 
although generally used much less sparingly.
37 Schleyer’s original text runs: ‘Durch Eisenbahnen, Dampffschiffe, Telegrafi und Telefoni ist 
der Erdball zeitlich und räumlich gleichsam zusammengeschrumpft. Die Länder der Erde 
haben sich so zu sagen bedeutend genähert. Darum sind die Zeiten für kleinlichen, 
engherzigen Nazionalstolz wol für immer dahin. Die Menschheit wird täglich 
kosmopolitischer, und sent sich nach Einigung. Durch die grosartige Weltpost ist ein 
gewaltiger Schritt zu disem schönen Zile vorwärz gemacht worden. Auch inbezug auf Geld, 
Mas, Gewicht, Zeiteinteilung, Geseze und Sprache sollte sich das Brudergeschlecht der 
Menschen mer und mer einigen! Zu diser Sprach-Einigung im grosartigsten Mastabe will 
vorliegendes Werkchen den ersten Anstos geben. […] Nachdem sich die Menschheit zur 
Weltpost geeignigt hat, muß sie sich auch zu einer Weltschrift,-sprache und -Grammatik 
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Schleyer’s call was heard all over Europe, and in the following years 
Volapük societies and journals sprang up all over the continent. In 
1885  the  Kadem  Bevünetik  Volapüka,  the  Volapük  Academy,  was 
established  to  direct  the  further  growth  and  development  of  the 
language, and by 1889, ten years after the first Volapük publications, 
there were 1.5 to 2 million users of the language in the world (as 
estimated by Schmidt 1988[1963]:13-14). 1889 is the year in which 
the  Volapük  movement  reached  its  peak,  and  the  year  of  its 
spectacular downfall, precipitated, it would seem, not so much by any 
features of the language itself, but by Schleyer’s proprietorial attitude 
to his creation. He saw himself as the infallible pope of the Volapük 
movement, with zero tolerance for heretics.38 But the success of the 
Volapük  movement  depended  on  many  people. Most prominent 
among them was Auguste Kerckhoffs (1835–1903), a Parisian 
professor of languages, whose Cours complet de Volapük (first 
edition 1885, but with many subsequent editions) provided the main 
introduction to the language for French speakers and the speakers of 
other Romance languages. Kerckhoffs’  status within the Volapük 
movement was institutionalised when he was elected the director of 
the Academy in 1889, a position that he exploited to submit his 
proposed reforms to the language to Schleyer. Schleyer’s not 
unexpected rejection of the reforms led to a schism in the movement 
between those loyal to Schleyer and those  loyal to Kerckhoffs, a 
schism that was solidified in 1890, when Schleyer disowned the 
Volapük Academy and founded a new, rival organisation. In the 
following year, 1891, Schleyer struck Kerckhoffs off his register of 
officially recognised Volapük speakers. The language never 
recovered from the split, although the Academy lived on for several 
decades.39
einigen! Dises ist für sie unstreitig der grosartige, geistigmaterielle Gewinn und Fortschritt.’ 
Schleyer’s enthusiasm for language reform extended to reforming German orthography; this 
is why his spelling in German frequently seems unusual. The ‘world post’ that he refers to is  
most probably the Universal Postal Union, an agreement between European and Europeanised 
countries reached in 1878 – but based on the earlier General Postal Union of 1874 – that  
guaranteed  carriage  and  provided  for  uniform  tariffs  for  international  post  between  the 
member countries (see Francis Lyons 1963:43-48). 
38 At the back of his earliest 1880 grammar of the language is a diploma of proficiency which 
lists  the seventeen rules  Schleyer laid down to govern the language movement.  Here the 
datuval volapüka, the ‘creator of the world language’, is declared the sole authority on the 
language, with the exclusive right to determine its future development. As Forster (1982:46) 
notes,  in coining his title,  Schleyer has reached for the superlative extremes his language 
allows. There are two suffixes in Volapük to indicate a ‘person concerned with’, -el and -al, 
the first being the normal form and the second the elevated form, so  sanel is ‘doctor’, but 
Sanal ‘The Saviour’. A normal inventor would then be datuvel, and datuval one much greater.
39 In 1892 the academy’s name was changed and its  affiliation became the language project 
Idiom Neutral  (the grammar of which is set  out in Rosenberger 1902), and in 1908, with 
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While Volapük in its own right may have failed in its first decade, 
it had proved that a constructed language as a solution to the 
international language problem was feasible and it  had succeeded in 
whetting the appetites of enthusiasts for such a system. The Volapük 
void was soon filled by the new project Esperanto, which  first 
appeared  1887 in  a  series  of  self-published  brochures  in  Russian, 
Polish, French and German by Dr Ludwig Lazarus Zamenhof (1859–
1917),  an  eye  doctor  from  Białystok,  in  what  was  then  the 
westernmost  regions  of  the  Russian  Empire  and  now  eastern 
Poland.40 Haupenthal (2005b) argues that the  rapid spread of 
Esperanto  was in fact enabled by the collapse of the Volapük 
movement: disillusioned Volapükists, who already possessed the 
infrastructure of societies and journals, converted en masse to the 
Esperanto cause. From the very beginning Esperanto displayed a 
different character from  Volapük: Schleyer’s soaring rhetoric of the 
Progress of Man was replaced with more muted hopes of achieving 
inter-ethnic understanding. Whereas Volapük was the ‘world-
language’, Esperanto was ‘the hoping one’,  the pseudonym 
Zamenhof used when he introduced his lingvo internacia 
(international language). As a Jew from a highly assimilated Russian-
speaking family in a region where Poles were ethnically dominant, 
Zamenhof experienced at first hand the friction and mutual hatred 
that can exist between the subgroups of humanity. His goal was to 
give these subgroups a bond that would join them in their common 
humanity, a bond that does not seek to supersede their existing 
linguistic culture but is rather superimposed upon it. In response to an 
enquiry from the Russian Esperantist Nikolaj Afrikanoviĉ Borovko in 
1896, Zamenhof offered the following story about his motivations for 
creating the language:
I was born in Białystok, district of Grodno. This place of my 
birth and my childhood gave the direction to my future aims. In 
Białystok the population consisted of four diverse elements: 
Russians, Poles, Germans and Jews; each of these elements 
spoke a different language and was hostile to the other 
another  name change,  it  moved to Italy and adopted  Latino sine Flexione,  the project  of 
Giuseppe Peano,  the  mathematician  who inspired  Russell  in  his  logicism (see  chapter  2,  
section 4), a state of affairs that continued until 1939, when the Academy was shut down by 
Mussolini. In the Netherlands a small Volapük movement, speaking a reformed version of the 
language proposed by Arie de Jong (1865–1957), grew up in the interwar years, but it was  
wiped out during the Second World War, with the banning of the language in Germany and 
German-occupied  territories  (see  Schmidt  1998[1963]  and  Haupenthal  2005b for  detailed 
histories of the Volapük movement).
40 A German supporter of Zamenhof’s project made an English translation in the same year, but 
it is generally considered very poor quality; the authorised English translation is by the Irish 
supporter R.H. Geoghan from 1889.
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elements. In this city more than anywhere else one felt the 
heavy unhappiness of linguistic diversity and was convinced at 
every step that this diversity of languages is the only, or at least 
the chief, cause that separates the human family and divides it 
into hostile parties. I was brought up as an idealist. I was taught 
that all men are brothers, while on the street and in the yard, 
everything at every step made me feel that men did not exist: 
only Russians, Poles, Germans, Jews, etc. exist. This tormented 
my young spirit, although many would laugh at this ‘sorrow for 
the world’ of a child. Because it appeared to me then that the 
‘elders’ possessed an omnipotent strength, I repeated to myself 
that when I was older I would definitely do away with this evil.
(Zamenhof 1929[1896]:417-418)41
But his  hopes for the unification of humanity did not remain 
restricted to the linguistic. Almost  a  quarter  of  a  century after  his 
publication on Esperanto, Zamenhof began in the 1900s to publish 
his design for a new religion, which he first called ‘Hillelism’ after 
the ancient rabbi Hillel, who Zamenhof took as his inspiration, but 
later renamed to the less Jewish and more Esperanto Homaranismo 
(generally rendered in English as ‘Humanitism’). Homaranismo is to 
religions what Esperanto is to languages: it is a superimposed set of 
principles that seeks to draw out the commonalities in religions. The 
adherent of any religion can adopt Homaranismo, without having to 
deny their existing religion  (Zamenhof  1929:312-345  contains  a 
selection of Homaranismo materials; see also Forster 1982:91-94). At 
the  ‘Universal  Races  Congress’  in  London,  Zamenhof  (1911) 
presented to a general audience his thesis that differences in language 
and  religion  alone  are  the  causes  of  division  and  antipathy  in 
humanity.42
41 Zamenhof’s original letter is in Russian, but the translation above is based on the commonly 
accepted Esperanto translation, which runs: ‘Mi naskiĝis en Bjelostoko, gubernio de Grodno. 
Tiu ĉi loko de mia naskiĝo kaj de miaj infanaj jaroj donis la direkton al ĉiuj miaj estontaj 
celadoj. En Bjelostoko la loĝantaro konsistas el kvar diversaj elementoj: rusoj, poloj, 
germanoj kaj hebreoj; ĉiuj el tiuj ĉi elementoj parolas apartan lingvon kaj neamike rilatas la 
aliajn elementojn. En tia urbo pli ol ie la impresema naturo sentas la multepezan malfeliĉon 
de diverslingveco kaj konvinkiĝas ĉe ĉiu paŝo, ke la diverseco de lingvoj estas la sola, aŭ 
almenaŭ la ĉefa, kaŭzo kiu disigas la homan familion kaj dividas ĝin en malamikaj partoj. Oni 
edukadis min kiel idealiston; oni min instruis, ke ĉiuj homoj estas fratoj, kaj dume sur la strato 
kaj sur la korto, ĉio ĉe ĉiu paŝo igis min senti, ke homoj ne ekzistas: ekzistas sole rusoj, poloj, 
germanoj, hebreoj k.t.p. Tio ĉi ĉiam forte turmentis mian infanan animon, kvankam multaj 
eble ridetos pro tiu ĉi “doloro pro la mondo”  ĉe la infano. Ĉar al mi tiam ŝajnis, ke la 
“grandaĝaj” posedas ian ĉiopovan forton, mi ripetadis al mi, ke kiam mi estos grandaĝa, mi 
nepre forigos tiun ĉi malbonon.’
42 His dual dreams of superimposed linguistic and religious unity have been pursued by other 
modern religions. Baha’ Ulah (1817–1892), the founder of the Baha’i Faith, hoped for ‘the 
origination of one language that may be spread universally among the people […] in order 
that this universal language may eliminate misunderstandings from among mankind’ (quoted 
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Although the  use  of  Esperanto  was a  feature  of  Homaranismo, 
Zamenhof  was  careful  not  to  associate  his  language  project  too 
closely  with  religion.  The  overtly  humanitarian  message  of 
Esperanto,  which blended into Zamenhof’s  religious interests,  was 
well  received among the language’s early supporters,  but  with the 
spreading  of  the  project  across  Europe,  the  purely  humanitarian 
aspects of the project came under pressure. Matters came to a head at 
the  first  Esperanto  World  Congress  at  the  French  seaside  town 
Boulogne-sur-Mer,  in  1905  (see  chapter  3  Forster  of  1982;   Lins 
1988:26-27).  Here  Esperanto acquired for first time its official 
trappings: the reference grammar Fundamento de Esperanto 
(Foundation of Esperanto; Zamenhof 1905) was adopted as the 
official statement of Esperanto’s linguistic system and the Lingva 
Komitato (linguistic committee) was established to defend the 
Fundamento and regulate the further linguistic growth of the 
language. But the congress did not constrain itself to purely linguistic 
matters: contained in the Fundamento is the Deklaracio pri la esenco 
de la Esperantismo (declaration of the essence of Esperantism), five 
points that seek to normatively define what the Esperanto movement 
is. Point 4 confirms the language as the property of its speaker 
community, not the property of any single person (Zamenhof 
1905:37), as was the case with Volapük, to that project’s detriment. 
This  is  a point that Zamenhof sought  to  establish  from the  very 
beginning:  inside  the  front  cover  of  Zamenhof  (1889[1887]),  he 
writes,  ‘For a language to be universal, it is not enough to call it that. 
/ An international language, like every national one, is the property of 
society, and the author renounces all personal rights in it forever.’ The 
comment ‘it is not enough to call it that’ may be a jibe at Volapük, the 
‘world language’. Point 5 of the declaration then goes on to state the 
absolute neutrality of the Esperanto community, in all matters, 
especially political and religious ones: an Esperantist is simply 
someone who uses the Esperanto language, regardless of what they 
use it to do (Zamenhof 1905:37).
The legislated apolitical and irreligious nature of Esperanto was a 
result that Zamenhof permitted but did not endorse. His speech to the 
congress reiterated his hope that Esperanto would specifically aid 
humanity in living in peace and harmony, a message that did not sit 
well with the  congress organisers, who feared the potential of 
exposing the movement to charges of pacifism and communism, 
in Stojan 1929:149). Many Baha’i consider Esperanto a viable universal language. There is 
also a  familial  connection in  this  regard:  Zamenhof’s  daughter,  Lydia  Zamenhof,  was an 
active member of the Baha’i community and promoted Esperanto among them.
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widely considered the symptoms of a chronic lack of patriotism in 
this nationalistic age. Even more alarming was Zamenhof’s plan to 
close his speech with a prayer, a plan from which the organisers 
could not dissuade him, although they managed to convince him to 
drop its final stanza, which  contains  its overtly  religious and 
pacifistic conclusion (see Forster 1982:84-87 and Lins 1988:28; the 
speech and prayer, complete with final stanza, are contained in 
Zamenhof 1929:360-365, 589-590). Conscious of the tensions 
revealed at the congress, and hoping to maintain the success of 
Esperanto, Zamenhof stood down as official head of the movement at 
the conference and devoted himself instead to the promotion of 
Homaranismo. Despite relinquishing his official status, Zamenhof 
continued to be hailed as the Majstro (master) and spoke in this 
unofficial capacity at subsequent world congresses. Neither did he 
give up his activism: at the 1906 congress – held in the year in which 
the anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia came to Białystok and touched 
Zamenhof personally – he spoke about the interna ideo (internal idea) 
of Esperanto, the goal of which is to achieve ‘fraternity and justice 
between all peoples’. This formulation might seem sufficiently bland 
and vague to be inoffensive to most, but in the nationalistically 
charged atmosphere of the first decade of the twentieth century it was 
still considered dangerous by many in the Esperanto movement (see 
Forster 1982:95-99 and Lins 1988:35-36; Zamenhof 1929:368-374 
contains the text of the 1906 speech).
It was in this highly charged atmosphere, at the very beginning of 
the twentieth century, before the issue had played out publicly in the 
Esperanto movement, that the Délégation pour l’adoption d’une 
language auxiliaire internationale was called into being, by scientists 
and scholars who wanted to facilitate international co-operation in 
their fields, but wanted to stay far from political and religious 
entanglements. We see here a return from the humanistic rhetoric of 
the Esperanto movement, to the rhetoric of progress that heralded the 
arrival of Volapük, as in the words of the  Délégation’s secretaries, 
Leau and Couturat (first mentioned in section 2):
It is a commonplace that there is extraordinary progress in the 
means of communication: soon we will be able to travel around 
the world in forty days; we can send a message by telegraph (or 
by wireless) from one shore of the Atlantic to the other; we can 
telephone from from Paris to London, to Berlin, to Turin. With 
these  communication  facilities  comes  a  corresponding 
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extension in economic relations: the European market extends 
over  the  whole  earth,  and  the  principal  producing  countries 
compete at  all  points  of the globe.  The great  nations  posses 
colonies all the way to the Antipodes and have interests in the 
most  distant  countries.  Their  politics  is  not  confined  to  the 
European stage; it  has become colonial and ‘global’. Always 
for the same reason, they are obliged to agree and unite, for 
commercial  interests  (Brussels  Sugar  Convention),  and  for 
moral interests  (International Convention on the White Slave 
Trade).
(Leau and Couturat 1903:vii)43
Leau  and  Couturat  together  dominated  the  Délégation  from  its 
founding in 1901 to its  conclusion in 1907. In this  year,  after the 
tensions in the Esperanto movement had already played out, the 
Délégation moved to make a final decision on the international 
language problem. As a result, a committee was formed, made up of 
fourteen eminent scientific men (not all  of whom could attend the 
committee’s meetings), representing all parts of the ‘civilised’ world 
–  Europe, North and South America –  and all modern fields of 
endeavour (see Kotzin 1915[1913]:5, Jespersen 1962[1921], Guérard 
1922:146-147, and Lorenz 1910[1909]:15). Prominent among them, 
apart from Leau and Couturat, were the linguists Jan  Baudouin de 
Courtenay  (1845–1929), Otto Jespersen  (1860–1943) and Hugo 
Schuchardt  (1842–1927), all already known as defenders of 
constructed languages within linguistics (see section 4  below); 
Giuseppe Peano, pioneer of logicism in mathematics and inventor of 
Latino sine Flexione, which he spoke on occasion at the committee 
meetings;44 and German professor  of  chemistry Wilhelm Ostwald 
(1853–1932).45
43 Original text: ‘C’est un lieu commun que de constanter les progrès inouïs des moyens de 
communication : on pourra bientôt faire le tour du monde en quarant jours; on télégraphie 
(même sans fil) d’un côté à l’autre d’Atlantique; on téléphone de Paris à Londres, à Berlin, à 
Turin. Ces facilités de communications on entrainé une extension correspondantes des 
relations économiques : le marché européen s’étend sur la toute la terre, et c’est sur tous les 
points du globe que les principaux pays producteurs entrent en concurrence. Les grands 
nations possèdent des colonies jusqu’aux antipodes et elles ont des intérêts dans les pays de 
les plus lointains. Leur politique n’est plus confinée sur l’échiquier européen; elle devient 
coloniale et “mondiale”. Toujours pour la même raison, elles sont de plus en plus obligées de 
s’entendre et de s’unir, soit dans un intérêt commercial (Convention de Bruxelles relative au 
régime des sucres), soit dans un intérêt moral (Convention internationale relative à la traite 
des blanches).’ See Francis Lyons (1963:103-109 and 274-285) for more information about he 
Brussels Sugar Conventions and the International Convention on the White Slave Trade.
44 Jespersen (1962[1921]:744) provides us with this colourful titbit revealing  the  linguistic 
situation  at  the  committee’s meetings: most business was conducted in French, although 
Baudouin  de Courtenay occasional preferred to speak German, and Peano spoke his Latino 
sine Flexione.
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The committee’s  final decision fell in favour of Esperanto, 
providing a few revisions were made to the language, revisions which 
were outlined in a mysterious pamphlet submitted to committee 
under the pseudonym ‘Ido’ (an Esperanto suffix meaning ‘offspring’, 
here used as an independent word). The reforms (which we address in 
section 4) were designed to simplify the language – that is, make its 
grammar more natural to speakers of less inflected western European 
languages – but also to impose a ‘logical’ structure on the language. 
Esperanto, so the committee, needed to meet the requirements of 
modern science. The  philosophical  concerns  of  the  Enlightenment 
language projects once again took over the humanitarian aspects. The 
Ido advocate Richard Lorenz put it so:
The fact is that science, philosophy and technology  are 
constantly waging a fierce battle with existing languages. What 
they want is a language that is as simple and clear as the 
fundamental laws of nature, as logical as the precision of 
experiment, and as many-sided as the complexity of the facts 
which it has to describe.
(Richard Lorenz 1910[1909]:12)
The Esperanto Lingva Komitato, not unsurprisingly, rejected the Ido 
reforms. The  tension  between  the  founding  amateurs  and  their 
academic  usurpers  is  palpable  in  contemporary  accounts  of  the 
Délégation (positive accounts  include  Lorenz  1910[1909],  and 
negative  accounts  Kotzin  1915[1913],  Guérard  1922:135-160; 
Blanke 1985:185-188 provides  a  more neutral  modern  view).  The 
ensuing dispute plunged to new depths of acrimony when Louis de 
Beaufront (1855–1935), who had been chief patron of the Esperanto 
First World Congress and was Zamenhof’s hand-picked advocate of 
Esperanto to the committee, claimed authorship of the Ido pamphlet. 
In later years it emerged that Couturat and the prominent French 
Esperantist and confidant of Zamenhof Alfred Michaux (1859–1937) 
also had a hand in authoring the Ido reforms (see Forster 1982:128-
130; Blanke 1985:187). Esperanto and its offspring Ido went their 
separate ways: Ido continued to change under following waves of 
45 Of  all  of  them,  Ostwald  had  perhaps  distinguished  himself  the  most  with  his  efforts  at 
international standardisation and co-operation: he developed the Weltformat system of paper 
sizes,  the  immediate  ancestor  of  the  modern  ISO  216  paper  sizes  that  are  used  almost 
universally today; he proposed the introduction of Weltgeld, which the Euro realises in limited 
form, and he was the financial backer of the  Brücke organisation in Munich that sought to 
catalogue all scientific work as a way of removing boundaries between scientists working in 
different fields and countries (see Krajewski 2006; Domschke and Hansel 2000; Domschke 
and Lewandrowski 1982).
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reforms, which were proposed and implemented in the splinter 
group’s main journal, the aptly named Progreso (Progress).
Only a few years after the Ido schism, the catastrophe of the First 
World War realised  the dangers of European nationalism,  and 
highlighted the urgency of the international language problem for the 
pacifist camp. It is from this time that we have Ogden’s first hints at 
the need for an  international language.  After the typed pages in the 
chapter  ‘Universal  Language’ of  his  ‘Significs’ manuscript,  which 
went through various drafts from 1911 to 1922 (see chapter 2, section 
5), Ogden the pacifist has scrawled, in an ‘uncharacteristically large 
hand’,  as  Gordon  (1990a:187)  puts  it:  ‘Symbolic  language  would 
unite  sense  and  meaning’,  ‘Differences  in  language  make  war 
possible’, and ‘To cause the spread of English is to extinguish the 
possibility  of  war.’ It  was  also  in these years that  the Esperanto 
movement became more radical, or at least it appeared more radical 
in the polarised light. During the war, the Universala Esperanto 
Asocio (Universal Esperanto Association), founded in 1908 as an 
expressly pacifist and internationalist Esperanto body in the wake of 
the Ido schism, supported its causes in such material ways as 
operating a mail and package forwarding service between the warring 
countries via Switzerland (see Lins 1988:52 and Forster 1982:159). 
After the war, in 1921, the  Sennacia Asocio Tutmonda  (Worldwide 
Anational Association), a group dominated by Marxists until the end 
of the 1920s, was established as a  splinter group from the UEA. In 
the 1930s both organisations went on to be banned and their members 
persecuted under the new totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany and, 
perhaps  ironically,  given  the  blanket  designation  ‘communist’  in 
western  countries,  in  the  Stalinist  Soviet  Union  (Lins  1988  and 
Forster 1982 cover this history in some depth).
In the 1920s, as Ogden began to work out the details of his Basic 
English, the failure of projects like Ido to find wide-scale adoption 
and the apparent radicalisation of Esperanto kept the final resolution 
of the international language problem far away: the most successful 
project, Esperanto, continued to be unpalatable to those who wanted 
to  maintain  an  apolitical  veneer.  In  1924  Alice  Vanderbilt  Morris 
(1874–1950),  heiress  of  the  New  York  Vanderbilt  family,  whose 
fortune derived from a private transport empire built in the nineteenth 
century, established the International Auxiliary Language Association 
(IALA). Although her interest in the problem may date back to as 
early as 1918 (see Falk 1999:38-39), it was almost certainly piqued in 
1921 through conversations with Fredereick Gardner Cottrell (1877–
90
1948), professor of physical chemistry at the University of California, 
Berkeley, and former Ph.D. student of Ostwald in Leipzig, who may 
have been instrumental in pollinating the interlinguistic thoughts of 
Cottrell that later sprouted in America. Cottrell was chairman of the 
Committee on International Auxiliary Language, founded 1919 under 
the  auspices  of  the  International  Research  Council  in  Washington 
D.C. (see IALA 1945; Esterhill  2000:1-2),  and he came to talk to 
Morris on the topic after she and his wife became friends while they 
were both resident at  the Pompton Lakes Sanitarium, New Jersey, 
where they were recovering from illnesses (Falk 1999:41).
IALA implemented the approach of the American private research 
foundation, sponsoring programs into the three aspects of the 
international language problem that it identified: linguistics, 
education and sociology (see chapter 9 of Falk 1999). Each of these 
programs was led by an expert in the field, linguistics initially by the 
anthropological linguist Edward Sapir (1884–1939), education by the 
psychologist Edward L. Thorndike (1874–1949), and sociology by 
the sociologist Herbert N. Shenton (1884-1937; see Falk 1999:48). 
Over  the  following years  each program brought  forth  studies  into 
similarities and differences across existing languages  (Sapir  1930; 
1944; Sapir and Swadesh 1932; Swadesh and Morris 1934), optimal 
second-language pedagogy  (Thorndike  and  Kennon  1927;  Eaton 
1927; Eaton 1934a; 1934b; 1940), and problems of communication in 
international settings (Shenton 1933). IALA scholars also produced 
some popular propaganda for the international language cause, such 
as Sapir (1931; 1933), and Shenton (1930). The latter was published 
in  Ogden’s  journal  Psyche  and  offers  a  fascinating  visionary 
statement of the role of IALA and ‘social engineers’ in solving the 
international  language  problem.  Ogden  was  among  the  many 
‘consultants’ asked by the IALA in this period to offer their thoughts 
on and propose solutions to the international language problem (see 
Esterhill 2000:5; Falk 1999:54-55).
Although the IALA provided some support to Esperanto activities 
–  the complete works of Zamenhof (1929),  Stojan’s (1929) 
Bibliografio of international language, which is written in Esperanto, 
and  Eaton’s  (1934b)  ‘general  language  course’,  based  around 
Esperanto, were prepared and published with grants from IALA – it 
is clear that Esperanto’s political associations alone made the 
language undesirable within IALA. Like the Délégation before it, the 
leaders  of  IALA sought to rescue the international language 
movement from radicals and utopians, to make it the servant of 
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decent scientific enterprise. In his 1922 ‘program-circular of the 
Committee on International Auxiliary Language of the International 
Research Council’, we  see  the  words  that  Cottrell  undoubtedly 
uttered in Morris’ ear the year before, as he urged her to set up her 
foundation,  the only hope for  snatching the international  language 
movement from fingers of the Bolsheviks:
From a sociological standpoint one of the most important 
features of the whole subject of international language 
development is the surprising interest and fidelity to the cause 
shown by the proletariat. It has really been from this class that 
there has come to the movement not only the great bulk of 
personal effort, but of financial support as well. It has been 
truly the multiplication of the “widow’s mite”  which has 
supported the word thus far...If this interest of the masses can 
be carefully studied and sympathetically grasped by competent 
sociologists, it may be given constructive guidance for the 
benefit of all; but if neglected and left entirely to be developed 
by radicals, it may serve to merely fan the flame of bolshevism.
(Cottrell, quoted in Guérard 1922:185-187)
This is a message that resonated with Morris: in her directions to 
Sapir she dismissed certain types of language projects, which, she 
casually added, ‘[l]ike communism [… have] been tried and failed’ 
(Morris in a letter to Sapir, 1925, quoted in Esterhill 2000:5). The 
story of IALA after 1930 mimics in its outlines that of the 
Délégation. At its first international meeting in Geneva  in  1930, 
IALA moved to select an international language. None of the projects 
reviewed by the subsequent Committee for Agreement in 1935 was 
found to be satisfactory, and in 1937 IALA began to design its own 
language project under the direction of the English Germanist 
William Edward Collinson (1889–1969; see Falk 1995:250-252; 
Esterhill 2000:7-8). This project was concluded under the direction of 
Alexander Gode (1906–1970) in 1951, with the name ‘Interlingua’. 
Although there were several directors of the IALA language project 
from its inception in 1937 – Collinson, then E. Clark Stillman (1907–
1995) from 1939, and then André Martinet for the brief period 1946–
1948 –  it is Gode’s name that appears on the final works, Gode 
(1971[1951]), the dictionary, and Gode and Blair (1971[1951]), the 
grammar. He is widely considered the have had the greatest influence 
on the shaping of the final product (see, for example, Blanke 
1985:173; cf. chapter 12 of Falk 1999). Gode, it should perhaps be 
noted, was actively anti-communist in the later Cold War period; he 
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translated into English Gerhard Szczesny’s (1966) attack on Bertolt 
Brecht’s socialism.
We see then the international language movement as a part of the 
social and political environment of late nineteenth and earlier 
twentieth century Euro-America, the expression of widespread hopes 
for easing international communication, but for very different, and 
increasingly antagonistic, reasons. On the one side were the 
humanitarians, hoping to bring about the brotherhood of man through 
a common language, which in some minds became  associated with 
communist aspirations; on the other were the technocrats, looking for 
a medium for international scientific intercourse to secure and 
accelerate the progress of civilisation, but keeping their distance from 
the apparent  left-wing politics of  the  humanitarians.  This  split 
mirrored a division between amateur enthusiasts, who tended towards 
the humanitarian side, and scholarly language constructors, who were 
more interested in international  language as a tool  of  science.  But 
whatever their politics and despite their mutual denunciations, the 
forms of the major language projects proposed in this period looked 
ever similar, as they moved towards a ‘common solution’. It was as 
these tensions were at their height and with no resolution in sight that 
Ogden  put  forward  his  Basic.  Ogden  was  publicly  involved  in 
broadly  ‘progressive’  causes,  but  there  are  no  hints  of  the 
‘communist’ sympathies that so alarmed the technocratic camp in the 
international language movement. It was with this technocratic camp 
that Ogden principally aligned himself, as we will now see, with his 
rhetoric and design proposals for Basic. But his adherence to a single 
living  national  language,  namely  English,  presents  an  unusual, 
perhaps characteristically British, solution to the problem, which in 
many ways stood in opposition to the cherished ideals of neutrality 
that the technocrats held.
4. The common solution
‘[J]ust as bicycles and typewriters are now nearly all of the same 
type, which was not the case with the early makes,’ commented the 
Danish linguist and language constructor Otto Jespersen (1860–1943; 
1928:52), ‘we are now in the matter of interlanguage approaching the 
time when one standard type can be fixed authoritatively in such a 
way that the general structure will remain stable, though new words 
will, of course, be constantly added when need requires.’  Even 
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though the large number of new projects that appeared in this period 
inevitably displayed a high degree of diversity, the major projects – 
that  is,  the  projects  that  actually  found  supporters  beyond  their 
creators  –  all  ‘show[ed]  an  unmistakable  family  likeness,’  as 
Jespersen  continued,  ‘and may  be  termed  dialects  of  one  and the 
same international  language.’ The common solution  of  this  period 
follows  a  pattern  largely  established  by  Esperanto:  the  result  was 
invariably a language lexified by the major European languages and 
offering a grammar based on them, but simplified and regularised. 
Superficially,  Basic  seemed to go against  this  trend.  It  was  based 
solely on the English national language: its vocabulary and grammar 
were  simply  a  subset  of  those  offered  by  Standard  English,  not 
modified according to any scheme at all. But Basic did answer to the 
broader  design  considerations  that  lay  behind  contemporary 
international  language  projects.  Ogden  believed  that  the  English 
language already offered many of the features the artificial language 
constructors worked so hard to incorporate into their languages.
The traditional classification of constructed languages comes from 
the  French Esperantist  Gaston Moch (1859–1935;  1897),  and was 
popularised  by  Leau and Couturat’s (1903;  1907)  surveys  of 
language projects. This classification offers a primary division into a 
priori and a posteriori languages, terms perhaps  derived from their 
use in epistemology: an a priori language is constructed de novo, 
usually according to a particular ‘logical’ or philosophical scheme, 
while an a posteriori language makes use of lexical material and the 
grammatical organisation of existing, usually European, languages 
(Moch  1897:44;  Leau and Couturat 1903:xxvii-xxviii). This 
classification into the a priori and a posteriori is, however, by no 
means absolute; it is rather a continuum, and there is a clear trend 
from the advent of Volapük to the publication of IALA Interlingua in 
which constructed languages shed a priori properties and became 
increasingly a posteriori.
Alongside the contrast between a priori and a posteriori is a 
tension between the ‘analytic’  and ‘synthetic’  in language,  another 
distinction with a namesake in epistemology. In the linguistic sense, 
the  terms  ‘analytic’ and  ‘synthetic’  originate  in  early  nineteenth 
century language typology, and specifically in the work of  August 
Wilhelm von  Schlegel  (1767–1845;  cf.  Koerner  1989b;  Morpurgo 
Davies  1998:71-76).  Drawing  on  existing  morphology-based 
language  classifications   –  Schlegel  (1818:85)  cited  those  of  his 
brother  Friedrich  von  Schlegel  (1772–1829)  and  the  Scottish 
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Enlightenment figure Adam Smith (1723–1790) – Schlegel posited a 
three-way primary division into  les  langues sans aucune structure  
grammaticale  (later  dubbed  ‘isolating  languages’ in  English),  les  
langues qui emploient des affixes  (agglutinative languages) and  les  
langues  à  inflexions (inflecting  languages).  The  Indo-European 
languages  (to  refer  to  them anachronistically)  belong  to  this  final 
group,  which  Schlegel  subdivided  into  les  langues  synthétiques  
(synthetic languages) – Latin, Ancient Greek and Sanskrit – and les 
langues  analytiques  (analytic  languages),  exemplified  to  varying 
degrees  by modern  Romance and Germanic  varieties.46 In  making 
this classification, Schlegel, and his contemporaries, were concerned 
with  inflectional  morphology  alone,  but  the  later  language 
constructors, in adopting this contrast, applied it also to vocabulary, 
where multimorphemic compound words were understood as analytic 
in contrast to the synthetic forms of monomorphemic words.47 
For  the language constructors,  there  was an increasingly  strong 
preference for all that was analytic and a shunning of the synthetic 
(cf.  Falk 1995:254; 1999:57-58, 61-66; Joseph 1999:55-56). In the 
context of nineteenth-century language study, this represents a new 
fashion,  contrary  to  philologists’  traditional  love  for  the  subtle 
complexities  of  inflection  embodied  in  the  classical  languages. 
Schlegel assigned ‘first place’ to the synthetic inflecting languages, 
although  he  also  admired  the  newer  analytic  languages  for ‘the 
degree  of  perfection  of  which  this  type  is  susceptible’ (Schlegel 
1818:17; see Arens 1955:166-170 for  excerpts  and commentary).48 
46 These analytic languages, Schlegel (1818:16) tells us, have developed in historical times out 
of  their  synthetic  ancestors  through a  process  of  decomposition,  while  the origins  of  the 
synthetic parents, as with the other incommensurable primary typological classes, remain ‘lost 
in  the  night  of  time’.  Schlegel’s  (1818:16)  original  wording:  ‘L’origine  des  langues 
synthétiques se perd dans la nuit des temps; les langues analytiques, au contraire, sont de 
création moderne:  toutes celles  que nous connoissons,  sont  nées  de la décomposition des 
langue synthétiques.’ This process is observable both in Europe, and in the East, Schlegel 
(1818:86-87) tells us.
47 Since  the  days  of  Moch,  Leau  and  Couturat,  numerous  alternative  classifications  of 
constructed languages have been proposed, most of which represent an elaboration of the a 
priori/a  posteriori  distinction,  in  one  way  or  another  (see  Blanke  1985:99-110).  The 
synthetic/analytic distinction, however, has received very little attention under this name in 
the secondary interlinguistic literature, even though, as we show, it was a major concern of 
linguists  and  language  constructors  in  the  period.  We  maintain  these  two  dimensions  of 
classification for constructed language in the discussion here, because they are the dimensions 
suggested by the primary literature, especially by Ogden’s writings.
48 Schlegel (1818:15) writes: ‘Je pense, […] qu’il faut assigner le premier rang aux langues à 
inflexions.’ He (ibid.:17) continues: ‘En Europe, les langues dérivées du latin, et l’anglois, ont 
une grammaire toute analytique, et les littératures de ces belles langues, cultivées avec tant de 
soins  et  de  succès,  nous  montrent  à  peu  près  le  degré  de  perfection  dont  ce  genre  est  
susceptible.’
95
Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  (1767–1835),  Schlegel’s  more  influential 
contemporary,  in  his  own  consideration  of  the  vollkommenste  
Sprachform (most perfect form of language) concluded that, although 
no  attested  language  satisfies  all  desiderata,  the  highly  inflecting 
‘Sanskritic languages’ come closest (Humboldt 1907[1836]:252-253; 
cf. the excerpts in Arens 1955:192-194; see also Morpurgo Davies 
1998:111-114).  An  admiration  for  languages  with  morphologically 
intense grammars became the received attitude among those involved 
in the study of language during the course of the nineteenth century, 
and  later  turned at  the  hands  of  the  leading  German comparative 
grammarian August Schleicher (1821–1868) into a doctrine of decay 
from  the  synthetic  ideal  (see  Morpurgo  Davies  1975:652-682; 
1998:196-200;  Koerner  1989c).  Discussing  the  ‘evolution’ of  the 
older synthetic Germanic languages, represented by Gothic, into the 
modern,  analytic  Germanic  languages,  he  wrote  (1874[1860]:34): 
‘Our words, as contrasted with Gothic words, are like a statue that 
has been rolling for a long time in a bed of a river till its beautiful 
limbs have been worn off, so that now scarcely anything remains but 
a polished stone with faint indications of once what it was.’49
Although  many  rebutted  what  they  saw  as  excesses  in  his 
theorising – prominent here is the American linguist William Dwight 
Whitney (1827–1894; see Alter 2005) – Schleicher’s thought shaped 
much of the mid-nineteenth-century linguistic landscape.50 This is no 
49 Schleicher’s original words are: ‘[...] unsere Wörter nehmen sich gotischen gegenüber aus,  
wie etwa eine Statue, die durch langes Rollen in einem Fußbette um ihre Glieder gekommen 
und von der nicht viel mehr als eine abgeschliffene Steinwalze mit schwachen Andeutungen 
des  einst  vorhandenen  geblieben  ist  […]’ The  English  translation  given  above  is  from 
Jespersen (1894:11).
50 Another of Schleicher’s ideas that would influence attitudes to constructed languages is his  
‘Darwinian theory of  linguistics’ (outlined most  clearly  in  Schleicher  1863;  reinforced in 
Schleicher 1865), where he turned the new and fashionable Darwinian theory of evolution on 
languages and came to conceive of them as a kind of living organisms, subject to the laws of 
evolution. While many were cautious in taking this approach too literally, the conception of 
languages as a kind of natural phenomenon beyond human control became well established 
and exerted ideological resistance to the acceptance of constructed languages. Philologists 
such  as  Gustav  Meyer  (1850–1900;  Meyer  1976[1891])  and  the  Neogrammarians  Karl 
Brugman  (1839–1919)  and  August  Leskien  (1840–1916;  Brugman  and  Leskien  1907) 
objected  to  constructed  languages  on  the  grounds  that  no language could be  consciously 
tampered with. They were opposed by such figures as the German-born and trained British 
philologist  Max  Müller  (1823–1900;  see  Kniele  1889),  and  the  Délégation members 
Schuchardt  (1888) and Baudouin de Courtenay (1976[1907]),  who cited attested cases  of 
conscious intervention in language. There is a sense in which the debate was settled from a 
practical point of view when such projects as Volapük, in a limited degree, and Esperanto, to a 
much greater  degree,  proved  to  be  usable  between  speakers  who  had  no  other  common 
language. But an uneasiness about the constructed nature of these languages persisted well  
into the later periods of the international language movement, prompting Sapir (1929:17), in 
his  capacity  as  director  of  linguistic  research  at  IALA,  to  comment  that  linguists’  
‘lukewarmness’ about constructed languages ‘seems rather to be bound up with all kinds of  
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doubt the reason why Jespersen made an example of Schleicher in 
combating this evaluative attitude to language history and language 
typology.  In  his  doctoral  dissertation,  published  1894  in  English 
translation,  with  the  frank  title  Progress  in  Language,  Jespersen 
argued against  the exaltation  of  the  synthetic,  which he attributed 
squarely to Schleicher. On Jespersen’s account, Schleicher wanted to 
force existing typologies into a Hegelian scheme of development and 
decline  where,  with  the  progress  of  civilisation  in  prehistory, 
languages  climb from isolating  origins  to  the  heights  of  flexional 
synthesis,  and then collapse into analytic forms in historical  times 
(see  Jespersen  1962[1920]:698-701;  Schleicher  1850:16; 
1874[1860]:35; cf. 1865:28-29). By contrast, Jespersen (1894:25-26) 
saw  analyticity  as  an  advance:  ‘In  language,  analysis  means 
suppleness, and synthesis means rigidity.’ Analysis hands the speaker 
the means to express themselves naturally, as they wish; synthesis, by 
contrast,  forces  the  speaker  to  fit  their  expression  to  complex 
inherited arbitrary forms. This is  a view that Jespersen maintained 
throughout his career: his last publication, the posthumous Jespersen 
(1962[1941]), revisits the topic. It is also a view that would resonate 
with Ogden’s later work, especially in its admiration of English as 
one of the best present-day representatives of the analytic tendency. 
Schleicher’s  scheme,  asserted Jespersen (1894:9-10),  is  simply the 
product  of  unfounded  prejudice,  ‘a  grammar-school  admiration,  a 
Renaissance love of the two classical languages and their literatures’. 
He  concluded:  ‘The  so-called  full  and  rich  forms  of  the  ancient 
languages are not a beauty but a deformity’ (Jespersen 1894:14). The 
reaction against Schleicher, Jespersen (1894:14-16) believed, was the 
beginning  of  a  shifting  tide:  he  cited  scattered  statements  from a 
handful of his contemporaries who were drawn to the new analytic 
aesthetics.  We  also  observe  that  the  committee  of  the  American 
Philosophical Society, in rejecting Volapük, commented:
romantic notions [where … a] language was thought of as something like a tree that grew up 
without human care and could not be interfered with without spoiling the growth. That was a 
very interesting metaphor, but I think we are paying the price for it now in the difficulty we  
are finding in convincing people that an international language may be constructed.’ Views of 
this sort probably contributed to the lack of support for the international language movement 
that Sapir encountered among his professional colleagues. Although many prominent linguists 
signed Sapir’s (1925) call for support for the international language movement, they seem to 
have done so reluctantly. Leonard Bloomfield, after signing, expressed reservations to Sapir 
privately  (cf.  Bloomfield  1914:324-325).  Hermann  Collitz,  the  first  president  of  the 
Linguistics Society of America, was openly hostile to the notion of an international language 
in his presidential address (Collitz 1925). See also Falk (1995; 1999:45-47, 61, 67-69, 88-92).
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Volapük is synthetic and complex ; all modern dialects become 
more and more analytic and grammatically simple ; the formal 
elements  of  Volapük  are  those  long  since  discarded  and 
outgrown by Aryan speech [… Volapük] seems to us a distinct 
retrogression in linguistic progress.
(Brinton et al. 1888:12)
In a supplement to the report, in which they responded to criticisms 
of their conclusions, the committee continued: ‘The crucial test of the 
development  of  language  is  that  the  sentence  shall  express  the 
thought intended to be conveyed, and nothing more. When this can be 
attained  simply  by  the  order  of  words  in  the  sentence,  without 
changes in those words, such changes are not merely useless, they are 
burdensome, and impede the mind’ (Brinton et al. 1888:14).
The  admiration  for  the  analytic  was  most  prevalent  among 
contemporary  mathematicians  and  logicians.  This  is  ‘analytic’ not 
only in the linguistic sense that we have just seen, but also as the term 
is understood in epistemology. In the development of the new logical 
notations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we see 
the conflation of these two senses. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was 
frequently  cited  in  this  period  for  his  classification  of  knowledge 
along the dimensions of the a priori versus the a posteriori, and the 
synthetic  versus  the  analytic.  Analytic judgements,  said  Kant 
(1998[1781]:141), ‘do not add anything to the concept of the subject, 
but  only  break  it  up  by  means  of  analysis  into  its  component 
concepts,  which  were  already  thought  in  it  (though  confusedly),’ 
whereas synthetic judgements ‘add to the concept of the subject  a 
predicate that was not thought in it at all, and could not have been 
extracted from it through any analysis’.51 To illustrate this distinction 
Kant offered the analytic judgement ‘all bodies are extended’, where 
he argued the notion ‘extended’ is contained in the concept ‘body’. 
By contrast, in ‘all bodies are heavy’, ‘heaviness’ is not contained in 
‘body’: this is a synthetic judgement. 
The history of logical developments from Frege onwards is to no 
small extent one of trying to consign more and more concepts to the 
analytic category and thereby render them explicable through logical 
analysis.  This  is  the  impetus  behind  logicism  in  mathematics,  of 
which  Frege  and  Peano  were  pioneers  (see  chapter  2,  section  4). 
51 Note  that  in  this  quotation  Kant  is  talking  in  terms  of  traditional  subject-predicate 
propositions. In modern first-order propositional logics, as developed by Frege, Peano and 
Russell (see chapter 2, section 4), the structure of a proposition is not limited to the relation  
between the predicate and its subject.
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Although in later  years he engaged much less with the distinction 
between  synthetic  and  analytic,  Frege  (1959[1884]:§88)  sought  to 
demonstrate that mathematical truths are analytic, in that they can be 
reduced  to  and  proved  in  logic,  and  not  synthetic,  as  Kant 
(1998[1781]:144) had claimed. ‘The truth is that they [mathematical 
truths]  are  contained  in  the  definitions,’  argued  Frege 
(1959[1884]:101), ‘but as plants are contained in their seeds, not as 
beams are contained in a house.’ It is to reveal this analytic character 
and set  it  out  in  visible  form that  Frege was driven to  invent  his 
Begriffsschrift (Frege 1959[1884]:§91). Through his enhanced notion 
of  analytic  judgements  Frege  sought  a  means  for  perspicuously 
capturing the creative insights that allow us to grasp such truths, all in 
a form that can be mechanically verified (see chapters 3 and 4 of 
Dummett 1991; de Jong 1996 for detailed discussion).
While Peano did not address Kant directly, Russell certainly saw 
his  developments  in  logical  notation  and  the  accompanying 
axiomatisation of arithmetic (see chapter 2, section 4) as helping to 
demonstrate  the  underlying  analytic  nature  of  mathematical 
judgements,  against  Kant’s  erroneous  insistence  on  their  synthetic 
nature: 
[T]he Kantian view […] asserted that mathematical reasoning 
is not strictly formal [i.e. is analytic], but always uses intuitions 
[… i.e. is synthetic]. Thanks to the progress of Symbolic Logic, 
especially  as  treated  by  Professor  Peano,  this  part  of  the 
Kantian philosophy is now capable of a final and irrevocable 
refutation. 
(Russell 1903:4)
Russell’s  later  technical  and  theoretical  efforts,  in  particular  his 
theory  of  descriptions,  were  aimed  at  broadening  this  facility  for 
analysis to expressions beyond mathematics. This was perhaps also 
the motivation behind Wittgenstein’s characterisation of the structure 
of logic as the structure of the world (Wittgenstein 1922:prop. 5.6-
5.61). Rudolf Carnap, a former student of Frege’s (introduced into the 
dissertation  properly  in  chapter  4),  explicitly  embraced  Kant’s 
distinction in  his  general  epistemology and identified  the  a priori  
with the analytic and the a posteriori with the synthetic, eliminating 
Kant’s  category  of  the  ‘synthetic  a  priori’,  knowledge  prior  to 
experience that is not contained in the terms themselves, the category 
to  which  Kant  assigned  mathematical  truths  (Carnap 
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1967[1928]:§106). Carnap’s example, followed notably by the British 
exponent  of  Viennese  logical  positivism Alfred  Jules  Ayer  (1910–
1989;  1955[1936]:77-83),  became  one  of  the  two  ‘dogmas  of 
empiricism’ that the American philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine 
(1908–2000)  identified  in  his  later  critique  of  logical  positivism 
(Quine  1953[1951]),  a  dogma  that  Quine  and  others  found 
problematic (other critiques include White 1950; chapter 4 of Hempel 
1965, based on material  dating back to 1950–1951; and the much 
later  Kripke  1980[1972]).  Beginning  with  Frege  and  Peano,  and 
coming  to  a  close  with  Quine,  there  is  an  undeniable  preference 
among logicians for analysis,  which leads to efforts to expand the 
domain of what can be analysed by fashioning formalisms that lay 
analytic structures bare. 
Moreover, at least from Peano onwards, these formalisms became 
increasingly  ‘analytic’,  as  the  term  is  understood  in  linguistic 
typology:  they were constructed of  atomic operators  and variables 
arranged in simple linear fashion. Frege, in his  Begriffsschrift,  had 
originally relied on both of the two dimensions afforded by a piece of 
paper in setting out his formulas; he also joined his symbols together 
with  various  ligatures  to  create  composite  diagrams  (see  Frege 
1972[1879]  for  examples  of  his  notation).  These  were  features  of 
Frege’s  notation  that  Peano  criticised:  Peano  insisted  on  the 
superiority  of  his  own system, with separate,  unchanging symbols 
strung together in one dimension only (see Kennedy 2002[1980]:99-
101).  It  is  Peano’s  approach  that  prevailed;  subsequent  logicians 
preferred his plain strings to Frege’s elaborate diagrams. We therefore 
see in the formalisms established in this period the coming together 
of  the  two  senses  of  ‘analytic’ from  epistemology  and  linguistic 
typology.52
The  new  logical  notations  may  have  in  fact  contributed  to 
changing aesthetic preferences in linguistics. Certainly links between 
linguistics  and  the  new  language-critical  analytic  philosophy  are 
attested later in this period. Joseph (1996) convincingly demonstrates 
that Sapir’s well-known views on the connection of linguistic form to 
speakers’  habitual  patterns  of  thought  owe  much  to  new 
developments  in  philosophy,  and in  particular  to  The  Meaning  of  
52 There is a temptation to see a link between Schlegel’s coining of the terms ‘analytic’ and 
‘synthetic’ in  typology  and  Kant’s  coining  of  the  same  terms  in  epistemology  that  goes 
beyond the words’ pre-technical senses. If there is an influence, it would presumably run from 
Kant to Schlegel: Kant’s distinction is earlier and was widely discussed before Schlegel made 
his. Further research may turn up a more solid link between the thought that lies behind the 
parallel terms, but at this point we can only speculate.
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Meaning  (see  Sapir  1921:14,  94,  102,  104-105,  112-113;  1923; 
1949[1924];  1949[1929]:162;  cf.  Koerner  2000 for  a  simultaneous 
reinforcing and tempering of these arguments). In his role as director 
of  linguistic  research  at  IALA,  Sapir  was  also  an  advocate  of  an 
analytic structure for the international language (Sapir 1925; cf. Falk 
1999:61-63).  Leonard  Bloomfield  (1887–1949),  the  pioneer  of 
American structural  linguistics,  was  deeply impressed by the  later 
logical  positivists’ work  in  logic  and  epistemology  (discussed  in 
chapter 4), and incorporated many of their tenets and methods into 
his  approach  to  linguistics  (see  Bloomfield  1936;  1938;  Hiz  and 
Swiggers 1990; Tomalin 2004). Although no great supporter of the 
international  language  movement  (see  Falk  1999:61),  he  saw 
‘simplification’ towards  the  analytic  pole  as  an  inevitable,  if  not 
desirable  process,  in  language change  (see  Joseph  and Newmeyer 
2012:347).
Fashions  in  the  international  language  movement  accord  with 
those  in  mainstream  philology  and  linguistics:  the  earlier 
international  language  projects,  such  as  Volapük  and  Esperanto, 
tended  more  towards  synthesis,  while  later  projects  turned 
increasingly  to  analytic  structures.  Basic  stands  at  the  end of  this 
trend,  with Ogden arguing that  English presents  the most  suitable 
basis for the international language precisely because of its naturally 
analytic structure, even more analytic than most of the constructed 
languages.  In  the  earlier  projects  grammatical  simplification  over 
natural languages was achieved through regularising the morphology 
and removing the most obviously arbitrary grammatical categories, 
such  as  grammatical  gender. Inflection in Volapük admits no 
irregularities or exceptions, and common but often redundant 
categories such as adjective-noun agreement and grammatical gender 
are absent. But Volapük nouns still inflect for four cases – 
nominative, accusative, dative and genitive, as in German –  and 
singular and plural number. Verbs agree with their subjects for 
person, number and natural gender, and exhibit a number of voice, 
aspect and tense inflections; Carlevaro (quoted in Blanke 1985:209) 
calculates 2,688 distinct forms of each transitive verb in Volapük (for 
guides  to  Volapük  grammar,  see  Schleyer  1982[1880];  1888; 
Kerckhoffs 1885; Blanke 1985). Schleyer believed that his reforms to 
the general European grammatical pattern made the language clearer: 
‘All artifice, unclarity and bizarreness are proscribed in it [the 
language]!! […]  The language is not for hiding one’s thoughts, but 
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for sharing them!’ (Schleyer 1982[1880]:5)53 He did not seem to have 
any overarching scheme dictating how that clarity should be 
achieved, however. Esperanto represents in many ways an extension 
of this pattern: there is the same absolute paradigmatic regularity and 
movement away from agreement, at least between verbs and their 
subjects, and grammatical gender, but morphology remains an 
integral part of the nominal and verbal system of the language. 
Central to the language is a system in which the parts of speech that 
traditionally inflect and are mutually derivable in the European 
languages are explicitly marked with certain endings: nouns with -o, 
adjectives with -a, adverbs with -e, and verbs in the infinitive with -i. 
Verbs have five additional endings, covering several tenses and 
moods –  present, past, future, conditional and imperative –  and can 
be derived to create active and passive participles in each of the 
tenses. Nouns and adjectives inflect for two cases, nominative and 
accusative, plus singular and plural number, and they exhibit 
agreement in this inflection (see Zamenhof  1889[1887] and 
Zamenhof 1905 for outlines of Esperanto grammar).
With  the  growing  technocratic  current  in  the  international 
language  movement,  logicians  came  to  play  an  increasingly 
important  role  and  the  Juggernaut  of  analytic  syntax  made  its 
progress.  The elimination of morphology was the leitmotiv of such 
languages as Peano’s Latino sine Flexione,  literally, ‘Latin without 
inflections’.  Indeed,  Peano,  in  his  two  capacities  of  pioneering 
logicist and language constructor, provides an illustrative example of 
the convergence of fashions between these groups. In both his logical 
notation and his international language project he aimed for analytic 
forms.  Even  in  the  case  of  Latino  sine  Flexione,  however,  the 
commitment to analytic forms came into conflict with naturalising a 
posteriori design considerations: in his original proposals for the 
language, Peano (1903) did indeed eliminate all inflection, but in 
subsequent revisions number inflection on nouns crept back into the 
language (see Barandovská-Frank 2003:20). Similar conflicts arise in 
the history of Ido and IALA Interlingua. The Ido reforms saw a 
dismantling of much of the morphological apparatus of Esperanto: 
adjective-noun agreement was eliminated and the accusative case was 
made optional. This represented the ‘[s]uppression of certain useless 
grammatical rules, which are troublesome to many nations, and 
especially to persons possessing only an elementary education’ 
53 The exclamation marks are original. The original text: ‘Alle Künstelei, Unklarheit und 
Verschrobenheit sei in ihr [der Sprache] auf’s äuserste verpönt!! [...] In ihr soll man die 
Sprache nicht haben, um seine Gedanken zu verbergen, sondern sie mitzuteilen!’ 
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(Couturat  et al. 1910:75; emphasis original), that is, the elimination 
of the arbitrary insofar as it is superfluous and the naturalisation of 
the grammar for speakers of languages without these features (most 
notably English, and most modern Romance languages, at least as far 
as the accusative is concerned). Further naturalising reforms in Ido 
are scattered throughout the grammar. In many cases, these actually 
make the language less ‘analytic’, in that isomorphy between form 
and meaning in Esperanto is collapsed in some Ido forms; for 
example, the Esperanto plural noun ending -oj, where -o marks noun 
and -j plural, is collapsed in Ido to the monomorphemic -i  (see 
Beaufront 2004[1925]; Couturat et al. 1910:75-85; Blanke 1985:189-
192 for Ido grammar and contrasts to Esperanto). IALA Interlingua, 
released almost fifty years later, represents the almost complete 
surrender of the analytic in grammar to the a posteriori (cf. chapter 8 
of  Blanke  2006). Grammatically, it is essentially English: nouns 
inflect for number, pronouns for case, and verbs for tense. By this 
time, the a posteriori had grown so much in importance that the 
frequent and quasi-grammatical verbs haber ‘have’, esser ‘be’  and 
vader ‘go’ were granted  irregular past tense forms, mimicking their 
behaviour  in  the  major  European  languages  (see Gode and Blair 
1971[1951]). Despite his preference for analytic structures, Sapir, as 
director of research at IALA, recognised the overriding importance of 
harmonising the international language with existing languages (cf. 
Falk 1999:65). He presaged IALA’s surrender of analyticity to the a 
posteriori as he observed:
[S]o far as the logical structure of a language is concerned, we 
are perhaps not at the end of our researches. [… W]e, who are 
fashioning Occidental culture[,] have been using certain useful 
linguistic tools. These tools vary from place to place, but by 
and  large  are  remarkably  similar.  […  W]hy  not  use  the 
common bond of experience which is implicit in the use of all 
these tools in a simplified and regularized form?
(Sapir 1929:17-18)
In  fact  Gode,  the  principal  designer  of  Interlingua,  later  spoke 
frequently of ‘Standard Average European’, a term coined by Sapir’s 
student Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941) to designate precisely the 
commonalities in linguistic structure that Sapir describes (see Gode 
1971[1951]; Whorf 1956). Basic also surrenders logical structure to 
the  a posteriori:  being essentially a subset  of the natural language 
English, its grammar exhibits all the exceptions and irregularities of 
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English  that  are  represented  in  the  subset.  The  superior  nature  of 
English was sufficiently great, argued Ogden, that such unfortunate 
lapses could be tolerated (see section 7).
The same tension between a posteriori considerations and the 
desire to achieve an ‘analytic’ structure  played out in the design of 
vocabularies. Volapük, in both its grammar and vocabulary, so 
claimed Schleyer (1880:3, 7), was derived from the major European 
languages, with special attention given to English. But Schleyer’s 
desire to improve the languages, in this case to force words into a 
better phonological scheme, frequently rendered the borrowed roots 
unrecognisable: vol and pük, for example, are derived from the 
English words ‘world’ and ‘speak’ respectively (the intervening a is a 
genitive ending on vol). Schleyer (1888) provided lists of the rules he 
said he used in constructing the vocabulary, but the rules have a 
rather miscellaneous and arbitrary character: nouns must not end in 
sibilants, words must not be longer than six syllables, clusters of 
three consonants or vowels were not allowed, the letters s, k, o, ä, ö, 
ü, p, h, r, l should be avoided as much as possible, and syllables that 
do not contribute directly to the clarity of a word can be dropped. 
Schleyer never felt the need to justify these rules, and in fact gave 
himself licence to ignore them in any particular case if he felt they 
would be inappropriate, which only served to increase their 
arbitrariness. In Esperanto the source of Zamenhof’s borrowed 
lexical forms is more transparent, but he imposed an a priori 
agglutinative affix system on the vocabulary, mainly as a means of 
reducing the amount of material a learner would need to assimilate to 
use the language: he claimed that the learner would need to memorise 
only 900 roots and affixes (Zamenhof  1889[1887]). We have, for 
example, in Esperanto, the prefix mal- for opposite, so from bona 
‘good’, we derive malbona ‘bad’; from sana ‘healthy’, malsana 
‘sick’. The suffix -il indicates an instrument; from the verb tranĉi ‘to 
cut’  it is possible to derive tranĉilo ‘knife’. Zamenhof’s stated 
motivation for using recognisable borrowed roots is also mnemonic; 
he had experimented with wholly invented forms, but found them too 
difficult to remember. In any case, he noticed, there is already a huge 
store of shared words in the major languages, words that are already 
international, with an origin mainly in the Romance and Germanic 
languages (Zamenhof 1929[1896]:419-420).
The rigorous statistical identification and selection of 
‘international words’  became a hallmark of the later technocratic 
international language projects, such Ido and IALA Interlingua. 
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Jespersen (1910[1909]:30-34) devoted himself to the technical task of 
measuring the internationality of forms in Ido against Esperanto, and 
credits the idea of rigorously evaluating the international credentials 
of existing words to Rosenberger (1902) in his Idiom Neutral (see 
Guérard 1922:157-158 for some refinements on Jespersen’s 
observations). Jespersen (1928) later applied the international metrics 
he developed to the vocabulary of his own language, Novial. In IALA 
Interlingua, the design of the vocabulary became simply a 
‘standardization project’ (a term used in IALA 1945, among other 
places)  of the divergent yet fundamentally similar European 
languages, in keeping with the direction Sapir had already suggested. 
Schleyer never accepted international recognisability as the leading 
criterion in word selection. Long  after Esperanto with its familiar 
roots had already eclipsed Volapük, Schleyer commented bitterly: 
[T]o simply adopt purely Latin words in a tinkerer’s language 
[a term Schleyer used to refer to Esperanto], like homo, sed, 
and similar –  any language-tinkerer, who wants to make the 
matter easy and only wants to make a bit of money, can do that. 
And that is something that many other imitators of Vp. 
[Volapük] before S. [Zamenhof] have already done, but also 
without success.
(Schleyer 2001[1900]:7)54
With the a posteriori principle that word roots should be 
‘international’  firmly entrenched in Esperanto, a priori ‘analytic’ 
concerns  further directed  principles  of  word  formation  in many 
subsequent projects. Leading the analytic charge in the Esperanto 
versus Ido debate was Couturat, first and foremost a mathematician 
and logician. Every morpheme, Couturat (1910[1909]:43-44; see also 
Couturat 1907; 1910) said, attributing the insight to Wilhelm Ostwald 
but also reprising his idol Leibniz, should correspond exclusively to a 
single idea: there should be no homonymy or synonymy. Words with 
related meanings should display their semantic relationship in their 
forms; the meanings of the derived words should always be 
predictable and reversible. Agglutination, which for Zamenhof was 
mainly an aid to learning the language, became the servant of logic: 
54 Original text: ‘Rein lateinische […]  Wörter einfach in eine Pfuschersprache nur so 
herübernehmen, wie homo, sed, u. dgl., das kann jeder Sprachen-Pfuscher, der sich die Sache 
l e i c h t machen und etwa nur Geld verdienen will, und das haben vor S. schon viele andere 
Vp. nachäffer unternommen, jedoch auch e r f o l g l o s .’
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[T]he [international] language will become the exact and 
faithful expression of our thoughts, and will conform to that 
indwelling and instinctive logic which, in spite of all sorts of 
irregularities and exceptions, animates our languages. […] Not 
only does it [the international language] offer to them 
[philosophers], as it does to all men, a medium of 
communication between all countries, but it furnishes them also 
with an instrument of precision for the analysis and exact 
expression of the forms of thought, which is very superior, 
from the point of view of logic, to our traditional languages, 
encumbered as these are with confused and ambiguous 
expressions.
(Couturat 1910[1909]:51-52) 
These  principles  led  to  strict,  logically  motivated  rules  of  word 
derivation  in  Ido  (for  comparisons  of  Ido  and  Esperanto  word 
derivation,  see  Jespersen  1910[1909]:40,  Couturat  1910[1909]:46, 
and Blanke 1985:193).55 IALA continued the tradition of striving for 
form-meaning isomorphy and relentless consistency, a goal that 
frequently lost out to a posteriori requirements: Interlingua per-mitt-
er should mean ‘send, put through’, but instead means ‘permit, 
allow’; con-clud-er means ‘conclude’, not ‘close along with’ (these 
examples are  due to  Blanke 1985:180;  see Gode 1971[1951]:xlvi-
xlvii  for  a  description  of  the  system  of  Interlingua  word 
composition). Basic, by contrast, did not subscribe to the logicians’ 
ideal  of  form-meaning isomorphy:  as  we  see  in  section  6,  Ogden 
embraced metaphor as a means to extending the semantic range of 
words in his language, drawing on the theory of interpretation and 
definition outlined in The Meaning of Meaning, and possibly inspired 
by features of preceding projects from the Enlightenment.
Over the course of the modern international language movement 
we see a growing commitment to the  a posteriori  in designing the 
international language, which often conflicted with the desire to make 
the international language analytic, as that term is understood in both 
epistemology and linguistic typology. The solution settled on towards 
the  end  of  the  period  was  generally  to  ensure  that  the  lexical 
substance of the international language was a posteriori – largely for 
the ease this provided in learning the language – but that the grammar 
55 It is interesting to note that the mathematician René de Saussure (1868–1943), brother of the 
linguist and founder of structuralism Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), defended Esperanto 
derivation against the Idists under the pseudonym ‘Antido’ (anti-Ido). His zeal for Esperanto 
ultimately went unrewarded, however: his later proposals for reforms to Esperanto were not 
only rejected by the Esperanto Academy, but also resulted in his expulsion (see Künzli 2001; 
Forster 1982:150-151; see also Joseph 2012:516-519).
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and rules of word formation answered to logical,  analytic  dictates. 
Ogden essentially shared these aesthetic concerns in Basic, although 
he had no time for the painstaking striving for international neutrality 
that was so central to most of these projects.
5. Basic English and the common solution
The common aesthetic considerations in vocabulary and grammar, 
the striving for a logical structure in language, Ogden took on board 
in Basic, but the endless agonising over the most inclusive a 
posteriori forms for the international language he simply threw 
overboard: ‘Make everybody speak English,’ Ogden (1931:13)  said, 
quoting the contemporary American capitalist Henry Ford. Ford in 
fact permeates Ogden’s project: the ubiquity of his name, rendered a 
trademark, led Ogden to admit it into Basic as a permissible word for 
‘automobile’ (see section 6 below; Ogden 1943:25, second column, 
repeats the Ford anecdote with a more tolerant moral). The advanced 
‘analytic tendency’  of English, argued Ogden, already offers the 
perfect basis for logical language; the job of the language constructor 
is merely to exploit this tendency and make the language accessible 
to the foreigner. While it is true that other language constructors 
looked favourably on English – Schleyer (1880:3) said that ‘Volapük 
is based on English, since it is the easiest and most widespread of all 
the civilised languages,’56 Zamenhof  (1929:418)  drew  inspiration 
from ‘the simplicity of English grammar’, and Sapir (1925:248) saw 
English  moving  towards  the  analytic  ideal,  already  reached  by 
Chinese – the conclusion that English alone, and not some carefully 
composed potpourri  of  the major languages,  provided all  that  was 
needed to solve the international language problem was, to most in 
the international language movement, nothing short of scandalous. 
Although there were proposals to officially sanction some national 
languages,  such  as  English  and  French,  in  particular  geographical 
‘zones’, such proposals remained far from the mainstream (see Stojan 
1929).  Some  constructed  languages,  such  as  Peano’s  Latino  sine  
Flexione, took existing languages as their basis, in this case Latin, but 
this is emphatically a dead language and one that already has a long 
history  as  a  medium  of  international  communication  between 
56 Original text: ‘Der Weltsprache ligt die englische Volkssprache zugrunde, weil dise von allen 
Sprachen gebildeter Völker die leichteste und verbreiteste ist,’ and he continued, ‘(abgesehen 
von ihrer heillos verwirrten Ortografi.)’
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speakers of other languages. The only directly comparable projects, 
which  attempted  to  refashion  one  living  national  language  for 
international purposes, were widely denounced as chauvinistic. One 
notable  and  somewhat  inexplicable  episode  involved  Wilhelm 
Ostwald (1915), who in the early phases of the first World War called 
for  the  creation  of  Weltdeutsch  to  help  protect  German  interests. 
Baumann (1915) represents an effort to implement this proposal, and 
the earlier Salzmann (1913) was a similarly conceived project for the 
already  faltering  multi-ethnic  and  multilingual  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire (see Krajewski 2006 and Stojan 1929 for further details).  In 
the face of such denunciations, however, Ogden argued that the a 
posteriori  constructed  languages,  with  their  Romano-Germanic 
vocabularies  and  grammar,  offer  an  unfair  advantage  to  native 
speakers of languages from those families and discriminate against 
others, a state of affairs that would not be tolerated if the Romance 
and  Germanic  languages  were  not  already  dominant.  ‘If  orientals 
were to agree to promote some modification of Cantonese or Hakka, 
similar in many respects to Chinese and Japanese, as an international 
language  for  Europe,’ Ogden  (1935:8)  pointed  out,  ‘its  claims  to 
“neutrality” would hardly be taken seriously.’ Ogden’s gaze beyond 
Europe to the world is perhaps peculiarly British, the perspective of a 
nation whose territories  and trade lay mostly beyond that continent; 
although,  it  must  be  noted,  the  charge  of  Euro-centrism  against 
constructed languages had already been made by the Germans Meyer 
(1976[1891]:41) and Brugman and Leskien (1907:22), among their 
many other objections.
Further  pressing  the  claims  for  English,  Ogden  (1933[1930]:1) 
observed that, quite apart from its naturally superior structure to the 
constructed  languages,  English  was already more  widespread than 
any  of  them,  including  Esperanto:  ‘English  is  the  expanding 
administrative  (or  auxiliary)  language  of  over  600,000,000 people 
and financial  reasons  alone  should  convince  even  those  who take 
statistics seriously that it is bound to expand more rapidly in the near 
future.’ In any case, the arousal of national jealousies should be no 
argument  against  English;  foreigners  must  simply  put  aside  their 
petty interests in the face of  the best  solution.  ‘The objection that 
many Frenchmen and Indians would not be in favour of the adoption 
of any form of English as an auxiliary language,’ Ogden (1931:107) 
tells us, ‘is not more serious than the objection that many diplomats 
and military men are not in favour of peace – as an argument against 
international arbitration.’
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As we have seen, Ogden’s first recorded thoughts on fashioning 
English for international purposes were written at the outset of the 
First World War (see section 3). In Ogden’s mind, securing peace and 
progress  relied  on  exporting  the  English  tongue,  and  the  English 
mind it serves. This is essentially a colonial project, where those to be 
colonised are no less than the entire non-English speaking population 
of  the  world.  And  this  view  was  no  peculiarity  of  Ogden’s:  his 
collaborator I.A. Richards spent a significant part of the 1930s and 
40s in China, bringing, with the support of the American Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Chinese into the modern world, where they would, 
according to Richards (1935:45), ‘[…] need an understanding of an 
enormous number of ideas, feelings, desires  and attitudes that they 
can only gain through some form of Western Language. In practice 
this means some form of English.’ Richards’ attitude was not one of 
cultural genocide – he loved traditional Chinese culture and worked 
to aid  its  further  transmission –  but  at  the same time he  saw the 
expansionist march of the colonial West and felt he had to give the 
Chinese the intellectual tools they would need to remain their own 
masters (see Russo 1989:405; Koenecke 2004; cf. Joseph 1999:69-
70). Present-day mores would brand Richards’ attitude paternalistic, 
not without reason.57
Richards,  like  Ogden,  also  endorsed  Basic  as  a  technologically 
advanced  tool  of  pacifism  because,  in  breaking  down  language 
barriers and forcing people to work at thinking through their ideas, it 
would  foster  mutual  understanding  and  contemplation.  ‘Without 
canned food, modern metallurgy, and oil, there could be no global 
war,’ Richards (1943:vi) writes.  What is needed are corresponding 
‘developments in the means of mental transport – and thereby in the 
spreading  of  common  truths  which  would  make  antagonism  and 
disloyalty harder to cultivate’. Basic would provide this ‘means of 
mental transport’, and in so doing ensure that speakers have properly 
formulated  ideas  to  transmit,  preventing  pointless  and  hollow 
57 It cannot, however, go without notice that China’s recent rise – through which the country has 
already surpassed its former Western oppressors by some measures – is the result of rapid  
economic development achieved by appropriating and adapting Western ideas and practices 
(not necessarily of a linguistic nature). If he were here today, Richards, like many present-day 
cultural  missionaries,  would  no  doubt  be  uncomfortable  about  what  aspects  of  Western 
thought have been adopted and how they have been applied. Many of those key facets that fall 
under the convenient rubric of ‘human rights’ would seem to be missing, for example. But 
maybe cultural exchange first becomes truly paternalistic when dictates are issued on how 
elements of a foreign culture should be adopted, as the ruling elites of present-day China 
would insist.
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arguments, which can spill over into attempted resolutions through 
physical force:
Basic as a tool in training thought discourages dispute. It curbs 
our eternal temptation to argue before we know what we are 
arguing about. It is a restraint upon the habit of verbal warfare 
which may be connected more closely than we suppose with 
actual warfare as a key institution of our traditional culture. We 
shall  never  have  a  reasonable  world  until  we  are  more 
reasonable within ourselves.
(Richards 1943:101)
The faith in the English language as the ultimate medium of reason 
and resolution took the first steps to becoming British government 
policy in 1943, as British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1874–
1965; 1944[1943]:97-99) laid out his vision for the world after an 
Allied victory  in the war:  ‘I like to think of British and Americans 
moving about freely over each other’s wide estates with hardly a 
sense of being foreigners to one another. But I do not see why we 
should not try to spread our common language even more widely 
throughout the globe, and without seeking selfish advantage over any, 
possess ourselves of this invaluable amenity and birthright.’  He 
concluded: ‘Such plans offer far better prizes than taking away other 
people’s provinces or land, or grinding them down in exploitation. 
The empires of the future are the empires of the mind.’ The white 
man’s burden had become the Anglo-American burden of post-war 
reconstruction;  the  spoils  were  no  longer  natural  resources  and 
limitless labour, but the fertile territories of people’s minds; and the 
gifts of civilisation were no longer products of industry, but words 
and  thoughts.  Churchill  acted  on  these  words  immediately  and 
ordered  an  enquiry  into  Basic,  with  a  view  to  adopting  it  as 
government  policy.  The  machinations  of  public  servants  and  the 
hostility of  the British Council  – which had its  own vision of  the 
reconstructed, Anglicised world – meant,  however, that  the project 
withered on the bureaucratic vine (see Gordon 1990b:50-53; Graham 
1977:159-160;  Lauwerys  1977:163-166;  cf.  the  account  of  British 
and  American  language  policy  in  Phillipson’s  1992  study  of 
‘linguistic imperialism’). A lack of co-ordination between Ogden and 
Richards in this period may have also played a role:  by this  time 
Richards had become the main representative of Basic in the United 
States, a status resented by Ogden, a language creator perhaps no less 
jealous than Schleyer. With confusion on either side of the Atlantic 
over what support was forthcoming and from what institutions, and 
with  Ogden  and  Richards  unwilling  to  mount  a  joint  campaign, 
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official  support  and  funding  for  Basic  evaporated  (see  Russo 
1989:438-441; Joseph 1999:61-64).
But  in  1943,  riding  on  the  swell  of  Churchill’s  endorsement, 
Ogden  –  drawing  a  straight  line  through  Schleyer,  the  technocrat 
language constructors, Churchill and the science fiction author H.G. 
Wells (whose contribution we examine in section 9 below) – allowed 
himself to imagine the reconstructed, technological Anglo-American 
future, supported by Basic (and described here in Basic):
[I]t has long being clear that the divisions between countries 
have  become far  less  natural  than  the  rivers  and  mountains 
which have kept men shut up, as if in boxes, for thousands of 
years.  Our  present-day  boxes  are  the  systems  of  ideas  by 
which, through education, the mind is limited to the words of 
one “nation” – walled in, as the prisoner of language. But in the 
past 20 years science has at last taken the roof off, and through 
the air come the voices and the machines, which, as was noted 
by the Prime Minister at Harvard, have overcome the distances 
of the past and made the earth suddenly seem so much smaller. 
That is why an International Air Force, policing land and sea, 
and a second or International Language, working with Radio, 
are  the  two  chief  instruments  by  which  the  future  may  be 
guided to Peace […]
(Ogden 1943:23-24)
But not everyone saw the benevolent  role of  the English-speaking 
nations in leading the world to peace and progress. Albert Guérard 
(1880–1959),  in  his  survey  of  the  mature  international  language 
movement,  saw  little  difference  between  English-speaking 
exceptionality  and  the  belligerent  nationalism fostered  by  fascism 
(see also Drezen 1931:138 for a similar critique):
[T]he adoption of any national language for international 
purposes is not to be desired even if it were feasible. It is well 
to insist upon this point, for in every man there slumbers a 
Hitler, eager to force his will and to assert the supremacy of his 
own tribe. Many Americans, not consciously imperialistic, take 
it for granted that when the world comes to its senses it will 
adopt the language as well as the fashions of Hollywood. 
Among English radicals there survives an enormous insularity 
which would be ludicrous if it were not appalling. H. G. Wells 
chides mankind for not creating the World State –  but the 
Wellsian World State must be of English speech [see section 9]. 
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A subtle logican like Mr. Ogden is on this point as obtuse as 
any realtor from Zenith […]  What most advocates of 
International English fail to realize is that the materialistic 
arguments they adduce really militate against the language. 
Wealth, numbers, “dominion over palm and pine,” “mastery of 
the seven seas” – all that blatant Kiplingesque self-assertion is 
a bid for universal supremacy; and against such supremacy the 
world will eternally revolt.
(Guérard 1944[1941]:134)
Of course,  in  today’s  world  the  international  language problem is 
rarely  mentioned,  at  least  not  in  the  terms  we have  seen  here.  A 
solution has been found: English – Standard English, or at least the 
variants  that  approach  the  codified  ideal  –  is  at  this  moment  the 
international language – in science and technology, travel, the media 
– a status it has won not through the careful plans of any scholar, but 
through  the  sheer  weight  of  British  and  then,  especially  in  the 
decades  following  the  Second  World  War,  American  economic, 
military  and  cultural  hegemony.  Whether  this  state  of  affairs 
vindicates Ogden or whether it is the realisation of his  opponents’ 
fears is a difficult question. As the simple victory of might over mind, 
it is probably fair to say that it is not precisely what Ogden and his 
supporters envisaged. 
Ogden’s Basic occupied a curious place in relation to the ‘common 
solution’  to  the  international  language  problem.  While  in  his 
preference for ‘analytic’ structure with minimal morphology Ogden 
conformed  to  the  established  design  aesthetics  of  the  mainstream 
international  language movement,  in his  abandonment  of  the ideal 
‘international’  compromise  in  discovering  a  posteriori  forms  he 
abnegated  one  of  their  dearest  principles.  Ogden’s  attitude  was 
perhaps typically British, the attitude of a nation whose unparalleled 
power  was built,  first  and foremost,  on  its  global  trading empire, 
whose exports included not only material goods but also its language 
and culture. British conquest and expansion, in the received narrative, 
was  effected  more  through  peaceful  and  mutually  beneficial 
economic exchange than by military means. Ogden’s oddness in the 
context  of  the  wider  movement  continued in  his  almost  exclusive 
focus on the vocabulary of his language, as we see below.
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6. Panoptic conjugation
Whereas most earlier language constructors concerned themselves in 
equal measure with grammar and vocabulary –  even  if  only  to 
eliminate  grammar,  understood as morphology,  in  approaching the 
analytic ideal –  Ogden saw the vocabulary alone as the key to the 
problem. With the right selection of words, all other design 
considerations would fall into place. The centrepiece of Basic then 
was its core vocabulary, a ‘scientifically selected’ list of 850 words, 
sifted out of the standard language through the process of ‘panoptic 
conjugation’, essentially a method for revealing  the  semantic 
relations between words.  From a central ‘root  word’, the semantic 
‘conjugates’, as Ogden put it, can be discovered by following various 
‘radial definition routes’; that is, semantic dimensions along which 
the ‘conjugates’ differ from the root word. From the root word ‘man’ 
we find such words as ‘Southerner’  (a man from a certain place), 
‘octogenarian’ (of a certain age), ‘dwarf’ (of a certain size; Ogden 
1930a:13-14). This is  ‘conjugation’ because Ogden imagined these 
words forming a semantic paradigm – like the inflectional paradigm, 
or  conjugation,  of  a verb – where each of  the peripheral words is 
derived  from  the  root  word. He  described  the  procedure  in  the 
following terms (see also Ogden 1930a:9-17; Lockhart 1931a:73-75): 
To conjugate a verb is to put it through its tricks. Conjugates, in 
another connexion, are words related to the same root. If we 
apply the terms to words in general so that any word can have 
its conjugation and conjugates, it will be convenient to exhibit 
these so that they can be appreciated at a glance – panoptically. 
The  most  convenient  panoptic  method  is  to  place  the  word 
under consideration at the centre of a circle, whose radii can 
then represent the directions in which the conjugates may be 
sought. For example, in the case of ‘House’, cottage, bungalow, 
hotel,  sanatorium,  palace,  hut,  hovel,  home,  city,  room, 
chimney, etc. 
(Ogden 1928c:2)
This method is ‘panoptic’, as Ogden says, because the words should 
be laid out in such a way that their relationships are all visible ‘at a 
glance’ (echoing a hope Russell  held out  for  his  ‘logically perfect 
language’;  see  chapter  2,  section  4).  To  this  end  Ogden  further 
indulged his penchant for  visualisation and offered the diagram in 
Figure 1, which has a place for a root word, twenty ‘radial definition 
routes’ – clearly the definition routes of  The Meaning of Meaning 
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catalogued  and  enumerated  (see  chapter  2,  section  3)  –  plus 
conjugates related by opposition, marked and unmarked derivation.
Figure 1. Panoptic Conjugation (Ogden 1930a:12)
The semantic roots discovered through panoptic conjugation become 
the  words  adopted  into  the  Basic  core  vocabulary,  while  their 
peripheral conjugates are eliminated, a procedure Ogden (1930a:14) 
codified in his ‘elimination formula’:  ‘Given the word at the centre 
[of the panoptic conjugation diagram], and the means of covering the 
radial  definition  route  in  not  more  than  nine  words,  then  the 
conjugate at the periphery can be eliminated.’ The eliminated words 
are replaced by paraphrases based on the root word and the radial 
definition  route:  ‘Southerner’ becomes  ‘a  man  from  the  South’; 
‘dwarf’,  ‘a  man  much  smaller  than  normal  size’,  and so  on.  The 
paraphrases  are  enshrined  in  the  Basic  dictionary  as  ‘dictionary 
clichés’, the standard translation of the eliminated words into Basic 
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(see Ogden 1929b:20; Ogden 1930a:14; Ogden 1932c is the actual 
Basic dictionary).  
But several practical restrictions on word elimination complicate 
this  picture. As  Ogden  stated  in  his  ‘elimination  formula’,  if the 
paraphrase is more than nine words long or otherwise ‘awkward’, the 
original word should be retained. Peripheral words can also obtain a 
reprieve from elimination if they help avoid homophony, are very 
frequent, or are useful in forming derivatives and metaphors (Ogden 
1929a:5; 1930a:14). With  further  exposition,  Ogden’s  ‘scientific’ 
method is increasingly taking on the character of an art, dependent on 
his intuition and ineffable judgement. The radial definition routes, for 
instance, are never described rigorously; we have to divine them from 
the examples Ogden provides. Likewise, we are never given a way to 
assess  the  ‘awkwardness’  of  paraphrases.  Determination  and 
elimination  of  homophony,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be  performed 
mechanically,  but  this  principle  clearly  has  subordinate  status  in 
forming the core vocabulary: I and eye are both among the 850. Word 
frequency similarly requires no special talent – it is simply a matter 
of counting – but Ogden was highly critical of learning vocabularies 
based on word frequency, of which there were many compiled at the 
time  (see  section  3),  commenting  (Ogden  1929b:9):  ‘[T]he  real 
statistical task of linguistic [sic] is not so much the determination of 
the number of words actually used by any particular person or class 
of persons as the study of how a reduction may be effected in the 
number  of  words  which  need  be  used;  i.e.  how a  given  field  of 
reference may be covered with the greatest economy.’ He closed by 
reiterating:  ‘What  is  really  required  is  a  scientifically  selected 
vocabulary  minimum’ (see  also  Ogden  1929b:6-9;  Walpole  1937; 
Myers 1938:55-70).
The possibilities of derivation and metaphor did receive detailed 
elaboration from Ogden,  but  at  the  same time they reveal  Basic’s 
subservience to Standard English and the problematic status of his 
claim of 850 words: we see that the core vocabulary in fact consists 
of 850 word forms that are generally polysemous and whose formal 
and semantic scope is bound by Standard English idiom. In terms of 
derivation, only words  that would be idiomatic in Standard English 
can  be  created  with  the  agentive  suffix  -er/-or  (with  the  choice 
between -er and -or dictated by the corresponding word in Standard 
English), the gerund and present participle suffix  -ing, and the past 
participle  suffix  -ed  (see  Ogden 1933[1930]:47-50).  Compounding 
involves  further  difficulties:  permissible  compounds  are  not  only 
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restricted by idiom, but their senses are often ‘different from what 
would  be  the  normal  suggestion  of  the  parts’,  as  in  the  cases  of 
‘become (= come to be)’ and ‘outcome (= what comes out)’ (Ogden 
1932a:54-56). In the processes of ‘extension’ and ‘specialization’, the 
possibility of consistency between form and meaning is abandoned as 
Basic core words take on additional  senses without any change in 
form  (Ogden  1933[1930]:45-46). Extension  proceeds  through 
metaphor, such as when ‘letter’, which in its simplest sense is taken 
to be a letter of the alphabet, becomes ‘letter’, an epistle, or ‘lift’ the 
action becomes ‘lift’, an elevator. In specialisation a word takes on a 
more specific sense than it prototypically has, such as when ‘judge’ 
refers specifically to a judge at law rather than a judge of any other 
sort. In addition, some words can be used as different parts of speech 
without any formal marking: for example, the noun back can become 
an adverb and the adjective round can become a preposition (Ogden 
1933[1930]:47).  These  various  nuances  and  additional  senses 
inherited from the  standard  language are  catalogued in  The Basic  
Words: a detailed account of their uses (Ogden 1932b) which, at 101 
pages, is far from the panoptic ideal.
The claim to 850 words suffers further when it  is revealed that 
Basic can, as the need arises, take on ‘special vocabularies’ consisting 
of personal and place names, trade terms, ‘localized names’, slang, 
‘measuring  terms’ (numbers  and  units  of  measure),  and  scientific 
words (technical terms). It is thus legitimate to say in Basic, ‘He went 
to  London  in  his  Ford’  (i.e.  Ford-brand  automobile;  Ogden 
1929b:12), where  London and Ford qualify as supernumerary Basic 
words because they are a place name and a trade name respectively. 
‘He went to “Town” in his “bus,”’ is equally legitimate:  Town is a 
‘localized name’ and bus a slang term (Ogden 1929b:12). But there is 
an  unacknowledged  continuum  of  acceptability  in  these  ad  hoc 
additions: localised names and slang receive quotation marks from 
Ogden. In addition, onomatopoeic words are considered ‘universally 
intelligible without explanation’ and can also be used freely in Basic. 
This includes such unarguably onomatopoeic expressions as pop and 
splash, but also cuckoo (the bird species), hiccup (the bodily action) 
and  tom-tom (the drums;  Ogden 1929b:14-15).  The same provisos 
attached  to  the  ‘elimination  formula’ for  selecting  core  words  are 
operative in special vocabularies: we should prefer, for example, ‘a 
word like clay, forming fire-clay, china-clay, pipe-clay, etc., [because 
it]  has  obvious  uses  in  definition,  as  have  also  filtration  and 
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distillation,  being key-operations in the definition or description of 
more complicated processes’ (Ogden 1929c:21-22). 
In his pursuit of lexical minimalism Ogden may have fallen prey 
to his own ‘word-magic’. He triumphantly cited the figure of ‘850 
words’, but behind many of these word forms lurks a tangled web of 
unpredictable and idiomatic additional senses. This problem did not 
go  unnoticed  by  Basic’s  critics.  Among them were  Michael  West 
(1888–1973;  1944[1939]:152)  and  Janet  Aiken  (dates  unknown; 
1944[1936]:147)  –  proponents  of  rival  reduced  Englishes,  the 
‘Carnegie vocabulary’ and ‘Little English’ respectively – as well as 
Morris  Swadesh  (1909–1967;  1944:204),  at  the  time  a  student  of 
Sapir’s engaged in cross-linguistic research for IALA, who later went 
on to develop his own concept of a ‘core vocabulary’ in the form of 
the ‘Swadesh list’, a list of 100 words thought to be highly resistant 
to borrowing that could be used for lexicostatistical comparison of 
languages (see Swadesh 1955; final version in Swadesh 1972:283-
284).  Aiken  identified  the  source  of  Ogden’s  problem  in  an 
insufficient appreciation for the underlying structure of the language:
The English language is like an iceberg – two-thirds below the 
surface.  Words are  what we see on a page.  They are indeed 
necessary, but their  importance is on the whole secondary to 
linguistic  construction,  pattern,  or  structure.  Words are  more 
easily  learned  than  inflections  or  grammatical  rules.  The 
vocabularies which have been devised thus far may be likened 
to a steeple without a church. What they need most of all is to 
have  a  solid  underpinning  of  grammar  and  construction.  If 
English can be simplified not only in words, but also in these 
more fundamental respects, then we shall have a result worthy 
of much praise.
(Aiken 1944[1936]:147)
But it would seem that Ogden saw the precisely reversed situation: if 
first the ‘words’ were correct, the structural aspects of the language 
would  follow.  This  is  a  departure  from  common  practice  in  the 
international  language  movement  at  the  time.  In  terms  of  their  a 
priori theoretical commitments, the majority of language constructors 
in  this  period  were  concerned  first  and  foremost  with  the  formal 
aspects  of  language:  the  striving  for  analyticity  in  grammar  and 
vocabulary  was  a  question  of  the  abstract  structure  of  linguistic 
systems,  not  of  the  actual  material  from  which  they  were  to  be 
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constructed (see section 4). But Ogden made lexical material his core 
concern and all formal properties contingent to it. As we demonstrate 
in  the  following section,  Ogden  saw the  formal  features  of  Basic 
issuing forth from his constrained, minimalist vocabulary. Although 
this attitude seems novel to Ogden, it was graining ground: Morris, 
the  founder  of  IALA,  emphasised  the  importance  of  words  over 
grammar  from at  least  1924 (see  Falk  1995:244-245;  1999:57-58, 
65), and this view would become one of the main design principles of 
the  later  IALA  Interlingua.  Gode  and  Blair  (1971[1951]:ix) 
remarked: 
It  is,  then,  only  a  seeming  reversal  of  the  principle  of 
grammar’s  precedence  over  vocabulary  that  after  the 
vocabulary  of  a  planned  auxiliary  language  has  been 
determined all that remains to be said by way of grammar must 
be completely subordinated to the structural characteristics of 
the  vocabulary.  The  grammatical  structure  of  a  planned 
language determines its  basic character precisely as does the 
structure of a natural  language.  But the  determination of the 
vocabulary  leaves  few  grammatical  questions  wholly 
indeterminate […] The fundamental principle […] must be that 
this grammar shall be the minimum or simplest possible system 
fit  to  govern  the  use  of  the  chosen  vocabulary  in  coherent 
speech.
(Gode and Blair 1971[1951]:ix)
Here  grammar  is  made  dependent  on  the  vocabulary:  grammar 
becomes  nothing  more  than  the  ‘minimum  or  simplest  possible 
system’ needed for putting words together to make sentences. This is 
a  related  but  not  identical  line  to  the  striving  for  analytic  formal 
structures (cf.  Falk 1995:245-246; 1999:57-58, 61-66). Rather than 
advocating  the  concerted  construction  of  a  transparent,  analytic 
grammar, the view here seems to be, as it was with Ogden, that the 
desired  grammar  would  simply  emerge  from  a  deftly  assembled 
vocabulary, or at least that it would be a minimal veneer applied to 
such  a  vocabulary.  The  shift  from  considering  formal  aspects  of 
grammar in the abstract to concentrating on the material substance of 
words is perhaps unsurprising. On a pre-theoretical level, words are a 
more  obvious,  tangible  component  of  language.  They  are  the 
segmentally  instantiated,  corporeal  forms  of  speech,  unlike  more 
abstract grammatical rules; at the same time they are the bearers of 
118
reference. These are among the features that Silverstein (2001[1977]) 
recognises as particularly salient in languages cross-culturally and apt 
to  impress  themselves  on speakers’ awareness.  That  words  should 
come  to  be  seen  as  the  core  of  language  seems  in  this  light 
understandable:  the  fascination  with  abstract  formal  structure 
characteristic of mainstream language constructors up to this point 
represents an intellectualised departure from our lay understanding of 
language. In a related vein, Joseph (1995; revisited and expanded in 
2000:93-140)  argues  for  the  existence  of  an  enduring  but  not 
necessarily explicit tradition in western linguistic thought – beginning 
in  the Cratylan naturalism versus  conventionalism debate –  which 
sees  the  natural  at  home in  grammar  and the  conventional  in  the 
lexicon. Language constructors who, even tacitly, subscribe to this 
view  need  only  concern  themselves  with  the  arbitrary  and 
conventional lexicon; the grammar, in reverting to the natural, should 
take care of itself. This is indeed the program Ogden pursued.
7. Grammatical Reform
In the preceding exposition a great difference in approach to grammar 
has  emerged  between  Ogden  and  his  contemporaries:  while  other 
language constructors sought simple and logical grammars through 
the regularisation  of  the best  constructions  modern  Indo-European 
languages have to offer, Ogden felt that grammatical reform would 
proceed naturally from the scientifically selected Basic vocabulary. 
Whatever grammar exists in Basic is imported clinging to its words. 
The surprising consequence, in the context of grammars machined to 
precise rules and measures, is that Basic grammar is permeated by 
exceptions  and  irregularities,  which  go  far  beyond  the  quirks  of 
derivation we have already seen above.
The  attempt  to  control  Basic  grammar  through  word  selection 
begins with the types of words adopted into the language. The parts 
of  speech  that  manifest  themselves  in  natural  languages,  Ogden 
claimed,  are  to  a  large  extent  simply  artefacts  of  each language’s 
historical  development,  and  depart  from  the  original  scheme  of 
‘universal grammar’ based on human perception of the world, which 
recognises a division into ‘objects’, ‘operations’ and ‘directions’: 
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[T]he  level  at  which  ordinary  language  is  effective,  is  one 
where  the  distinctions  between  ‘entity’,  ‘state’,  ‘change’, 
‘process’, ‘event’, ‘behaviour’ and ‘relation’ are reflected in a 
threefold symbolic differentiation.  From the anthropomorphic 
standpoint, there are the  objects which we wish to talk about, 
the operations which we perform on them, and the directions in 
which we operate.
(Ogden 1929a:3)
Later  that  same  year,  he  proposed  a  different  threefold  scheme 
involving ‘things’,  ‘events’ and ‘qualities’,  recognising qualities as 
‘mentally differentiated though physically they are inseparable from 
the objects and happenings which they are said to qualify’ (Ogden 
under the pseudonym More 1929:31).58 The Basic vocabulary should 
therefore not be populated by ‘nouns’, ‘verbs’, or ‘pronouns’, but by 
‘things’ (corresponding to nouns), ‘qualities’ (adjectives), ‘operators’ 
(verbs),  and  ‘directives’  (prepositions;  Ogden  1932a:2).  These 
naturalised  parts  of  speech  are  central  to  Basic:  the  first  item in 
Ogden’s (1933[1930]:12) list of the knowledge required to use Basic 
is ‘the functions of the different parts of speech’. But unfortunately 
for  Ogden’s  scheme,  there  remained  several  purely  grammatical 
categories  that  he  could  not  do  without:  pronouns,  conjunctions, 
adverbs of  manner  derived from ‘qualities’,  and sentence adverbs, 
such as ‘tomorrow’, ‘together’, and ‘though’. These he subsumed in 
the Basic word list under the label ‘etc.’
Nouns, or ‘things’, are at the heart of the vocabulary since – even 
if our ontologies advance into the abstract – at base nouns are names 
of objects in the world. An immediate pedagogic advantage presents 
itself: a language based on nouns can be taught largely through ‘the 
pictorial  method,  and  particularly  from  the  pictorial  dictionary  to 
which  the  various  Larousse  compilations  are  already  pointing  the 
way’ (Ogden 1929c:29). Only 200 of the 600 ‘things’ in the Basic 
core  vocabulary  are  explicitly  marked  as  ‘pictured’,  but  Ogden’s 
efforts to realise the ‘pictorial method’ for Basic would lead to his 
collaboration  with  one  of  the  most  visually  minded  of  his 
contemporaries, the Vienna Circle philosopher Otto Neurath, and the 
58 ‘Adelyne More’ was a playfully humorous pseudonym Ogden used frequently when writing 
in The Cambridge Magazine and Psyche. His main motivations for employing a pseudonym 
may have been to create the appearance of greater diversity in the editorial content of these 
magazines, and also to distance himself from more controversial or experimental ideas. Under 
this name he wrote Uncontrolled Breeding, or fecundity versus civilization, a contribution to  
the study of over-population as the cause of war and the chief obstacle to the emancipation of  
women  (More 1916),  an inevitably controversial feminist and pacifist  tract.  An apparently 
female author would also no doubt lend extra credibility to such a book. Ogden had other  
pseudonyms that he used on occasion (see Gordon 1990b:136, notes 5 and 6).
120
further  development  of  the  latter’s  system  of  picture  statistics  to 
depict  much  more  than simply  the  200 pictured  things:  Neurath’s 
system itself would become ‘Isotype: International Picture Language’ 
(see chapter 4, section 4). Richards went on to independently develop 
methods  of  teaching  Basic  using  minimalist  comics  and animated 
cartoons, for which he spent the northern summer of 1942 at Walt 
Disney Studios  in  California  to  receive  instruction  in  the  relevant 
techniques (Russo 1988:436).
Ogden’s emphasis on the visible or otherwise observable carries 
over into the treatment of adjectives or ‘qualities’. This is especially 
useful in the case of ‘emotive adjectives’, where it ‘[...] may not be 
possible to convey all  the subtleties of mood and attitude,  but the 
behaviour by which alone they are recognized is usually less elusive’ 
(Ogden 1929b:21). So, for example, in the place of ‘coy’ we describe 
the behaviour by which we recognise a coy woman: ‘one who does 
not put forward her female attractions, or who does not give herself 
away  readily  to  men’ (loc.  cit.).  Similarly,  ‘barbaric’ is  ‘like  the 
natives of Central Africa or the South Sea Islands’, and ‘envious’ is 
‘feelings about some one in a much desired position’ (loc. cit.). 
The most  undesirable part  of  speech is  the verb,  since it  is  the 
antithesis  of  word-world  isomorphy:  it  typically  conflates  many 
functions in a single inscrutable package. At its most extreme, argued 
Ogden, a verb can include all  of  an ‘operation’, an ‘object’  and a 
‘direction’, as in the case of ‘disembark’, analytically paraphrased as 
‘get [operation] off [direction] a ship [object]’. In the various systems 
of tenses, moods and aspects attached to them, verbs also harbour the 
most formal complexity and irregularity among the parts of speech. 
Ogden (1929a:3; repeated in Ogden 1933[1930]:19-20) states: ‘When 
the most necessary  names, the most fundamental  operators and the 
essential directives have been determined, it can be shown that a verb 
is primarily a symbolic device for telescoping an operation and an 
object or a direction (“enter” for  go into).  Sometimes an operator, a 
directive  and  a  name  are  thus  telescoped,  as  in  the  odd  word 
“disembark” (get,  off,  a  ship) ;  Latin goes so far as to throw in a 
pronoun,  and  a  tense  auxiliary.’  Simultaneously  reinforcing  his 
naturalised grammatical scheme and his faith in English as its surest 
medium, especially in its American varieties, he adds:
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So long as the essentially contractive nature of the verb was 
concealed by the existing grammatical definitions, there could 
be no reduction in the vocabulary sufficiently radical to affect 
the problem of a Universal Language, nor is this now possible  
in any language other than English ; and it is the continuous 
approximation  of  East  and  West  (especially  in  its  latest 
American developments), which makes this particular form of 
English basic for the whole world.
(Ogden 1929a:4; emphasis original; see also 1933[1930]:53-
54)
The solution to the evils of verbs lies in dissecting them to reveal 
their semantic parts, their ‘operators’, ‘objects’ and ‘directions’. This 
is the ‘the chief grammatical provision for substitution in the 
grammar of Basic’ (Ogden 1929b:17). The result is the ‘operators’ of 
Basic (come, do, get, give, go, keep, let, make, put, take, send, say, 
seem, see), which are supported by two auxiliaries (be, have), which 
can also act as operators (see Ogden 1932a:20-24; 1933[1930]:53-
60). These operators can be combined with ‘directives’ (prepositions) 
and ‘things’ (nouns) to paraphrase any verb in Standard English: for 
the Standard English word ‘insert’  Basic has the operator-directive 
equivalent put in. With a variety of different ‘things’ this can replace 
many more Standard English verbs, such  as  ‘put (a word) in = 
“interject”, put (an account) in = “render”, put (the tea) in = “infuse”, 
put (the sheep) in = “fold”, put (a request) in = “file”, put (a seed) in 
(the earth) = “plant”, put (the baby) in (the bath) = “immerse”, put 
(things) in (a house) = “install”, and so forth’ (Ogden 1933[1930]:54-
55). As we might expect in light of the role of Standard English idiom 
in word derivation (see section 5), the range of objects that can enter 
into this relationship is similarly beholden to the standard language, 
drastically restricting the freedom and true compositionality of this 
technique.
Even though the parts of speech have been rechristened with their 
semantic labels, they continue to follow the morphological patterns of 
their  Standard English  equivalents, including all irregularities. 
‘Things’ exhibit number inflection (including the distinction between 
mass and count nouns, irregular and semi-irregular forms such as 
‘feet’ and ‘knives’, and forms that have zero inflection, such as 
‘sheep’, or are always formally plural, such as ‘trousers’ and 
‘scissors’;  Ogden  1932a:10); the ‘operators’,  like  English  verbs, 
agree with their subjects and have  all  the same tenses, including 
compound tenses with be and have auxiliaries; the ‘qualities’ have 
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periphrastic comparative and superlative forms when they are more 
than one syllable long, or the endings -er and -est when only one 
syllable (with some exceptions: bent, like, wrong; early;  Ogden 
1933[1930]:51-52); and the pronouns inflect for case  (Ogden 
1932a:73-77). ‘These facts may be sad,’ Ogden (1932a:10) tells us in 
Basic, ‘but what are seven [irregular noun forms] among such a 
number?’ 
The continued observance of these irregularities, and indeed any 
form of morphology at all, was intended to be merely a concession to 
the standard language, designed not to offend the ears and eyes of 
Standard English speakers until  Basic took hold, and designed to 
inculcate the right habits for those who would go on to learn 
‘Complete English’. But  such  concessions  would  have  only  be 
temporary. Ogden anticipated that it was only a matter of time before 
the ‘analytic tendency’ of the standard language went to completion 
and these ‘sad facts’ disappeared altogether:
From this point of view it is an historical accident that the 
operator group still inflect [sic]. If put and take had developed 
as far as the model word cut, only the regular third person 
singular would differentiate them from the similar roots in an 
analytic language like Chinese. ‘I cut,’ ‘we cut,’ ‘they cut’ – 
today and yesterday – ‘I have cut,’ ‘the cake is cut,’ ‘a cut 
cake,’ ‘a cut off the cake,’  and so on. But ‘he cuts.’  This 
lamentable and unmannerly hissing about a third person has 
been characterized by Sir Richard Paget as un-English. It 
would probably have disappeared long ago in the normal 
course of events had not printers, lexicographers, and 
schoolmasters rallied so egregiously to its defence ; and if any 
reform is overdue in our accidence, here is surely an 
appropriate casualty.
In due course, all irregular plurals and possibly all plurals – 
since we have already learnt to dispense with sheeps – might 
well follow it.
(Ogden 1936:57; see also Ogden 1931:30-31)
Grammatical reform, Ogden insisted, could only proceed in a 
piecemeal fashion. The various failed attempts at English spelling 
reform show us how futile it  is  to  overhaul a single aspect of the 
language at once. The only hope for Basic, and for Standard English, 
would be to isolate a reasonably well-behaved subset of the language 
and rely on the natural analytic tendency and the further 
simplifications of learners to effect grammatical reform: ‘Basic, then, 
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offers us for the first time a rational incentive to reform the essentials 
by degrees’ (Ogden 1936:58-59). Complete change could propagate 
to the entire system quite rapidly – ‘in a single generation’ – in this 
modern age of ‘printing, radio, and world-travel’. This could occur, 
says Ogden  (1931:30-31), wryly expressing his appreciation of 
American idiom,  ‘[…] with much less of a shock than the average 
Englishman experiences when confronted by a youthful American – 
whose more elastic phraseology is nevertheless perfectly intelligible 
to him. He is slowly learning to “get busy” and “put over” his own 
“concepts”. “Right now” his “co-ed” offspring are “talkie fans” ; they 
get “psyched” and know all the “dope” - “and then some”.’ American 
English,  according to Ogden, is  the leading dialect  in the analytic 
tendency.  Later  reflecting  on  work  he  had  done  in  removing 
‘Americanisms’ from a  text  for  an  English  audience,  Ogden ‘was 
unable to get away from the feeling that this foolish process was like 
putting wax lights back into a Club because certain old men had not 
got used to the electric system. But it was worse than a waste of time. 
From the point of view of an International Language it was clearly a 
step in the wrong direction’ (Ogden 1993[1932]:42).
With the words and their behaviour in place, all that remained was 
putting them together to make sentences. To this end Ogden offered a 
simple  schematic  syntax  based  on  that  of  Standard  English.  This 
would be imparted principally through ‘model sentences’, which are 
supposed to exhibit the full range of possible syntactic permutations. 
Several of these model sentences appear in the Basic pedagogic 
literature, and two of them, which are intended to illustrate 
maximally expanded sentences, where every possible sentence 
position is filled, appear in the fold-out list of the 850 words in all 
Basic books: ‘The camera man who made an attempt to take a 
moving picture of the society women, before they got their hats off, 
did not get off the ship till he was questioned by the police,’ and ‘We 
will give simple rules to you now.’ In this connection Ogden revived 
the  ‘panoptic’ principle  with  his  own panopticon,  or  ‘Basic  Word 
Wheel’ (shown in Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Ogden’s Panopticon (Ogden 1932a:183)
Each  of  the  concentric  discs  of  Ogden’s  panopticon  contains  all 
words of one part of speech, and by rotating them it is possible to 
make  grammatically  correct  sentences.  Grammar  has  become  so 
natural  that  it  is  amenable  to  mechanical  manipulation  using  the 
simplest of human inventions, the wheel. Ever the technocrat, Ogden 
(1931:32)  saw  ‘modern  mechanical  aids’  as  crucial  to  Basic’s 
success:  ‘The  teaching  of  grammar  without  the  use  of  modern 
mechanical  aids  cannot  long  survive,  and  Basic  English  has  been 
designed to profit by the visual and mechanical factor in a very high 
degree’ (see also Ogden 1929a:6-7; 1930a:8). 
8. Bentham and beyond
Although Basic is in many ways innovative and unique, it was by no 
means the product of spontaneous generation, but rather the offspring 
of  a  long  line  of  ideas,  within  the  contemporary  international 
language movement and beyond. Much of Ogden’s rhetoric, however, 
would suggest an origin of the first sort: Ogden rarely talked about 
the  sources  of  his  ideas,  and  the  wider  international  language 
movement  in  particular  rated  no  mention,  except  when  he  was 
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attacking the ‘artificial’ languages, most usually Esperanto (see, for 
example,  Ogden 1935).  The only  inspiration Ogden acknowledged 
was  Bentham,  but  in  this  acknowledgement  he  attributed  to  him 
almost all the insights he saw embodied in Basic. Ogden tells us that 
he first encountered Bentham in 1914, but it was not until 1923, when 
translating Hans Vaihinger’s (1852–1933; 1924[1911]) Philosophy of  
As-If, that he engaged with Bentham seriously (Ogden 1928a:2; cf. 
Gordon 1990b:45). By the time the first hints at Basic appeared in 
print (i.e., Ogden 1927b), Ogden was a confirmed Benthamite. But 
the  unpublished  traces  of  Basic  predate  Ogden’s  infatuation  with 
Bentham, and  Ogden (1929a:5) himself described the emergence of 
Basic  with  the  following  words:  ‘The  full  application  of  these 
principles,  some of which were being tested as long ago as 1908, 
others emerging with the completion of the  Meaning of Meaning in 
1923, while the final synthesis was not achieved until the spring of 
1928, necessitated many months of unremitting labour on the part of 
several  collaborators.’ Richards  (1977:108)  tells  us  too  that  when 
writing The Meaning of Meaning, ‘Ogden had long been deep in the 
history  and  theory  of  universal  languages’.  We  may  therefore 
legitimately ask what other ingredients, and in what quantities, are to 
be found in Basic. Because of Ogden’s reticence on this issue, we 
must engage in some textual archaeology to find clues.
We  might  suspect  Ogden’s  exclusive  but  generous 
acknowledgement of Bentham as being simply a bolster to his own 
originality and uniqueness. Bentham’s name is known to all, but he is 
also suitably remote in time, not the current fashion and somewhat 
obscure:  his  devotee can claim to have rediscovered an illustrious 
precedent,  missed by ignorant  contemporaries. Such a motive may 
have driven Ogden, but there would seem to be much more. By the 
1930s Ogden emerged as a major Bentham scholar, on a mission to 
rehabilitate  his  work and image (see,  for  example,  Ogden 1932d). 
Ogden clearly identified with Bentham, to the point that he sought 
out and acquired one of the Bentham silhouette rings, which he wore 
(Gordon 1993:vii).59 In  Ogden’s view,  both he and Bentham were 
geniuses ahead of  their  time,  misunderstood and unappreciated by 
their  contemporaries.  ‘[I]t  is  clear  that  Orthology,  the  science  of 
correct symbolism based upon an elaborate analysis of the technique 
of  communication,  was  the  corner-stone  of  Bentham’s  system,’ 
Ogden tells us.60 ‘That this has so seldom been realised by subsequent 
writers is due to the fact that Bentham was in this respect more than a 
59 Bentham  had  directed  in  his  will  that  rings  bearing  his  portrait  should  be  made  as  
commemorative gifts for his twenty-six closest friends (see Atkinson 1987).
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century  ahead  of  his  times’ (see  Ogden  1928b:5;  see  also  Ogden 
1993[1932]:35-36). This  identification  extended  to  their 
entrepreneurial spirit and clashes with bureaucracy. Bentham wanted 
to run his  panopticon prison as a capitalist  enterprise and,  despite 
several attempts to build it, was constantly frustrated by governments 
first expressing interest in financing its initial construction and then 
withdrawing it (see Semple 1993). Ogden similarly copyrighted the 
Basic project and its related materials, and pursued infringers with a 
vengeance. And the demise of Basic followed after it came under the 
official patronage of the British government (see section 3; Lauwerys 
1977).
In one of the few passages  where he wrote about the theoretical 
background to Basic, and at that pseudonymously, Ogden tells us that 
there are ‘five main principles’ that underlie the system. These are 
‘the elimination of verbs, the analysis of the thirteen operators and 
twenty-one directives which replace them in universal grammar, the 
use of panoptic conjugation in systematic definition, the projectional 
interpretation of emotive adjectives, and the development of 
Bentham’s theory of Fictions in the treatment of metaphor’ (Ogden, 
as More 1929:3). The fact that Bentham is named explicitly in only 
one of these principles belies his significance: Ogden credited him 
with inspiring every one of these points, and the one that bears his 
name, the theory of Fictions, is the centrepiece of the entire system of 
Basic. In fact, Ogden credited Bentham with the idea of developing 
English  for  universal  communication,  albeit  without  a  specific 
citation to Bentham’s work. ‘It is to be noted that Bentham did not 
devote  attention  to  the  question  of  a  synthetic  language,’ Ogden 
(1993[1932]:21)  says,  ‘not  because  he  was  not  familiar  with  the 
60 ‘Orthology’ is a term that Ogden elevated to utmost importance in his work: he named the  
institute  that  he set  up to promote Basic the ‘Orthological  Institute’.  Ogden (1952:11-12) 
described  the  term so:  ‘It  was  with  the  object  of  focussing  attention on  these  normative 
possibilities [in improving communication] that the term “Orthology” was selected in 1927. 
Except  by  [British  mathematician  Karl]  Pearson,  from  its  first  appearance  in  1622  in 
Fotherby’s Atheomastix, it has been used only in a grammatical or pedagogical context – to 
cover that part of grammar which deals with “the right imposition of names.” It was therefore  
associated with propriety in language as opposed either to the “incorrect” use of words or to 
neology. To extend this normative approach to the “logos” – to the control of words and 
symbols  in  general  –  involves  also  a  change  of  orientation  as  regards  correctness.  Our 
language is said to be “correct” when it conforms to current usage or to the usage of the 
“best” writers of a given period ; an improvement of our linguistic tools, on the other hand, 
may often be effected by deviation from current usage, whether  by innovation (including 
neology) or systematization. Orthology is therefore concerned both with the changes desirable 
in our attitude towards words and symbols and with the changes in language itself which a 
scientific  study of  Thoughts,  Words  and Things may require’ (see  also vol.  3  of  Gordon 
1994:xviii, note 20; 2006:2582).
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controversy, but because he believed in the development of English 
for  universal  needs.’ But  in  addition  to  the  acknowledged debt  to 
Bentham, we find for each of the principles underlying Basic earlier 
precedents in sources that Ogden would probably have known.
The theory of Fictions, at least under Ogden’s interpretation, looks 
very much like the theory of word-magic. To  say  to  what  extent 
Bentham and Ogden’s ideas really do resemble one another we would 
have to carefully  separate  Bentham from Ogden’s interpretation,  a 
task that goes beyond the immediate requirements of the intellectual 
genealogy we are tracing here. By Ogden’s account, he had already 
written chapter 2 of The Meaning of Meaning, ‘The power of words’, 
before  he  read  Bentham  and  was  surprised  and  pleased  at  the 
similarities  when  he  later  learnt  of  Bentham’s  theory  (Ogden 
1928a:2).  At the foundation of  Bentham’s theory is the distinction 
between ‘real’ and ‘fictitious’ entities: the former are those that have 
an actual existence in the world and the latter are mere artefacts of 
our use of language. ‘To language, then –  to language alone –  it is, 
that fictitious entities owe their existence ; their impossible, yet 
indispensable existence,’  Bentham tells us  (quoted  in  Ogden 
1932d:15). They are indispensable because we need them to 
conceptualise anything beyond what is immediately present before 
us. But, as in word-magic, trouble arises when we do not recognise 
fictitious entities as such and assume their real existence.
At  least  this  much  was  a  fairly  common  foundation  of  the 
language-critical philosophies current in the early twentieth century. 
We have already seen the various connections between Ogden and 
Richards,  Welby,  Moore,  Russell  and Wittgenstein (see chapter  2). 
Vaihinger’s  (1924[1911])  Philosophy  of  As-If  – the  translation  of 
which  into  English,  it  will  be  remembered,  Ogden  credited  with 
giving him the opportunity to study Bentham more closely – was an 
expression  of  many  similar  sentiments  popular  in  the  German-
speaking world and, if we follow Carus (2007), was probably among 
the indigenous German thinking that  influenced the Vienna Circle, 
and in particular the young Rudolf Carnap (see chapter 4, section 2). 
Ogden repeatedly insisted on Bentham’s priority and superiority in 
this area of thought: ‘He [Bentham] anticipated, and went far beyond, 
Vaihinger’s  Philosophie  des  Als-Ob  [Philosophy  of  As-If];  and,  a 
fortiori, the relevant analyses of Bergson’ (Ogden 1993[1932]:40; see 
also Ogden 1928b:4).
As Ogden said himself, Bentham’s theory of Fictions found direct 
application in creating metaphorical extensions in Basic, but this is 
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not  the  only  place  Ogden  could  have  found  inspiration.  Welby’s 
intensive focus on metaphor as the engine of signification in language 
must  of  course have still  exercised  some influence as Ogden was 
working on  Basic. Indeed, we have seen that Ogden’s first hints at 
English as an international language are recorded in his ‘Significs’ 
manuscript written just before the First World War, and later Ogden 
explicitly  tied  his  Basic-era  panoptic  conjugation  to  the  theory  of 
definition in  The Meaning of Meaning, which owed much to Welby 
(see chapter 2, section 6): ‘The Panoptic Eliminator shows its place in 
the  general  scheme  of  the  substitution,  where  the  Theory  of 
Definition discussed in  The Meaning of Meaning  is developed and 
applied to Lexicography in general and to Conjugation in particular’ 
(Ogden 1930a:1; see also Ogden 1952:12-13). Looking further back 
in time, to Wilkins, Ogden’s Enlightenment predecessor in language 
construction, we see that he also placed special importance on regular 
metaphorical processes as a means to enlarging the senses expressible 
in  his  language.  Wilkins  (1968[1668]:318)  noted  that  in  existing 
languages  ‘there are  two ways used […] for  varying the  sense  of 
words; either by  Tropes: or by such a kind of  Composition  as doth 
alter  the  termination  of  them’.  In  Latin  and  English,  Wilkins’ 
principal control languages, ‘tropes’ are generally unmarked but, in 
order  to  retain  the  unambiguous  nature  of  his  language,  Wilkins 
included explicit markers for tropes in his series of ‘transcendental 
particles’,  which  perform  functions  generally  achieved  through 
derivation  in  natural  languages  (see  Wilkins  1968[1668]:318-351; 
Maat  2004:225-229).  First  among  the  transcendental  particles  are 
those for ‘metaphor’, for ‘enlarging the sense of that word [to which 
is applied], from that strict restrained acception which it had in the 
Tables,  to  a  more  comprehensive  signification’,  and  ‘like’,  which 
‘doth  denote  a  varying  of  the  sense  of  that  word  [to  which  it  is 
affixed],  upon  the  Account  of  some  similitude’  (Wilkins 
1968[1668]:323-324). ‘Prophesie’ and ‘suiter’, for example, with the 
metaphor  particle,  mean  ‘prediction’ and  ‘candidate’ respectively. 
The ‘like’ particle, applied to ‘Pitch’ would mean ‘deep black’, and 
applied to ‘Arme’ could mean ‘Arme of Tree, Sea’ (ibid.:323-325). 
The effects these particles have offer clear parallels to Ogden’s, albeit 
unmarked, ‘extension’.
The elimination of verbs, also among the ‘five main principles’ of 
Basic, is another suggestion found in Bentham’s work, based on his 
theory  of  Fictions.  ‘A  verb,’  says  Bentham  (quoted  in  Ogden 
1932d:cvii), ‘slips through your fingers like an eel.’ Nouns are to be 
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preferred to verbs, according to Bentham, because actions expressed 
as nouns are more clearly recognisable as fictions and as such are 
more manipulable: 
The verbal noun [i.e. the noun that denotes an action] – when 
thus  obtained  in  a  state  of  separation  from  these  adjuncts, 
which  form  so  many  parts  in  the  composition  of  the  very 
complex part of speech called a verb ; and which, in this its 
separate state, becomes the name of a sort of fictitious entity, of 
a sort of fictitious body or substance – is, in this state, rendered 
more prehensible.
(Bentham, quoted in Ogden 1932d:lxxxvi)
The situation in language, Bentham continues, is comparable to the 
use of algebra: algebraic variables represent a problem at an abstract 
level, and when the variables are replaced with actual numerals, the 
problem becomes concrete.  If  the  ‘slippery’ parts  of  speech –  the 
verbs,  adverbs,  conjunctions,  etc.  – were to be decomposed into a 
complex made up of just a noun, a verb and an adjective, then what is 
said would become immediately apparent: 
In like manner, when of a sentence of which a preposition, an 
adverb, or a conjunction, makes a part, the equivalent is given 
in a sentence in which no part of speech other than a 
substantive, a verb, and an adjective, or some other substantive, 
is employed –  then, and then only, is the import respectively 
attached to these mysterious parts of speech at once clear, 
correct, and complete. 
(Bentham, quoted in Ogden 1932d:lxxxvii; see also Ogden as 
More 1928)
Once  again,  these  ideas  do  not  seem  to  originate  with  Bentham: 
earlier precedents can be found in sources with which Ogden was 
probably familiar. Both Dalgarno and Wilkins sought to do away with 
verbs, and the alternative forms they proposed are strikingly similar 
to Bentham’s. Dalgarno wanted to recognise only one part of speech, 
nouns, the names of things; all of the other traditional parts of speech 
simply represent modifications of and relations between nouns and so 
‘should be counted as inflexions and cases of the noun’ (Dalgarno, 
quoted in Maat 2004:103, see also  ibid.:104-110). The structure of 
sentences  he  modelled  on  syllogistic  propositions,  thereby 
eliminating  verbs,  since  they  become  under  this  scheme  a 
combination  of  copula  and predicate.  Wilkins  allowed for  a  more 
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diverse  ecosystem  of  word  classes,  but  still  targeted  verbs  for 
elimination,  seeing  them,  like  Dalgarno,  as  either  derivatives  of 
nouns  or  complex  structures  playing  the  role  of  a  copula  and 
adjective (see Maat 2004:235). But just as Ogden would later have 
trouble maintaining his remoulded parts of speech, both Dalgarno and 
Wilkins  took  recourse  to  traditional  grammatical  categories  and 
terminology in their projects, even after they had presented their new 
schemes (see Maat 2004:110-117, 249).
Dalgarno  and  Wilkins  were  driven,  within  the  limits  of 
practicability, by a desire to reach ‘universal grammar’, a term that 
Ogden also used (see section 7), and a keenly sought after ideal of the 
Enlightenment. The goal, in short, was to attempt to find a deeper 
basis for linguistic categories (see Padley 1976:154-209, in particular 
p.157;  Padley  1985).  Ogden  built  his  universal  categories  on 
psychology,  appealing  to  human  perception  of  the  world,  and 
Dalgarno  and  Wilkins  had  similar  ideas.  Dalgarno  says,  ‘The 
grammarian must assign names to things according to the ideas and 
logical  rules  derived from the  nature  of  externally  existing  things 
themselves’ (Dalgarno,  quoted  in  Maat  2004:65;  see  ibid.:153  for 
Wilkins’ similar position). A corollary of this position is the belief in 
‘natural’ syntax: both Dalgarno and Wilkins, like Ogden later, felt no 
need for the detailed description and explanation of syntax in their 
languages  (see Maat  2004:117-119,  248-249;  cf.  section 4 above). 
One  aspect  of  syntactic  questions  was  the  nature  of  the  parts  of 
speech.  In  Ogden’s  contemporary  milieu,  Malinowski  proposed  a 
natural evolution of the parts of speech based on his functional theory 
of language, and went on to speculate about how the various parts of 
speech might emerge from the view of the world shared by children 
and ‘primitive’ peoples:
The  grammatical  categories  with  all  their  peculiarities, 
exceptions,  and  refractory  insubordination  to  rule,  are  the 
reflection  of  the  makeshift,  unsystematic,  practical  outlook 
imposed by man’s struggle for existence in the widest sense of 
this word. It would be futile to hope that we might be able to 
reconstruct exactly this pragmatic world vision of the primitive, 
the savage or the child, or to trace in detail its correlation to 
grammar. But a broad outline and a general correspondence can 
be found ;  and the realization of this  frees  us  anyhow from 
logical shackles and grammatical barrenness.
(Malinowski 1989[1923]:328)
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The remaining two of  the  five main principles  of  Basic,  panoptic 
conjugation and the ‘projectional interpretation of emotive adjectives’ 
(that is, the paraphrasing of adjectives in terms of visible features; see 
section 6) may not have fully formed antecedents in Bentham’s work, 
but  the  seeds  of  these  ideas  are  definitely  there.  Ogden’s  use  of 
‘panoptic’ and his own ‘panopticon’ were not simply the repetition of 
a happy coinage from Bentham, but also involved the bringing on 
board  of  many  of  the  design  principles  and  social  connotations 
associated with Bentham’s project (as we see in section 9 below). In 
the projectional interpretation of emotive adjectives we are reminded 
of  Bentham’s  warnings  about  the  need  to  identify  and  isolate  the 
emotive  component  of  words,  warnings  which  are  common  to 
Ogden’s own word-magic and which his approach in describing the 
visible manifestations of emotive content heeds (see Bentham quoted 
in  Ogden  1932d:lxxii). But  in  the  visual  aspect  of  ‘projectional 
interpretation’,  which  is  both  an  ideal  and  a  pedagogic  principle 
throughout  the  Basic  vocabulary  (see  section  7),  we  are  also 
reminded of  the Enlightenment’s  fascination  with a  real  character, 
where the symbol would directly pick out its referent,  without the 
intermediary of spoken language (see section 2). Ogden’s language 
retained  speech,  but  in  the  attempt  to  tie  words  to  visual 
representation – or at least to teach words using visual representation 
–  it  revived  the  duality  of  a  real  or  universal  character  and  a 
philosophical language.
Ogden himself said that the principles of Basic grew out of the 
theory of definition in  The Meaning of Meaning, and we have seen 
that  hints  at  what  would become Basic  are  visible  even when his 
stated allegiance was to Welby’s Significs. But appearances would 
suggest a caesura between  The Meaning of Meaning  and Basic: the 
former,  in the spirit  of  Welby,  focuses attention on the process of 
interpretation; the latter, by contrast, legislates a specific medium of 
communication to restrict the freedom of interpretation. Of course, 
dissimilarity  in  phenotype  does  not  proscribe  underlying  genetic 
affinity: perhaps Basic, the theory of definition and Significs are not 
so  far  apart  after  all.  Ogden’s  scribbled  assertion  that  ‘[s]ymbolic 
language would unite sense and meaning’ suggests that he already 
saw a solution to the problem of misunderstanding in the creation of a 
certain form of language rather than in the case-by-case examination 
of interpretation that Welby advocated. There are also indications that 
Welby would have at least in part endorsed a constructed language of 
the type Ogden had in mind. Welby, who insisted on the inherently 
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context-dependent  nature  of  language,  rejected  any  possibility  of 
there being ‘Plain Meaning’, which entailed a rejection of any plan 
for  an  ideal  language  that  would  be  unambiguous  or  aspire  to  a 
perfectly  logical  structure;  she  specifically  cited  Wilkins’ project, 
Schleyer’s Volapük and Jespersen’s earliest efforts:
At present we have not even attained to an adequate conception 
of what an ideal language should be: we think of it, if at all, as 
the  impossible  thing  that  Bishop  Wilkins  proposed,  a 
formalised  dialect  of  culture  with  its  phrases  “rendered 
according to the genuine and natural importance of words,” as 
if this were anything but what their speakers intended by them! 
Or we try to invent an artificial ‘Volapük.’ It is surely time that 
the fetish of a possible Plain Meaning, the same at all times and 
places and to all, were thoroughly exposed, and students more 
explicitly  warned against  anything approaching it,  except  on 
the narrowest basis  of technical notation.  Even Dr Jespersen 
tells us that an ideal language would “always express the same 
thing by the same, and similar things by similar means; any 
irregularity and ambiguity would be banished; sound and sense 
would be in perfect harmony; any number of delicate shades of 
meaning could be expressed with equal ease: poetry and prose, 
beauty  and  truth,  thinking  and  feeling  would  be  equally 
provided for:  the  human spirit  would  have  found a  garment 
combining freedom and gracefulness, fitting it closely and yet 
allowing full play to any movement” (p. 365).61
(Welby 1985[1896]:192)
But elsewhere Welby allowed for the possibility that a small selection 
of words with precise and refined meanings could be a path to clarity 
in language: ‘Perhaps, just as we have twenty-six letters and a vast 
store of combinations, so a relatively small vocabulary might be 
made immensely more adequate’ (Welby 1983[1903]:62). This could 
be seen as an anticipation of Ogden’s word elimination. Although she 
believed  we  should  try  to  maintain  the  existing,  natural  form  of 
expression,  which  contains  our  ‘precious  psychological  heritage’ 
(Welby 1983[1903]:211-212), we should not allow ‘it to divide us, or 
to silence that which, being everywhere the highest thought of the 
highest man, is most of all worthy of expression’  (Welby 
1983[1903]:212; cf. Gordon 1990a). These last comments may have 
be playing off elements of the ‘organicist’ objections to constructed 
61 The citation Welby gives is to Jespersen (1894).
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languages  we  saw  in  section  3  against  the  utilitarian  need  to 
communicate.
Welby’s supporters repeatedly drew her in the direction of 
constructed languages. The winner of the ‘Welby Prize’ for the best 
essay on ‘[t]he causes of the present obscurity and confusion in 
psychological and philosophical terminology, and the directions in 
which we may hope for an efficient practical remedy’ (Anonymous 
1896;  see  Schmitz  1985:liii-lv), the  German sociologist Ferdinand 
Tönnies (1855–1936), proposed in his winning essay a continuum of 
languages, at one end of which meaning is understood only tacitly 
and at the other end of which it is established explicitly by 
convention; that is, laid down  (Tönnies 1899-1900:326). Tönnies 
(1899-1900:316-17)  raised  the possibility  of  ‘a whole language in 
which all word-meanings would have a conventional character’ (see 
Schmitz  1985a:cxvii-cxli;  1985b  for  commentary). It was this 
possibility of establishing a strictly conventional language that 
Tönnies pursued in his later work, and it is a sentiment that Ogden 
echoed in his talk on the ‘Progress of Significs’ in his suggestion that 
‘Unfortunates’  – inherently ambiguous words – should be banished 
from use (Ogden 1994[1911]:30-32). Gerrit Mannoury (1867–1956), 
a  prominent  member  of  the  later  Dutch  significs  movement  (see 
chapter 2, section 6), even wrote one of his later works in Esperanto, 
‘because only in this language are the meanings of words selected 
intentionally and with consideration and so they offer more stability 
and objectivity than the natural languages’ (Mannoury 1937:407).62 
The use of Esperanto in this paper was so important to Mannoury that 
he pursued it ‘even though this was to delay publication by several 
years’ (Mannoury  1987[1938]:164),  while  he  became  sufficiently 
proficient in the language.
Other  Welby  supporters included the French philosopher André 
Lalande (1867–1963) and Couturat, joint  founders  of  the Société 
française de philosophie, which from 1902 produced the Vocabulaire  
technique et critique de la philosophie (Lalande 1988[1902-1923]), a 
dictionary of French philosophical terminology with translation 
equivalents in other major European languages. One of the primary 
goals of the Vocabulaire  was  to help standardise the terminology 
within French and across other European languages  (see  Schmitz 
1985a:cxv). Welby also corresponded with Lalande in this connection 
and several entries in the Vocabulaire make reference to her (Schmitz 
62 Original Esperanto text: ‘[…] čar nur in tiu lingvo la vortsignifoj estas intence kaj pripense 
elektikaj kaj pro tio ili havas pli da stabileco kaj objektiveco ol la interrilatigiloj de la naturaj  
lingvoj.’
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1985a:cxvi-cxvii). Couturat was of course also a  leader of the 
Délégation, and twice, in 1901 and 1902, he sought, through Tönnies, 
to secure Welby’s signature on his declaration for an international 
auxiliary language. A third attempt was made in 1903, through the 
Scottish sociologist Patrick Geddes (1854–1932;  see Schmitz 
1985a:cxv-cxvi). Even Bertrand Russell was persuaded to sign the 
declaration in 1903, although presumably with reservations, given his 
later comments: ‘[Couturat] lamented that word Ido did not lend itself 
to the formation of a word similar to Esperantist. I suggested ‘idiot’, 
but he was not quite pleased’ (Russell 1967:135-136).
Ogden’s sole but  repeated citation of  Bentham and his  habit  of 
referring to  his  contemporaries  only to  say how they were wrong 
misrepresents the genealogy of his ideas. Bentham, it is true, was a 
great inspiration to Ogden and many of his ideas, mostly stemming 
from his theory of ‘Fictions’, are implemented in Basic. But some of 
the most prominent features of Basic – the treatment of metaphor, the 
notion of  ‘universal  grammar’ with a  campaign against  verbs,  the 
emphasis  on  the  visible  –  have  quite  probable  antecedents  in  the 
Enlightenment projects of Dalgarno and Wilkins, with which Ogden 
would have presumably been familiar. Even if Bentham gave Ogden 
an overarching philosophy in the theory of Fictions, individual ideas 
within  Ogden’s  subsequent  developments  on  it  could  have  been 
informed  by  these  other  projects.  Before  he  declared  himself  a 
Benthamite,  Ogden  articulated  his  own  detailed  philosophy  of 
language,  recorded  in  The  Meaning  of  Meaning,  and  he  did  not 
simply  forget  it  in  his  conversion:  he  in  fact  explicitly  tied  its 
practical  aspect,  the  theory  of  definition,  to  his  new  ‘panoptic’ 
method.  Basic  therefore  has  a  further  pedigree  descending  from 
Welby’s  Significs,  a  semiotic,  interpretation-based  philosophy  that 
may appear superficially incompatible with the legislated fixed code 
operation  of  Basic.  But  this  apparent  incompatibility  begins  to 
dissolve under closer examination of Welby’s comments on language 
engineering and the interpretation she was subject to in her time.
9. Totalitarianism
As  we  have  seen,  Ogden  and  his  supporters  cast  Basic  as  a 
scientifically  engineered  tool  for  liberating  thought,  for  making 
language the servant of reason, rather than making thought follow the 
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strictures of language. At the beginning of the 1930s – with modernist 
optimism at its height, despite, or perhaps because of, the financial, 
social  and  political  troubles  across  Europe  –  such  goals  were 
respectable,  but  with  the  hardening  of  ideological  fronts  over  the 
following decade and the descent into actual war –  total  war on a 
destructive scale never before seen in Europe – a sense of malaise 
and suspicion at grand social engineering projects set in. Technocrats 
and  their  schemes,  whether  from the  left  or  right  of  the  political 
spectrum, became the subject of criticism, and to the lips of many 
intellectuals came a mantra of ‘freedom’. Many intellectuals who had 
previously considered themselves socialists of one form or another, 
or were sympathetic to left-wing causes,  abandoned the ideologies 
and movements they had previously supported, in the belief that any 
all-encompassing,  centralised  social  planning  inevitably  led  to 
totalitarianism.  Basic English – neither  ‘socialist’ nor ‘fascist’,  but 
most  certainly a manifestation of technocratic social engineering – 
would become the target of similar critiques from no less than George 
Orwell  (1903–1950),  whose  fictional  constructed  language 
‘Newspeak’ in the novel  Nineteen Eighty-Four (Orwell 1987[1948]) 
is  in  many  ways  an  anti-Basic. Basic  he  saw not  as  a  means  to 
liberating thought and easing communication, but as a instrument of 
totalitarian control.
A monument  marking  the  new  intellectual  trend  against  social 
planning is  the 1944 book  Road to Serfdom, written in England by 
the  Austrian  émigré economist Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992). 
The book argued that the totalitarianism of the contemporary Soviet 
Union and Germany were two manifestations of a common impulse 
to comprehensive economic and social planning, an impulse that was 
winning  increasing  support  in  Britain,  to  the  detriment  of  that 
country’s tradition of liberalism, and leading the country down the 
totalitarian path:
Few are ready to recognise that the rise of fascism and naziism 
[sic]  was not  a  reaction  against  the  socialist  trends  of  the 
preceding period but a necessary outcome of those tendencies. 
This is a truth which most people were unwilling to see even 
when the similarities of many of the repellent features of the 
internal  regimes  in  communist  Russia  and National  Socialist 
Germany were widely recognized. As a result, many who think 
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themselves infinitely superior to the aberrations of naziism and 
sincerely hate all its manifestations, work at the same time for 
ideals  whose  realisation  would  lead  straight  to  the  abhorred 
tyranny.
(Hayek 2007[1944]:59)
Karl  Popper (1902–1994) – likewise an exile from fascist  Vienna, 
first in Christchurch, New Zealand, and then in London, who would 
become one of  the  most  renowned philosophers  of  science  in  the 
twentieth century – staged at the same time a similar attack on social 
planners driven by high ideals and grand schemes in his two-volume 
The Open Society and its Enemies, written, Popper (1945:xi) tells us, 
from  1938  to  1943,  and  first  published  1945  (Caldwell  2006 
examines the intellectual relationship between Hayek and Popper). 
The  first  volume  took  on  Plato’s  idealism  and  the  overt 
totalitarianism – to describe it anachronistically – of his Republic; the 
second volume treated Marx and his Hegelian notion of the inevitable 
march  of  history  towards  communism,  without  concern  for  what 
might be trodden on in the process. Popper contrasted two poles of 
political intervention in society: ‘Utopian engineering’, the attempted 
implementation of grandiose social plans with the highest ideals; and 
‘piecemeal engineering’, the identification of specific social problems 
with narrowly focused solutions, such as ‘health and unemployment 
insurance’,  ‘arbitration  courts’,  ‘anti-depression  budgeting’,  and 
‘educational reform’ (Popper 1945:168). The first ‘demands a strong 
centralized rule of a few’ and ‘therefore is to lead to a dictatorship’ 
(Popper 1945:169). The second, however, can engage the majority’s 
‘reason’ and allow them to rationally recognise the actual, concrete 
problems they face and look to a direct compromise solution:
[I]f it is easier to reach a reasonable agreement about existing 
evils and the means of combating them than it is about an ideal 
good and the means of its realization, then there is also more 
hope that by using the piecemeal method we may get over the 
very  greatest  practical  difficulty  of  all  reasonable  political 
reform,  namely,  the  use  of  reason,  instead  of  passion  and 
violence,  in  executing  the  programme.  There  will  be  the 
possibility of reaching a reasonable compromise and therefore 
of achieving the improvement by democratic methods.
(Popper 1945:168-169)
In the same vein Orwell turned on Basic as an instrument of social 
engineering,  intended  to  establish  wide-scale  social  conformity 
137
through  the  control  of  thought.  The  critique  that  Orwell  would 
develop is no fantastic extrapolation of the potential abuse that could 
be made of Basic: the idea of enlightened and benevolent control is 
there to be found in Basic itself. This is most clear in Ogden’s use of 
Bentham’s term ‘Panopticon’ and his derivative ‘panoptic’. As is well 
known,  Bentham’s  panopticon  was  an  architectural  plan,  an  ideal 
design  for  public  institutions  centred  on  supervision:  ‘perpetual 
prisons in the room of death; or prisons for confinement before trial, 
or  penitentiary-houses,  or  houses of correction,  or  work-houses,  or 
manufactories,  or  mad-houses,  or  hospitals,  or  schools’ (Bentham 
1843[1791]:40;  emphasis  original).  The  panopticon  was  an 
architectural contrivance for ‘obtaining power of mind over mind, in 
a quantity hitherto without example : and that, to a degree equally 
without example, secured by whoever chooses to have it so, against 
abuse’ (Bentham 1843[1791]:39).  This  would be achieved through 
‘seeing  without  being  seen’  (Bentham  1843[1791]:44;  emphasis 
original). The proposed panopticon would be a circular building with 
a  watchtower  in  the  middle:  the  ‘inspector’ would  remain  in  his 
watchtower  and  look  out  at  the  inmates  of  the  panopticon,  each 
isolated in their own cell around the circumference. This we can see 
in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. The Panopticon (vol. 4 of Bentham 1843:596).63
At  any  moment  the  inspector  could  potentially  be  watching  any 
inmate, but through the special arrangement of lighting and blinds 
installed in the tower, all  the inmates should be able to see of the 
inspector  is  his  silhouette;  they  could  not  tell  if  they  were  being 
observed or if the inspector was even present in the tower. Although 
the  single  inspector  could  not  possibly  have  his  eye  on  everyone 
simultaneously, Bentham advocated a range of technical devices and 
psychological games to heighten the impression of his omnipresence 
and omniscience. Through a series of ‘tin tubes’ that would connect 
his tower to each cell, the inspector could talk privately to any inmate 
at  any  time,  without  the  others  knowing  that  he  was  elsewhere 
occupied (Bentham 1843[1791]:41).  ‘Untoward’ inmates should be 
allowed for a period to test the limits of their freedom. But during this 
63 The page reference given above is to the original publication, but this actual scan comes from 
http://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Datei:Panopticon.jpg&filetimestamp=20071122210022 , accessed on 24 October 2012.
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time, particularly close watch would be kept on them, and their every 
misdeed would be observed and noted. One day, chosen at random to 
maximise surprise, the inmate would be presented with a catalogue of 
their  transgressions,  revealing  that  they  were  being  observed  and 
controlled all along:
I will soon put an end to his [the inmate’s] experiments : or 
rather, to be beforehand with him, I will take care he shall not 
think of making any. I will single out one of the most untoward 
of the prisoners. I will keep an unintermitted watch upon him. I 
will  watch  until  I  observe  a  transgression.  I  will  minute  it 
down. I will wait for another : I will note that down too. I will 
lie by for a whole day : he shall do as he pleases that day, so 
long  as  he  does  not  venture  at  something  too  serious  to  be 
endured. The next day I produce the list to him. – You thought  
yourself undiscovered : you abused my indulgence : see how 
you were mistaken. Another time, you may have rope for two  
days, ten days : the longer it is, the heavier it will fall upon  
you.  Learn  from  this,  all  of  you,  that  in  this  house  
transgressions never can be safe. Will the policy be cruel? – 
No; it will be kind: it will prevent transgressing; it will save 
punishing.
(Bentham 1843[1791]:81-82; emphasis original)
Although  the  psychology  applied  here  may  strike  many  modern 
readers as rather sinister, Bentham, it would seem, was oblivious to 
these implications. He saw only good in this atmosphere of pervasive 
surveillance, and the potential for his design to overcome the faults of 
existing  prisons.  In  contrast  to  the  existing  state  of  affairs,  there 
would be  no direct contact between the inspector and the inmates, 
and any warders who must stray out into the cells would be subject to 
the same ‘irresistable controul [sic]’  from the inspector: these two 
features should reduce  the opportunities for ‘neglect or oppression’ 
(Bentham 1843[1791]:45). But the sinister aspect of his project takes 
on a new dimension when Bentham argues for the suitability of his 
design to ‘work-houses’, ‘manufactories’, ‘mad-houses’, ‘hospitals’ 
and ‘schools’, with  the suggestion that overbearing omnipotence, or 
at least the appearance of it, is a fitting model for such a variety of 
public institutions, a point that Foucault emphasises in his study of 
the Panopticon (see Semple 1993:9-11 et passim for a counterbalance 
to this view; cf. Božovič 1995): 
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The Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it 
is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal 
form; its functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance 
or  frictions,  must  be represented  as  a  pure  architectural  and 
optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology that 
may and must be detached from any specific use.
(Foucault 1979[1973]:205)
In light of these potential sinister connotations, which Foucault later 
explicitly articulated, it might seem odd that Ogden would embrace 
‘panopticism’ as a guiding principle in Basic, central to its design; 
indeed, in the earliest publications the project goes by the name of 
‘Panoptic English’ (e.g., Ogden 1928a). Ogden even flirted with the 
connotations:  of  his  own  ‘panopticon’,  used  for  teaching  and 
practising Basic syntax (shown in Figure 2, section 7), he commented 
that ‘it enables the entire vocabulary imprisoned in this procrustean 
structure to be envisaged at a glance’ (Ogden 1936:59-61). Control is 
a goal of Basic: at the very least, Basic is a technological instrument 
for  taking  control  of  the  individual’s  own mind  –  of  overcoming 
word-magic – and at most it is a contrivance for ‘obtaining power of 
mind over mind’, as Bentham claimed for his panopticon. We must 
not forget that Richards was actively propagating Basic in China as 
part of mental training for the Chinese to bring them into the modern 
world, and of course Churchill’s fateful words in 1943 that opened 
the prospect of future ‘empires of the mind’ (see section 5). But again 
this  was  seen  as  humane  and  benevolent  control,  control  for  the 
subject’s  own good.  This  is  nowhere  clearer  than  in  the  work  of 
Basic’s greatest literary champion, H.G. Wells. In his mock history 
textbook from the future, The Shape of Things to Come (Wells 1933), 
where  the  problems of  his  day  are  turned into  a  narrative  with  a 
resolution,  Wells fantasised about an enlightened technology-based 
‘Air Dictatorship’ – so called because its authority is exercised by 
aeroplane, the modern technology that most impressed Wells – that 
brings peace and order to the whole world. On the linguistic front, 
worldwide  communication  and  rational  thought  and  discourse  are 
secured by the Air Dictatorship’s lingua franca, Basic English (see §7 
in ‘Book the Fifth’ of Wells 1933 et passim).
This vision of Wells’, a recurring theme in his work, made Orwell 
uncomfortable.  Writing  at  the  most  hopeless  point  of  the  Second 
World War,  in  1941,  Orwell  emphatically  rejected  it  as  naïve and 
misguided.  The  most  technologically  advanced  society  today,  he 
wrote,  is  Nazi  Germany,  and  the  power  of  their  totalitarian 
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dictatorship is based not on reason, but on the emotional appeal of 
crude, folkish romanticism, against which Britain and the Allies have 
nothing to offer:
 
Modern Germany is far more scientific than England, and far 
more barbarous. Much of what Wells has imagined and worked 
for  is  physically  there  in  Nazi  Germany.  The  order,  the 
planning,  the  State  encouragement  of  science,  the  steel,  the 
concrete, the aeroplanes, are all there, but all in the service of 
ideas appropriate to the Stone Age. Science is fighting on the 
side of superstition.
(Orwell 1968[1941]:170)
The critique became more pointed in  Nineteen Eighty-Four,  where 
the world is divided into three ideologically identical, continuously 
warring technocratic dictatorships, whose only reason for existence is 
the maintenance of power, and where scorning the welfare of their 
subjects  is  treated  as  proof  of  this  power.  A key tool  of  the state 
apparatus is Newspeak, a constructed language in which, as in Basic, 
word elimination plays a central role, but as a means of limiting the 
thought of its speakers rather than freeing it: the elimination of words 
prevents mention of the associated thoughts, and leads ultimately to 
the  elimination  of  the  thoughts  themselves.  ‘[R]eduction  of 
vocabulary  was  regarded  as  an  end  in  itself,’  writes  Orwell 
(1987[1949]:313), ‘and no word that could be dispensed with was 
allowed to survive. Newspeak was designed not to extend but to 
diminish the range of thought, and this purpose was indirectly 
assisted by cutting the choice of words down to a minimum.’
Orwell’s Newspeak was the product of many influences, including 
other constructed languages like Esperanto: during his time in Paris 
as a young man Orwell lived with his aunt Nellie Limouzin and her 
partner Eugène Adam, better known as ‘Lanti’,  the founder of  the 
Esperanto  SAT  organisation  (see  Bowker  2003:105-107;  Shelden 
1991:136-137;  see  section  2  for  SAT).  Orwell’s  perception  of 
political  and bureaucratic  discourse also clearly colours Newspeak 
(see,  for  example,  Orwell  1968[1946]).  But  Newspeak  quite 
obviously emulates and parodies Basic in many of its key features 
(see  Orwell  1987[1949]:312-326 for  his  ‘grammar’ of  Newspeak), 
and Orwell was briefly professionally involved with Basic, producing 
several programs promoting Basic at the BBC (see Franke 2008:197-
217; Fink 1971; Courtine 1986; Rai 1988:125-126; Joseph 2001). At 
this  time,  and for  many years  after,  he  would  seem to  have  been 
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supportive of Basic: a letter from Orwell to Ogden on 1 March 1944 
(in Davidson 2010:226-227) shows that he was still at least politely 
supportive of Basic as late as two years before he started drafting 
Nineteen  Eighty-Four,  in  1946  (see  Bowker  2003:368-370).  In 
Orwell  (1968[1946]),  where  he  targeted  thoughtless  political 
sloganeering,  we can  see  what  he  would  have  found attractive  in 
Basic:
In prose, the worst thing one can do with words is surrender to 
them.  When  you  think  of  a  concrete  object,  you  think 
wordlessly, and then, if you want to describe the thing you have 
been visualising  you probably  hunt  about  until  you find  the 
exact words that seem to fit it. When you think of something 
abstract you are more inclined to use words from the start, and 
unless you make a conscious effort to prevent it, the existing 
dialect  will  come rushing in  and  do the  job  for  you,  at  the 
expense of blurring or even changing your meaning. Probably 
it is better to put off using words as long as possible and get 
one’s  meaning  as  clear  as  one  can  through  pictures  and 
sensations.
(Orwell 1968[1946]:138-139)
Needless to say, these words could have been written by Ogden: the 
power of empty words over thought, Ogden’s ‘word-magic’, is there, 
as well as Ogden’s preferred solution, the careful thinking out of what 
is  to  be said,  starting from ‘pictures  and sensations’,  no less.  But 
obviously at this time Orwell was experiencing a change of heart: 
while he endorsed the motivation behind Basic, he could not accept 
the legislated, restricted code it offered, and he could not overlook 
the  fact  that  it  was  the  official  language  of  the  Wellsian  world 
dictatorship.
The parody of Basic in Newspeak is thoroughgoing, cutting right 
to the panoptic core:   Nineteen Eighty-Four  is in fact a critique of 
totalitarianism  realised  as  an  implementation  of  panopticism.  The 
citizens of  Nineteen Eighty-Four  are under constant  surveillance – 
‘Big Brother is watching you’ – through ‘telescreens’, from which the 
inspectors  of  the  ‘Thought  Police’  can  both  observe  and  speak 
privately to any individual at any time:
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The  telescreen  received  and transmitted  simultaneously.  Any 
sound  that  Winston  made,  above  the  level  of  a  very  low 
whisper,  would be picked up by it;  moreover,  so long as he 
remained  within  the  field  of  vision  which  the  metal  plaque 
commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of 
course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at 
any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought 
Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was 
even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. 
(Orwell 1987[1948]:4-5) 
Later in the novel (Orwell 1987[1948]:230-231), Winston Smith, the 
protagonist, and his girlfriend Julia are surprised when the telescreen 
speaks to them, to tell them to stay still, shortly before their arrest. 
Surveillance takes other non-technological forms in Nineteen Eighty-
Four: the Thought Police regularly patrol the streets and can look in 
windows,  and  higher  windows  can  be  watched  from  helicopters; 
average  citizens,  and  family  members,  including  children,  are 
encouraged to watch and inform on each other. Even the program of 
cumulative  surveillance  to  stifle  the  subject’s  will  to  test  the 
boundaries is present: Winston and Julia are permitted for some time 
to carry on an affair and take part in what they believe is a seditionary 
movement, until they are apprehended. We never know Julia’s fate, 
but  we  watch  as  Winston’s  crimes  are  paraded  before  him  and 
exposed to him as delusional. These similarities between the society 
of  Orwell’s  Nineteen  Eighty-Four  and  Bentham’s  panopticon  are 
obvious and have been remarked on (see, for example, Strub 1989; 
Lyon 1994:57-67), but Orwell’s direct biographical link to Bentham’s 
Panopticon through Basic would seem to have escaped notice. Orwell 
biographers (e.g., Bowker 2003; Meyers 2000; Taylor 2003; Shelden 
1991) fail to make the connection to Bentham altogether; this may be 
because  it  is  considered  peripheral  to  Orwell’s  biography  (see 
Bowker 2007 for a survey of Orwell biographies).
The critique Ogden faced in his control of meaning through Basic 
was  an  expression  of  the  growing  disillusionment  with  the 
technocratic social engineers and their schemes for the betterment of 
the  world,  a  disillusionment  prompted by the  high-flown rhetoric, 
disastrous actions and resulting turmoil of the 1930s and 40s. The 
denunciation of the technocrats for their totalitarian tendencies was 
not  entirely  unreasonable:  there  was  indeed  a  strong  belief  in 
enlightened, benevolent control. The same critique would resonate in 
other quarters at the same time, in particular in those of the logical 
positivists of the Vienna Circle, with whom Ogden came into contact 
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in his efforts to promote Basic during the 1930s, as we see in the next 
chapter. They held similar hopes and shared a similar fate.
10. Summary and conclusion
The international language movement, which sprang up and became 
the subject of popular interest in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, was pulled, in the first years of the twentieth century, into the 
orbit of scientists and scholars keen to establish an auxiliary language 
for international communication, for the services it could render in 
accelerating and propagating the results of scientific progress. At the 
same time, they wanted to divorce the movement from the politically 
radical and ‘utopian’ elements that seemed to be defining its image. 
In their efforts to make the international language a reputable topic of 
scientific investigation, the technocratic language constructors looked 
to  the  precedents  set  in  the  Enlightenment,  when  the  creation  of 
philosophical languages was a subject of serious scholarly interest. 
Basic English was Ogden’s contribution to the international language 
movement,  after  the  technocratic  turn  had  been  taken.  Although 
generally reticent to discuss the thought that lay behind the project 
and to  acknowledge  his  intellectual  debts  –  except  in  the  case  of 
Jeremy Bentham – Ogden clearly drew inspiration from a variety of 
sources  in  the  contemporary  movement  and  their  Enlightenment 
predecessors.
Basic has, however, several odd features in comparison to other 
contemporary projects: its exclusive reliance on English as a source 
language,  complete  with  all  irregularities,  was  contrary  to  the 
painstaking efforts at international equality and regularisation made 
by  the  major  mainstream  language  designers.  Ogden’s  special 
solution  was  a  product  of  his  conviction  that  normal,  Standard 
English  already  provided  much  of  what  was  sought  after  in  the 
international language. It is already spoken by many different groups 
found all over the world, and is spreading further every day, and its 
natural ‘analytic tendency’ brings it ever closer to the grammatical 
and lexical ideal that other language constructors worked so hard to 
artificially  re-create.  This  view  was  no  peculiarity  of  Ogden’s;  it 
would seem to be a manifestation of a widespread belief in British 
exceptionality, under which Britain serves as colonial master and the 
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bringer  of  enlightenment  to  the  whole  world,  a  view  explicitly 
articulated by such figures as Winston Churchill.
After some enthusiasm, and even official support from the private 
Rockefeller  Foundation  in  the  United  States  and  the  British 
government,  Basic  faded  away  in  the  years  following  the  Second 
World War. But it did not disappear without a trace: the idea of a 
reduced English for international purposes re-emerged in the 1970s 
with Caterpillar Fundamental  English,  a restricted form of English 
modelled  on  Basic  and  design  and  propagated  by  the  Caterpillar 
Tractor Company. It was seen as a means of cutting down translation 
costs and was used for compiling technical documentation for their 
equipment that could be used anywhere in the world. However, the 
project  was  abandoned  by  Caterpillar  in  the  early  1980s  when  it 
became apparent that technical writers were unable to stay within the 
boundaries of the language and that foreign readers often needed just 
as  much  training  to  use  manuals  written  in  the  language  as  in 
Standard English.  It  also became clear  that  there was a marketing 
advantage  in  talking  to  customers  in  their  own language,  a  point 
otherwise  forgotten  or  denied  in  English  evangelism (see  Verbeke 
1973; Kamprath et al. 1998).
The order and rationality Ogden sought to bring through Basic was 
a commonplace among the technocratic language projects, and other 
wide-scale  social  projects  of  the  modernist  era.  Quite  apart  from 
many  particulars  of  language  philosophy,  this  is  a  point  shared 
between  Ogden  and  the  philosophers  of  the  Vienna  Circle,  with 
whom Ogden was about to come into contact. Their common attitude 
led  them  to  collaboration,  and  also  to  contend  with  a  common 
backlash to their projects, in a post-war climate tired and resentful of 
the decades of disorder and calamity brought about,  it was widely 
held, by these efforts to order and control.
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4. OGDEN AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE
1. Introduction
By the beginning of the 1930s the centre of gravity of the new 
analytic approach to philosophy had moved from Cambridge to 
Vienna. Russell  and  Wittgenstein’s  various  versions  of  logicial 
atomism,  mixed  with  indigenous  strands  of  German  philosophy, 
became the wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, or ‘scientific world 
conception’, embodied  in  a  set  of  doctrines  known  variously  as 
‘logical  positivism’ or  ‘logical  empiricism’. Although  not  wholly 
uncritical  of  their  innovations,  Russell  himself  recognised the pre-
eminence  of  the  direction  taken  by  the  Viennese  philosophers, 
commenting later that he was, ‘as regards method, more in sympathy 
with  the  logical  positivists  than  with  any  other  existing  school’ 
(Russell  1940:7).  The Viennese proponents of these new doctrines 
did not consider themselves ‘pure philosophers’, but scientists 
striving  to  secure  the  epistemological  foundations  of  science  and 
thereby do away with the accumulated confusions of philosophy. 
Their target was ‘metaphysics’ as practised by the German idealists, 
but in their mouths this word became a disparaging  term for any 
philosophy that did not meet their standards of logical rigour. The 
aim was modern thought for the modern world, and an escape from 
the mysticism and mystification of the past.
Ogden came into personal contact with two of the most prominent 
members of the Vienna Circle, as the group is known, Otto Neurath 
(1882–1945) and Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), in 1933, just after 
Basic English had appeared on the scene and was being vigorously 
promoted, and just after the members of the Circle had published 
some of their foundational papers and were gaining attention in the 
English-speaking world  (some of the first publications about the 
work of the Vienna Circle to appear in English include Neurath 
1983[1931], Feigl and Blumberg 1931, and Stebbing 1933). Ogden’s 
intentions were, in the case of Neurath, for collaboration and, in the 
case of Carnap, business. Ogden wanted to adapt Neurath’s ‘Vienna 
method of picture statistics’  for the teaching of Basic, fulfilling a 
long-held hope for a visual educational adjunct to  Basic  (Ogden 
1929b:29; cf. chapter 3, section 7), and from Carnap he wanted to 
secure  the  English  translation  rights  to  his  recent philosophical 
papers, which were already being keenly discussed in the English-
speaking world.
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By the time they became aware of each other, both Ogden on the 
one side and Carnap and Neurath on the other had formulated the key 
ideas that constituted their doctrines and were already busy 
promoting them. For this reason it is not possible to discern any 
major mutual influence, but both sides had a lot in common and, 
especially in the collaboration between Ogden and Neurath, many 
peripheral but significant aspects of their thought became aligned. 
Both sides took language as central to philosophical problems, which 
they saw as impinging on the everyday life of ordinary people. The 
means to combating traditional  philosophical  confusions,  they felt, 
was to develop an improved language, whose validity depended on 
everyday language, variously conceived. In section 2 we look first at 
the modernist  intellectual  background of  the Vienna Circle,  in  the 
tradition of Cambridge analysis shared with Ogden, but also in the 
indigenous  German-language  and  Viennese  traditions  that  they 
followed.  We  then  examine  in  section  3  the philosophical and 
programmatic similarities between Ogden, Neurath and Carnap. In 
section 4  we turn to the collaboration between Ogden and Neurath 
and see how Neurath’s system of picture statistics was re-aligned to 
the international  language movement.  Section 5  then examines the 
development of the relationship and the personal dynamics between 
Ogden, Neurath and Carnap as  revealed  through their extant 
correspondence. In section 6  we then come to the most striking 
external parallel between Ogden and the Vienna Circle philosophers: 
the critique of Circle’s ‘unity of science’ program as totalitarian, a 
critique reminiscent in many ways of that directed at Basic.
2. The Viennese scene
Vienna, in the decades leading up to and following the turn of the 
nineteenth century to the twentieth, was home to a vibrant intellectual 
culture,  a  world  romanticised  today  as  one  of  discussion  groups 
meeting in cafés and private homes, as well as formally organised 
associations  offering  public  lectures  and  courses  to  the  average 
person. The Vienna Circle, which defies precise delineation from its 
environment,  manifested  itself  as  both  a  private  discussion  group 
organised from 1924 by Moritz Schlick (1882–1936), and a formal 
association, the Verein Ernst Mach, founded in 1928.64 Its participants 
64 Schlick,  professor  of  ‘philosophy  of  the  inductive  sciences’ at  the  University  of  Vienna, 
initially organised the discussion group on the urging of his students Herbert Feigl (1902–
1988) and Friedrich Waismann (1896–1959). The Verein Ernst Mach has traditionally been 
considered the public face of this discussion group because of the joint membership of many 
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were active in many areas of intellectual life besides, in Vienna and 
other cities of central and eastern Europe (see further chapter 6 of 
Haller 1993). The image most commonly associated today with the 
Circle is that projected by two of its most vocal members, Neurath 
and Carnap; but these were responsible for only some of the many 
ideas raised and debated within the group. The line they presented 
offers  many parallels  to  ideas developed by Ogden in this  period, 
with  a  common  inspiration  in  Russell  and  Wittgenstein’s  logical 
atomism, among other sources.
The default image we have of the Circle today derives principally 
from a document intended to be its manifesto, published in August 
1929 (Verein Ernst Mach 2006[1929]). As stated on its title page, the 
manifesto has ‘no officially named author’, but the preface is signed 
by Neurath, Carnap and Hans Hahn (1879–1934), a mathematician, 
friend  and  brother-in-law  of  Neurath  (see  Stadler  1997:693-694). 
Documentary evidence  as  well  as  the  themes and phrasing of  the 
manifesto reveal the text to be very much a joint product, although 
Neurath and Carnap were among the most  significant authors (see 
Uebel 2008; cf. Mulder 1968; Haller 1993:70; Stadler 1997:372). In 
the manifesto the ‘scientific world conception’ is pitted against the 
confusions and deceptions of ‘metaphysics’. This was not simply an 
academic project, but an effort ‘to fulfil a demand of the present day[, 
…]  to fashion tools of thought for the everyday, not only for the 
everyday of scholars, but also for the everyday of all who in whatever 
way are involved in the conscious work on shaping our lives’ (Verein 
Ernst  Mach  2006[1929]:10-11).65 The  Circle’s  professed  goal,  in 
Neurath’s words, was to make a better world and a better life through 
the  enlightenment  that  science  brings.  This  is  of  course  the  same 
sentiment driving the Ogden’s researches into meaning and language 
participants,  including Schlick,  who was chairman of  the  Verein from its  inception to  its 
dissolution. However, the Verein was more the creation of the  Freidenkerbund Österreichs 
(Free-thinker Association of Austria), of which Neurath was a prominent member (Stadler 
1997:364-370; 1982; see also Neurath’s 1930–1931 description of the Verein Ernst Mach). 
There was a great deal of tension between Schlick and Neurath: Schlick was uncomfortable  
about the intellectually aggressive and politically engaged attitude of Neurath and the Verein, 
as we will see below. The Vienna Circle is also identified by its journal, Erkenntnis, published 
from 1931 in  co-operation  with  the  like-minded  Gesellschaft  für  Empirische  Philosophie 
(Society for empirical philosophy) in Berlin (see Stadler 1997:248-251). 
65 The complete sentence reads in the original: ‘Der Wiener Kreis glaubt durch seine Arbeit im 
Verein Ernst Mach eine Forderung des Tages zu erfüllen: Es gilt, Denkwerkzeuge für den 
Alltag zu formen, für den Alltag der Gelehrten, aber auch für den Alltag aller, die an der 
bewußten Lebensgestaltung irgendwie mitarbeiten.’ An idiomatic English translation that does 
not quite capture the central place of the word Alltag in this quotation can be found in Neurath 
and Cohen (1973:305).
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(see chapter 2, sections 1-3), and his efforts at developing Basic (see 
chapter 3, section 4).
The writing of the manifesto was prompted by Schlick’s decision 
to decline a call to a professorship in Bonn in favour of staying in 
Vienna,  which made it ‘clear to him and to us that there is such a 
thing as the “Vienna Circle” of the scientific conception of the world, 
which goes on developing this mode of  thought in a collaborative 
effort,’  as  the  manifesto  declares  (Verein  Ernst  Mach 
2006[1929]:299).  Although  gratified  by  the  honour  shown  to  him 
through the dedication of the manifesto, Schlick complained that he 
could  not  agree  with  its  advertisement-like  style  and  seemingly 
dogmatic formulations (Mulder 1968:390; cf. Uebel 2008:93). This 
difference in understanding of the political and social duties of the 
Circle,  along with differences in philosophical  doctrine,  lay at  the 
base of the main division in the Circle, that between the ‘left-wing’, 
represented  chiefly  by  Neurath,  and  the  ‘right-wing’,  represented 
primarily  by  Schlick.  Carnap  stood  in  between  these  two  poles: 
starting with views more closely aligned to the right-wing, he later 
drifted towards Neurath (Haller 1993:70; Carus 2007:243). The key 
doctrinal divisions between the two wings took on their clearest lines 
during the so-called ‘protocol sentence debate’, to which we come in 
the  next  section.  In  the  face  of  theoretical  innovations  driven  by 
Neurath – and adopted to some extent by Carnap – Schlick and his 
student Friedrich Waismann maintained a conservative attitude to the 
problem  of  ‘verification’  of  sentences  that  leant  heavily  on  the 
evolving ideas of Wittgenstein (cf. chapter 2, section 4).66
The Circle was conscious of its place in the history of ideas: the 
manifesto  contains  a  section  on  its  historical  background  (Verein 
Ernst Mach 2006[1929]:301-304), which both highlights fellow ‘anti-
metaphysical’ philosophers  around  the  world  –  here  Russell  and 
Moore  are  named as  exponents  of  a  long English  tradition  –  and 
66 Held  up  as  a  model  by  Schlick  and  present  in  Vienna  in  the  final  years  of  the  1920s, 
Wittgenstein granted small audiences to selected Circle members – eventually restricted to 
just Schlick and Waismann – where he expounded his ideas in transition (see McGuinness 
1979,  which  contains  records  of  Waismann’s  abortive  efforts  at  writing  an  exposition  of 
Wittgenstein’s  ideas).  Neurath,  for  his  part,  could  never  tolerate  this  subservience  to 
Wittgenstein:  it  is  reported  that  in  the  Circle’s  discussions  of  the  Tractatus Neurath 
continually  interrupted  the  discussion  by  exclaiming  ‘metaphysics!’  It  was  eventually 
suggested to him that he should just hum ‘mmm’ when he felt the discussion was becoming 
metaphysical rather than disturbing it with his interjections. In response, he said it would be 
more efficient to say ‘not-m’ when the discussion turned away from metaphysics (Neurath 
recounts  this story in  his  correspondence with Carnap and Charles  Morris,  18 November 
1944, quoted in Reisch 2005:8; Cartwright et al. 1996:5-6 also tell the anecdote, but without 
attribution).
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provides a catalogue of empirically minded thinkers active in Vienna 
in previous decades, along with the foreign authors they translated 
and  interpreted.  Prominent  among the  Viennese  philosophers,  and 
representative of the direction of their thought, is Ernst Mach (1836–
1916), after whom the Verein Ernst Mach was named, and for whom 
the  chair  that  Schlick  later  occupied  in  Vienna  was  originally 
established. Mach was known as much for his research in physics as 
his  work  in  the  philosophical  foundations  of  science.  In  his 
epistemology, we see the same sort of realism and faith in immediate 
experience that characterises Russell’s later doctrines (see chapter 4 
of Haller 1993; cf. chapter 2, section 4). The evolution of Schlick’s 
thought  independently  followed  a  similar  course  to  Russell’s: 
although long interested in philosophical questions, he only officially 
turned to philosophy after completing his doctorate in physics.67  He 
had arrived at many of the epistemological positions that united him 
with Russell and Wittgenstein before he became aware of their work 
(see  Haller  1993:104-107):  perhaps  he  was drawn to  Wittgenstein 
more for the confirmation he provided for his existing views, and the 
eloquence  with  which  he  provided  it,  than  for  any  instruction  he 
offered.
Similar backgrounds straddling multiple disciplines were common 
also to Carnap and Neurath. Carnap began with studies in physics, 
mathematics  and  philosophy,  under  Gottlob  Frege  in  Jena  (see 
chapter  2,  section  4),  among  others.  This  set  him  on  the 
‘scientifically’  oriented  course,  anchored  in  rigorous  formalised 
argumentation,  confirmed in his doctoral  dissertation (published as 
Carnap 1922), a study of conceptions of space in physics.68 In Vienna 
– where he was active, but not always present, from 1925 onwards – 
this  developed  into  an  ever  more  aggressive  campaign  for  the 
scientific world conception and assault on ‘metaphysics’, a line that 
Neurath  most  strongly  represented  and  which  Schlick  frequently 
found uncomfortable (see chapter 11 of Stadler 1997 for examination 
of the tensions between Schlick and Neurath). But whereas Neurath 
was  engaged  in  bringing  the  scientific  world  conception  to  the 
general population, Carnap stayed largely within the boundaries of 
academia.  His  organisational  activities  extended  only  to  other 
academic groups,  such as the lectures he arranged at  the Bauhaus 
school of design (see Dahms 2004), and his attacks on metaphysics 
67 Schlick’s doctoral supervisor was the German physicist Max Planck (see Stadler 1997:775).
68 Carnap’s doctoral dissertation was supervised by Bruno Bauch (1877–1942), a Neo-Kantian 
of the Southwest School (see Carus 2007 and Carnap 1963:11-12).
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were  highly  technical  and  directed  at  an  academic  audience:  the 
general approach was to use the logical techniques developed in his 
more  constructive  works  to  dissolve  ‘pseudo-problems’ that  have 
occupied philosophers, as in his 1928 essay  Scheinprobleme in der 
Philosophie  (Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy), where he argues that 
the opposing arguments for realism and idealism are simply products 
of  linguistic  and  logical  confusion.  The  tone  of  these  essays  is 
generally superior and summary, much like that adopted by Ogden 
and Richards in The Meaning of Meaning (see chapter 2, section 1). 
Carnap  concludes  Scheinprobleme  with  what  he  believes  is  a 
comprehensive list of all objections that could be raised against his 
arguments and adds: ‘For the sake of clarity, all critics are requested 
to  admit  explicitly  to  one  of  these  viewpoints’  (Carnap 
1967[1928]:343). 
Neurath, more socially and politically engaged than Carnap, began 
in Vienna with studies in areas as diverse as mathematics and natural 
science  to  history,  and  earned  his  doctorate  in  Berlin  with  a 
dissertation on ancient  notions of  commerce,  trade and agriculture 
(published  as  Neurath  1906-1907[1906]).69 The  social  engagement 
that Neurath would show after his return to Vienna in 1919 had a 
period of  incubation  during the  First  World War:  in  1916 he  was 
appointed director of the Kriegswirtschaftsmuseum (Museum of War 
Economy)  in  Leipzig,  founded  in  order  to  explain  to  the  average 
citizen the workings of the war economy (see  Schumann 1973 and 
Cartwright  et al. 1996:20), which Neurath idealised as a model of 
economic efficiency. It was at this time that he began to develop his 
system of picture statistics, as a means of communicating complex 
economic facts to a lay audience. The common beliefs and goals that 
underlie this work and Ogden’s Basic were apparent to both Neurath 
and  Ogden,  and  resulted  in  their  later  collaboration  (which  we 
examine  in  section  4  below).  After  the  war  Neurath  had  the 
opportunity  to  implement  his  ideas  for  a  thoroughly  planned, 
socialised economy as president of the Bavarian Central Economic 
Administration  in  the  short-lived  Bavarian  Räterrepublik  (Soviet 
Republic). When this experiment failed economically and politically, 
Neurath was imprisoned for treason, but his release was soon secured 
by the socialist  government of ‘Red Vienna’ (see  Cartwright  et al. 
1996:43-63). After being deported to Vienna, Neurath continued his 
69 Neurath’s doctoral supervisors were the historian of the ancient world Eduard Meyer (1855–
1930) and the economist and sociologist Gustav Schmoller (1838–1917). He in fact submitted 
two doctoral dissertations, only the second of which was actually examined. The reason for  
this is unknown (see Cartwright et al. 1996:11-12).
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work  in  the  Gesellschafts-  und  Wirtschaftsmuseum (Museum  of 
Society and Economy), founded in 1920, which remained his main 
occupation during his period of contact with the Vienna Circle.  The 
principal  goal  of  this  museum  was  to  make  better  citizens  by 
educating them about the economic policies and achievements of the 
Viennese  government,  and  represented  the  union  of  Neurath’s 
existing  pedagogic,  economic  and  political  interests  (see  Neurath 
1991[1926] and Neurath 1991[1933]). Neurath’s public efforts on the 
intellectual  front  lacked  the  detail  of  Carnap’s  anti-metaphysical 
evangelism,  but  he  was  still  given  to  making  programmatic 
statements and to singling out the Circle’s intellectual enemies (such 
as in Neurath 1983[1930] and Neurath 1983[1931]; see Neurath and 
Cohen 1973:1-80 for further biographical details on Neurath).
The most widespread image we have today of the Vienna Circle 
reflects, and is the conscious propagandistic product of, the Circle’s 
‘left-wing’,  dominated  by  Neurath  and  cautiously  supported  by 
Carnap. Neurath and Carnap took up the fight for the Circle’s radical 
anti-metaphysical philosophy in the wider academic community, as 
well  as  the  general  population.  The  views  they  held  share  an 
unmistakable and freely acknowledged kinship with those developed 
near-simultaneously in Cambridge, but are rooted also in indigenous 
German-speaking  traditions.  Vienna  and  Cambridge  were  bound 
together  by  the  same  epistemological  questions  and  the  same 
approach to answering them. And for the politically engaged Neurath, 
in  particular,  just  as  for  Ogden,  these  were  urgent  problems  that 
impacted on everyday life. In both centres everyday experience was 
taken to be the foundation of knowledge, and the means to exploring 
this  experience  was  the  language  in  which  it  is  expressed.  The 
problem remained, however, exactly how to pin down the everyday. 
The  solutions  arrived  at  by  Neurath  and  Carnap  mirror  those 
proposed by Ogden, as we see in the following section.
3. The everyday versus metaphysics
The target of Neurath and Carnap’s attacks was ‘metaphysics’: for 
them this  included not  only doctrines whose proponents  explicitly 
described them as such, but any philosophy that failed to meet the 
standards of ‘scientific’ epistemological rigour they set. In fact, they 
did not even consider their own work as philosophy in the traditional 
sense, but rather the elimination of philosophy and its replacement 
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with a new ‘unified science’, a notion that originates with Neurath 
(e.g.,  1931:618)  and that  would become an increasingly important 
platform associated with the Circle. ‘Unified science’ would facilitate 
free  co-operation  and  communication  among  scientists,  breaking 
down the disciplinary boundaries  that  presently  separate  them.  As 
Neurath put it:
It is one of the tasks of our time to aid scientific reasoning to 
attain its  goal without hindrance. Whoever undertakes this  is 
concerned not so much with “philosophy,” properly speaking, 
as with “anti-philosophy.” For him there is but one science with 
subdivisions – a unified science of sciences. We have a science 
that deals with rocks, another that deals with plants, a third that 
deals with animals, but we need a science that unites them all.
(Neurath 1983[1931]:48)
In  this  wholesale  denunciation  of  ‘metaphysics’ as  the  product  of 
logical and linguistic confusions and the striving for a new ‘scientific’ 
solution, we are of course reminded of Ogden and Richards’ crusade 
against  ‘word-magic’ (see  chapter  2).  The  similarities  do  not  end 
here,  a  fact  of  which  all  parties  were  aware.  Early  in  his 
correspondence with Carnap, Ogden sent him a copy of The Meaning 
of  Meaning,  where  he  marked out  the  point  at  which Ogden  and 
Richards give their own assessment of ‘metaphysics’. Carnap replied, 
‘From  the  marked  point  (p.222)  I  see,  that  our  views  about 
metaphysics will be in good agreement. With great interest I will see 
the details of your views’ (postscript dated 30 December 1933 to a 
letter from Carnap to Ogden, 29 December 1933). The ‘marked point’ 
was most probably in the second paragraph on page 222 of the third 
revised edition, published 1930, where Ogden and Richards address 
‘metaphysics’:
[T]he  set  of  confusions  known  as  metaphysics  has  arisen 
through  lack  of  this  true  grammatical  approach,  the  critical  
scrutiny  of  symbolic  procedure.  In  the  same  manner  our 
analyses of Beauty and Meaning are typical instances of what 
grammar might long ago have achieved had grammarians only 
possessed  a  better  insight  into  the  necessities  of  intelligent 
intercourse, and a livelier sense of the practical importance of 
their science.
(Ogden and Richards 1989[1923]:222; same page as the edition 
of 1930; emphasis original)
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In the details Carnap will have discovered that Ogden and Richards’ 
method  of  definition  involved  a  highly  similar  procedure  to  the 
technique  he  used  himself  in  one  of  his  most  famous  anti-
metaphysical  passages,  his  attack on Heidegger’s  proposition ‘Das 
Nichts selbst nichtet’ (The nothing itself nothings). This proposition, 
Carnap argued, is  ‘meaningless [...] in [the] strictest sense’ (Carnap 
1959[1931]:61),  and  contains  merely  an  expression  of  a 
Lebensgefühl (attitude to life), perhaps partly assimilable to ‘emotive’ 
connotation  in  Ogden  and  Richards’ terminology  (see  chapter  2, 
section 2). He demonstrated, in the sort of diagrammatic form also 
eagerly  employed  by  Ogden,  how  an  originally  meaningful 
expression could have strayed into the realm of the meaningless. In 
the  left-hand  column  below  we  start  with  a  perfectly  meaningful 
expressions  of  the  everyday  language.  Meaningless  sentences  are 
then built  from these in the middle column by using words in the 
same sentence structure that logically do not fit. Natural languages 
permit  such  logical  misuses  of  words,  but  a  logically  correct 
language,  as  in  the  third  column,  would  forbid  such  expressions 
(Carnap 1959[1931]:70).70
70 In  his  detailed  study of  the intellectual  interaction between Carnap,  Heidegger and Ernst 
Cassirer (1874–1945), Friedman (2000) shows that the three were very well informed about 
one another’s work and that Carnap’s critique of Heidegger was considerably subtler than it 
has  traditionally  been  taken  to  be.  Heidegger  in  fact  responded  to  Carnap’s  critique  in 
unpublished lectures from this period (see chapter 2 of ibid.).
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I. Meaningful sentences 
of ordinary language
II. Transition  from  sense  
to  nonsense  in  ordinary  
language
III. Logically correct 
language
A.  What is outside?
Ou(?)
       Rain is outside.
Ou(r)
A.  What is outside?
Ou(?)
       Nothing is outside.
Ou(no)
A. There is nothing (does 
not exist anything) that is 
outside.
~(∃x) . Ou(x)
B. What  about  this  rain? 
(i.e.  what  does  the  rain 
do?  or:  what  else  can be 
said about this rain?)
?(r)
1. We know the rain.
K(r)
2. The rain rains
R(r)
B. ‘What  about  this 
Nothing?’
?(no)
1. ‘We seek the Nothing’
    ‘We find the Nothing’
    ‘We know the Nothing’
K(no)
2. ‘The Nothing nothings’
No(no)
3. ‘The  Nothing  exists 
only because...’
Ex(no)
B. None of these forms 
can ever be constructed.
The  key  to  exploding  these  metaphysical  statements,  in  Carnap’s 
view, lies in realising that, because they break the rules of logic, they 
cannot be made to say anything about the world. If a statement can be 
tested for correspondence to the world then it is valid; if not, it is 
meaningless metaphysics. Philosophy must pass the same epistemic 
tests as science, and science derives its validity from observation of 
the  world.  Observation,  for  its  part,  takes  place  at  the  level  of 
phenomenal experience. Chemists cannot see the individual hydrogen 
and  oxygen  atoms  that  make  up  water,  but  they  assume  their 
existence because when they run an electric current through water, 
they produce two kinds of gas: one that ignites when exposed to a 
flame (the hydrogen) and another that  promotes the burning of an 
existing  flame  (the  oxygen).  But  scientific  facts  extend  into  the 
domain of the intangible: physicists, for example, cannot see or feel 
gravity as such, but they posit its existence because it provides the 
most  economical  explanation  and  reliable  predictions  of  such 
observable  facts  as  the  falling  of  apples  to  the  ground  and  the 
movement of the moon through the sky. This is to say, the epistemic 
basis of science is experience of the world as it comes to us through 
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our eyes, ears, skin, and so on. Scientific facts are the stories we tell 
to connect and explain these experiences.
The elevation of scientific practice to epistemological principle led 
Carnap  to  measure  his  philosophy  against  the  phenomena  of  the 
world as we experience them, rather than appealing to such abstract 
entities as sense-data, as Russell had done, or Wittgenstein’s atomic 
Tatsachen (see chapter 2, section 4; prop. 2 of Wittgenstein 1922). In 
this context the language of the everyday, as the language in which 
we express our experiences, gains a new significance. Carnap’s 
elevation of phenomenal experience to the epistemic basis goes back 
to at least 1926, when he completed the manuscript of Der logische 
Aufbau der Welt (The  logical  construction  of  the  world;  Carnap 
1967[1928]).  But by the time Carnap had come into contact with 
Ogden in 1933, he had retreated to the less strict position of 
‘physicalism’, a doctrine originally proposed by Neurath, but which 
finds  its  classical  exposition  in  Carnap’s  (1934[1931])  essay  ‘Die 
physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft’ (The 
physical language as the universal language of science), an essay that 
was published in English translation by Ogden in 1934 under the title 
The Unity of Science, a title shared with a series of conferences from 
1934 to 1941, organised primarily by Neurath (these conferences are 
documented exhaustively in Stadler 1997:395-436). The doctrine of 
physicalism arose around ‘late 1929’ out of Neurath’s  objections to 
the Wittgensteinian  atomistic epistemology prevailing in the Vienna 
Circle, and Carnap’s phenomenalistic developments on it  (Uebel 
2007:137; see also Carnap 1934[1931]:28; Carus 2007:239-251). The 
dialogue in which physicalism was developed and refined within the 
Circle is known as the ‘protocol sentence debate’, named after the 
subject  of  discussion,  the  ‘protocol  sentences’,  the  statements  in 
which observations are recorded, as in a scientist’s ‘protocol’ of their 
experiment. 
At  the centre of Carnap’s (1934[1931])  physicalism is  the 
‘physical language’. This is indeed the language of the scientific 
discipline of physics, although not necessarily in the form it has today 
or in the form it has had in any historical period  (ibid.:54). The 
defining property of this language is that it talks objectively about 
physical entities in the world in quantitative terms (ibid.:52-67). That 
is, it talks of goings on in the world in a mathematically precise way 
independent of the perceptions of any individual. It is possible to 
verify any statement of this physical language by translating it into a 
‘protocol language’ – a language used to record the experiences of an 
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individual observer –  and there are as many of these protocol 
languages as there are observers. The phenomenon comes first and 
the analysis later, argued Carnap (ibid.:46-47), turning to then recent 
research among the Gestalt psychologists.
Carnap  took the physical language as his basis for two reasons. 
First, it is objective, or rather inter-subjective. That is, it talks about 
the world in absolute  terms,  divorced from the perspective of  any 
single speaker. This is in contrast to the protocol languages, each of 
which refers to the private experience of the individual and so is not 
available for public discussion.  Secondly, so claimed Carnap, every 
statement in every scientifically valid language can be translated into 
the physical language. Statements in any of the ‘sub-languages’ of 
chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology and so on – that is, in any 
of the genuine sciences –  can all be translated into the physical 
language. It is in fact the possibility of effecting this translation that 
confirms the scientific validity of the discipline and its language 
(Carnap 1934[1931]:67-74). A ‘metaphysical’ statement, by contrast, 
cannot be translated into the physical language and this is how we 
can identify it as such (we saw an illustration of this technique above 
in the case of ‘The nothing itself nothings’). But not every statement 
in the physical language can be translated into one of the sub-
languages. The physical statement may deal with a subject matter that 
lies outside the scope of a given sub-language: a statement that could 
be translated into chemical terms may not be translatable into 
sociological terms, for example. It is this possibility of translating any 
statement from the sub-languages into the physical language that 
makes it the ‘universal language’  that guarantees the ‘unity of 
science’  as a single undertaking, and simultaneously excludes 
everything that is not scientific –  these  are  the  constructive  and 
exclusionary sides of the scientific world conception (ibid.:96).
The protocol languages are similarly sub-languages of the physical 
language. Any statement in a protocol language can be translated into 
physical terms, but the reverse is not always possible: the physical 
statement may go beyond the limits of the private experience of any 
particular individual, but for every true physical statement there is a 
possibly existing protocol language that it could be translated into. 
Again, it is this possibility of translation that lends validity to the 
physical and protocol languages: a true statement in either in fact 
says precisely the same thing as its translation into the other; they 
differ only in terms of their form. It should be remembered here that 
the physical language really  does  talk in physical terms. The 
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description of perception in the protocol language becomes in the 
physical language an account in such terms as the position in four 
dimensional space of the individual electrons that make up the 
electrical impulses in nerves:
Hence,  every statement in the protocol language of S can be 
translated into a physical statement and indeed into one which 
describes the physical state of S’s body. In other words there is 
a correlation between S’s protocol language and a very special 
sub-language of the physical language. This correlation is such 
that if any statement from S’s protocol language is true the 
corresponding physical statement holds intersubjectively and 
conversely. Two languages isomorphic in this fashion differ 
only by the sounds of their sentences.
(Carnap 1934[1931]:87-88)
Carnap  admitted that this conclusion may seem astonishing, but 
claimed that it is quite obviously true; he contended that we in fact 
intuitively make such translations between the physical and protocol 
languages every time we think about other people’s accounts of their 
perceptions:
The  reader may still hesitate, feeling that such a deduction is 
utopian and would need full knowledge of the physiology of 
the central nervous system for its performance. This is not 
however the case ; derivation of the required physical 
statements is already possible and is achieved in everyday life 
whenever communication occurs. It is true that what we know 
in such cases of the physical situation of other persons’ bodies 
cannot as yet be formulated as a numerical distribution of 
physical coefficients of state but it can be formulated in other 
expressions of the physical language which are just what we 
require.
(Carnap 1934[1931]:85-86)
In Carnap’s physicalist conception after 1929 the language of 
everyday experience therefore had a special and unrivalled role as the 
medium of immediate experience that correlates with the physical 
language. But this actually represented a step back from his position 
in Der logische Aufbau der Welt in 1926, where ‘autopsychological 
objects’, essentially the same entities of direct experience that are 
spoken about in the protocol language, form the basis of his system. 
He  preferred  this  basis  because  of  its  epistemic  primacy  (Carnap 
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1967[1928]:101, §64), but he was forced to move away from it when 
it became apparent that it was incurably solipsistic. The danger of 
solipsism was known to Carnap, and he wanted to characterise his 
approach as merely ‘methodological solipsism’; that is, an approach 
that  applies  the ‘form and method of solipsism’  without 
acknowledging ‘its central thesis’ (ibid.:102). He  felt that he had 
escaped solipsism in practice, because he looked to the ‘structure’ of 
experience rather  than its  ‘material’.  The substance of individuals’ 
experiences may not be the same, argued Carnap, but the relations of 
the elements that  make up these experiences are comparable from 
individual  to  individual  because  they  correspond  to  the  relations 
between  the  entities  in  the  world  that  are  responsible  for  the 
experiences (see §66, §16 of ibid.). This focus on formal relations as 
the  basis  of  objective  knowledge  of  course  has  an  immediate 
precedent in Russell’s ‘logical constructions’ (see chapter 2, section 
4), and has roots extending back to Kant (cf. Richardson 1998:35-51; 
chapter 5 of Daston and Galison 2007). Carnap (1967[1928]:101-106, 
§64 and  §65) tried to further sidestep the problem of solipsism by 
making the additional point that ‘the given does not have a subject’. 
A stream of experience simply exists; it only makes sense to identify 
a perceiving subject distinct from the world and other perceivers once 
the  stream  of  experience  has  been  analysed  –  or  ‘physically 
reconstructed’, to use Carnap’s term – and these elements have been 
separated out. There are no parts to a stream of experience, including 
no ‘subject’ or perceiver, until it has been processed in this way. But 
when Carnap came to actually sketch his analytical apparatus, he was 
not  able  to  maintain  the  purely  methodological  character  of  his 
solipsism:  his efforts at securing intersubjectivity depended  on 
heteropsychological reconstruction of others’  perceptions, which 
necessarily had to proceed over a physical step, anchored in the 
individual’s own autopsychological basis. That  is,  to  reach  the 
intersubjective description, we must think about what other observers 
would perceive by imagining what the world would look like if we 
occupied the position they occupy and saw the world through their 
eyes.  This  approach  appeals  to  agreement  between  perceivers  on 
specific  phenomena  and  weakens  the  assumption  that 
intersubjectivity  is  guaranteed  by  the  inherent  structural 
correspondence  of  all  streams  of  experience.  As a result, argues 
Uebel (2007:131-134), Carnap’s system succumbed to anti-solipsistic 
arguments from Neurath and Heinrich Neider (1907–1990), another 
member of the Circle, at that time still a student.
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But Neurath’s objections to Carnap’s philosophy went even deeper 
than his arguments against ‘methodological solipsism’. Any form of 
epistemological  certainty  and  an  ‘ideal  language’  in  which  this 
certain  knowledge could be expressed, both notions which underlie 
Carnap’s  ‘autopsychological  objects’  and  his  later  ‘protocol 
languages’, were for Neurath metaphysical dreams. In his discussions 
with Carnap, Neurath continually returned to these topics (which he 
raised in the published record in Neurath 1981[1928], a review of 
Carnap 1967[1928]; Neurath 1983[1930]; and Neurath 1983[1931]). 
Among  the clearest and best-known formulations of Neurath’s 
position contra Carnap is Neurath (1983[1932]), his reply to Carnap 
(1934[1931]). Even though with the advent of physicalism in 1929 
Carnap had departed from ‘methodological solipsism’, in 1931 he 
still imagined a protocol language in which ‘[t]he simplest statements 
[…]  refer to the given, and describe directly given experience or 
phenomena, i.e. the simplest states of which knowledge can be had’ 
(Carnap 1934[1931]:45). But for Neurath, there could be no ‘given’; 
every observation involves the application of some sort of theory, a 
notion  frequently  associated  with  the  French  physicist  and 
philosopher of science Pierre Duhem (1861–1916), whom Neurath 
(1983[1932]:98) cited as an inspiration, among others (cf. Cartwright 
et al. 1996:111-131). Neurath’s rejection of the ‘given’ in its semantic 
aspect  –  that  is,  the  rejection  of  the  possibility  of  observation 
statements that could only be interpreted as having one single, fixed 
reference without any ambiguity – may show some influence from 
Welby and her supporters (see chapter 2, section 4). Welby, it will be 
remembered,  denied  the  possibility  of  what  she  called  ‘Plain 
Meaning’,  that  is,  literal,  uninterpreted,  unambiguous  meaning. 
Neurath was certainly aware of her work: a strong influence on him 
in his early years was the sociologist Ferninand Tönnies, winner of 
the ‘Welby Prize’ (see chaper 3, section 7; Cartwright et al. 1996:10-
11). He even commented on the later Dutch significs movement as 
working also towards unified science (e.g., Neurath 1987[1938]:136; 
1938:19),  inviting  one  of  their  members,  Gerrit  Mannoury,  to  the 
1937 Unity of Science Congress (his talk is published as Mannoury 
1987[1938]; he is also published in Erkenntnis: Mannoury 1934). 
The impossibility of the ‘given’ means that there can be no clean 
separation between the protocol language and the physical language: 
the two are distinguished only in that the protocol language makes 
reference to observer, while the physical language does not (Neurath 
1983[1932]:93). All  we have, according to Neurath, is the ‘trivial 
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language’ that is handed down to us from previous generations and is 
full of imprecise, unanalysed terms, which Neurath called Ballungen 
(a term Cohen, in his translation of Neurath 1983[1932], renders as 
‘verbal clusters’). Instead of pursuing the inevitably fruitless goal of 
reaching an ideal language, we should simply seek to clean out the 
language we have of its metaphysical terms  (Neurath 
1983[1932]:91), which  will give us a ‘universal  jargon’, the best 
result that we can ever hope for  (ibid.:92). This  is the view that 
Neurath summed up so elegantly in his well-known Schiffer  [sailor] 
metaphor,  a  recurring  motif  in  his  writings  (for  its  history,  see 
Cartwright et al. 1996:89-166):
There  is  no  way  to  establish  fully  secured,  neat  protocol 
statements as starting points of the sciences. There is no tabula 
rasa. We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the 
open sea, without ever being able to dismantle it in dry-dock 
and reconstruct it from the best components. Only metaphysics 
can  disappear  without  trace.  Imprecise  ‘verbal  clusters’ 
[‘Ballungen’]  are  somehow  always  part  of  the  ship.  If 
imprecision is diminished at one place, it may well re-appear at 
another place to a strong degree.
(Neurath 1983[1932]:92)
Carnap (1934[1931])  was clearly already struggling with objections 
of this kind. He was prepared to acknowledge Neurath’s point as a 
practical difficulty, but not as an insurmountable theoretical barrier. 
There may be Ballungen in actual protocol languages, but that does 
not mean that there can be no ‘primitive protocols’  in which they 
have been entirely eliminated: ‘Owing to the great clumsiness of 
primitive protocols it is necessary in practice to include terms of 
derivative application in the protocol itself. This is true of the 
physicist’s protocol and true in far greater measure of the protocols 
made by biologists, psychologists and anthropologists’  (Carnap 
1934[1931]:44).  In  the  face  of  Neurath’s  critique,  Carnap  (1932) 
accepted the possible existence of many different kinds of protocol 
languages.  This  was  the  beginning  of  Carnap’s  new  program  of 
‘logical tolerance’,  which had little to say about the question of a 
single epistemological foundation and instead concentrated attention 
on the technical details of translation between languages (see Carnap 
1937[1934], a work also published in English by Ogden). 
But Carnap strove always for precision and formal rigour in his 
theorising and no amount of tolerance would lead him to leave his 
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finely  specified  logical  systems  floating  coherently  but  without 
correspondence to the world. Inspired by the logical theory of truth 
developed by the Warsaw School of logicians, which has its classical 
formulation in the work of Alfred Tarski (1901–1983), first presented 
publicly  in  1931  (but  first  published  Tarski  1956[1933]),  Carnap 
(1942)  elaborated  a  theory  of  ‘pure  semantics’,  a   theory  of  the 
possibilities  of  ‘semantical  systems’,  abstracted  away  from  the 
‘pragmatics’ of actual instances of language in use, and even from the 
‘descriptive semantics’ of any particular  language (Carnap 1942:8-
15).  Carnap’s  semantical  system consists  of  rules  laid  down  in  a 
metalanguage  that  specify  the  designation  of  signs  in  an  object 
language  and  the  conditions  under  which  sentences  in  the  object 
language are true, since ‘to understand a sentence, to know what is 
asserted by it, is the same as to know under what conditions it would 
be true’ (Carnap 1942:22).71 
Of course, this talk of ‘truth’ and the formal, rigid stipulation of 
the possibilities of interpretation in the abstract could never appeal to 
Neurath. In his correspondence with Carnap after the appearance of 
Carnap (1942) – discussed at length in chapter 10 of Reisch (2005) – 
Neurath objected to Carnap’s scheme, and the realist ontology that he 
believed it  suggests through the implication that there is an object 
language at the very bottom of the hierarchy that refers to the ‘given’. 
Carnap  (1942),  no  doubt  reflecting  on  many  discussions  that  had 
taken place in previous years, anticipated Neurath’s reaction in his 
preface,  and  urged  an  open  mind  to  experimentation  to  see  what 
results  might  present  themselves  from  admitting  consideration  of 
meaning and truth in the abstract:
While  many  philosophers  today  urge  the  construction  of  a 
system  of  semantics,  others,  especially  among  my  fellow 
empiricists,  are  rather  sceptical.  They  seem  to  think  that 
pragmatics  –  as  a  theory  of  the  use  of  language  –  is 
unobjectionable, along with syntax as a purely formal analysis; 
71 The device of metalanguage and object language is employed as a way of liberating Carnap’s 
account from Wittgenstein’s (1922) distinction between saying and showing. Wittgenstein, it 
will be remembered, thought that it was impossible to  say  anything about the workings of 
language, logic, and the world as a whole using language and logic themselves. All that could 
be done was to show through the use of language and logic how they worked. The Tractatus 
itself only showed these principles; it was unable to say anything about them. Many theorists 
saw a potential  escape from this limitation in metalanguages,  languages of higher orders, 
which would be able to  say  something about their object languages. This possible solution 
occurred even to Russell in his preface to the Tractatus (see chapter 2, section 7; cf. chapter 5 
of Uebel 2007).
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but semantics arouses their suspicions. They are afraid that a 
discussion  of  propositions  – as  distinguished from sentences 
expressing  them  –  and  of  truth  –  as  distinguished  from 
confirmation  by  observations  –  will  open  a  back  door  to 
speculative metaphysics, which was put out at the front door. 
Some  metaphysicians  have  indeed  raised  futile  issues 
concerning truth, or rather the Truth, and I certainly should not 
like to help in reviving them. The same,  however,  holds for 
many  other  concepts,  e.g.  number,  space,  time,  quality, 
structure, physical law, etc. Should we then refrain from talking 
about them in a non-metaphysical, scientific way? It seems to 
me  that  the  only  question  that  matters  for  our  decision  in 
accepting or rejecting a certain concept is whether or not we 
expect fruitful results from the use of that concept, irrespective 
of any earlier metaphysical or theological doctrines concerning 
it.
(Carnap 1942:vii-viii)
Neurath  pursued his preferred course of cleaning out the ‘trivial 
language’ to create a ‘scientific jargon’. In this direction he produced 
his Index  Verborum Prohibitorum – a pun on the Catholic Church’s 
Index Librorum Prohibitorum and all that it implies – a list of words 
forbidden for their unavoidable slipperiness, which would inevitably 
drive their users to metaphysics.  This  he  alluded  to  in  Neurath 
(1983[1932]:91),  but  only  explicitly  mentioned  first  in  print  in 
Neurath (1987[1933]:8), although the idea would seem to go back to 
his days as a doctoral student (see Neurath and Cohen 1973:7; Reisch 
1997). He also constantly urged the use of concrete terms in place of 
more abstract expressions: instead of talking of ‘magnetism’  and the 
‘kingdom of animals’,  for instance, talk should be of magnets and 
individual species (Neurath 1996:257-258, 304-305).
While Carnap followed the formal route in elaborating an ideal 
language for  the sciences,  Neurath pursued the practical  course of 
providing  a  forum  for  specialists  to  present  their  sciences  in  the 
universal  scientific  jargon.  Inspired  by  the  Encyclopédie  of  the 
French Enlightenment figures D’Alembert (1717–1783) and Diderot 
(1713–1784; see Neurath 1937:134; Dahms 1996), Neurath began a 
project  that  eventually  became  The  International  Encyclopedia  of  
Unified  Science,  which  ‘aim[ed]  to  show  how  various  scientific 
activities such as observation, experimentation, and reasoning can be 
synthesized,  and  how  all  these  together  help  to  evolve  unified 
science’ (Neurath 1938c:2).72 The  system of science does not exist, 
72 In this passage, his introduction to the first volume of the encyclopaedia, Neurath cites the 
‘famous French  Encyclopédie’ as an inspiration. Neurath’s idea for the encyclopaedia was 
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says Neurath, so the best that can be hoped for is a collaboratively 
compiled encyclopaedia  of  scientific  wisdom. In places it  may be 
inconsistent,  but  ‘an  encyclopedia  (in  contradistinction  to  an 
anticipated system or a system constructed a priori) can be regarded 
as the model of man’s knowledge. For, since one cannot compare the 
historically given science with “the real science,” the most one can 
achieve in integration of scientific work seems to be an encyclopedia, 
constructed by scientists in co-operation’ (Neurath 1938c:20; see also 
Neurath 1983[1935]a).
Many of the points Neurath raised in this period find expression 
around the same time – but still before they made contact – in the 
writings of Ogden and his assistant  Leonora Wilhelmina Lockhart, 
who  developed  a  theory  of  ‘word  economy’  (Lockhart  1928; 
Lockhart  1931a).  Lockhart,  much  of  whose  wording  resembles 
Ogden’s  own,  saw  the  best  approach  to  the  ‘scientific’ study  of 
meaning  and  symbolism  in  the  ‘science  of  Symbolism’ that had 
grown out of The Meaning of Meaning and manifested itself in Basic 
(Lockhart 1931:12, 63). This gives us the means to make language ‘a 
more precise instrument of thought’, she argued, and in fashioning 
this  instrument  ‘we are faced with the […] problem of  reduction’ 
(Lockhart  1931:56).  Reduction  can  be  understood  as  grammatical 
reduction and as reduction of words, the elimination of complex rules 
of syntax and morphology and the elimination of excessively fine-
grained and compositionally inscrutable words respectively. English, 
with its ‘analytic tendency’ (see chapter 3, section 5), provides the 
perfect basis for both: it is a language ‘in which the elements entering 
into  one  construction  may  be  reassembled  and  used  in  another’ 
(Lockhart 1931:23).
Lockhart did not see ‘analysis’ of an expression as an end in itself: 
analysis is only useful insofar as it helps to establish a reference. But 
analytical expressions are generally better for establishing references, 
since  they  allow  us  to  ‘systematize  our  knowledge’,  and  so  are 
perhaps  the  best  ‘antidote  to  the  habit  of  using  words  without 
first publicly expressed at the Pre-Congress of the First International Congress for the Unity 
of Science in 1933. Concrete plans for the encyclopaedia were laid, under the direction of 
Neurath’s Mundaeum Institute in the Hague (which Neurath founded after going into exile 
from Vienna), at the First International Congress for the Unity of Science in the following 
year, and a contract for publication was settled with the University of Chicago Press, where 
Charles Morris, a prominent native American supporter of logical empiricism was based, in 
1937. Seven volumes appeared altogether; the first in 1938 and the last in 1969. The second 
volume contained the first publication of Kuhn’s (1962) influential The Structure of Scientific  
Revolutions.  See  Cartwright  et  al. (1996)  and  Stadler  (1997:399-400)  for  discussion  of 
Neurath’s encyclopaedism.
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adequate reference’ (Lockhart 1931:56-57). In writings undertaken at 
Ogden’s  prompting  (Wisdom  1930:11,  note  1)  ,  the  British 
philosopher John Wisdom (1904–1993), a student of Moore and the 
transitionary  Wittgenstein,  argued  that  there  was  a  fundamental 
different between ‘analysis’ and ‘interpretation’, which Ogden’s hero 
Bentham and like-minded philosophers failed to fully appreciate (cf. 
chapter  3,  section  8).  Wisdom essentially  took  analysis  to  be  the 
analysis of a  concept, through which the fundamental elements and 
structure of facts in the world are revealed, while interpretation he 
treated as merely establishing what particular words mean; through 
interpretation we simply replace one set of words for picking out a 
referent  with  another,  without  necessarily  offering  a  more 
philosophically  motivated  description  (see  Wisdom  1930;  1931). 
Lockhart  (1931)  rejected  the  distinction  and  claimed  that  it 
presupposed the possibility of some sort of ultimate, ‘metaphysical’ 
knowledge beyond that which can be expressed verbally. Ogden and 
Richards (1989[1923]:110) had already dealt with this issue in their 
discussion of definition when they denied that there was any contrast 
between ‘real’ and ‘verbal’ (i.e., ‘nominal’, or ‘symbolic’) definitions. 
This  is  the contrast  between knowing what  thought  to  attach  to  a 
word, which is provided by the verbal definition, and knowing the 
underlying  properties  of  the  object  referred  to  by  the  word, 
expounded in the real definition. It is rooted in Aristotle’s theory of 
essences,  and  received  the  formulation  referred  to  by  Ogden  and 
Richards in the work of Locke (cf.  §1.1 of Gupta 2012). Ogden and 
Richards argued that words are only ever convenient symbols and a 
definition  simply  provides  a  more  convenient  set  of  symbols  for 
picking out a referent, while a so-called real definition would be an 
enumeration of  the properties  of  an object  in  the world.  Although 
such  an  enumeration  could  also  serve  as  a  more  convenient 
paraphrase, its target is the referent, not the symbols that refer to it, 
and so goes beyond the domain of the science of symbolism.
By limiting  analysis  to  whatever  is  most  expedient  for  making 
reference, Lockhart was following a principle established already in 
The  Meaning  of  Meaning.  In  the  absence  of  absolute  ‘god-given 
concepts’, as she put it, that ought to underlie analyses, she was left 
with the question of where any given analysis should stop, that is, 
what  the  correct  bottom level  of  analysis  should  be.  There  is  no 
single correct level, she concluded; any analysis can be reduced to a 
lower explanatory level (Lockhart 1931:58):
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[E]ven within the confines of a single language, the basis of 
definition is determined by the particular aspect of knowledge 
with which we are, for the moment, concerned. The ‘species’ 
on which the botanist’s classification is based may be resolved 
in the chemist’s test tube into a variety of substances ; and the 
simple elements of the chemist’s world will be turned by the 
physicist’s electroscope into a complex system of energy. Each 
account of phenomena has its legitimate starting point. And as 
there seems to be no means of escape from the bias attaching to 
individual systems, linguistic or scientific, it is difficult to see 
how an absolute analysis of the constituents of the universe is 
possible.
(Lockhart 1931:50-51)
In the place  of  ultimate analysis  Lockhart  adopted  analysis  at  the 
level  of  our  everyday  phenomenal  experience:  ‘If  language  is  to 
consult  human  convenience  –  and  being  a  tool  fashioned  by  the 
human mind for its own purposes, this can scarcely be denied – it 
should  symbolize  objects,  as  far  as  possible,  at  the  level  of  our 
perceptions. Facts that cannot be inferred directly from contact with 
the  object  should  not  be  covered  by  the  unit  symbols’ (Lockhart 
1931:60;  cf.  Walpole  1937;  Myers  1938).  We see  here  sentiments 
familiar  from  Carnap’s  conception  of  protocol  languages  and 
Neurath’s  universal  jargon.  Further  strengthening  the  resemblance, 
we  hear  Susan  Stebbing  (1885–1943),  a  philosopher  in  the 
Cambridge tradition, echoing the critique Wisdom made of Bentham 
– and, by implication, Ogden and Lockhart – when she criticised the 
Vienna  Circle  philosophers  for  failing  to  distinguish  between 
different  kinds of  analysis  (Stebbing 1933;  see also Beaney 2003; 
Milkov  2003).  Comparing  the  logical  constructions  of  logical 
atomism  and  related  theories  (see  chapter  2,  section  4)  to  the 
‘fictions’ of Bentham (see chapter 3, section 8), Ogden claimed that if 
logical  analysts  took  their  logical  constructions  seriously  and 
admitted them as an essential part of language, as Bentham did his 
fictions, they would discover that many logical constructions cannot 
in fact be reduced to purported atomic facts. His comments at this 
time  in  support  of  analysis  at  the  level  of  everyday  language,  as 
advocated by Lockhart, and in opposition to the search for the ‘ideal 
language’, could have been written by Neurath:
167
Bentham believed that language must contain fictions in order 
to remain a language, i.e., that a language which “mirrored” 
reality would be impossible. If the logico-analysts were to 
believe that “logical constructions”  must necessarily occur in 
language they would profoundly modify their attitude to the 
problem ; for it would follow that there could be no atomic 
proposition and all analyses would be relative. Whether some 
hierarchical analysis is possible must remain doubtful. What is 
at any rate clear is that we could not talk of the analysis of a 
given proposition. This is the real bone of contention between 
the logic-analytic temperament and the technological approach 
of Bentham. The latter realized that the problem is eminently a 
practical one – the classification of thought by simplifying and 
revealing the structure of language ; and therefore a task for 
whose performance no eternally valid rules can be 
promulgated. The logico-analysts postulate an ideal language – 
perfect even in its well disposed irregularities – which requires 
methodical articulation in accordance with a preconceived 
metaphysical scheme.
(Ogden 1932d:l-li; emphasis original)
Neurath  and Carnap, in the name of the Vienna Circle, sought to 
proselytise the modern scientific world conception, to achieve the 
‘unity of science’, which would bring all sciences together and 
exclude the unscientific. Carnap, like Ogden, targeted ‘metaphysical’ 
philosophers to expose their nonsensical doctrines. The weapon he 
used  was also the same: reductio  ad absurdum executed  through an 
analysis of his opponents’ language. In this battle, the language of the 
everyday became the anchor that prevented talk from drifting off into 
the metaphysical. But Neurath  objected  to  Carnap’s  ‘everyday’. 
Carnap wanted phenomenal experience to be his ‘given’, his solid 
foundation. For Neurath, even this reeked of metaphysics. All we 
have is our everyday language, our ‘trivial language’; all we can hope 
for is to continually  purge it of those expressions that lead to 
metaphysical misconceptions, in order to approach a universal jargon. 
The unity of science can then be achieved through the compilation of 
an encyclopaedia, where each scientist relates his discipline to the 
wider world in the jargon. But both Carnap and Neurath’s notions of 
everyday language resonate with Ogden and  Lockhart’s  postulates 
about  performing  analysis  in  language  at  the  level  of  everyday 
experience. Neurath would draw further on these insights in his 
collaboration with Ogden, in which his ‘Viennese method of picture 
statistics’ became the ‘Isotype: international picture language’.
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4. International picture language
Neurath had already begun experimenting with the visual 
representation of statistical information during his time at the 
Kriegswirtschaftsmuseum in Leipzig, but it was at  the  Viennese 
Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum in the 1920s  that the method 
reached new heights of sophistication and systematisation and 
became a top intellectual export product, with the lending of exhibits 
to museums overseas and the establishment of branch museums in 
Berlin, the Hague, London and Moscow. A typical example of the 
method  from  this  period  can  be  see  in  Figure  1  below,  which 
illustrates the different types of economies found in the world and 
their  distribution  over  various  population  groups,  with  their  sizes. 
The  toothed  wheel  represents  modern  industrial  economies,  the 
hammer economies based around skilled trades and agriculture, and 
the  bow and  arrow hunter  and gatherer  economies  with  primitive 
agriculture. Each figure represents 100 million people; the outlined 
figures with hats represent Europeans; the brown figures with turbans 
represent ‘orientals’, Indians and Malays; the black figures Africans 
and ‘mulattoes’; and the yellow figures with pointed hats represent 
‘Mongols’.
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Figure 1. ‘Economic systems of the earth’ (Gesellschafts- und 
Wirtschaftsmuseum 1930:97)
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During  the  course  of  the  1930s,  Neurath  developed  his  picture 
statistics to deal with an ever wider range of material, going beyond 
the  purely  statistical  to  cover  historical  narrative  and  procedural 
instructions,  and addressed to an ever wider audience:  the method 
became  eventually  the  ‘international  picture  language’.  It  is  not 
entirely  clear  what  lay  behind  this  new  designation:  even  as  he 
introduced the ‘international picture language’, Neurath was careful 
to point out that ‘[t]here are simple picture languages in which no 
other sorts of signs are used. What we have to do with here, however, 
is a picture language which is not able to give the story by itself, but 
only with the help of the words of a normal language’ (Neurath 
1936:16; Marie Neurath 2009:49 makes a similar point). Among later 
commentators, there are those, such as Müller (1991), who take the 
designation ‘picture language’ quite literally and examine it in light 
of the linguistic theories current in Neurath’s milieu; others, such as 
Burke  (2011),  dispute  that  Neurath  ever  thought  of  Isotype  as  a 
linguistic  system,  despite  the  rhetoric  that  suggests  as  much. 
Whatever the precise  status Neurath accorded to the method, it  is 
clear that he saw it as some sort of system of communication and that 
his approach was deeply bound up with his philosophical convictions 
about  the  place  of  ‘everyday’ language (as  discussed in  section  3 
above), convictions that he shared to a large extent with Ogden, and 
which came to  manifest  themselves  through Neurath  and Ogden’s 
collaboration.73
Ogden’s influence on Neurath’s picture statistics extended to one 
of  the most  conspicuous features of  the approach,  its  name. From 
1935 onwards the method was called ‘Isotype’, which, like Ogden’s 
‘Basic’,  is  an  acronym:   ‘International  System  Of  TYpographic 
Picture  Education’;  a  name,  incidentally,  that  would  seem  to 
emphasise the system’s pedagogic character rather than its claims to 
being  an  international  auxiliary  language.  Marie Neurath (née 
Reidemeister) – a major proponent of Isotype, coiner of the name, 
73 The principles of Neurath’s system and the philosophical ideas that lie behind them are 
recorded in numerous publications by Neurath. Most of these are collected, and translated into 
German for texts originally in other languages, in Haller and Kinross (1991). Neurath’s 
earliest essay in which the basics of the method can be recognised is Neurath (1991[1925]), 
written  shortly after the founding of the Vienna Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum. 
Neurath (1991[1933]) and (1936) describe the system in detail. Neurath (1996) gives a 
thorough philosophical and pedagogic justification for the system, and Neurath (2010), his 
‘visual autobiography’, tells the story of the development of the system from the perspective 
of his personal history. Examples of the system in action can be found in Gesellschaft und 
Wirtschaft (Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum 1930), which contains reproductions from 
the original exhibits in the Vienna museum. The bibliography of Marie Neurath and Kinross 
(2009) contains references to many further primary and secondary sources.
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and  for  many  years  the  companion  and  later  wife  of  Neurath  – 
recalled the inspiration she drew from Ogden’s Basic in the re-
branding:
The two Basic books forced us to find a new name for the 
method and the formation of the word ‘Basic’  (‘British 
American Scientific International Commercial’) helped in this. 
One afternoon I sat down and played around with it. I arrived at 
‘International System Of Teaching in Pictures’ - Isotip; that did 
not sound quite right yet, except for the first syllable. It was 
then only a short step to ‘Isotype’; but I did not succeed in 
finding a good sequence of words for it, and we stayed with the 
not entirely satisfactory solution of ‘International System of 
Typographic Picture Education’. When Neurath returned in the 
evening from a meeting in Amsterdam he was pleased with the 
name, and the next day, asked Arntz [chief graphic designer on 
the project; introduced below] to design a symbol for it. Both 
name and symbol were then published, for the first time, in 
International picture language.
(Marie Neurath 2009:47)
Marie Neurath’s recollection cannot be entirely reliable here. Neurath 
(1991[1935]),  a  publication  in  Dutch,  used  the  name Isotype  and 
appeared  one  year  before  Isotype:  international  picture  language 
(Neurath 1936), the first of two books published in collaboration with 
Ogden  (the  second  being  Neurath  1937).74 Isotype: International 
picture language sets out the system of Isotype and makes a case for 
its use in pedagogic and international contexts. With the obvious and 
acknowledged influence that Ogden had on the name ‘Isotype’, it can 
be imagined that he, an active participant  in the international 
language movement, played a major role in bringing Neurath into the 
fold and casting  Isotype as an ‘international picture language’, 
despite whatever misgivings Neurath may have had about pressing 
the linguistic status of the method. Even if Neurath wanted to keep 
the  linguistic  claims  of  Isotype  within  limits,  pictures  and  visual 
representation  certainly  occupied  an  important  place  in  his 
philosophy of language. According to Neurath, pictures show – and 
can only show –  concrete, tangible objects; they are incapable of 
expressing the abstract entities that populate the metaphysician’s 
world. Pictures perhaps offer the best medium for Neurath’s 
‘universal  jargon’. There is freedom in the possible abstractness of 
74 Kinross in fact includes a reproduction from Neurath (1991[1935]) as a illustration on the 
same page where Marie Neurath’s text is printed.
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the spoken language, but also metaphysical danger; a picture 
language protects us from this:
What a triumph it was, when people freed themselves from the 
limits of pictographic writing, what a triumph, when language 
adapted itself flexibly and in multiple forms to the demands of 
scientific work, when people learnt to master this logical tool. 
Of course, liberation from the picture led also to diversions, led 
into the realm of the meaningless. Nominalisation created new 
problems.  In  particular  the  German  language  leads  to  such 
metaphysical diversions; it allows numerous statements about 
‘the nothing that nothings’ (Heidegger), about the ‘being’  – as 
if the ‘being’ could be used in a sentence like the sword or the 
table. The pure pictographic writing recognises a sword and a 
table, but no being.
(Neurath 1991[1933]:269)75
We see  here  Neurath’s  repetition  of  Carnap’s  earlier  elevation  of 
Heidegger to a paradigmatic example of metaphysical nonsense (see 
section  3).76 The  faith  in  pictures  that  Neurath  shows here  is  not 
unique  or  even  original  to  him.  Ogden, we have already seen, 
preferred nouns to verbs because, among other reasons, nouns 
generally name things that can be ‘pictured’, while verbs do not. And 
in his Basic paraphrases for adjectives he preferred descriptions of 
the observable behaviour that the target of an adjectival qualification 
exhibits to the elusive qualities adjectives might otherwise be taken to 
convey  (see  chapter  3,  section  7).  In  Neurath’s  immediate 
philosophical  milieu,  Wittgenstein proposed  his ‘picture theory of 
language’, where the ‘pictures’ we make of the world correspond to it 
exactly, and Russell also spoke of ‘images’ in our minds, although he 
75 The original text runs: ‘Welcher Triumph war es, als man sich von den Schranken der 
Bilderschrift befreit hatte, welcher Triumph, als die Sprache biegsam und vielgestaltig sich 
allen Anforderungen wissenschaftlicher Arbeit anpaßte, als man dieses logische Werkzeug 
beherrschen lernte. Freilich, die Befreiung vom Bild führte auch auf Abwege, führte ins 
Gebiet des Sinnleeren. Substantivierung gab Anlaß zu immer neuen Problemen. Insbesondere 
die deutsche Sprache verleitet zu solchen metaphysischen Abwegen, sie gestattet 
umfangreiche Erörterungen über ‚das Nichts, welches nichtet‘  (Heidegger), über das ‚Sein‘; 
als ob das ‚Sein‘  ebenso in einem Satz verwendet werden könnte wie das Schwert oder der 
Tisch. Die reine Bildschrift kennt zwar ein Schwert und einen Tisch, aber kein Sein.’ 
76 Neurath’s  singling  out  of  the  German  language  as  particularly  inclined  to  lead  to 
‘metaphysical diversions’ is perhaps also a response to Heidegger’s claim that German, along 
with Greek, ‘is (in regard to its possibilities for thought) at once the most powerful and most 
spiritual of all languages’ (Heidegger 1959[1935]:57). The lectures from which this quotation 
is taken were given only in 1935, but Heidegger may have made similar comments at an  
earlier date.
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was of course careful to emphasise that he did not necessarily mean 
visual images  (see  chapter  2,  section  4).  Müller  (1991:239-230) 
specifically warns against looking for ‘family resemblances’ between 
Neurath’s thought and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, pointing out 
the Neurath’s extreme negative reaction to the work (cf. section 2). 
Despite  their  differences,  however,  we  can  still  observe  the  quite 
clear common ground they had, along with others, in treating pictures 
as direct representations of the world. Müller does not deny this: his 
warning is probably directed at those who would posit an influence of 
the early  Wittgenstein on Neurath that goes beyond observing their 
shared  positions  in  their  common  milieu.  Pietarinen  (2011:74) 
believes that Neurath felt pictures ‘achieve what they do […] because 
of the specific iconic modalities that are more directly linked with 
cognition than the conventional symbols of natural language are,’ an 
idea he finds ‘reminiscent’ of Peirce’s views on iconic signs.  
‘Words divide, pictures unite’, first attested in German as ‘Worte 
trennen  –  Bilder  verbinden’  (Neurath  1991[1933]:273),  and 
eventually  gaining  a  Basic  translation,  ‘Words  make  division, 
pictures make connection’ (Neurath 1936:18), was Neurath’s repeated 
slogan  for  Isotype.  It  echoes  his  call  for  unified  science, 
‘Metaphysical  terms  divide  –  scientific  terms  unite’  (Neurath 
1987[1933]:23,  emphasis  original;  see  also  Haller  1993:175-176; 
Cartwright  et  al. 1996:179),  and  in  so  doing  classes  ‘word’ with 
‘metaphysical  terms’ and ‘pictures’ with ‘scientific terms’.  But the 
‘division’  and ‘connection’  that Neurath had in mind were  not 
necessarily of an international character. The roots of the system were 
pedagogic: the original purpose was  to explain economic details to 
the uneducated visitors  to  the  Vienna  Gesellschafts-  und 
Wirtschaftsmuseum. Here the division is not between peoples, but 
between the social classes of a single people.  Neurath 
(1983[1946]:236) later commented that  ‘[w]hen I created “Isotype,” 
together with my collaborators, as an international technique of visual 
information, I  was thinking mainly of the masses,  who could now 
grasp  something  more  than  before  of  the  present  knowledge  of 
mankind.’ And it is not just any pictures that unite. Isotype employs a 
distinctive style motivated by a similar spirit of minimalism to that 
found in Basic: the system of Isotype must make use of the minimum 
number  of  pictures  possible,  and the  pictures  themselves  must be 
reduced to the barest outlines, containing only the details that are 
necessary for them to be recognisable. At the same time, the pictures 
have to be as clear and engaging as possible: they should be ‘living 
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signs’  that talk directly to the viewer  (see Neurath 1936:32-33; 
Neurath  1991[1933]:269). The  viewer  should  be  drawn  into  a 
dialectical, ‘meditative’ process when they look at an Isotype picture; 
as they look and think about the picture, more details should become 
apparent, but only to a certain point:
A picture that makes good use of the system gives all the 
important facts in the statement it is picturing. At the first look 
you see the most important points, at the second, the less 
important points, at the third, the details, at the fourth, nothing 
more – if you see more, the teaching picture is bad.
(Neurath 1936:27)
The style arrived at for this minimalistic depiction was a form of 
silhouette drawing stamped out from linocuts, visible  in  Figure  1 
above, where each picture takes on the form of a ‘type’, or, as might 
be said in the present age of computer graphical user interfaces, 
‘icon’  (Neurath  1991[1935]:342  appraises  the  graphic  style  of 
Isotype). This style was largely the product of the German artist Gerd 
Arntz (1900–1988), who came to work at the Vienna museum in its 
early days (see Annink and Bruinsma 2010).
Neurath spoke of the individual symbols as the ‘vocabulary’ of the 
system and the method of their combination as the ‘grammar’, 
although he always maintained a distance from the implications of 
linguistic status these terms carry (see Neurath 1936:56). The basic 
principle  of  the  grammar  is  that  symbols  should  be  overlaid  to 
produce  compounds representing  concepts  that  belong together.  In 
Figure  1  we  can  see  this  principle  at  work:  the  symbols  for  the 
different economic systems are placed on the symbols that represent 
the  population  groups.  In  this  connection  Neurath  emphasised  the 
need  for  independence  of  visual  representation  from  the  spoken 
language. Whereas in many spoken languages there is a metaphorical 
use of words that causes us to talk of ‘a person’s foot’ and ‘the foot of 
a mountain’, no such metaphor should appear in a visual language 
because there is  no visual  connection between these two concepts 
(Neurath 1936:54-56). Most other grammatical principles in Isotype 
are of a practical rather than semantic nature and concern such issues 
as the layout of symbols, the use of colours, and, of course, given the 
system’s original purpose of representing statistics, the representation 
of quantities (see Neurath 1936:73-74 et passim; 1991[1933]).
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Isotype occupies a perhaps not fully appreciated position in 
Neurath’s thought and activities. From his return to Vienna after his 
imprisonment in Bavaria to the end of his life, Neurath’s work on 
Isotype, through various institutions, was his main occupation and 
source of income. He used Isotype both in his projects aimed at social 
reform, such as his museum work (represented in Gesellschafts- und 
Wirtschaftsmuseum 1930) and publications like Modern Man in the 
Making  (Neurath 1939), a world history demonstrating the advance 
of civilisation, and in his more theoretically oriented projects, such as 
the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, for which Neurath 
planned an unrealised ‘Atlas […] worked out as an Isotype Thesaurus 
showing important facts by means of unified visual aids’ (Neurath 
1938a:25).  As Isotype entered its ‘international picture language’ 
phase, it was used increasingly for instructions and narratives rather 
than just  statistical representations, as in the case of the diagram in 
Figure 2, which instructs parents to take their children to the doctor to 
be cured when they exhibit the symptoms of rickets. This use of 
Isotype reached its peak after Neurath’s death, when Marie Neurath 
was employed by the Nigerian government in the 1950s to produce a 
range of illustrated information booklets to explain government 
policy during the decolonisation period  (e.g.,  Western  Regional 
Government 1955).
Figure 2 (Neurath 1936:55)
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On a purely theoretical level, pictures appealed to Neurath as the 
basis of a system of communication, especially of scientific 
communication, because of what  he  saw  as  their inherent 
connectedness to the world. This ensured that they were accessible to 
everyone, he believed, regardless of their level of education or 
cultural background. He was not alone in seeing pictures in this light: 
Ogden, Wittgenstein and Russell all held similar views. Neurath, 
however, did not see the ‘picture language’  as having the same 
expressive range as spoken languages. But this could be an asset. 
Because so much cannot be expressed in the picture language, we are 
forced, as we are in Basic, to concentrate on the essentials and be 
clear about what we mean: 
But in the same way as Basic English is an education in clear 
thought – because the use of statements without sense is forced 
upon us less by Basic than by the normal languages, which are 
full of words without sense (for science) –  so the picture 
language is an education in clear thought –  by reason of its 
limits.
 (Neurath 1936:20-22)
5. Contact and collaboration
In both cases Ogden’s contact with Neurath and Carnap was initiated 
by him and began with a proposal. Neurath he pursued because he 
wanted to develop a visual education method for Basic; Carnap 
because he wanted to secure the English translation rights to his 
philosophical papers. In both instances he  was successful. The 
collaboration with Neurath resulted in Isotype: International Picture 
Language (Neurath  1936)  and Basic by Isotype (Neurath 1937). 
Carnap’s ‘Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der 
Wissenschaft’ (1931) appeared in Ogden’s Psyche Miniatures series 
as The Unity of Science (1933), and his Logische Syntax der Sprache 
(1934) with  Kegan Paul as Logical Syntax of Language (1937). A 
great deal of the correspondence between Ogden, Neurath and 
Carnap is made up of back-and-forth negotiations regarding  the 
publication of these books, and  often degenerates into brusque 
exchanges over such distasteful topics as fees, royalties and 
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copyright. But amid these exchanges their common philosophical and 
linguistic interests still managed to emerge as topics of discussion.77
Ogden was keen to win such eminent intellectuals as Neurath and 
Carnap over to the Basic  cause. Neurath’s earliest letters to Ogden, 
beginning in 1933, appear to be lost,78 but from Ogden’s side of the 
correspondence  it  can  be  seen  that  he  responded  with  interest  to 
Basic: Ogden writes, ‘The Basic books named in your letter went all 
to you on October 7 (registered), and I am hoping that they are now 
in  your  hand’ (Ogden  to  Neurath,  17  October  1933;  underlining 
original), suggesting Neurath had expressed an interest in these books 
in his previous letter. In his first reply to Ogden, later that same year, 
Carnap also displayed some curiosity about Basic, prompted by his 
existing interest in international languages, in particular Esperanto, 
and Neurath’s enthusiastic comments on Basic:
When Neurath was here recently he spoke enthusiastically 
about your “Basic English”. I’d be very grateful if you could 
send me something in the way of orientation. For many years 
I’ve had a lively interest in the problem of an international 
auxiliary language. In terms of theory I’m especially interested 
in the logical side of this problem, the question of logical 
syntax. But I’ve also been involved with the practical aspects (I 
can speak Esperanto, but am not dogmatically attached to this 
system). I consider an auxiliary language especially worthwhile 
and necessary for international relations in science.
(Carnap to Ogden, 7 December 1933)79
In response Carnap also received most of the Basic literature 
published at that time. Ogden sent (Ogden to Carnap, 11 December 
1933): Bentham’s Theory of Fictions, Jeremy Bentham 1832–2032, 
77 The Ogden-Neurath correspondence is kept in the Ogden collection of Archives of McMaster 
University and the Neurath collection of the Noord-Hollands Archief. The Ogden-Carnap 
correspondence is kept in the Ogden collection at McMaster.
78 The first letters from Ogden to Neurath and Carnap in the McMaster Archives date from 1933 
(29 September 1933 and 4 December 1933 respectively); the letters in the Noord-Hollands 
Archief, from both Neurath and Ogden, cover only the period 1941–1944 (see Fabian 
1996:352). In both cases, from the wording of the letters it appears that it is the first contact 
between the parties.
79 Original text: ‘Als Neurath kürzlich hier war, sprach er auch mit Begeisterung von Ihrem 
“Basic English”. Ich wäre Ihnen sehr dankbar, wenn Sie mir etwas zur Orientierung schicken 
könnten. Ich bin seit vielen Jahren lebhaft interessiert an dem Problem einer internationalen 
Hilfssprache. Theoretisch interessiert mich besonders die logische Seite dieses Problems, die 
Fragen der logischen Syntax. Aber auch praktisch habe ich mich damit befasst (ich kann 
Esperanto, bin aber nicht dogmatisch festgelegt auf dieses System). Ich halte besonders für 
die internationalen Beziehungen auf dem Gebiet der Wissenschaft die Verwendung einer 
Hilfssprache für erstrebenswert und notwendig.’
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Opposition, Word Economy, Basic English, The ABC of Basic 
English, Basic English Applied: Science, Basic for Economics, Carl 
and Anna, Debabelization, and the 1933 issue of Psyche. He 
commented that ‘[t]hese will give you a general picture of the theory 
on which the system is Based [sic].’ Carnap further ordered (Carnap 
to Kegan Paul, 29 December 1933): The Basic Words, The Basic 
Dictionary, The Basic Vocabulary, and Basic by Example. Ogden 
later sent The Meaning of Meaning and Richards’  Basic Rules of 
Reason, of  which Carnap acknowledged receipt in a letter on 30 
December 1933. Unwilling to allow any opportunity for propaganda 
to slip by, Ogden  points out in his letter of 11 December 1933 that 
‘[t]his letter is itself all in Basic English, and within the rules of the 
ABC [of Basic English]’ (underlining original).  He also frequently 
signs himself ‘Yours (in Basic) very truly, C. K. Ogden’. 
Neurath’s  initial  interest  in  Basic  appears  to  have  continued 
through the 1930s. Apart from their collaboration, Ogden was made a 
member in 1935 of the international  organising committee for  the 
Unity of Science congresses (recorded in Neurath 1938a:26; Stadler 
1997:406),  and Neurath invited him to speak at the 1937 Congrès 
Descartes in Paris (the Ninth International Congress of Philosophy), 
as well as inviting both Ogden and Lockhart to talk at the 1941 Unity 
of Science congress on ‘the analysis of language making’ and word 
economy respectively (the invitations are dated Neurath to Ogden 10 
June 1937, 26 September 1941; Neurath to Lockhart 26 September 
1941;  Neurath  also  sent  invitations  to  participate  in  the  1939 
congress:  Neurath  to  Ogden,  7  February  1939,  11  April  1939). 
Neither Ogden nor Lockhart presented at these conferences, however. 
The reason why remains an open question, but the invitations from 
Neurath imply that he wanted to encourage their program or at least 
that he thought it was worthy of wider discussion and debate in such 
a high-level forum. A later letter of Neurath to Lockhart suggests that 
he found Basic English a useful source for his own work and had a 
desire to learn more about its historical and philosophical 
background:
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I had more than once [in recent lectures at Oxford, Nottingham, 
London and Exeter] an opportunity to discuss Basic English 
problems. Let me repeat how much I appreciate the General 
Basic Dictionary. It helps me really in preparing my Scientific 
Universal Jargon and to understand better some problems of 
Language Making. Where could I find a report, [sic] how Basic 
has been made? The history, so to speak, of this language?
(Neurath to Lockhart, 19 July 1941)
Neurath’s reaction to one of the most controversial aspects of Basic, 
its strident promotion of all that is ‘British American’ as a model for 
the  world, is informative about his political and philosophical 
orientation. In 1942 he writes to Ogden: ‘Since I believe, more or 
less,  in  the  Anglicization  of  the  world,  I  anticipate  success  for 
BASIC, of course’ (Neurath to Ogden, 23 January 1942). By the time 
he wrote these words, with the Second World War well underway, 
Neurath  had been  living in   Great  Britain  for  two years.  He  had 
arrived there after fleeing the German invasion of the Netherlands, 
where he had been based since 1934. In February of that year, the 
Verein Ernst Mach, the registered society that formed the public face 
of the Vienna Circle, was shut down by the Austro-Fascist regime of 
Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dolfuß (who was himself assassinated 
in July of that same year in the political turmoil that gripped Austria). 
Neurath, who was at the time in Moscow disseminating  his picture 
statistics in  the USSR at  the invitation of the Soviet government, 
decided not to return to Vienna. The rise of fascism in central Europe 
was felt by other members of the Vienna Circle. Carnap, who took up 
a professorship in Prague in 1931, was already away from Vienna 
when events took their dramatic turn, but he continued to visit 
frequently until 1933. After setting out on a lecture tour in the United 
States in 1935, he never returned to Europe. Many of those who 
stayed in Vienna faced an even more unfortunate fate. Schlick, 
probably the Circle’s  least politically active member, was murdered 
by one of his students in 1936, an individual act, but one spurred on 
by  the  social  and  political  climate  (see  Stadler  1997:920-961  for 
comprehensive documentation of the incident).
Great  Britain  was  Neurath’s  refuge  and  Ogden  was  among the 
friends who helped him to become established there. It would seem 
that Ogden assisted in Neurath and Marie Reidemeister’s (from 1941 
Marie Neurath) release from internment as enemy aliens. Their main 
British  supporter  at  this  time  was  Susan  Stebbings  (introduced  in 
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section 4; see Reisch 2005:15-16), but Ogden also assisted. Neurath 
writes to Ogden in 1940:
I  am  like  Reidemeister  interned;  we  are  reading,  writing, 
designing and continuing our scientific and educational work. 
But we are handicapped by the lack of libraries and of contacts 
with  scholars.  The  society  for  the  pr.  of  sc.  [promotion  of 
science] and learning made an application for release. I ask you 
for help too. It will be too great to have a reference letter from 
you and Reidemeister’s additional letter of Miss Lockhart could 
be useful  too telling about  our Institute in Holland.  A doubt 
hardly can arise about our political reliability.
(Neurath to Ogden, 11 September 1940)
The Neurath of the 1940s was a man satisfied with his new English 
homeland and the Anglo-American future he anticipated. Ogden and 
Neurath’s correspondence in this period consists mostly of queries 
from  Neurath  about  the  history  of  various  English  thinkers,  in 
particular  Ogden’s hero,  Jeremy Bentham. Ogden indulged him in 
each letter  with pages of  information and opinion.  In a  somewhat 
cryptic passage of a very long letter buried in this exchange, Neurath 
ruminated on the  ‘British Atmosphere’ and its  role  in  shaping the 
‘Modern Atmosphere’:
I do not know, how you think of the history of the science – I 
think that the empiricist parts of them become more and more 
elements of a common realm, the ‘orchestration’ seems to be 
increasing. The ‘tools’ are more and more unified – there is no 
particular physics in the USA, India, not even in Germany, in 
spite of stupid books on German or Aryan physics. This 
progress in ‘unification’  is related to some progress in 
unification also in the field of language reform, terminology in 
a wider sense etc. Condillac, Hobbes, Bentham, Mill, etc and 
then others too, play their role, creating the MODERN 
ATMOSPHERE. I think that Logical Empiricism is an element 
of this atmosphere of scientific encylcopedism. The fact that an 
archbishop of Dublin wrote Elements of Logic, MANY 
STATEMENTS IN IT WHICH YOU ACCEPT, TOO 
(objecting, very much, to other of course) impresses a 
continental scientist, who is accustomed to different types of 
archbishops, professors of universities in the middle of the 19th 
century. The point is, that I ‘believe’ very much in the British 
Atmosphere, compared with others, in spite of many things.
(Neurath to Ogden, 26 February 1942; capitalised words 
original)
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The worldwide ‘progress in “unification”’  that characterises the 
‘modern atmosphere’, the scientific world conception, of which the 
logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle is a part, believed Neurath, is 
well-rooted in the ‘British Atmosphere’,  to  the  point  where  it  is 
perceptible even among the British clergy of the nineteenth century, 
as exemplified by Richard Whately, author of Elements of Logic 
(Whately  1845), where  on  the  Continent,  by  contrast,  only 
reactionaries  could  be  expected  in  such  positions.  Ogden, who 
maintained the image of the classical eccentric English gentleman 
scholar, would have been the perfect friend for a newcomer trying to 
assimilate to the ‘British Atmosphere’. Neurath even suggested that 
Ogden may have inspired some aspects of George Bernard Shaw’s 
prototypical eccentric English academic, Henry Higgins, as he was 
portrayed in the 1938 film version of Pygmalion. Neurath commented 
(19 December 1944): ‘I have just seen again the film PYGMALION 
and again, I felt that some details remind me of your studios, with a 
Chinaman’s shaking head, a big Grammophon [sic] funnel and other 
paraphernalia, which let me feel at home in some intellectualized 
cosy climate. Did you realize that, too?’ Ogden replied (24 December 
1944): ‘I haven’t seen the Pygmalion film, but Bernard Shaw was a 
frequent visitor to the Institute in happier times to hear himself 
recorded on the big gramophones. If Peace be only lurking around the 
corner, it may not be too long before we can once more take up the 
threads left by V1, V2 ... V4.’80 Neurath’s  praise  for  ‘our  British 
muddle’ came out in  his  correspondence with Carnap at  the same 
time  (see  Cartwright  et  al. 1996:87).  In  one  of  his  last  writings, 
Neurath compared ‘Anglo-Saxons’ to ‘Germans’:
[Germans] are, as individuals, on an average not less friendly 
than  other  people,  but  the  German  atmosphere  is  full  of 
enthusiasm and exaltation, more than, for example, the Anglo-
Saxon one; that is, full of preparedness to admire self-sacrifice, 
and to desire death in war for the highest good; and, from self-
sacrifice it is but a short step to realizing that sacrifice of others 
is unavoidable for  the  cause. In the Anglo-Saxon atmosphere, 
people think more in terms of the little happiness of all little 
men  in  a  human  environment,  and  even  the  people  on  top 
regard themselves more often as people who like to have their 
80 Shaw’s script for  Pygmalion was first published in 1912, when Ogden was still a university 
student.  It  is  therefore  impossible  for  Ogden  to  have  served  as  a  model  for  the  original 
character  of  Henry  Higgins,  although  it  is  still  possible  that  some  of  his  traits  were 
incorporated into the Higgins character as portrayed in the later film version. Commonly cited 
inspirations  for  Higgins  include  the  English  phoneticians  Henry  Sweet  (1845–1912)  and 
Daniel Jones (1881–1967; see Wainger 1930:558; Collins and Mees 1998:97-103).
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weekends and who therefore could become potential victims of 
a  future  totalitarianism,  rather  than  as  people  who  are 
permanent commanders of guard formations. This would agree 
with the prevalence of empiricist utilitarianism in the western 
countries and of metaphysical idealism in Germany.
(Neurath 1983[1946]:238)
Despite the  early exploratory enthusiasm he expressed in his first 
exchanges with Ogden, Carnap’s ‘lively interest’  in international 
auxiliary languages did not develop into the sort of support for Basic 
that Neurath showed. Much of Carnap’s Christmas holiday of 1933, 
which followed shortly after his first contact with Ogden, was spent 
reading and digesting the books Ogden had sent him, and in his first 
letter after Christmas, whose opening could have served as a 
testimonial for Basic, he demonstrated an interest in the language that 
would have certainly pleased Ogden:
the best and most pleasing things of all I got this Christ-
birthday are the books you sent me so kindly. It was very 
interesting for me to get knowledge of your system of Basic 
English. And here you see the fruit of my reading. At school I 
was learning much Latin and Greek but very little English. 
Later I was sometimes reading English books and papers of my 
science range, but had no chance for talking and writing. My 
knowledge of English is so bad, that I not ever had the heart for 
writing an English letter. And now I am very happy to be able 
to do so by help of Basic English.
(Carnap to Ogden, 29 Dec 1933)81
Carnap goes on to endorse Lockhart’s theory of ‘word economy’. He 
writes: ‘I am in full agreement with your (and Miss Lockharts [sic]) 
statement about word economy. I have the belief: if there would be a 
competition among the philosophical books and papers in German for 
the use of the least number of words, I possibly would be at the top’ 
(Carnap to Ogden 29 December 1933). 
But  the winner of the winter holiday remained for Carnap 
Esperanto. In his next letter, he gave Ogden’s permission to use his 
name on a petition in support of Basic – ‘I give you with pleasure my 
81 Note that Carnap begins the first paragraph after the greeting formula with a lower-case letter; 
this is standard German practice, but of course not English practice. In the corrections to his 
Basic that Ogden sent back to Carnap (as Carnap  requested him  to do), Ogden silently 
corrected this point. Ogden may not have been aware of this difference himself: he also 
corrected without explicit mention a genitive apostrophe, although  he explicitly corrected 
several commas.
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approval to put my name on the list of those who give their support to 
Basic’ (Carnap  to  Ogden,  7  February  1934) –  but maintained a 
preference for Esperanto, which, he writes, ‘is still more simple than 
Basic. (Much more, in my opinion, than you seem to see; what you 
say at some places f.e. about Esperanto is not quite right; but this 
question is not very important)’  (Carnap  to  Ogden,  7  February 
1934).82 In practice, however, perhaps only a language like Basic that 
is derived from a natural language has a chance. Carnap backed away 
from putting too much weight on such practical concerns; he only 
countenanced such issues because of the arguments of his pragmatic 
friend Neurath:
[W]e see from the facts –  or at least it seems very probable – 
that the much greater number of men are not ready to make use 
of a not-natural language system; they have even a disgust at 
such a one.  For this reason a part language of a natural 
language has much more chance to be taken in use by a great 
number of men in the near future, on the condition that this 
language is simple enough (though not so simple as a 
constructed one). Now, in my opinion, your Basic system is in 
this condition. It is possible to make use of it even at present in 
the relations to a very great number of men. You are right that 
this gives to Basic the greatest chance of beeing [sic] the help-
language of the future. I will say you openly, that I have a 
feeling of regret about the fact that a constructed language – 
though much better, if seen from the angle of theory – has no 
chance in fact. But facts have more force than feelings; and so 
we have to take Basic. (I myself am a man more of theory and 
system than of fact and doing. That I am looking now at the 
question of Basic from the angle of fact is chiefly the effect of 
the words of my friend Neurath).
(Carnap to Ogden, 7 February 1934; underlining original)83
In  his  reply,  Ogden  implied  that  he  and  Carnap  were  actually  in 
agreement  on  the  question  of  Basic  versus  Esperanto  (12  March 
1934): ‘Delighted to have your signature. [What you say is what we 
mean by “not satisfactory for the purpose”; i.e. “men are not ready to 
make  use  of  a  made-up  language.”]’  Note  that  Carnap  did  not 
consider Esperanto perfectly logical, however: 
82 There are some rather unidiomatic features of this passage, such as the periphrastic 
comparative ‘more simple’ and the abbreviation ‘f.e.’ for ‘for example’, presumably formed 
on analogy with German ‘z.B.’.
83 Carnap’s term ‘help-language’ is perhaps a calque on the German word  Hilfssprache or the 
Esperanto word helplingvo, which in Standard English usually has the more Romance form 
‘auxiliary language’ and in Basic is ‘helping language’.
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In  consequence  of  the  unsystematic  and  logically  imperfect 
structure of the natural  world-languages  (such as German or 
Latin),  the  statement  of  their  formal  rules  of  formation  and 
transformation  [within  Carnap’s  logical  syntax  project;  see 
section  3]  would  be  so complicated  that  it  would  hardly  be 
feasible in practice. And the same difficulty would arise in the 
case of the artificial world-languages (such as Esperanto); for, 
even  though  they  avoid  certain  logical  imperfections  which 
characterize  the  natural  world-languages,  they  must,  of 
necessity,  be still  very complicated from the logical point of 
view owing to the fact that they are conversational languages, 
and hence still dependent upon the natural languages.
(Carnap 1937[1934]:2)
In  connection  with  the  view  expressed  here,  it  is  interesting  to 
observe  that  Carnap  later commented that the debate over  natural 
versus constructed languages was one of the central points of 
disagreement that later drove the different schools of analytic 
philosophers in their different directions. On one side were Moore, 
Wittgenstein and their followers, who concentrated on expression in 
natural language and, on the other, the Vienna Circle philosophers, 
who focused on expression of scientific facts in the artificial 
languages of mathematics and logic:
Only slowly did I recognize how large the divergence is 
between the views of the two wings of analytic philosophy in 
the question of the natural versus constructed languages[…] It 
seems to me that one explanation of this divergence is the fact 
that in the Vienna Circle mathematics and empirical science 
were taken as models representing knowledge in its best, most 
systematized form, toward which all philosophical work on 
problems of knowledge should be oriented. By contrast, 
Wittgenstein’s indifferent and sometimes even negative attitude 
toward mathematics and science was accepted by many of his 
followers, impairing the fruitfulness of their philosophical 
work.
(Carnap 1963:68-69)
The Wittgenstein that Carnap describes is surely one already on the 
way to  his  later  views,  one  that  could  in  no way be  mistaken  as 
striving  to  develop  a  ‘logically  perfect  language’ (see  chapter  2, 
section 7). Carnap (1963:26) also recollected that ‘[a]t our very first 
meeting with Wittgenstein, Schlick unfortunately mentioned that I 
was interested in the problem of an international language like 
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Esperanto. As I had expected, Wittgenstein was definitely opposed to 
this idea. But I was surprised by the vehemence of his emotions. A 
language which had not “grown organically” seemed to him not only 
useless but despicable’ (cf. Carnap 1963:28-29, 34). This meeting is 
almost  certainly the  first  one organised by Schlick and Waismann 
with Wittgenstein, on 4 July 1927, the topic of which was Esperanto 
and its relation to the doctrine of intuitionism in the philosophy of 
mathematics  (see  Stadler  1997:485).  Constructed  languages  were 
definitely on Wittgenstein’s mind, and his reaction recalls the debate 
over whether constructed languages could ever ‘live’ (see chapter 3, 
section 4),  and his increasing movement away from a formal to a 
pragmatic conception of language.
It  is  not  possible  to  say  from the  correspondence  with  Ogden 
where Carnap stood in relation to  the  critique of  Basic  as  Anglo-
centric. He later cited two motivations for his interest in international 
languages: the simplicity of their structure, and ‘the humanitarian 
ideal of improving the understanding between nations’  (Carnap 
1963:69). In Carnap’s mind, as we have seen, Basic did not meet the 
first of these ideals as well as the more artificial constructed 
language, and it is easy to imagine that its Anglo-centrism, with its 
inevitable elevation of one national culture above all others, would 
have also  detracted in his view  from its ability to fulfil the second 
ideal. Basic  is  not  even  mentioned  in  Carnap’s  (1963:67-71) 
retrospective survey of constructed language projects. Unlike Neurath 
in  England,  Carnap  was  not  quite  so  infatuated  with  his  new 
American  home.  Among many features that pleased him, he also 
found much to criticise in the new host culture, such as the ‘strong 
conformism’ he detected in American society:
Once I referred in a talk with Einstein to the strong conformism 
in the United States, the insistence that the individual adjust his 
behavior to the generally accepted standards. He agreed 
emphatically and mentioned as an example that a complete 
stranger had written him that he ought to have his hair cut: 
“Don’t forget that you now live in America.”
(Carnap 1963:39)
Carnap’s perception of American society was no doubt influenced by 
living through the chilliest  parts of the Cold War, when the anti-
communist paranoia of McCarthyism led to FBI investigations into 
the backgrounds and political persuasions of many American 
186
academics, Carnap included, a situation examined in detail by Reisch 
(2005). If Carnap found conformism objectionable, it is easy to 
imagine that he may have been disturbed by a project like Basic, with 
its ‘panoptic’ basis, and all that implies (see chapter 3, section 9). 
By the spring of 1934 Carnap seems to have more or less given up 
on Basic. He began his first letter in April with: ‘please allow me to 
write in normal English. My former letters were exercises in Basic, 
but it takes me a little more time to write in Basic, because of the 
right selection of words’  (Carnap  to  Ogden  13  April  1934). 
‘Nevertheless,’ he added, ‘I would prefer to get your letters in Basic 
as before, if it does not cause you trouble or loss of time’ (ibid.). He 
announced also to Ogden that he had been invited to deliver a series 
of lectures in London in October of that year, and so now he had 
reason to improve his knowledge of ‘normal English’. This is in fact 
the trip when Carnap first made the personal acquaintance of Ogden, 
later recalling that ‘I talked often with C. K. Ogden, mainly about 
language and logic, his Basic English and international languages’ 
(Carnap 1963:33-34).
Unperturbed, Ogden pursued Carnap further as a potential Basic 
English speaker. In response to an apparent enquiry from Neurath on 
the possibility of translating the proceedings of the 1934 meeting of 
the Unity of Science movement in Prague, he wrote: ‘Carnap himself 
writes excellent Basic! Why not ask him to be present, for Basic, at 
the Conference?’ (Ogden to Neurath, 22 April 1934). As the date of 
Carnap’s London lectures drew closer, Ogden urged him to consider 
using some Basic: ‘Why not do one of your “London Lectures”  in 
Basic? I would be happy to go through a rough copy in the simplest 
English you are able to send. There would be no need to say that it 
was Basic till after the event’ (Ogden  to  Carnap,  21  July  1934; 
underlining original). Here Ogden was urging Carnap to employ one 
of his favourite ruses for demonstrating the efficacy of Basic: a text is 
delivered in the language and then at the end, with a flourish, it is 
revealed that  Basic was being used all  along, a technique he uses 
himself  in  Ogden  (1943:25).  Carnap politely but firmly rejected 
Ogden’s advances, with some attempt at consolation. He felt he 
would be ‘too much restricted’ if he had to speak Basic, a suggestion 
that would have surely irritated Ogden:
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Your suggestion of giving one of the lectures in Basic has 
something attractive about it, and I had thought myself already 
before about this idea. But I think that this occasion would not 
be quite convenient, because these lectures contain a lot of 
technical terms; I should feel to [sic] much restricted, if I were 
to say these things in Basic. But I am considering the 
possibility of writing later on a paper and in this case I should 
be very obliged for your kind help to put it into Basic.
(Carnap to Ogden 30 August 1934)
The later published version of these lectures appeared under Ogden’s 
editorship (Carnap 1934; 1935), but in ‘normal English’, not Basic 
English.  There do not seem to be any extant  papers by Carnap in 
Basic. 
Amid these negotiations emerged one Basic enthusiast that Ogden 
never seems to have really appreciated: Ina Carnap, the wife of 
Rudolf Carnap. She was keen to contribute to the Basic project. Her 
first letter to Ogden is not dated but, from the friendly insinuations it 
contains, it would seem that the two had recently met each other in 
person: ‘You see the result from my being friend with you. What 
about C.K.??’ she wrote, asking for permission to address Ogden as 
‘C.K.’,  as  was common among his  friends (Ina Carnap to  Ogden, 
undated). This is presumably shortly after Carnap’s trip to London in 
October 1934 to deliver his lectures. She told Ogden that ‘at the time 
I give every free minute to Basic and I am very pleased by doing it.’ 
She offered her notes on Lockhart’s translation of Carl and Anna 
(Frank 1937[1933]) into Basic, which seems to be ‘a bright work’ but 
‘there are some points where [she] does not give [her] full 
agreement’. Ogden replied with encouragement  (Ogden  to  Ina 
Carnap, 14 November 1934). In her next letter Ina Carnap suggested 
translating the satirical  book  Der Papalagi (Tuiavii  aus  Tiavea 
[pseudonym  of  Scheurmann]  1920)  into Basic and offered  her 
assistance  to Paul  Hempel (dates  unknown), head of the German 
English teachers association and chief Basic-German lexicographer.84 
This letter she closed with some jesting uncertainty, which may have 
been a sign of healthy self-deprecation or of a sense that her advances 
were  unwelcome: ‘Dear  Mr. Ogden, if you are unhappy with my 
violent Basic interests and about all the trouble you get by it, you 
may give me a stop and put me in my place. This would not be the 
cause of troubles with me’ (Ina  Carnap  to  Ogden,  21  November 
1934).
84 Paul Hempel is not to be confused with Carl Hempel (1905–1997), a member of the Vienna 
Circle.
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Her fears would seem to have been founded. Within a week of this 
second letter Ogden replied with encouragement for her work – ‘It is 
clear that you are quite an authority on Basic from the start.’ –  and 
said that he was looking forward to her notes on Carl and Anna and 
the translation of Der Papalagi, and that Dr Hempel may indeed be 
pleased to have help with his dictionary work (Ogden to Ina Carnap, 
26  November  1934). But this tone was probably more a sign of 
politeness than sincerity. Ogden passed the materials on to Lockhart 
and after a long delay and a follow-up enquiry from Rudolf Carnap – 
‘Mrs. Carnaps [sic] sends you her best thanks for “St.Marc”  and 
Richards’ “Basic in Teaching”. Have you had time to give a look to 
the “Papalagi”?’ (Carnap to Ogden, 26 March 1935) – Ogden finally 
replied five months later to say that Lockhart was still looking into it: 
‘“Papalagi” is still with Miss Lockhart, and will not be waiting longer 
than the Stebbing story. Till then, I am hoping the Basic is going 
forward’ (Ogden to Ina Carnap, 1 April 1935). Lockhart  eventually 
replied almost a year later with a response that was not particularly 
encouraging:
I  had a preliminary look through your sample when it first 
came in, and saw that it is amusing stuff and well worth taking 
trouble with, but also that it would need a good deal of time to 
get the Basic right.
I put the manuscript on one side, as I gathered from Mr. Ogden 
that there was no great urgency about it, and I happened to be 
very busy just then. I should like to revise it now and send it 
back to you with full comments to guide you in the translation 
of the rest of the book, if you decide to persevere with it, but as 
I know practically no German, I must wait till Miss Graham is 
free to collaborate on the job.
[…] With deep apologies for having let the matter for so long,
(Lockhart to Ina Carnap, 12 March 1936)85
Perhaps Ina Carnap did not have quite the cachet Ogden was looking 
for in a supporter of Basic. 
85 Lockhart’s claim to know ‘practically no German’ would seem to be difficult to reconcile with 
the fact that she is credited as translator of the Basic edition of Carl and Anna, as discussed 
above.
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6. Totalitarianism revisited
In an era darkened by the shadow of totalitarianism, within days of 
Nazi  Germany’s  invasion  of  Poland  in  1939,  the  final  act  of 
aggression that triggered the Second World War, the first expression 
of the kind of anti-technocratic sentiments that came into full bloom 
after the war were levelled at  the logical  positivists of  the Vienna 
Circle,  from  within.  Horace  Kallen  (1882–1974),  at  the  Fifth 
International  Congress  for  the  Unity  of  Science,  criticised the 
movement for what he saw as its totalitarian tendencies. The division 
between ‘science’  and ‘metaphysics’, the meaningful and the 
meaningless, current  in  the  unity  of  science  movement  was,  he 
argued,  but another manifestation of the same absolutism  and 
intolerance that characterised the political climate of Central Europe 
and had plunged the continent once again into war. What was needed, 
according to Kallen, was not a ‘unity’  of science, but an 
‘orchestration’ of scientific activities, not a melding of ‘scientific’ and 
exclusion  of  everything  else,  but  free  co-operation  between  all 
scholars. Kallen’s critique taps into the revolt against interference in 
political and social life that Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper – 
both Viennese intellectuals sent into exile, like the members of the 
Vienna Circle, as a result of Central Europe’s decline into fascism – 
would later stage against self-appointed planners and reformers that 
follow high-flown philosophical ideals, and to which Ogden’s Basic 
and like-minded constructed languages faced from Orwell after the 
war  (these  critiques  are  introduced  in  chapter  3,  section  9).  The 
debate that Kallen’s critique triggered resumed again after the war, 
and was carried out mostly between Kallen and Neurath: Neurath, the 
left-wing  radical,  in  political  as  well  as  intellectual  matters,  was 
clearly disturbed by Kallen’s attack, which he painstakingly tried to 
deflect, claiming it was the result of misunderstanding (this topic is 
dealt with in great detail in chapter 9 of Reisch 2005).86
‘Like a union of lovers,’ Kallen (1940[1939]:87)  maintained, the 
unity of science movement, ‘far from being a fusion of plurality into 
unity, [should]  multiply plurality and liberate diversification.’  The 
goal should not be the one conquering system that subsumes and 
supersedes all others, but tolerance and a dialogue between all 
approaches to knowledge. This sentiment, of course, is found also in 
86 Neurath  had  long  been  involved  in  the  planning  and  organisational  debate  in  its  purely 
economic  aspect:  Ludwig  von  Mises  (1881-1973)  –  founder  of  the  Austrian  school  of 
economics and mentor to Hayek – formulated many of his key liberal doctrines in response to 
Neurath’s views on adapting the institutions of the war economy for use in peace time (see 
Caldwell 1997:5-10).
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Neurath’s writings, but Neurath’s tolerance had limits: he was still 
one of the first to shout ‘metaphysics’ and condemn all doctrines not 
compatible with physicalism, in its various forms  (see  section  2). 
‘[I]n any process of enquiry,’  commented Kallen  (ibid.:85), ‘it is 
always the other fellow’s meanings that we declare meaningless, not 
our own.’ In Kallen’s view, the logical positivists’ efforts to establish 
a universal linguistic medium for science – which Carnap approached 
formally  and  Neurath  informally  with  his  ‘universal  jargon’ (see 
section 3) – entail the exclusion of all other approaches. ‘Logpu’, as 
he  dubbed  their  proposed  universal  language,  has  as  its  goal  the 
imposition  of  a  single,  unified  logic  on  others,  which  the  logical 
positivists would control as members of an elite scientific caste:
[They]  would need to conquer or to buy the status of a 
privileged hieratic class to whose exclusive custody the 
peculiar treasure would accrue; not only would they act as its 
consecrated keepers; it would become their sole and peculiar 
task to indoctrinate the chosen of the next generation in the 
sacred mystery, which would have to be made unintelligible as 
it was holy to the rest of mankind. The vernaculars of the latter 
would have to be depreciated as ignoble and vulgar, unworthy 
to be the vehicles of the superior deliverances of science.
(Kallen 1940[1939]:91)
This inevitable course that ‘unification’ of  this  sort  would take is 
visible all around, argued Kallen: in the totalitarian countries it had 
already gone to completion and, in the ‘free countries’, the same 
pressures could be felt from such forces as ‘Big Business’  and a 
reinvigorated ‘ancient ecclesiastical authority’; the unity of science 
movement was just one more of these (Kallen 1940[1939]:82, 87). 
Revisiting the topic in the resumed discussion immediately after the 
war in 1945, Kallen saw the power of institutionalised, ‘unified’ 
science as having only  grown. This  had  led  to  scientific 
breakthroughs,  he  did  not  deny,  but  only  because  the  insights  of 
individual,  unconstrained  thinkers  pointed  the  way  for  further 
research.  A prominent example  in the preceding six years was the 
project, involving ‘some few men of science in England, some 
hundreds in the United States, [who] had an idea of the premises and 
procedures of the enterprise’, ‘some army men and politicians [who] 
had a notion of its goal’, and ‘some 65,000 human beings, in three 
different plants, their foremen, production managers, expert 
physicists, chemists, biologists, engineers’, who were responsible for 
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building of the ‘uranium-bomb’ (Kallen 1946a:516). But the original 
work  that  made  this  project  conceivable  came  from  undirected 
enquiry  into  radioactivity and the ‘structures and energies of the 
atom’ by such individual  physicists as James Clerk Maxwell, Ernest 
Rutherford, Frederick  Soddy, Max  Planck, Niels  Bohr and Albert 
Einstein (Kallen 1946a:519). There would have been no object for 
investigation through a systematic research program if it were not for 
the discoveries  they were led to  by their  unfettered creativity  and 
genius.87
In the place of ‘unity’,  which  he  understood  as  an  inevitably 
assimilating  process, Kallen proposed ‘orchestration’, the  free  co-
operation  of  individuals,  a term Neurath readily adopted in the 
following discussion. Neurath acknowledged  the dangers Kallen 
perceived, but denied that they are present in the unity of science 
movement:
It is the problem of any democracy, which any actual scientific 
research organization has also to solve:  on the one hand the 
non-conformists must have sufficient support; on the other 
hand, scientific research needs some co-operation. This implies 
on the one hand that we have to leave something to chance, and 
that on the other hand we have to find some loyal compromise 
for actual collaboration, without suppressing personal 
convictions. What can we call this democracy of co-operation 
within the ‘encylcopedism of logical empiricism’? I have no 
better word for that than Kallen’s ‘orchestration’.
(Neurath 1983[1946]:236)
The ‘universal jargon’ that Neurath proposed as the refined language 
of unified science –  and here he also readily accepted Kallen’s 
facetious term ‘Logpu’  –  was not a means for segregating the 
scientist caste, it was not ‘something highbrow and complicated’ 
(Neurath 1983[1946]:237), but just the everyday language refined. If 
Kallen, Neurath and a ‘Melanesian friend’ were to have lunch in a 
New York restaurant, Neurath  contended,  they should have no 
difficulties understanding one another as long as they used terms like 
‘turkey’, ‘crackers’, ‘cold’, ‘hot’, ‘happy’, and so on. The Melanesian 
may have no word for ‘turkey’, but would surely be able to substitute 
it with the term ‘some fowl’. Difficulties would only arise if the 
language were to depart from the everyday with terms like ‘causality’ 
and ‘inner experience’  (ibid.:237). In  his  earlier  arguments  for 
87  Kallen’s contrast of systematic research programs and revolutionary fundamental  insights  
could be seen in part as an anticipation of Kuhn’s (1962) notion of scientific paradigms.
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scientific encyclopaedism (cf.  section 3),  Neurath claimed that  the 
‘unified-science-attitude’ based  on  such  empiricism  had  naturally 
become more prevalent in life all over the world. But in a concession 
to  the  kind  of  objection  that  Orwell  would  later  make  to  Wells’ 
scientific  and  technological  optimism,  he  acknowledged  that 
technological  advance  and  the  general  scientific  attitude  do  not 
always march in lockstep, as the case of modern Germany showed: 
‘How much modern engineering and technical activity, together with 
all  the  helpful  special  sciences,  were  evolved,  for  instance,  in 
Germany during the nineteenth century and how little comprehensive 
scientific  empiricism!’  (Neurath  1938a:22).  The  unparalleled 
technological  advance  of  modern  Germany,  he  argued,  proceeded 
without  any  challenge  to  the  reign  of  obscurantist  traditional 
philosophy (cf. Neurath’s comparison of the intellectual atmospheres 
of Britain and Germany in section 5).
Kallen could not  countenance Neurath’s faith in the underlying 
unity of everyday experience and the language we use to describe it 
as the source of a growing empirical tendency: ‘even such “sensory 
data”  as “turkey,”  “cold,”  “hot,”  “happy,”  may have to start as 
incommensurable diversities and work their ways toward a 
consensus’ (Kallen  1946a:521).  No language can carry universal 
meanings: ‘[e]ven Neurath’s clever and welcome isotypes [sic] are 
far from having the self-evidence he claims for them; they cannot say 
identical things to different people, nor can they say much to the 
same people without the explanatory texts which gives [sic] them 
their meanings. Vary texts and you vary the meanings. The parallel 
for Logpu need not be pressed’ (Kallen  1946a:521). To Neurath’s 
luncheon Kallen invited also ‘a brahmin Hindu, an orthodox Jew, a 
Buddhist Chinese, and one of Stefansson’s Eskimos’.88 What the 
guests would wish to eat and how they would eat it depends on a 
range of ‘attitudes, feelings and judgments’  that they bring to the 
table, all of which may be inexpressible in Logpu. What unity they 
could achieve would be a ‘free exchange’  of some points of diet, 
some expressions and table manners, which would come about not 
through any underlying unity, but through the fact that they are all 
eating at the same table, with each participant respecting the right of 
others to carry on in their own way (Kallen 1946a:521-522).
88  ‘One of Stefansson’s Eskimos’ is presumably a reference to the ethnographic work of Arctic 
explorer and anthropologist Vilhjalmur Stefansson (1879–1962).
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Kallen’s  critique  of  unity  and  planning  can  be  seen  as  an 
expression of  the sentiment against  ideals  and wide-scale schemes 
that grew during the polarisation of the European social and political 
scene in the 1930s and has its classical formulation in the critiques of 
Hayek and Popper published after war, a genre into which Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four also fits  (see chapter  3,  section 9).  Popper’s 
social critique has particular relevance to the debate between Kallen 
and  Neurath  when  compared  with  his  well-known position  contra 
logical  positivism,  on  which  his  reputation  as  a  philosopher  of 
science  is  built.  Popper’s  signature doctrine  of  ‘falsification’ (first 
published  Popper  1959[1934])  exhibits  the  same  pragmatic  and 
‘piecemeal’ attitude that motivates his social and political philosophy. 
Falsification, in contrast to the ‘verification’ associated in particular 
with the right-wing of  the Vienna Circle,  lays weight  only on the 
disconfirmation, or falsification, of propositions and the theories they 
express,  rather  than seeking to  confirm,  or  verify,  propositions  by 
matching  them  to  the  world.  Scientific  progress,  argued  Popper, 
results from successively refining theories to overcome the points on 
which they have been falsified. There is no ‘absolute’ foundation to 
science; it is always provisional and open to gradual improvement:
The  empirical  basis  of  objective  science  has  thus  nothing 
‘absolute’ about  it.  Science  does  not  rest  upon rock-bottom. 
The  bold  structure  of  its  theories  rises,  as  it  were,  above  a 
swamp.  It  is  like  a  building  erected  on  piles.  The  piles  are 
driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any 
natural  or  ‘given’ base;  and when we cease  our  attempts  to 
drive our piles into a deeper layer, it is not because we have 
reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that 
they are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time 
being.
(Popper 1959[1934]:111)
In  the  same way,  social  progress,  under  Popper’s  conception  (see 
chapter 3, section 9), gradually results from identifying and solving 
specific social problems. Neurath (1983[1935]b) attacked Popper for 
‘pseudorationalism’,  interpreting  him  as  supposing  that  there  are 
complete and definite theories that can be comprehended at once and 
that each one can be tested against an experimentum crucis. He also 
pointed out that Popper’s claim that the goal in science should be to 
falsify existing theories hardly accords with the behaviour of actual 
scientists. Despite this, Popper’s vision of approximation of theory to 
a  complex  world  is  not  wholly  incompatible  with  the  views  on 
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epistemology that Neurath advanced within the Vienna Circle (cf. his 
Schiffer metaphor in section 3; Glock 2008:164-168). The difference 
lies  in  Neurath’s  unrelenting  pluralism,  while  Popper  imagines 
incremental improvement in one single system approximating to the 
world of experience.
Amid  these  discussions  Neurath  was  becoming,  in  his  social 
philosophy,  sensitive  to  the  totalitarian  dangers  of  technocratic 
planning, as we have already seen in his admiration for the ‘British 
atmosphere’ in his correspondence with Ogden (see section 5). In his 
essay  ‘International  Planning  for  Freedom’ (Neurath  1973[1942]), 
Neurath still envisaged a ‘world commonwealth’ organised by ‘social 
engineers’ to restore world order after the war, but he placed on the 
social engineers the obligation to factor ‘happiness conditions’ into 
their  planning programs, rather  than reaching for  particular  targets 
measured  on  a  single  scale,  such  as  production  or  profit,  without 
regard  for  the  hardship  this  may  cause  elsewhere  (Neurath 
1973[1942]:423-431). In fact,  argued Neurath, a certain amount of 
‘muddle’ may be necessary and even desirable in a free, democratic 
society,  where  everyone has  the  opportunity  to  follow,  or  at  least 
voice, their own conscience. In the long run, a free organisation may 
even  be  more  efficient  than  one  that  is  strictly  technocratic  and 
directed to a single goal: ‘Some muddle thus seems unavoidable in a 
society of free men and within a democratic world commonwealth,’ 
noted Neurath (1973[1942]:430). ‘People who like freedom and see 
these  relations,  will  not  give  bad  names  to  a  muddle  without 
analyzing whether this muddle is perhaps related to civil liberty or 
not […]’
But it may not have been possible for those around him to take 
Neurath at his word.  Neurath’s strong, frequently uncompromising 
personality and his history  of  personal engagement in various 
‘undemocratic’ governmental planning efforts undoubtedly played a 
role in forming his reputation for autocracy: he was after all in charge 
of the socialising of the Bavarian economy during their soviet 
republic, his disputes within the Vienna Circle often led to hurt 
feelings, and as editor of the Encyclopaedia he changed the titles and 
content of many contributions from other authors without 
consultation  (see  Reisch  2005:204-205). For  those  who  were 
unsympathetic, Neurath could be seen as a  reviled dictator, not of a 
state, but of a intellectual program. Kallen never pressed his position 
so far:  before their final exchange over the character of the unity of 
science movement could be published in 1945, Neurath passed away, 
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and in his obituary of Neurath, appended to their published 
discussion, Kallen insisted on Neurath’s ultimate commitment to 
freedom: ‘Of course he had his intolerances and rejections – who has 
not? –  but the doctrines and disciplines which he excommunicated 
were those which experience had led him to hold as enemies of free 
men in a free society, as superstitions employed by malicious power 
to degrade and to starve the soul of mankind’ (Kallen 1946b:529-
530).  Quoting Neurath’s final correspondence with him, Kallen 
allowed him to state once again his position that the goal of unified 
science as realised through the universal jargon is misunderstood:
I do not assume that the Melanesian, the Jew and the Hundu 
[sic], You and I will agree about attitudes, tastes, and taboos. I 
do assume that we shall be in a position to tell each other in an 
understandable way about our differences. To tell that Otto 
likes beef, to tell that the Hindu dislikes beef implies that Otto 
and the Hindu both use expressions which mean ‘beef,’ ‘liking,’ 
‘disliking.’ Without a common vehicle to both they cannot tell 
one another of their differences.
But I go farther. I add that we cannot have a common language 
for the discussion of the ‘Ding an sich’ [thing in itself]  or of 
‘vitalism.’
(Neurath, quoted in Kallen 1946b:531-532)
7. Summary and conclusion
As we have seen in this chapter, during the course of the 1920s and 
30s Vienna became the centre of the new ‘scientific world 
conception’, propagated  by the philosophers  of  the  Vienna Circle. 
Ogden, driven by the prospect of publication deals and the hope of 
collaboration, made contact with two of the Circle’s leading figures, 
Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath. The overlapping philosophical 
traditions of Ogden and the Circle philosophers,  and  their  shared 
modernist  milieu, led them to share some common interests and 
adopt  similar positions: on both sides  language and the reform of 
language  to  rid  it  of  what  was  variously  termed  ‘word magic’ or 
‘metaphysical’ expressions  was  a  primary  concern.  For  the  Circle 
philosophers this effort was part of a wider project of the ‘unity of 
science’, which sought to bring all the sciences together through a 
single  mutually  intelligible  linguistic  medium,  and  to  exclude,  by 
rendering  inexpressible,  everything  unscientific.  Both  Carnap  and 
Neurath, like Ogden, relied on the ‘everyday’ language to reach this 
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goal,  although precisely how the everyday was understood varied. 
Carnap wanted to rely on everyday statements of pure phenomenal 
experience as his basis, a view he was forced to reconsider in the face 
of  Neurath’s  objections.  For  Neurath,  there  was  no  pure,  ‘ideal’ 
language that stands before theory and beyond ambiguity. Instead, all 
we have is our ‘trivial’ language that is handed down to us, full of 
imprecise  Ballungen;  this we have to work with,  to gradually and 
continually clear it of its ‘metaphysical’ garbage.  Ogden’s position 
was akin to Neurath’s: Basic was intended to be a controlled, refined 
and simplified version of the everyday language.
In his contact with Carnap and Neurath, Ogden attempted to win 
them over to the Basic cause. Carnap, already an avid Esperantist, 
initially showed some interest in Basic, but never really developed 
true enthusiasm for the project. Neurath’s interest is more difficult to 
gauge. His collaboration with Ogden resulted in two books in which 
Basic is both promoted and used as the medium. In this collaboration, 
his  ‘Vienna  method  of  picture  statistics’ became  an  ‘international 
picture  language’,  christened  with  an  acronym  out  of  the  Basic 
mould, Isotype. Neurath was always careful not to press the linguistic 
status of Isotype too far, but it is clear that the method is both very 
deeply  entwined  with  and  a  manifestation  of  his  philosophy  of 
language. 
The  commonalities  between  Ogden  and  the  Vienna  Circle 
philosophers extend to the reactions they had to face to their work. At 
the end of our modernist arc, in the atmosphere of disillusionment 
that descended on Europe in the wake of the Second World War, the 
logical  positivists  were  accused,  from  within  their  own  ranks,  of 
implementing  a  totalitarian  ideology.  Their  efforts  to  unify  the 
sciences and provide them with a common linguistic medium were 
seen as entailing the assimilation or exclusion of all other thought, 
just as Ogden’s Basic was cast as an instrument of thought control.
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5. EPILOGUE
1. Review and results
The case studies of three episodes related to the intellectual life of C. 
K. Ogden presented in the preceding pages have offered us a new 
perspective on attitudes and approaches to the problem of meaning in 
the  modernist  age  of  the  early  twentieth  century.  Reflected  in  the 
ideas,  rhetoric  and  plans  we  have  examined  are  the  characteristic 
modernist themes of a sense of crisis and the search for new solutions 
in  science  and  technology.  Ogden’s  efforts,  and  those  of  his 
contemporaries, follow the familiar pattern of the age: optimism and 
faith  in  science  led  to  the  ‘scientific’ treatment  of  meaning,  the 
practical  temperament  of  the  age  turned  this  into  engineering 
projects, and finally the climate of disillusionment at the end of the 
Second World War precipitated their abandonment.
Our  first  case  study  looked  at  the  philosophy  of  language 
expounded  in  The  Meaning  of  Meaning,  and  its  place  in  the 
intellectual  environment  in  which  it  was  written.  This  book  was 
Ogden  and  Richards’  first  major  contribution  to  the  ongoing 
discussion on the problem of meaning, a consuming concern of the 
period  that  shaded  into  broader  issues  in  religion,  metaphysics, 
epistemology  and  logic.  The  Meaning  of  Meaning  was  both  a 
theoretical treatise on the place of meaning in language and life, as 
well as a practical manual for its artful manipulation and use (as we 
saw in chapter 2, sections 2-3). As a synthesis of, first and foremost, 
the logical doctrines of Russell and the semiotic theorising of Welby, 
with both of whom Ogden was in personal contact, it reflects many of 
the key ideas relating to meaning that had currency in the modernist 
period. Of utmost importance here is the perception that there is a 
crisis in meaning, and an urgent need to tame language, the premier 
bearer  of  meaning in the human world.  The method suggested by 
Ogden and Richards – consisting in periphrastic definitions supported 
by rules of best practice in using language – is essentially a hybrid of 
Russell’s  descriptions  and  Welby’s  focus  on  the  process  of 
interpretation (sections 4-5). But these two traditions represented by 
Russell  and Welby were in many respects deeply antagonistic, and 
the kind of synthesis Ogden and Richards made could not be taken 
for granted: it would be decades before similar approaches entered 
the  mainstream  of  English-speaking  philosophy  (section  6). 
‘Science’, the saviour of the modernist age, was invoked by Ogden 
and Richards to support their project. Not only did they appeal, like 
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Russell and many other linguistic theorists (section 8), to the latest 
research  by  self-consciously  ‘scientific’  modern  psychologists  to 
ground their work, but they also claimed the same scientific rigour 
and validity for their theory in dubbing it the ‘science of Symbolism’.
Basic  English – Ogden’s next  major  endeavour  and our second 
case study –  turned the ‘science of Symbolism’ into an engineering 
project. Basic was Ogden’s contribution to the thriving international 
language  movement,  where  the  contemporary  sense  of  crisis  was 
answered by the immensely practical temperament of the modernist 
age. The crisis was the difficulty of international communication in a 
rapidly shrinking multilingual world, the inefficiencies this imposed 
on  international  science  and  business,  and  the  problem  of 
nationalistic  chauvinism  that  was  seen  to  be  fed  by  it.  The  best 
solution would be a language specially constructed for international 
use, which would realise the ideals of contemporary philosophy of 
language (chapter 3, section 3). Ogden’s Basic, as an implementation 
of the science of symbolism, conformed in this respect to the norms 
of the wider movement. As it was elaborated and applied, Ogden’s 
philosophy of language moved more in the direction of Russell – and 
the majority of language constructors – and away from Welby. Rather 
than inviting its speakers to contemplate the process of interpretation, 
Basic legislates forms to constrain the possibilities of interpretation 
(sections  6-7).  Ogden  also  took  on  board  the  latest  typological 
fashions  in  logic,  linguistics  and  the  international  language 
movement,  praising ‘analytic’ structures in  language as forms that 
directly embody the meanings they represent (section 3). But in other 
respects  Basic  was  extremely  unusual.  While  other  language 
constructors agonised over the most  inclusive ‘international’ forms 
for their languages, Ogden saw all that was needed in English. To 
create the best international language, argued Ogden, all that needed 
to be done was to constrain English and make it  accessible to the 
foreigner,  a  view  that  found  little  sympathy  among  his  fellow 
language constructors, but which seems to be a manifestation of a 
particularly British attitude to the world (section 5). 
In our final  case study, in which we examined Ogden’s contact 
with Neurath and Carnap, we saw the coming together of the major 
themes  running  through  the  other  two  case  studies.  When  Ogden 
made contact with Neurath and Carnap, they had already arrived at 
their  own  all-encompassing,  linguistically  oriented  philosophical 
doctrines, which – despite their differences on certain key points – 
they  subsumed  under  the  common  label  ‘physicalism’ (chapter  4, 
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section 3). Their views were highly compatible with Ogden’s, a fact 
that  was  clear  to  them,  as  we  saw  through  their  correspondence, 
where  all  three  engaged  with  one  another  and  discussed  the 
similarities and differences in their philosophy (section 5). From this 
contact resulted a collaboration between Ogden and Neurath in which 
Neurath’s system of picture statistics – which was deeply rooted in 
his philosophy of language – was brought into alignment with Basic, 
and with the wider international language movement (section 4). The 
commonalities between Ogden and his Viennese counterparts came 
into even clearer  relief  when we saw their  common fate:  on both 
sides,  they  were  charged  with  being  agents  of  totalitarianism. 
Ideological  weariness  drove  Orwell  to  parody  Basic  –  and  other 
constructed languages – in his fictional Newspeak (chapter 3, section 
9), and Kallen to critique logical positivism and the physicalist notion 
of  a  common  language  (chapter  4,  section  6).  Basic  and  logical 
positivism were ranked among the varieties of totalitarianism, those 
uncompromising  and  intolerant  ideologies  that  trampled  common 
sense and common decency in early twentieth century Europe. This 
ideological malaise marks the decline of the modernist period: the 
technocrats’ grand projects,  built  on wisdom derived from science, 
were  seen  as  but  another  manifestation  of  the  same  inhumane 
impulses  that  brought  catastrophe  on  the  world.  Whatever  their 
intentions, the technocrats’ aim of rapid, comprehensive reform was 
now subject to suspicion.
The picture sketched in this dissertation depicts a very tiny area in 
the vast terrain of early twentieth century European thought. But this 
area  is  one  traversed  by  many different  traditions,  and  our  finely 
detailed  picture  offers  numerous insights  extending out  into these, 
illuminating  the  connections  and mutual  influences  that  link  them 
together.  Of  particular  interest  here  is  perhaps  the  international 
language movement, which – since its dissolution and disappearance 
at  the  end  of  our  era  –  has  slipped  out  of  the  present-day 
consciousness  of  the  period:  one  major  contribution  of  this 
dissertation is the attempt made to restore it to its rightful place. This 
dissertation  also  demonstrates  the  utility  of  the  sort  of  detailed 
historical scholarship it tries to effect. An appreciation of the origin of 
the ideas and methods we work with on a daily basis, the contexts in 
which they were developed, and the way in which they have evolved, 
is of great value in helping us to understand what it is we do and why 
we do it so. This is an important point to emphasise, since it is one 
that is frequently forgotten or even denied. To put this in terms of my 
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personal experience, I have observed that my move into the history of 
ideas from my original background in linguistics has been met with 
dismay from most of my former teachers and colleagues. For many 
linguists,  it  would seem, history is at best irrelevant gossip and at 
worst some sort of perverse post-modernist attack on Truth. This is 
despite the fact that even such a universally recognised pioneer of the 
field as Noam Chomsky has made a monograph-length foray into the 
history of ideas – in his 1966 Cartesian Linguistics – although as an 
‘art lover’ who ‘go[es] back to earlier stages of scientific thinking on 
the  basis  of  our  present  understanding’ in  order  ‘to  perceive  how 
great  thinkers  were,  within  the  limitations  of  their  time,  groping 
towards concepts and ideas and insights  that they themselves could 
not be clearly aware of’ (Chomsky 1971).89 An ‘art lover’s’ attitude to 
intellectual  history,  as  Chomsky  describes  it,  strikes  me  as 
excessively teleological. But despite my objections, I would hope that 
my hostile colleagues would appreciate the relevance he sees in such 
studies,  even  if  we  may  continue  to  disagree  about  details  of 
approach. 
The content of this dissertation may not be immediately relevant to 
all  practising  linguists  who  are  busy  working  away  on  the  upper 
reaches  of  the  disciplinary  scaffold.  But  there  may  still  be  some 
benefit in being aware of studies of this kind, which try to show what 
the scaffold is  standing on.  Perhaps we should take our cue from 
Averroes. In response to similarly intolerant and dismissive attacks 
on philosophy from medieval Islamic theologians, he set out to prove 
the compatibility of philosophy with Islamic law. He concluded that 
the Koran in fact obliges everyone to do philosophy, as long as they 
possess  ‘natural  intelligence’  and  ‘religious  integrity  and  moral 
virtue’ (see Leaman 1988:144-160).
2. Future directions
The many threads  that  run  through this  dissertation  extend out  in 
innumerable  directions:  there  is  immense  scope  for  tracing  these 
threads further  to see the course they follow through other topics. 
89 This reference is to the debate between Chomsky and Michel Foucault on Dutch television in 
1971. There is no canonical  recording or printed version of the interview and so it  is not  
possible to give a reference to the precise place where Chomsky uttered these words. The 
place can  be  found easily  in  the transcript  on Chomsky’s  website,  which is  listed in  the 
bibliography.
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Although there is often a sense in which ideas and approaches are 
simply ‘in the air’, we have managed in this dissertation to localise 
some in a small  part  of  early twentieth century thought.  We have 
charted the networks of  personal  connections and citations,  shared 
rhetorical strategies and forms of argument that reveal their genesis, 
development and transmission. Similarly fine-grained and meticulous 
historiographic  scholarship  could  illuminate  further  points  of  the 
intellectual  scene  in  this  period  and  beyond,  and  uncover  the 
connections between these and the ideas and milieux explored in this 
dissertation. Three topics in particular – some of which have already 
been touched on here – would seem to be potentially fruitful ground 
for  further  research:  the  converging  philosophical  views  and 
aesthetics of late nineteenth century logic and linguistics, the life of 
the modernist approaches to meaning in mainstream linguistics of the 
twentieth  century,  and  an  examination  of  present-day  theories  of 
linguistic semantics to see to what extent they represent a reflex of 
this earlier era.
In  this  dissertation  we  have  already  remarked  on  some  of  the 
striking  parallels  that  emerged  between  philosophy  and  language 
study in the late nineteenth century, and how these then converged 
during the technocratic phase of the international language movement 
of the early twentieth century (see in particular chapter 3, section 4). 
In the late nineteenth century these parallels consisted in terminology 
and fashions shared between the younger generation of philologists 
and  linguists,  represented  most  vocally  by  Jespersen,  and  the 
epistemological  concerns  addressed  by  the  new  logical  notations 
being  developed  by  Frege,  Peano  and  others  (see  also  chapter  2, 
section 4). There arose a preference for ‘analytic’ judgements to be 
expressed  in  an  ‘analytic’  language.  The  technocratic  language 
constructors drew on these sources to forge spoken languages that 
answered  to  these  requirements  from  epistemology  and  language 
aesthetics.  We  saw  several  explicit  statements  indicative  of  this 
convergence, and encountered several figures who propagated these 
views within their own professional fields and then carried them into 
the  international  language  movement;  most  prominent  here  would 
have to be Jespersen, Couturat and Peano. But these parallels did not 
necessarily  have  their  origin  in  this  period:  the  first  modern 
formulations of the analytic/synthetic contrast, in both epistemology 
and  language  study,  extend  back  to  the  late  eighteenth  and  early 
nineteenth centuries, and these are in turn the product of a tradition 
going back to ancient times (see chapter 3, section 4). It is almost 
202
certain  that  the  principal  philosophers  and philologists  of  the  late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were aware of one another’s 
work, and we may legitimately ask whether a mutual influence in this 
area was already present at this time. It is probably fair to say that, of  
all  the  fields  involved,  philology and broader  studies  of  language 
experienced the most rapid and dramatic developments in this period, 
at  the hand of  a few identifiable figures.  For this  reason,  the best 
course for further research into the evolution of these ideas may be to 
look at the writings and milieux of the leading thinkers in linguistic 
typology of this period, and what knowledge they would have had of 
the parallel debates in epistemology. We have already identified two 
figures  here  –  August  Wilhelm  von  Schlegel  and  Wilhelm  von 
Humboldt  –  who may serve  as  the  best  starting  point  for  further 
exploring this topic.
Although several threads of this dissertation weave in and out of 
twentieth century linguistics (see in particular chapter 2, section 9; 
chapter  3,  section  4),  only  peripheral  contact  was  made  with  the 
traditions feeding into the mainstream of the discipline.  There are, 
however,  several  well-known  connections  between  the  topics 
explored here and mainstream twentieth century linguistics. Leonard 
Bloomfield (1887–1949), a pioneer of American structuralism, was 
familiar with The Meaning of Meaning, although was not particularly 
impressed by it: he was disappointed by its ‘mentalism’, its appeal to 
unobservable mental  processes,  an approach incompatible with his 
later commitment to ‘mechanistic’ psychology, as practised by such 
schools  as  the  behaviourists  (see  Bloomfield  1927:215-216; 
1933:515; cf. Gordon 2006:2582-2583; chapter 2, section 4). He was 
also familiar with the doctrines of logical positivism, and personally 
acquainted with Carnap and his American supporter Charles Morris 
(1901–1979),  with  both  of  whom  he  worked  for  a  period  at  the 
University of Chicago (see Hiz and Swiggers 1990; Tomalin 2004). 
Logical positivism Bloomfield found much more impressive: he even 
produced an invited contribution to the International Encyclopedia of  
Unified Science  on the ‘Linguistic Aspects of Science’ (Bloomfield 
1938). Although he had much to say on topics in linguistic semantics 
(e.g.,  in  Bloomfield  1914;  1933),  Bloomfield  had  an  ambivalent 
relationship to the issue of meaning in language. He recognised the 
central importance of meaning to language, but at the same time he 
saw semantics  as  ‘the  weak  point  in  language-study’ (Bloomfield 
1933:140; cf.  Koerner 1970; Hymes and Fought 1981[1975]).  The 
proper domain of contemporary linguistics, according to Bloomfield, 
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should  be  the  study  of  formal  patterns  in  languages.  Logical 
positivism provided Bloomfield with the framework to conceptualise 
the disciplinary role of linguistics: restricted to the formal aspects of 
language, linguistics could rely on allied fields within unified science 
to  gradually solve the problems of  meaning (see,  e.g.,  Bloomfield 
1933:139-140; 1938:24; 1970[1943]:401).
The inspiration that Noam Chomsky (b. 1928) and his followers 
drew from the logical positivists and other pioneers in the ‘formal 
sciences’  of  mathematics  and  logic  has  also  been  thoroughly 
investigated (e.g., Tomalin 2006). Despite the ‘revolutionary’ rhetoric 
surrounding Chomskyan generative grammar, one very clear line of 
continuity between the generativists and their predecessors has been 
their concentration on the formal aspects of language (see Chomsky 
1957:13; chapter 9 of 1957). But early in his career Chomsky briefly 
flirted with the possibility that  the underlying forms he posited in 
what was at one time dubbed ‘deep structure’ might directly represent 
meanings  (e.g.,  Chomsky  1957:92;  1964[1962]:936;  1965:75-79, 
135-136,  148-160;  1966:33).  This  view became,  in  the 1960s and 
70s,  the  guiding  thesis  of  the  ‘generative  semantics’  movement, 
which sought to discover the putative underlying forms that directly 
represent  meanings.  Chomsky  and  his  loyal  followers  kept  their 
distance  from  such  representational  efforts  and  maintained  the 
independence  of  their  formal  investigations.  After  the  so-called 
‘linguistics  wars’  between  Chomsky’s  camp  and  the  generative 
semanticists, generative semantics as a school eventually faded from 
the academic scene in the 1980s (see Newmeyer 1986[1980]; Harris 
1993;  Huck and Goldsmith 1995; chapter  7 of  Seuren 1998).  The 
latter-day  efforts  of  the  generative  semanticists  to  establish 
scientifically  motivated  isomorphic  notations  for  meaning  may 
represent a reflex of the modernist approaches we have examined in 
this dissertation. Capturing meaning in precise, unambiguous forms 
was  the  overarching  goal  of  all  efforts  from  Russell’s  ‘logically 
perfect  language’ to  the  technocratic  projects  of  the  international 
language movement, including Ogden’s Basic (but these projects of 
course differed considerably in the use they hoped to make of these 
captured  meanings;  see  chapter  2,  sections  4  and  7;  chapter  3, 
sections 2-4). Generative semantics and related approaches may have 
been an independent development that recapitulated the debates of 
the  immediately  preceding  generations,  or  they  may  have  drawn 
inspiration – even if not entirely consciously – from their forebears. 
Further historical research may offer answers to such questions.
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The views of Bloomfield and Chomsky were also demonstrably 
formed by the same social  and political  forces we have witnessed 
acting  in  this  dissertation.  The  current  of  technocratic  benevolent 
control that was at its strongest in the inter-war years – and which 
swept  up  Ogden  and  the  logical  positivists  alike  (see  chapter  3, 
section 9; chapter 4, section 6) – also carried Bloomfield away. In his 
1929 presidential address to the Linguistics Society of America, he 
prophesied a future in which linguistics and the other human sciences 
would contribute to the enlightened control of humanity for its own 
good: 
I believe that in the near future – in the next few generations, 
let  us  say  –  linguistics  will  be  one  of  the  main  sectors  of 
scientific  advance,  and  that  in  this  sector  science  will  win 
through to the understanding and control of human conduct. 
In the domains of physics and biology science has for some 
time been working with success and has given us great power. 
In the domain of anthropology – that is, in the study of man’s 
super-biological activities – science has been unsuccessful. […]
The truth of this contrast and its tragic import appear plainly in 
the fact that our achievements in non-human science do us little 
good,  because  we cannot  understand  or  control  their  human 
consequences. We make powerful engines, but we have no way 
of deciding who is to use them, and we have seen them used for 
our destruction. We can prevent suffering and widen the scope 
of life, but the fruition of these our powers is disturbed by such 
means as the hazards of gambling.
(Bloomfield 1970[1929]:149; quoted partially in Harris 
1993:56)
Chomsky, whose career began in the period of disillusionment after 
the Second World War, reacted to previous scholarship in much the 
same  way  as  Orwell  reacted  to  Basic  and  other  constructed 
languages,  and Kallen to logical  positivism. Chomsky’s attacks on 
behaviourism, the signature psychological  doctrine associated with 
post-Bloomfieldian linguistics, were not simply motivated by a belief 
in their scientific inadequacy, but also by a rejection of their political 
implications (see Harris 1993:55-56; Barsky 1997:80, 99-100). About 
his assault on the behaviourism of Skinner (most notably Chomsky 
1959), Chomsky would later say:
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Now as far as the Skinner thing is concerned […] I just think 
it’s a fraud, there’s nothing there. I  mean, it is empty. It’s an 
interesting fraud. See, I think there are two levels of discussion 
here. One is purely intellectual: What does it amount to? And 
the answer is zero, zilch … […] Now the other question, why 
so much interest in it? And here I think the answer is obvious. I 
mean, the methodology that they are suggesting is known to 
every good prison guard, or police interrogator. But, they make 
it  look benign and scientific,  and so on; they give a kind of 
coating to it, and for that reason it’s very valuable to them. […]
What it does is give a cloak of neutrality to the techniques of 
oppression and control...
(Chomsky 2004[1974]:164-165; emphasis original)
There is no doubt much more to be found out about the influence of 
these  social  and  political  ideas  on  Bloomfield  and  Chomsky’s 
linguistic work in particular, and the wider reception of these ideas in 
the mainstream of twentieth century linguistics.
In  present-day  linguistic  semantics,  the  clearest  historical 
connection to the ideas explored in this dissertation is to be found in 
the various ‘formal’ semantic theories. These grew directly out of the 
logical  tradition established by Frege, Russell,  Carnap,  Tarski,  and 
others,  and only came to be integrated into mainstream linguistics 
after the end of the generative semantics period discussed above (for 
standard historical accounts from practising formal semanticists, see 
Abbott 1999; Partee 2011). But present-day linguistic semantics is a 
hugely diverse field,  of  which formal  approaches represent  only a 
small part (see Riemer 2010; Geeraerts 2010 for recent surveys). One 
outlier in this field that exhibits suggestive similarities to Ogden’s 
Basic, and related modernist approaches to meaning, is the Natural 
Semantic  Metalanguage  (NSM),  associated  chiefly  with  Anna 
Wierzbicka (b. 1938). The core activity of NSM is the definition, or 
‘explication’,  of  word  meanings  using  the  method  of  ‘reductive 
paraphrase’,  which seeks  to  restate  these meanings in  a  form that 
breaks them down into their putative components while retaining the 
original sense (see Wierzbicka 1987:12-13). The explication of the 
word  ‘mother’  below  is  a  typical  example  of  a  current  NSM 
definition:
206
X is Y’s mother. =
(a) at one time, before now, X was very small
(b) at that time, Y was inside X
(c) at that time, Y was like a part of X
(d) because of this, people can think something like this about 
X:
“X wants to do good things for Y
X doesn’t want bad things to happen to Y”
(Wierzbicka 1996:155)
The first line of this explication gives the canonical sentence context 
for  the  word  being  defined,  in  line  with  NSM  practitioners’ 
recognition of the fact that the sense a word carries is governed by 
the  context  in  which  it  is  used  (see  Wierzbicka  1987:8;  Goddard 
1994:23; Goddard:2002:14; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002:42). Parts 
(a) to (c) of the explication, Wierzbicka (1996:154-155) tells us in her 
commentary, deal with the biological side of motherhood, while part 
(d)  addresses  the  ‘social  and  psychological  component’.  In  her 
commentary she also devotes some space to justifying her definition, 
contrasting it to several other lexicographers’ definitions, all of which 
she finds inadequate.
The key assumption driving the NSM program is that  there are 
‘semantic primitives’, a set of meanings or concepts (the two terms 
are used interchangeably in the NSM literature) which all  humans 
possess,  and  out  of  which  all  other,  more  complex  meanings  are 
composed (Wierzbicka 1980:12-13; 1996:9-13). The ultimate goal of 
NSM practitioners  is  to  discover  these  primitive  meanings  which, 
according to their ‘strong lexicalisation hypothesis’, are held to have 
lexical  ‘exponents’ of  one form or  another  in  each of  the world’s 
languages  (Goddard  1994:13;  Wierzbicka  1996:14).  Although 
Wierzbicka (2011:381) recently stated that the inventory of semantic 
primitives may have reached its final form, it continues to fluctuate: it 
currently  contains  65  items,  with  one  further  candidate  under 
consideration (personal communication from Anna Wierzbicka via e-
mail, 1 January 2013).
The treatment of definition as a fundamental device for securing 
understanding  is  a  feature  common  to  both  NSM  and  Ogden’s 
philosophy of language, as expressed in  The Meaning of Meaning 
and as applied in Basic (see chapter 2, section 3; chapter 3, section 6). 
Both NSM and Basic also see the optimal basis for definitions in a 
vocabulary of limited size that contains only the ‘simplest’ words: in 
the case of NSM these are the semantic primitives, and in Basic they 
207
are those listed in the core vocabulary (see chapter 3, section 6). But 
there is a difference in the status accorded to these key words.  In 
NSM  the  primitives  are  taken  to  be  somehow  innate  (see,  for 
example, Wierzbicka 2011:379), while in Basic they are merely the 
words ‘scientifically selected’ for their practical utility in formulating 
definitions (see chapter 3, section 6). This difference in status most 
probably results from their different attitudes to analysis: Wierzbicka 
is  strongly committed  to  decompositional,  or  ‘reductive’,  analysis, 
whereas Ogden preferred transformative analysis in cases where it 
was more expedient (see chapter 4, section 3 for discussion of this 
contrast).  Wierzbicka’s  claims  for  innateness  stem  also  from  the 
rationalist  turn  in  post-1960s linguistics,  about  which we will  say 
more below. 
Between Ogden and Wierzbicka there is also a deep divide over 
the way the universal vocabulary is realised. For Ogden the actual 
Basic  word  forms  were  the  units  that  constituted  the  universal 
vocabulary,  but  for  Wierzbicka  the  word  forms  are  merely  the 
‘exponents’ of the semantic primitives. Each language of the world is 
taken to have its own list of exponents, but each item in these lists 
corresponds to exactly one primitive, and the items are isomorphic 
with their equivalents across the lists (see, for example, Wierzbicka 
1996:22-23).  Unlike  Ogden,  who  recommended  English  for  the 
world, Wierzbicka and her followers engage in considerable cross-
cultural  research  in  an  effort  to  discover  the  putative  universal 
meanings  and  their  exponents  in  a  geographically,  culturally  and 
typologically diverse range of languages (Goddard and Wierzbicka 
2002 is representative of this work).
But  the  NSM  emphasis  on  finding  lexical  exponents  betrays 
another similarity with Basic, the notion that words are the heart of 
language (see chapter 3, section 7). In recent years, there has been 
work with the NSM program on elaborating the ‘universal syntax’ of 
the semantic primitives, but this consists mainly in dividing them into 
classes  based  on  their  possibilities  of  combination  with  other 
primitives (see chapter 3 of Wierzbicka 1996), coupled with several 
‘powerful  iconic and indexical  mechanisms’ for  representing these 
connections (ibid.:146). Underlying this approach would seem to be 
the  same  assumption  that  was  held  by  the  technocratic  language 
constructors,  who  sought  completely  ‘analytic’  grammars  that 
transparently showed the interrelation of the ideas behind words (see 
chapter 3, section 4). However, in actual NSM explications, which 
are  rendered using  the  exponents  of  primitives  in  a  given natural 
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language, the structure of clauses and inflection of words follows the 
dictates  of  the  natural  language  used  (Goddard  2002:31-32;  cf. 
Wierzbicka  1996:26-27).  Again  we  are  reminded  of  Basic,  where 
Ogden strove to meet the demands of ‘universal grammar’, but still 
deferred in practice to the strictures of English. This comparison is 
not  straightforward,  however.  NSM  has  at  least  two  levels,  the 
abstract  level  of  the  primitives  and  the  surface  level  of  their 
realisation in natural languages. The ‘universal syntax’ is a feature of 
the abstract level, while the idiomatic forms of explications exist at 
the  surface  level.  Basic,  on  the  other  hand,  has  only  the  surface 
forms, which Ogden was coaxing towards ‘universal grammar’.
The similarities between NSM and Basic and its allies extend to 
some  aspects  of  the  discourse  they  are  couched  in.  In  all  these 
projects there is an insistence on the need for an intuitive, common-
sense approach to the representation of meaning. We have seen this 
quite clearly in Basic,  as well  as in Neurath’s Isotype project (see 
chapter  4,  sections  3-4).  In  similar  fashion,  Wierzbicka  is  highly 
critical  of  the  technical  and  remote-sounding  metalanguages 
employed in many other semantic theories. Despite their commitment 
to the rationalist notion of innate semantic primitives, Wierzbicka and 
her followers constantly emphasise the empirical character of their 
undertaking. Their explications, they claim, can be ‘verified’ by being 
tested against native speaker intuitions. The further development of 
NSM is a matter of refining inadequate explications and the list of 
primitives  used  in  them (these  ideas  permeate  NSM,  but  see,  for 
example, Wierzbicka 1980:17-18, 23; Wierzbicka 1987:2; 1988:11-
12;  1996:217;  Goddard  1994:10-12).  This  conception  of  scientific 
progress through gradual refinement might remind us of Neurath’s 
notion of the ‘universal jargon’ (see chapter 4, section 3), although 
the similarity is at such a generic level that no definite links can be 
postulated. Gradualism in present-day lay philosophy of science is in 
any case a commonplace, and has most probably achieved this status 
not through Neurath’s efforts but those of his rival Popper (cf. chapter 
4, section 6). It would therefore probably be unreasonable to seek a 
direct connection from Neurath to NSM in this area.
NSM seems as yet to have attracted no secondary historiographic 
commentary; the present historiography of NSM consists mostly of 
Wierzbicka’s  own  pronouncements.  By  her  account,  the  idea  of 
searching for semantic primitives was first suggested to her in a 1964 
lecture  on  Leibniz’  characteristica  universalis  and  related 
seventeenth-century  projects,  which  was  given  in  Warsaw  by  her 
209
teacher  Andrzej  Bogusławski (b.  1931;  Wierzbicka  1992:216-218; 
1996:11-13).90 Wierzbicka and her supporters see their project as a 
continuation of Leibniz’ work (as portrayed in Couturat 1901; 1903, 
among  other  places;  cf.  chapter  3,  section  2),  but  now  made 
achievable because of their empirical, scientific methodology rather 
than Leibniz’ reliance on philosophical speculation (loc. cit.). More 
recent  antecedents,  such  as  those  we  have  explored  in  this 
dissertation, are not unknown to Wierzbicka: she cites, in her various 
writings, such figures as Carnap, Ogden, Peirce, Russell, and both the 
early and late Wittgenstein. But her citations tend to deal only with 
particular,  isolated  points;  she  never  tries  to  engage  with  their 
systems of thought as wholes. In linguistics, such leaps back into the 
Enlightenment  and  disregard  of  the  immediately  preceding 
generation represent a common strategy, embodied most saliently in 
Chomsky (1966). Just as recent historiographic work on generative 
grammar  has  uncovered  the  continuities  that  exist  between  it  and 
immediately preceding schools (see the references above), a thorough 
historiographic investigation into  NSM may reveal  solid  historical 
threads binding the compelling commonalities between it, Basic and 
seemingly related approaches.
90 Wierzbicka (1992) gives the year 1964, while Wierzbicka (1996) has 1965. She has indicated 
that the correct year is 1964 (personal communication via e-mail, 1 January 2013).
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